ML20012D508
| ML20012D508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1990 |
| From: | Graves D, Pellet J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012D507 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-OL-90-01, 50-458-OL-90-1, NUDOCS 9003270431 | |
| Download: ML20012D508 (10) | |
Text
/{-Niyp. g s.
i I
.i[
9 t'-
l
%1 APPENDIX w
U. S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY' COMMISSION' 1
REGION'IV i
l
' Q, -
P 0perator: Licensing Examination Report: 50-458/0L 90-01 4
,f
'Oper6 ting License:- NPF-47 o,'
Docket No: 50-458
~'
Licensee: Gulf States: Utilities e
P. 0. Box 2951 z-Y
- Beaumont, Texas 77704--
4 Facility;Name:.'RiverBendStation(RBS)'
(
l LExaminations at: River Bend Station v
~
' danuary 29 - February 8,1990 i
Examii1ations Conducted:
Chief Examiner:
// i Moh l
E. N. Graves, Examiner Date Operator Licensing Section
- Division of eacto afety h
- -
ApprovedLby-
/
AM A
3 // 9d
<h,' Op rat (or Licensing Section
. L JeTiet, Chief D a'te' i g+
Division of Reactor Safety s
'1
~
L Summary:
+
s' i
LNRCLadministered requalification examinations to ten senior reactor operators il
' passed all-portionst of their examinations. One.SRO: failed the simulator p
. portion:of: the examination.. Five crews were evaluated and-found to be' satisfactory.- The requalification program was determined to be. satisfactory.
l'
'During:the examinations,. health physics practices by operators were observed to l
be inconsistent.. Also, emergency operating procedure enclosures,..which required the-placement of jumpers and the removal of relays, were noted 1.o be difficult
.to accomplish successfully.
+
l'.$
l' i-n 9003270431 900316 D
PDR ADOCK 05000458 il V
m
- j%/
&J
[m g-.
f f
. DETAILS 1..
PERSONS EXAMINED CREW SRO RO-Requalification-Examinations:
Pass-S 9
.10
-(NRCGrading)
Fail - 0 1
0
-2.
-EXAMINERS-D. N. Graves, Chief-Examiner J. M. Keeton.
l
>i
'K. M. Kennedy J. J. Muth J. L. Pellet-
'3.
EXAMINATION REPORT-LPerformance results for, individual examinees are not included-in this report as
~
-it will-be placed in the:NRC Public Document Room, and. these results are not:
c subjectsto public. disclosure.-
' 3.1; Examination Material Development I
<The licensee submitted the requested examination items in late November, 1989.:
- This submittal included a'pproximately 500 open reference written examination
- items,75:jobEperformance. measures (JPMs),15 dynamic simulator. scenarios, and j
1a.sampleiplan for constructing the examination. A review of this material
- determined that while.the material was satisfactory'from a requa.lification program evaluation standpoint :a-number of deficiencies existed, which are listed below. Facility representatives.were. informed of these' deficiencies as the review was performed.
3;1.1 : Written Examination Item Construction A number'of the written examination items did not meet.the guidelines in NUREG-1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," Examiner Standard ES-601,.
, pertaining to open reference question development. Examples of deficiencies ~
inoted included questions ~ that were direct lookup questions such that-the operator was' led to the answer or reference with no synthesis or analysis of information required, double jeopardy questions, and excessive wording in the
,e
' question' stem that added little'or no information needed to answer the question but may have tended to confuse the examinee or use a significant amount of examination time to read.
I
~m.
a g
_4 N
wh g
~
J 1
3.1.2 ' Job' Performance Measure Question Construction
-)
Many-questions'on the JPMs had the same deficiencies noted above and had to be.
reworded or replaced. These questions;sre to be written to the same-construction-standards as the written examination. items.
3.1.3'~ Job Performance Measure Critical. Step Identification Critical steps were' not identified. correctly on.the JPMs. Several JPMs had steps that should have been critical but were not identified as critical-as well as steps identified as critical that should not have been.
3.1.4 Question Importance Several of the questions had Knowledge and Ability Catalog (NUREG-1123) (KA)
L ratings of less than the 3.0 minimum value required by ES-601 of NUREG-1021.
~
3.1.5 Job Performance Measure Cue Construction Several JPMs were lacking necessary cues.
-i 3.1.6 Individual Simulator' Critical Task Identification Simulator scenarios for the dynamic simulator portion of the examination did y
nothaveindividualsimulatorcriticaltasks(ISCTs)properlyidentified.
(
3.1.7 : Dynamic Simulator Scenario Event Inclusion.
The scenarios contained normal evolutions, such as surveillance tests, to be evaluated when those tasks would'be better suited for JPMs.--
3.2. Examination Development-The facility was encouraged to. assemble and-propose written examinations, walkthrough examinations utilizing JPMs, and dynamic sinolator examinations
-from the material submitted to NRC. The facility examination team members were
. brought under. examination security at this time.
U Examinations:were assembled and submitted to NRC 4 weeks prior to the scheduled exam date. Examinations were scheduled to take place the weeks of January 29 (eight operators) and February 5 (twelve operators).
Enough examinations to
. accomplish 2 weeks of examinations were submitted and compared to the sample 2 plan for proper coverage. The sample plan review determined that examination topic coverage was satisfactory.
During the weeks of January 8 and 15, NRC examination team members visited the site to review the items selected for use in detail and finalize the examinations. All written examination items were reviewed and modified as necessary to comply with NUREG-1021 requirements regarding item construction.
= -- :--
r s
i k
L i
['
-4 1
All scheduled JPMs were reviewed and performed with a facility representative.
r Differences in identification of critical steps were resolved, and the
+
questions associated with the JPMs were modified.or. replaced as necessary to comply with NUREG-1021. During the performance of JPMs requiring tools, it was i
noted that the tools were not always available.. This was corrected by the-Operations Supervisor prior to examination administration.
A lengthy discussion concerning the methodology used in determining which steps in the dynamic simulator scenarios should be identified as ISCTs resulted in modifying the scenarios. Routine surveillance tests were removed from the scenarios, and agreement was reached on which steps should be identified as t
ISCTs.. By the end of the week of January 15, the examinations were essentially finalized with some minor corrections still to be made.
This detailed review of the examinations to be administered indicated that many of the deficiencies noted in Section 3.1 of this report were found throughout the material. While test item concept and content were generally good, many minor deficiencies existed in item construction. The training staff was
. receptive to NRC. comments and identified deficiencies were corrected accordingly..
The operations representative on the examination team was the operations
-supervisor. While this demonstrated a high. level of management interest and involvement in the examination process, it did create some problems. :He did not appear to be involved in the development of the proposed examinations.
It appeared that this was-left entirely up to the training staff. Many changes T
~
L were made to the examination items as a result of his. review and input. While L
'his review.and input were very helpful:during the examination review,1this should have been_ accomplished prior to the examinations being submitted to NRC.
Hefoccasionally would be. called away from the examination review to attend to matters-dealing.with his operations supervisor responsibilities. The operations representative assigned to the team should have no other duties
'~
while a member of the examination team during examination development-and should.be relieved of all other responsibilities when the draft examinations
+
are' prepared for submittal to NRC.
3.3 Examination Administration 3.3.1--Written Examinations On January 29, written examinations were administered to eight examinees (four R0sandfourSR0s). The written examinations were copied, graded, and reviewed by NRC following completion by the examinees.
Facility evaluators graded their copies of the examinations concurrently with NRC grading. Comparison of NRC grading with facility grading indicated 100 percent agreement with all eight
. examinees passing the written examination.
=
=
l
E X
q On February 5, written examinations were administered to twelve examinees (six.
.R0s and six SR0s). The examinations were copied, graded, and reviewed-following completion by the examinees as in week one. The facility failed one RO. NRC passed all examinees.
3.3.2 Dynamic Simulator Examinations 4
- On January 30, the dynamic' simulator examinations were administered for eight
.individualsL(twocrews). The facility evaluators failed one RO while the NRC evaluators passed all examinees. All crews passed. During the facility critiques between scenarios, facility evaluators were cuing examinees where performance weaknesses were observed. This caused the examinees to change i,
their performance during subsequent scenarios such that a true evaluation of the' examinees' as-found abilities could only be made from the first scenario administered during the examination. Facility evaluators indicated that ES-601 had been interpreted. to require this feedback between scenarios. The facility evaluators were informed that this was not the case and they stopped providing performance cues during the examination.
5
-On February 6, the dynamic simulator portion of the examination was administered to twelve individuals (three crews). All crews passed. NRC failed one SR0 while the facility evaluators did not fail any individuals. For facilitycrequalification purposes, this individual must be considered to have failed his annual'requalification operating test.
i 3 '. 3. 3 Job Performance Measure Examinations On January 31 and February 1. the walkthrough portion of the examination was administered to eight examinees. Five JPMs were common and performed' by all a
eight examinees. Each examinee performed a total of ten JPMs. All eight passed this portion of their examination and there was no disagreement between-i l
NRC and' facility results.
t On February 7 and 8, the walkthrough portion of the examination was
-administered to twelve examinees, again with five common JPMs. All twelve individuals passed this portion of their examination and there was no H
disagreement between facility and NRC results.
l 3.3.4 ' Observed Operator Performance t
-3.3.4.1 Crew Communications L
Crew communications were acceptable but weaknesses were observed. Examples of poor communications observed included information or orders given with no repeat-back or acknowledgement of receipt or understanding, and SR0s conferring in private-and failing to inform the remainder of the crew of plant conditions, status, or anticipated course of action.
1 I
I' b,.
s.
c k
r
-6,
P.
3.3.4.2.. Emergency Event' Classification Operators had-difficulty using the Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIP 001) to properly classify events. A classification error was the cause for the NRC failure ofithe SR0 on the dynamic simulator examination, y
3.3.4.3-Reactor Operator Use of Reference Material Use'of the logic drawings by R0s was weak.. On several occasions, operators answered a JPM question and then referred to the logic drawings to verify their
' answer, Once referring to the logic drawings, they could neither confirm nor refute. their initial answer, either because of an inability to find the appropriate drawing, or an inability to understand it once found.
3.3.4.4 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
E0P enclosures requiring the use of relay jumpers were found to be difficult to perform for several reasons.
o
.The location of the required relays was often in very confined spaces, with physical obstructions that would require working by touch.
o Relay labelling was often very difficult to read, and there was no i
special marking for relays identified in the E0P enclosure.
o Use of alligator clips for placing jumpers on relay terminal screws can
.i be very unreliable.
.i Lo' E0P enclosure steps contained a mixture of action statements and.
information notes with no visual-differentiation. Enclosure step.
sequences. appeared to create a pattern _of actions and notes such that a-performance step was missed when the pattern changed.
3.3.4.5 Health Physics Practices q
' Health Physics practices by observed personnel in the following areas were not consistent.
r.
o When exiting the containment, it was not clear whether it was required to
~,
frisk hand-held items. Some individuals did while others did not.
,o When exiting containment, many individuals were' alarming the PCM-1B monitor, presumably as a result of radioactive gasiin the containment. A sign posted at' the monitor stated to notify health physics if the PCM-1B alarms. Very few-individuals observed notified health physics.
It was presumed the alarms were because of gas attached to clothing and the L
observed action was to wait a period of time and attempt to count through the monitor satisfactorily. One individual did not wait until clearing
+
b the monitor to leave the area.
l'
o' 1 o-A PCM-1B was indicating " Contaminated Detector," and " Ready." None of the individuals who encountered this condition knew what this meant and proceeded to. count through the monitor prior to calling health physics, o
When exiting the radiation control area (RCA) through the fuel building, personnel were not consistent in frisking hand-held items. Several
-individuals would not have frisked the items had they not been questioned.
o More than one individual entered the RCA to perform a specified task without reviewing the radiation and contamination survey maps. During the examination, one individual who.did not review the survey maps stated that he had not entered the RCA in an extended time, i
o Several individuals, when encountering a radiation posting stating
Notify Health Physics Prior to Entry," entered the area without notifying health physics. One individual entered the area and notified Health Physics after exiting the area.
3.3.5 ~0bserved Facility Evaluator Performance All facility evaluators were determined to be satisfactory. Minor instances of improper evaluator practices or techniques were observed and listed below.
When observed, these items were identified to the facility evaluator and were L
corrected.
In no case did such weaknesses significantly affect the evaluation L
of the task, o
When an incorrect answer was given to a JPM question, the evaluator asked an additional question that prompted the examinee to the correct answer.
L o
Evaluators allowed verification steps during JPM performance to be totally verbal with no indication from the examinee that he/she knew how or where to make the' verification.
o An evaluator allowed the examinee to utilize another operator's knowledge l
to locate a valve when the examinee could not find it. The examinee was L
given credit for satisfactorily performing the step by the facility evaluator, o
Evaluators did not always use the cues provided in the JPM. This did not affect JPM performance but tended to make the examinee perform more of the referenced procedure than necessary. This was especially true for initial and terminating cues.
o Examinees had difficulty remembering the scope of the assigned task and initial conditions of the task because the assignment was entirely verbal.
=
, =
j',
.o L
. y
. o.
Too much emphasis was placed on completion of the JPMs within twice the validated time. As long as satisfactory progress is being made toward, completion of the task; the time may exceed twice the validated time, o
Evaluators occasionally asked extraneous questions during performance of the JPMs or asked for information beyond the scope of the original.
question.
o Evaluators need to clarify questions as to whether they apply to the situation addressed in the JPM's initial conditions or is applicable to the system or task regardless of conditions.
3.4 Site Visit Summary NRC met with facility licensee staff to provide requalification program evaluation and individual examinee results. The licensee training department staff were informed of the comments and observations noted above during preparation and administration of the examinations prior to the exit meeting.
The exit meeting-was held on February 9,1990, at the River Bend site. The following personnel were present:
NRC GSU i
D. N. Graves D. L. Andrews J. P. Jaudon J. W. Cook l
J. M. Keeton T. C. Crouse K. M. Kennedy W. S. Day i
D. J. Lange J. C. Deddens J. J. Muth J. R. Hamilton J. L. Pellet R. N. Jackson-o G. R. Kimmell W. H. Odell T. F. Plunkett J. P. Schippert K. E. Suhrke J. E. Venable R. G. West-NRC opened the meeting by stating that the purpose of the visit was to evaluate the River Bend Station licensed operator requalification program while administering examinations required for renewal of-licensed operators. The NRC introduced team members and thanked the facility for the support received from the training and operations staff during the development and administration of these examinations. The training staff had been previously briefed with the details included in this report regarding the performance of i
operators and evaluators. The following observations were for information only j
l
- and required no response as a result of being brought up at this meeting. Any J
L item requiring action or a response would be included in the final report and L
letter.
]
i 4.
p
1
.9 c
NRC then proceeded to address the following topics:
o Based on the NRC examination team's observation during the examinations, River Bend Station has a satisfactory requalification program.
o Twenty individuals were examined. On the basis of NRC grading, one individual failed the dynamic-simulator portion of the examination.
Because the requalification program is satisfactory, the facility may remediate and retest the failing individual and return him to licensed duties in accordance with the facility program. NRC will reexamine the-individual within'6 months of his failure for license renewal purposes.
o Operators had difficulty using the emergency implementing procedures to classify events properly. This accounted for the SRO failure on the simulator portion of the examination.
o The emergency operating procedure enclosures are difficult to perform and 4
may be more difficult under accident conditions, o
Health physics practices by observed personnel were inconsistent.
o All facility evaluators were determined to be satisfactory. Overall examination results were within the required 90 percent pass /fai1 agreement required by NUREG-1021 for a satisfactory program.
L o
The material submitted to NRC for examination preparation was better than minimally acceptable but NRC would expect to see improvements such that-during the next set of requalification examinations, less NRC involvement would be necessary in material review and revision. While the current level of material development required a significant effort on the facility's part, the level of effort should not be reduced. The examination bank should be a living document requiring continuous attention and revision, o
The individuals assigned to the examination team, especially from operations, should be assigned and dedicated earlier than 3 weeks prior to the first scheduled examination date.
NRC closed the meeting by recognizing the effort put forth by the facility staff and reiterated the importance of continuing to improve the examination
-material.
3.5 Simulation Facility Fidelity Report All items on the attached Simulation Facility Fidelity Report have been brought to the attention of the facility for corrective action as appropriate.
v;
.cy
,y b
\\?
SIMULATION FACILITY FIDELITY. REPORT u
Facility Licensee: Gulf States Utilities
[
Facility Docket Number: 50-458 Facility License Number: tiPF-47 Operating Tests Administered at: River Bend Station Operating Tests Administered: January 29 - February 8,'1990
-During the. conduct of the simulator portion of the operating examinations identified above, the following apparent performance and/or human factors
' discrepancies were observed:-
1.
When attempting to shift recirculation pumps to fast speed from slow speed, the 3A and 5A breakers did not-close. The " start" pushbutton must be held a
depressed much longer in the simulator (3 to 4 seconds) than in the plant
.to effect the transfer.
2.
When attempting to start a recirculation pump in slow speed, the LFMG breaker, 1A, did not close. The SA breaker did not open, nor did the 2A breaker close. This was a0ain a result of the start switch having to be 1,~
held depressed much longer in the simulator than in the plant.
I i
L b
1:'
t.i i
e