ML20011A071
| ML20011A071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/24/1981 |
| From: | Potapovs U NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Beecher D MCDOWELL-WELLMAN CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011A068 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900747 NUDOCS 8110060510 | |
| Download: ML20011A071 (2) | |
Text
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,g UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A
REGION IV
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE suite 1000 I
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ARLINGTON, TEX.AS 76011
- D M 241981 Docket No. 999007a7/81-01 CTI - Nuclear Division of McDowell - Wellman Company ATTN:
D. J. Beecher Manager of Engineering P.O. Box 5768 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Gentlemen:
This refers to the inspection conducted by H. W. Roberds of this office on March 10-13, 1981, of your facility at Cieveland, Ohio, associated with the fabrication of standby gas treatment systems and to the discussions of our findings with you and members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
This inspection was made as a result of:
(1) the issue of a 10 CFR Part 21 report pertaining to the identification of defects in a temperature detection unit type, that had been instrlled in equipment furnished to the Hartsville and Palo Verde Nuclear Generat'ng Stations; (2) the identification of incorrect connection of differential pressure gages in air clean uo units furnished to Ballefonte Units 1 and 2; (3) "he identification of defective Flanders Filters charcoal adsorber trays at Seo;oyah Units 1 and 2; (4) the identification of separation of screens frcm charcoal adsorber frames at the Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Stations; and (5) the identification of inadequate fire protection system drains in standby gas treatment charcoal adsorbers furnished to the Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Stations.
Areas examined and our findings are discussed in the enclosed report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of an examination of precedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the insoector.
During the inspection it was found that the implementation of your QA program failed to meet certain NRC requirements.
The specific findings and references to the pcetinent requirements are identified in the enclosures to this letter.
Please provide us within 30 days of the date of this letter a written state-ment containing, (1) a description of steps that have been or will be taken to correct these items, (2) a description of steps that have been or will be taken to orevent recurrence, and (3) the date your corrective actions and preventive measures were or will be comoleted.
Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause snown.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a cocy of nis letter and the enclosed inspection report will be olaced in the flRC's
$0060510820901 DESIGNATED ORIGINAL
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PDR Cortifica By
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CTI - Nuclear 2
Public Document Room.
If this report contains any information that you believe to be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by telephone within 10 days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withholding; and (b) sub-mit within 25 days from the date of this letter a written application to this office to withhold such information.
If your receipt of this letter has been delayed such that less than seven days are available for your review, please notify this office promptly so that a new due date may be established.
Consistent with Section 2.790(b)(1), any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and which contains a full statement of the reasons on the basis which it is claimed that the information should be withheld frcm public disclosure.
This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4).
The infomation sought to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit.
If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, the report will be placed in the Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, q
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l'-Mf' UldisPotapovs,CNief
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Vendor Inspection Branch
Enclosure:
1.
Notice of Nonconfomance 2.
Inspection Report No. 99900747/81-01
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CTI - Nuclear Docket No. 99900747/81-01 NOTICE OF NONCONFORMANCE Based on the results of an NRC inspection conducted on March 10-13, 1981, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in accordance with NRC requirements as indicated below:
Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states:
" Activities affecting j
quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished".
TVA Contract No. 77K31-820427, paragraph 3.0, " Applicable Codes and Standards",
includes Regulatory Guide 1.52.
Paragraph C.3.h in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, requires water drains to be designed in accordance with ERDA 76-21.
Section 4.5.8 in ERDA 76-21 states in part, "... When fire sprinklers are installed in the filter house, the drains must be sized to carry away the maximum sprinkler flow without water backup in the housing."
Contrary to the above, the drains in the standby gas treatment system charcoal adsorbers, furnished to the Hartsville and Phipps Bend nuclear units, were not sized to carry away the maximum fire protection system sprinkler flow without water backup (See Details, F.4.a.).
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No.
99900747/81-01 Program No. 51300 Company:
CTI - Nuclear Division o'l McDowell - Wellman Company P.O. Box !768 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Inspection Conducted:
March 10-13, 1981 O
Inspector:
M M
I H. W. Roberds, Contractor Inspector
' Date Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch 4/P/P/
Approved by: M m
I. Barnes, Chief Date Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on March 10-13, 1981 (99900747/81-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and other applicable codes and standards including:
10 CFR Part 21 report follow-up inspection relative to possible defective temperature detection units; follow-up inspec-tions in regard to improper installation of differential pressure gauges, defective charcoal adsorber trays fabricated by Flanders Filters, separation of screens from frame on deep bed adsorber section, and inadequate drains for removal of fire protection system water from the charcoal adsorbers.
The inspection involved 20 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
In the five areas inspected, no apparent nonconformances or unresolved items were identified in four areas, with the following nonconformance identi-fled in the remaining area:
Nonconformance:
Follow-up inspection on inadequate charcoal adsorber drains for removal lf fire protection system water.
Drains in standby gas treatment system charcoal adsorbers were not designed in accordance with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Notice of Nonconformance).
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2 DETAIL SECTION i
i A.
Persons Contacted
- D. L. Kammerzell, Manager of Operations
- D. J. Beecher, Manager of Engineering
- R. F. Meier, Manager of Quality Assurance
- J. Cross, Quality Assurance Engineer 4
- Denotes those persons attending exit meeting.
B.
10 CFR Part 21 Report Follow-up Inspection 3
1.
Introduction On February 12, 1980, Edison Electronics notified CTI - Nuclear that examination of a failed temperature detection unit indicated that the failure could be attributed to the use of acid flux in the sealing of the detection unit.
Similar temperature controllers had been supplied to CTI - Nuclear.
Edison Electronics recommended that all units (P/N 377-02831) be returned to them for inspection, with repair or replacement, as necessary.
CTI - Nuclear evaluated and reported this discrepancy to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 on May 3, 1980.
2.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain that the evalution, corrective action, and report of the deficiency or failure to comply were adequate and in conformance with the require-ments of 10 CFR Part 21 and associated procedures.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of "10 CFR 21 Report Evaluation" of April 24, 1980.
b.
Review of Edison Electronics letter of February 12, 1980.
c.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Purchase Order No. 2462.
d.
Review of CTI - Nuclear letters to NRC, TVA and Bechtel Power Corporation of May 3, 1980.
e.
Review of Edison Electronic Failure Analysis Report No. 62 of August 29, 1980.
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4.
Findings
3 a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
b.
CTi - Nuclear notified TVA Hartsville and Bechtel Power Corporation in regard to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, i.e. those nuclear plants where the affected Edison Electronics components had been installed in the air handling and air filtration equipment, and requested that the electrical panels be removed and returned to them.
CTI - Nuclear returned all suspect temperature detection units to Edison Electronics for evaluation and testing for acid flux contamination.
Of the i
135 units returned 23 were tested for acid contamination, all with negative results.
All of the suspect units have been or will be replaced by new temperature controllers.
C.
Follow-up Ins]ection on Improper Installation of Differential
)ressure Gages 1.
Introduction The differential pressure gauges on the air clean up units, which had been supplied by CTI - Nuclear for Bellefonte Nuclear Plants Units 1 and 2 were identified to have been improperly connected to the sample lines.
This discrepancy was reported by TVA in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) on August 29, 1980.
2.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported discrepancies and determine if the problem l
had generic implications.
Also ascertain if corrective actions had been initiated and steps to preclude recurrence of the identified l
deficiency had been taken.
l 3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of TVA Contract No. 77K36-820258-1 and 2N4M-129.
b.
Review of TVA Documents NCR 1237 and QCR 4542.
c.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Intra-Company Communications, " Instrument Tubing Problem on TVA WA 20121 through 20128," dated January 15, 1981.
d.
Review of CTI - Nuclear letter to TVA dated January 27, 1981.
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4 e.
Interviews with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
b.
CTI - Nuclear personnel met with TVA representatives on January 14, 1981 to examine and discuss the problem with the differential pressure indicators.
CTI - Nuclear agreed with TVA's finding that 44 differential pressure indicators were improperly connected.
Agreement was reached to remove the affected panels, retube and reconnect the differential pressure indicators, with TVA to perform the necessary rework at the job site.
CTI - Nuclear informed the NRC inspector that the discrepancy, if present in other units, would be readily detected when the system was tested, in that the gauge would not indicate a positive pressure reading.
They believed the problem was a result of:
(1) the drawings not clearly defining direction of air flow in the system; and (2) the high and low pressure ports on the differential pressure indicators not being identified.
To pre-i vent a recurrence of this deficiency, the drawings have been revised to clearly define the location of the high and low pressure and direction of air flow, Region IV, Vendor Inspection Branch, considers that adequate steps to preclude recurrence have been taken by CTI - Nuclear in regard to the identified deficiency.
The NRC inspector could not ascertain; however, if a similar problem existed in other equipment to that identified, in that evaluation or inspection of other air cleanup units had l
not been accomplished.
D.
Follow-up Inspection on Defective Charcoal Adsorber Trays Fabricated by Flanders Filters 1.
Introduction Charcoal adsorber trays (fabricated by Flanders Filters, Inc.), which had been purchased for the control building emergency air clean up system, the auxili&ry building gas treatment system, and the containment purge air clean up system at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, were found to be defective during testing of the filter systems.
The trays were observed to have leaked charcoal between the perforated screen and the frame, as the result of an improper pop riveted joint.
TVA reported this deficiency in accordance with the provisions of 4
10 CFR Part 50.55(e) on November 16, 1979, with a final report being made on December 14, 1979.
2.
Inspection Objectives 4
5 The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported discrepancy and determine if the problem had generic implications.
Also, to ascertain if corrective actions had been initiated and steps to preclude recurrence of the identified deficiency had been taken.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of CTI - Nuclear letter to Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement dated December 5, 1979.
b.
Review of Flanders Filters Inc. letter to Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement, dated December 5, 1979.
c.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Inspection Report dated January 11, 1980.
d.
Interview with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved iters were identified.
b.
CTI - Nuclear purchased drawer type carbon adsorber trays l
from Flanders Filters Inc. for Browns Ferry, Watts Bar and Sequoyah.
As a result of an inspection conducted by Flanders Filter Inc. and CTI - Nuclear personnel, it was determined that the loss of carbon was a result of the trays manufactured for Sequoyah not being fastened at the end of the beds.
Those trays manufactured for Browns Ferry and Watts Bar were observed to be either welded or riveted at the end of the beds and were I
not considered to be defective.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued IE Bulletin No. 80-03 on February 6, 1980 relative to this deficiency.
Ninety-four DT-10 type carbon adsorber filter trays were returned from Sequoyah to Flanders Filters Inc. for repair or replacetont.
These carbon adsorber filter trays were purchased prior to 1974 and were the only trays purchased from Flanders Filters Inc. by CTI - Nuclear.
E.
Follow-u) Inspection on Separation of Screens from Frame on Deep 3ed Adsorber Sections 1.
Introduction Screens which hold charcoal in deep bed adsorber sections were identi-fled at Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Plants to be separated from their frames due to improper spot welds.
This deficiency was reported by TVA to Region II, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on May 8,1980.
6 2.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the nature and scope of the reported discrepancy and determine if the problem had generic implications.
Also, ascertain if corrective actions had been initiated and steps to preclude recurrence of the identified deficiency had been taken.
3.
Method of Accomplishment, The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of TVA Quality Control Investigatior, Report No. 20605.06.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Intra-Com b.
Screen Spot Welds on W.A. 60208."pany Communication, "Adsorber c.
Review of Welding Procedure CWP No. 3500, " Resistance Spot Welding Machine Welding P-8 to P-8."
d.
Review of Welding Procedure CWP No. 0035, " Resistance Spot Welding Manual P-8 to P-8."
e.
Review of Welding Procedure CWP No. 0300 " Gas Tungsten Arc Welding P-8 to P-8."
f.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Drawing No. D 30693.
g.
Interviews with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
b.
After site inspection of available equipment, CTI - Nuclear maintained that the Filtrad (R) Carbon Adsorbers supplied to the Phipps Bend and Hartsville Nuclear Plants met TVA's technical and contractual requirements. This position was taken as a result of not identifying either broken spot welds, or separation of screens from their frames.
Review of correspondence by the NRC inspector did indicate, however, that a lack of control in cosmetic grinding had resulted in partial removal of spot welds.
An engineering analysis was performed to support the adequacy of t'e as-built fabrications and the results forwarded to TVA on October 14, 1980, in Design Report No. 60208-C-1.
No reply had been received from TVA as of the date of this inspection.
It was also verified that
7 additional controls on cosmetic grinding had been requested from the CTI - Nuclear manufacturing facilit.v.
Review for implementation of these measures was determined to be impracticable, as a result of the closure of the manufactur-ing facility shortly after the request and the sub-contract-ing of all remaining fabrication.
F.
Follow-up Inspection on Inadequate Charcoal Adsorber Drains for Removal of Fire Protection System Water 1.
Introduction The drains provided in the standby gas treatment system charcoal adsorbers have been identified to be too small to remove fire protection system water without backup, if the fire protection water system is operated continuously. This discrepancy was discovered as a result of the review of CTI - Nuclear's drawings by GE and was reported to TVA.
These systems were supplied to Hartsville and Phipps Bend nuclear power stations.
2.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the scope of the reported discrepancy and determine if the problem had generic implications.
Also, ascertain if corrective action had been taken to correct the reported deficiency.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of CTI - Nuclear Drawing No. D30680, revision B.
b.
Interviews with cognizant personnel.
4.
Findings a.
Nonconformances See Notice of Nonconformance.
b.
Unresolved Items None.
c.
A meeting was held on April 14 at CTI - Nuclear with TVA personnel to discuss the identified SGTS drain design deficiency with no definite decision or agreement on cor-rective actions being reached.
8 The charcoal adsorber viater deluge system was designed by CII - Nuclear to saturate the charcoal bed in 2.5 minutes at 50 psig of water pressure.
Drains were sized for limited system operation consictent with the saturation criteria and not for continued maximum deluge conditions after extinguishing of a fire.
CTI - Nuclear identified that the customer purchase specification had not provided any information on available site water supply for completing the system. Without this information, it was maintained that design of an adequate drain system could not be readily accomplished.
It would thus appe.ar that the identified problem relates primarily to control of design interfaces.
G.
Exit Meeting A post inspection meeting was held on March 12, 1981, with the management representatives denoted in paragraph A. above.
The NRC inspector informed management of the scope and findings of the inspection.
Management informed the NRC inspector that they were going to complete the present contract in an orderly fashion and would then disband CTI - Nuclear, with a target date of June,1982.
CTI - Nuclear has sub-contracted all air filtration systems to Bahnson Air Quality Control Division, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Contracts for air receiver and water receiver tanks for Hartsville A (Units 1 and 2), Hartsville B (Units 1 and 2) and Phipps Bend Units 1 and 2 have been sub-contracted to the Babcock and Wilcox Company, Barberton, Ohio.
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