:on 891213,approx 99 Snubbers Determined Not to Have Been Functionally Tested Before Installation.Caused by Inadequate Procedures Re post-mod Testing.Procedure Will Be Revised| ML20011E232 |
| Person / Time |
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| Site: |
Browns Ferry  |
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| Issue date: |
01/29/1990 |
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| From: |
Lalor M TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML20011E231 |
List: |
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| References |
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| LER-90-001, LER-90-1, NUDOCS 9002120180 |
| Download: ML20011E232 (4) |
|
text
NRC hrm 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-87)
Eapires 4/30/93 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (IER)
FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2)lJAGE(3)
_BRQWES FERRY VNIT 1
!Q15]MalaLullal11QfLtLe TITLE (4)
JHil6LLATION CT NDulujhBIES WITHOUT FUNCTIONAL T111LtN_DE_ID_UNCIER_l' REC.EDURES EVENT DAY (5) l LER NU@ER_(6) l REPORT DATE (7) l OTHER FACILITIES INVOL RQJ 8)
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l l l$EQUENTIALl l REVISION l l
l l FACILITY NAMES lDOCKETNUMBER($)
t!QNitij QM jYEAR lYEAR l l NUMBER l l NUMBER lhQNTHI DAY lYEA.R_J BROWNS FERRY UNIT 2 latilattitlMELQ l
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112l1[3181919101 1010l1l l 0 LQ_Lal 112191910.llROWNS FERRY UNIT 3 101510ldtlu2L5 OPERATING l lTHl$REPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR$:
MODE l LJCheckoneormoreofthefollcwing)(11)
(9)
IN I l20.402(b) l_l20.405(c) l_l50.73(a)(2)(lv) l_l73.71(b)
POWER l Ll20.405(a)(1)(1) l_l50.36(c)(1)
Ll50.73(a)(2)(v)
Ll73.71(c)
LEVEL l Ll20.405(a)(1)(li) l_l50.36(c)(2) l_l50.73(a)(2)(vil) lJLl0THER (Specify in (1QLLQLaLeLl20.405(a)(1)(iii) Ll50.73(a)(2)(i)
Ll50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A)l Abstract below and in Ll20.405(a)(1)(iv) l_l50.73(a)(2)(ll) l_l50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) l Text, NRC Form 366A) l_j 21405( a)( 1 )(v)
I 150.73(a)(2)(ill) l 150.73(aM2)(x) l Volunts.Ey_ Report LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME l
TELEPHONE NUMBER lAREACODEl Jikhael Lalor. Com_p]Jance Licensino Engineer l210l5l71219l-l2[017l1 IQMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l l
l l REPORTABLE l l
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- - l REPORTABLE l CAUitlSYSIItil_CDtLPQHENT lHANUFACTURER[ TO NPRDS l lCAUSElSYSTEMICOMEQMENTlHANUFACTURERlTONPRDSI I
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l YES ((f_ves, complete EXPECTEQ_.10BMISSION DATE) l X l NO l DATE (15) l l l l l l
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fif teen single-space typewritten-lines) (16)
As a result of a review on December 13, 1989, approximately 99 mechanical snubbers were determined not to have been functionally tested before their installation. These snubbers were installed on units 1, 2, and 3 systems between 1982 and 1985.
i The cause of this event was procedures that did not clearly specify the post-modification testing required for new snubbers. When it was identified that a functional test was not specified as a postmodification test by the design changes for the new snubbers, there was uncertainty whether preservice test requirements were met.
l Additionally, Browns Ferry Technical Specifications do not require functional testing of new snubbers before their installation.
A voluntary report is submitted since the possibility of installing inoperable snubbers as the result of not performing functional testing at other plants could have significant consequences.
Although there are no regulatory, code, or site administrative requirements to functionally test mechanical snubbers before their installation, TVA considers it to be l
a good practice. The applicable site procedure will be revised to require functional testing of snubbers before their installation. A ten percent representative sample of i.
the 33 unit 2 new mechanical snubbers has been functionally tested and determined to l
have been capable of performing their intended function. The remaining unit 1, 2, l.
and 3 new mechanical snubbers that were not functionally tested have been placed into l.
the population of existing snubbers for ongoing functional testing in accordance with l
the Technical Specification Inservice Inspection Requirements.
NRC Form 366(6-89) 9002120180 900129 PDR ADOCK 05000259 L
.S PDC
i NRC F;rm'366A U.S. NUCtEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N Apprsved OHD Ho. 3150-0104
- % (6-89),
Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (tER)
TEXT CONTINUA 110N FACit!TY NAME (1) lDOCKETNMER(2)1 LER NUMBER (6) l l
PAGE (3) l l
l l$EQUENTIAtl l REVISION l l l l l l
LEAR _l l NUMDER l l NUMBER-l l l l l 3ROWL[LRRY UNIT 1 10.l$jdQ}QLdjL9L9LDj-l 010 l 1 l--l 010 1012l0fLDJ 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)
' DESCRIIIl0N OF EVEliI As a result of a review on December 13, 1989, approximately 99 mechanical snubbers in units 1, 2 and 3 were determined not to have been functionally tested before their installation. These snubbers were installed between 1982 and 1985 on systems including core spray [BG), residual heat removal (B0],
reactor core isolation cooling [BN), high-pressure coolant injection [BJ), and main steam-.[SB] systems.
The postmodification testing specified by the design changes for these snubbers was a visual inspection in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 'AGME),
Section XI.
Upon discovery of the event, a review of the regulatory, code, and site administrative documents was initiated to determine the proper postmodification testing requirements. These snubbers were considered to be new snubbers, rather than replacements, in that they'had not been previously placed in service and
- - were additions to the existing systems. Postmodification testing of new snubbers is required to be consistent with the applicable industry code and does not require functional testing before placing new snubbers into service. The applicable industry code for postmodification testing of snubbers is ASME Section XI, which requires only a visual inspection of new mechanical snubbers.
Consequently, there are no code or plant administrative requirements to functionally test new mechanical snubbers before their installation.
Additionally, the Browns Ferry Technical Specifications do not require functional testing before placing new snubbers into service.
The event was reviewed for reportability determination in accordance with site procedures. A review of the event by the Shif t Technical Advisor determined that the event could be conservatively interpreted-to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(1), and an four-hour, nonemergency i
notification was made to NRC on December 29, 1989. TVA has subsequently determined that the event is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 since the technical specifications do not require functional testing of new mechanical snubbers before their installation.
A voluntary report is submitted since the possibility of installing inoperable snubbers as the result of not performing functional testing at other plants could have significant consequences.
At the time the event was discovered, units 1 and 3 were defueled, and unit 2 was in cold shutdown with fuel in the reactor vessel and the head removed.
HRC form 366(6-89)
a NRC [cre 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0HHIS$10N Approved OHB N). 3150-0104 A
(6289)
Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CON 11HUAT10N FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2)l LQfMQ_(h) l l__[3GE t 3) l l
l l$EQUENTIALl l REVISION l l l l l l
1YialLL L_HMER l [JMLL{ l l l l BROWNS FIRRY _Utili 1
- - It[MMdal 2l $! 91 91 01--l 0 1 0 1 1 l-l 0 1 0 l O! 3!nLL1! 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17)
CAUSL.0F EVENT The cause of this event was procedures that did not clearly specify the postmodification testing required for new snubbers. When it was identified that a functional test was not specified as a postmodification test by the design h
changes for the new snubbers, there was uncertainty whether preservice test requirements were met.
ANALYS_IS OF EVENT Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestricted pipe or component motion under dynamic loads resulting from an earthquake or severe transient, but allow for normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown.
Performance of preopera-Lional testing establishes the operability of the snubber before placing it in service. Not performing adequate testing could result in the installation of an inoperable snubber. Operation with an_ inoperable snubber (s) would result in an increase'in the probability of structural damage to piping or components.
Ilowever, the new mechanical snubbers were determined to be capable of performing their intended function based on the required visual testing of each snubber performed at installation and the successful functional tests of a ten percent representative sample of the 33 unit 2 new mechanical snubbers. Therefore, this event had no potential safety significance.
~
CQRRECTIVE ACTIONS _
Upon discovery of the event, a review was initiated to determine the proper postmodification testing requirements.
It was determined that there are no regulatory, code, or plant administrative requirement to functionally test new snubbers before_their installation. The current site procedure regarding postmodification testing was revised before the discovery of this event to recommend such testing. This procedure will be revised to require functional testing _of new snubbers before their installation.
A ten percent representative sample of the 33 unit 2 new mechanical snubbers has been functionally tested and determined to have been capable of performing their intende'd function. The remaining unit 1, 2, and 3 mechanical snubbers that were not functionally tested have been placed into the population of existing snubbers for ongoing functional testing in accordance with the Technical Specification Inservice Inspection Requiremente.
NRC Form 366(6-89)
- h t F;rm 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N Appr:ved OHB No. 3150-0104 y. c. (649)
Explrss 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION IACitITY NAME (1)
!DOCKETNUHDER(2)j LLlLilyMBER (6) I I
PAGE_J3)._ ___
l l
l l$EQUENTIALl l REVISION l l l l l l
jlE&lLl_ L HUMBER l I Hutt!E]Ll. l l l l
_HOWNS_f1RRY_ UNIT 1 lDl$j0jQjQl 2l_51911Ln1-I o I o I i 1 1 o I o-I 01 dintta! 4 TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)
EREY.1.0US SIti1MILEVIliTS LER 260/87007,R1 discusses an event due to the failure to specify postmodification testing in the design change.
That event involved the inability of the drywell control air primary containment isolation valves-to close on the loss of motive air. The corrective actions for that cause included administrative programs to ensure design changes specify postmodification testing and are reviewed by cognizant personnel. Although functionally testing
[
the valves to close on the loss of motive air is currently addressed by the Browns Ferry Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements, the valves were not addressed by the technical specifications at the time of that event.
The programmatic corrective actions taken in the previous similar event were implemented after the snubber design changes associated with this event were i
issued.
COMtilIMENI The site procedure regarding postmodification testing will be revised by March 30, 1990,- to require funcitonal testing of new snubbers before their installation.
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" Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
1 HRC form 366(6-89) l
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| 05000296/LER-1990-001-03, :on 900126,reactor Protection Sys Bus 3A Deenergized Resulting in Actuation of Plant Esfs.Caused by Voltage Transient & Inadequate Design of Setpoints for Circuit Protectors.Bus 3A Realigned |
- on 900126,reactor Protection Sys Bus 3A Deenergized Resulting in Actuation of Plant Esfs.Caused by Voltage Transient & Inadequate Design of Setpoints for Circuit Protectors.Bus 3A Realigned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000260/LER-1990-001-04, :on 900320,radiation Monitor on Refuel Zone Ventilation Exhaust Received High Radiation Trip Signal, Resulting in ESF Actuations.Caused by Loose Connector Pin on Radiation Detector.Detector Replaced |
- on 900320,radiation Monitor on Refuel Zone Ventilation Exhaust Received High Radiation Trip Signal, Resulting in ESF Actuations.Caused by Loose Connector Pin on Radiation Detector.Detector Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-001, :on 891213,approx 99 Snubbers Determined Not to Have Been Functionally Tested Before Installation.Caused by Inadequate Procedures Re post-mod Testing.Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 891213,approx 99 Snubbers Determined Not to Have Been Functionally Tested Before Installation.Caused by Inadequate Procedures Re post-mod Testing.Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1990-002, :on 900124,while Performing Manual Transfer of Power Supplies for 480-volt Shutdown Board,Alternate Power Supply Failed to Close,Resulting in ESF Actuations.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Instructions Revised |
- on 900124,while Performing Manual Transfer of Power Supplies for 480-volt Shutdown Board,Alternate Power Supply Failed to Close,Resulting in ESF Actuations.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Instructions Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1990-002-04, :on 900329,full Actuation of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred During Testing of Scram Discharge Instrument Vol Level Switches.On 900328,east Control Rod Drive Alarm Received.Cause Not Determined.Test Stopped |
- on 900329,full Actuation of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred During Testing of Scram Discharge Instrument Vol Level Switches.On 900328,east Control Rod Drive Alarm Received.Cause Not Determined.Test Stopped
| | | 05000296/LER-1990-002-03, :on 900301,transfer to Denergized Transformer Caused Loss of Power at 480-volt Shutdown Board 3A & Loss of Power at Reactor Protection Sys 3A.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled |
- on 900301,transfer to Denergized Transformer Caused Loss of Power at 480-volt Shutdown Board 3A & Loss of Power at Reactor Protection Sys 3A.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000296/LER-1990-003-03, :on 900314,blown Fuse in Primary Containment Isolation Sys Logic Panel Resulted in Actuation of Esfs. Caused by Failed Circuitry in Relay.Relay Replaced & Primary Containment Isolation Logic Reset |
- on 900314,blown Fuse in Primary Containment Isolation Sys Logic Panel Resulted in Actuation of Esfs. Caused by Failed Circuitry in Relay.Relay Replaced & Primary Containment Isolation Logic Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1990-003, :on 900201,normally Open Fan Inlet Damper Discovered Closed Causing Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train B to Be Inoperable.Root Cause of Event Could Not Be Determined.Mechanical Stop Repositioned |
- on 900201,normally Open Fan Inlet Damper Discovered Closed Causing Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train B to Be Inoperable.Root Cause of Event Could Not Be Determined.Mechanical Stop Repositioned
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000260/LER-1990-003-04, :on 900502,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Fuse Replaced & ESF Actuation Terminated.Event Will Be Reviewed W/Operations Personnel. W/9 Ltr |
- on 900502,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Fuse Replaced & ESF Actuation Terminated.Event Will Be Reviewed W/Operations Personnel. W/9 Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000296/LER-1990-004, :on 901020,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred & RWCU Sys Inboard Isolation Valve Found Closed.Caused by Failure of Control Room Alarm to Reflash.Failed Relay & Blown Fuse Replaced |
- on 901020,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred & RWCU Sys Inboard Isolation Valve Found Closed.Caused by Failure of Control Room Alarm to Reflash.Failed Relay & Blown Fuse Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000296/LER-1990-004-04, :on 901020,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred. Investigation Ongoing to Determine Cause of Actuation.W/ |
- on 901020,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred. Investigation Ongoing to Determine Cause of Actuation.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1990-004-02, :on 900319,three Reactor Bldg Hose Stations Removed from Svc W/O Providing Appropriate Compensatory Measures.Caused by Personnel Error.Necessary Repairs to Fire Protection Made & Compensatory Measures Setup |
- on 900319,three Reactor Bldg Hose Stations Removed from Svc W/O Providing Appropriate Compensatory Measures.Caused by Personnel Error.Necessary Repairs to Fire Protection Made & Compensatory Measures Setup
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000260/LER-1990-004-03, :on 900601,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred as Result of Water in Cable Spreading Room a Dripping on ECCS Analog Trip Units.Caused by Design Oversight.Water Spill Wiped Up & Cabinets Covered W/Plastic Sheeting |
- on 900601,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred as Result of Water in Cable Spreading Room a Dripping on ECCS Analog Trip Units.Caused by Design Oversight.Water Spill Wiped Up & Cabinets Covered W/Plastic Sheeting
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000296/LER-1990-005-04, :on 901231,reactor Bldg Vent Exhaust Monitor Removed from Svc Causing Compensatory Sample to Be Isolated. Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Procedures Revised to Utilize New Sample Taps on Refuel Floor |
- on 901231,reactor Bldg Vent Exhaust Monitor Removed from Svc Causing Compensatory Sample to Be Isolated. Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Procedures Revised to Utilize New Sample Taps on Refuel Floor
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000259/LER-1990-005-01, :on 900404,discovered That Compensatory Sample for Raw Cooling Water Sys Inadequately Taken.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Counseled on Importance of Procedural Compliance.Required Sample Taken |
- on 900404,discovered That Compensatory Sample for Raw Cooling Water Sys Inadequately Taken.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Counseled on Importance of Procedural Compliance.Required Sample Taken
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000260/LER-1990-005-03, :on 901002,deenergization of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred Due to Motor Generator Set Operation |
- on 901002,deenergization of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred Due to Motor Generator Set Operation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-006-02, :on 900429,diesel Generator C Automatically Started & Tied to 4,160-volt Shutdown Board C When Logic Breaker Closed During Functional Test.Caused by Personnel Error.Shutdown Board Restored to Power Source |
- on 900429,diesel Generator C Automatically Started & Tied to 4,160-volt Shutdown Board C When Logic Breaker Closed During Functional Test.Caused by Personnel Error.Shutdown Board Restored to Power Source
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000259/LER-1990-007-02, :on 900426,high Pressure Fire Protection Sys Water Supply to Turbine,Reactor,Diesel Generator & Control Bldgs Isolated.Caused by Attempt to Isolate Broken Water Pipe.Potable Water Sys Pipe Repaired |
- on 900426,high Pressure Fire Protection Sys Water Supply to Turbine,Reactor,Diesel Generator & Control Bldgs Isolated.Caused by Attempt to Isolate Broken Water Pipe.Potable Water Sys Pipe Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-008-02, :on 900512,actuations/isolations of Various ESF Sys Occurred Due to Blown Fuse in Primary Containment Isolation Sys Logic Panel.Caused by Jumpering Wrong Relay Contact.Fuse Replaced & Logic Reset |
- on 900512,actuations/isolations of Various ESF Sys Occurred Due to Blown Fuse in Primary Containment Isolation Sys Logic Panel.Caused by Jumpering Wrong Relay Contact.Fuse Replaced & Logic Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(i)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000259/LER-1990-011-01, :on 900720,deenergization of Reactor Protection Sys Bus 1B Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Design of Circuit Protector Setpoint.Setpoints Adjusted to Upper End of Allowable Band & Design Changes Implemented |
- on 900720,deenergization of Reactor Protection Sys Bus 1B Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Design of Circuit Protector Setpoint.Setpoints Adjusted to Upper End of Allowable Band & Design Changes Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-012-01, :on 900801,high Pressure Fire Protection Sys Fire Pump Start Logic Not Functionally Tested to Verify That Fire Protection Sys Pumps Maintain 120 Psig.Cause Unknown. Corrective Actions Will Be Determined |
- on 900801,high Pressure Fire Protection Sys Fire Pump Start Logic Not Functionally Tested to Verify That Fire Protection Sys Pumps Maintain 120 Psig.Cause Unknown. Corrective Actions Will Be Determined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-012, :on 900801,high Pressure Fire Protection Sys Found to Be in Violation of Tech Specs Because Functional Test Not Performed |
- on 900801,high Pressure Fire Protection Sys Found to Be in Violation of Tech Specs Because Functional Test Not Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-013-01, :on 900807,fuse Blew in Primary Containment Isolation Sys Logic Panel Resulting in Actuation of Esf. Caused by Random Failure of Relay.Failed Relay Replaced & Primary Containment Isolation Logic Reset |
- on 900807,fuse Blew in Primary Containment Isolation Sys Logic Panel Resulting in Actuation of Esf. Caused by Random Failure of Relay.Failed Relay Replaced & Primary Containment Isolation Logic Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-014-01, :on 900810,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred. Caused by Blown Fuse.Fuse Replaced.Reactor Protection Sys Bus 1A Realigned to Alternate Power Supply on 900811.W/ |
- on 900810,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred. Caused by Blown Fuse.Fuse Replaced.Reactor Protection Sys Bus 1A Realigned to Alternate Power Supply on 900811.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-015-02, :on 900916,unplanned Engineered Safety Features Actuation Occurred Caused by Personnel Error |
- on 900916,unplanned Engineered Safety Features Actuation Occurred Caused by Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000259/LER-1990-016, :on 901004,residual Heat Service Water Pump auto-start Failed to Respond as Expected During Performance of 3D Diesel Generator Run |
- on 901004,residual Heat Service Water Pump auto-start Failed to Respond as Expected During Performance of 3D Diesel Generator Run
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000259/LER-1990-017-01, :on 901122,relay Line Breaker Began Cycling from Closed to Open Causing Voltage Disturbance.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Operations Personnel Attempted to Stabilize Relay Line by Following Recommendations |
- on 901122,relay Line Breaker Began Cycling from Closed to Open Causing Voltage Disturbance.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Operations Personnel Attempted to Stabilize Relay Line by Following Recommendations
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-018-02, :on 901211,Security Micro Access Computer MAC-540 Malfunctioned & Automatically Shut in Degraded Mode. Nine Firewatch Observations Performed Late Due to Locking Vital Area Doors.Caused by Personnel Error |
- on 901211,Security Micro Access Computer MAC-540 Malfunctioned & Automatically Shut in Degraded Mode. Nine Firewatch Observations Performed Late Due to Locking Vital Area Doors.Caused by Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-018-01, :on 901211,micro Access Computer Malfunctioned Causing Nine Firewatch Observations to Be Late.Caused by Personnel error.MAC-50 Computer Reprogrammed.Firewatches on Compressed Schedule |
- on 901211,micro Access Computer Malfunctioned Causing Nine Firewatch Observations to Be Late.Caused by Personnel error.MAC-50 Computer Reprogrammed.Firewatches on Compressed Schedule
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-019-02, :on 901212,hourly Fire Watch Not Established When Instrument & Control Bus 1A Tripped,Resulting in Loss of Power to Fire Detection Panels.Investigation Underway. Supplemental Rept Will Be Submitted by 910214 |
- on 901212,hourly Fire Watch Not Established When Instrument & Control Bus 1A Tripped,Resulting in Loss of Power to Fire Detection Panels.Investigation Underway. Supplemental Rept Will Be Submitted by 910214
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-019, :on 901229,hourly Fire Watch Not Established When Instrument & Control Bus 1A Tripped Resulting in Loss of Power to Fire Detection Panels.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Bus Returned to Svc |
- on 901229,hourly Fire Watch Not Established When Instrument & Control Bus 1A Tripped Resulting in Loss of Power to Fire Detection Panels.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Bus Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-020, :on 901214,shutdown Board 1B Deenergized When Normal Feeder Breaker to Board Tripped During Time Delay Relay Test Resulting in ESF Actuation.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Maint Procedures Revised |
- on 901214,shutdown Board 1B Deenergized When Normal Feeder Breaker to Board Tripped During Time Delay Relay Test Resulting in ESF Actuation.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Maint Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(iv) | | 05000259/LER-1990-020-01, :on 901214,480-volt Shutdown Board 1b de-energized When Normal Feeder Breaker Tripped. Investigation Underway.Operations Personnel Notified Immediately After Event |
- on 901214,480-volt Shutdown Board 1b de-energized When Normal Feeder Breaker Tripped. Investigation Underway.Operations Personnel Notified Immediately After Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1990-021-01, :on 900927,proper Compensatory Actions Not Taken for Fire Protection Detection Sys Out of Svc When Hourly Fire Watch Could Not Enter 4,160-volt Shutdown Board Room A.Investigation Underway |
- on 900927,proper Compensatory Actions Not Taken for Fire Protection Detection Sys Out of Svc When Hourly Fire Watch Could Not Enter 4,160-volt Shutdown Board Room A.Investigation Underway
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000259/LER-1990-021, :on 900927,hourly Fire Watch Could Not Enter a 4,160-volt Shutdown Board Room to Perform Visual Insp of Area in Violation of Tech Spec.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Fire Protection Plan Revised |
- on 900927,hourly Fire Watch Could Not Enter a 4,160-volt Shutdown Board Room to Perform Visual Insp of Area in Violation of Tech Spec.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Fire Protection Plan Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
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