ML20012E775

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Notice of Violation from Insp on 891228-900108.Violation Noted:On 891120,operators Failed to Establish Secondary Containment Integrity within 12 H After Emergency Equipment Svc Water Pumps & ECCS Rendered Inoperable
ML20012E775
Person / Time
Site: Fermi 
Issue date: 03/23/1990
From: Greenman E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20012E774 List:
References
50-341-90-02, 50-341-90-2, NUDOCS 9004060281
Download: ML20012E775 (2)


Text

e

~

3.

?.

I t

NOTICE OF VIOLATION j

4 The Detroit Edison Company Docket No. 50-341 As a result of the inspection conducted from December 28, 1989 through.

January 8, 1990, and in accordance with the " General Policy and Procedures i

for NRC Enforcement Actions" (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), the following j

violation was. identified:

Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires two independent Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) subsystems to be operabie in modes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Inclusive in the definition of an operable EECW subsystem is the ability of the EECW pump associated with that subsystem to automatically start on an automatic l

actuation signal as discussed in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.b.

Technical Specification 3.7.1.3 requires two independent Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) subsystems to be operable in modes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Inclusive in the definition of an operable EESW subsystem is the ability of t

the EESW pump associated with that subsystem to automatically start on an automatic actuation signal as discussed in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.3.b.

i The Technical Specification action statements associated with 3.7.1.2 and 3.7.1.3 require in part that'the action associated with Technical Specification 3.5.2 be taken as applicable.

[

Technical Specification 3.5.2. requires two subsystems of emergency core cooling be operable in cold shutdown (mode 4) and under action statement "b" secondary containment integrity must be established within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of loss of both subsystems.

Te:hnical Specification 6.8.1.d states " Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment."

Contrary to the above on November 20, 1989, while in cold shutdown plant operators failed to establish secondary containment integrity within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after all EECW, EESW and consequently all Emergency Core Cooling Systems were rendered inoperable by the performance of two 480 VAC load shed surveillance l

tests in that the surveillance procedures established for this test activity I

did not direct restoration of the EECW and EESW pump breakers closing circuits to accept all the automatic initiation signals.

]

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1),

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this i

L office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or l

l explanation in reply, including for each violation:

(1) corrective action l

l l'

9004060281 90

{DR ADOCKODNh4g PDC g.

1 l

L

f: ~

.]

e L.

(

'C' 4-i a

h4 Notice of Violation 2

l l

l taken and the.results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid I

'further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

Consideration may be given to extending your response time.for good cause 1'

shown.

i f

(

ggg g 3 g M

a n =n '.

Dated Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects E

1

j e

i 1

e 2

9 U

j

't.

t

.