ML20010F877
| ML20010F877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1981 |
| From: | Aamodt M, Aamodt N AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109150066 | |
| Download: ML20010F877 (8) | |
Text
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United States of America b
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coCEED Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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erro 3efore the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board
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In the hatter of Ketropolitan Edison Company
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Three Eile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
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c Docket 50-289 4
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on Aamodt Responses to 30ard Orders August 20 and 25/f' g/ 4 Relative to Submission of Views on the 9
Investigatio5'.of Cheating and the Q
d Appointment of Frofessor hilhollin to
-1 Assist in Investigation of Cheating S[
Qf The NRC reports of TMI personnel cheating on NRC liefepi;ng'h.
5 examinations are incomplete.and inconsistent.
The Board notes that the cheating incident raised broader issues than the cheating of two individuals.
These issues are the integrity of licensee's management and personnel, the quality of personnel, the adequacy of the numbers of licensee's operators to mann the plant, Licensee's training and testing progra=s, and NRC's licensing program.
While 1
the investigations of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and 2
the Office of Inspector and Auditor established that two shift supervisors cheated on the NRC licensing examinations, these in-vestigations did not resolve the other impetant issues that the cheating incident raised.
In fact the investigations themselves raised these issues, through inuendo, and left them unresolved.
All the issues raised by the cheating i.cident need to be resolved prior to any fai-and final decision of the Board relative to management.
The Aamodts, as intervenors pro se, motion that the record be reopened for that purpose.
1he Board requested that parties who motion fcr a reopening of the record should identify why tney believe the i;RL investigations are inadequate, what they would seek to prove in the hearing, how 3
they would go about proving it, and recommendations to the Board QSO 5
for further investigation.
/til 1.
The NRC investigations have f ailed to exonerate 1.icensee 's management and other personnel.
The NRC only interviewed two canappment officials who were not directly con.ected with training 1 of Aygus3/11.nd August 11 (served August 14), referred to as IS - 8/6
+6a and is -
n109150066sioNo4 erved August 7), referred to as I A - 7/31, numberered 1-13 31 PDR ADCCK 05000289 G
2 and testing, while training management who testified in the hearing were not interviewed.
There was only a chaple of the licensing candidates interviewed.
Only eleven of 'the other 34 candidates were interviewed.
II - 8/11 at 7, 8, 19 - 40.
None of the candidates were asked if they had cheated or cooperated in the cheating of others.
They were primarily asked to describe and analyze the conditions under which they took the licensing examinations.
Further, the candida,tes appeared to lack candor in thsir descriptions r f the proctoring.
khile the proctors reported three to four hour periods when they were out of the with no stand-in, the candidates tested in those sessions related that there was continuous proctoring.Ix-7/31 ht 6;.IE
-8/11.at 25,27,31,39.
The candidates were not under oath to speak the truth.
NRC has no reason to believe that the candidates' de;criptions are truthfull since the tw6 candidates who finally admitted cheating did so only after a third interview and persistence by the NRC that the candidates sign a statement of the interviews.
Action Required:
Training management, specifically Dr. long, Dr. Enief, and Mr. Newton, as well as Mr. Ross who recommends candidates for licensing, should be cross-questioned under oath.
The remnining 34 candidates should be interviewed in depth, required to sign their statements and cross-questioned under oath where in-dicated.
Any lesser procedure is not likely to produce self-incriminating eviden 3.
2.
The IE report claims that a comprehensive review of the NRC examinations failed to reveal any further obvious similiarities of the kind detected in the examinations of the two operators who cheated.
Id. at 16.
This claim does not provide assurance that the other operators did not cheat.
The task of making a comparison of 34 tests is exhaustive as implied by L the NRC consultant.
I A - 7/31 at 2.
The Office of Inspection and inforcement had only been in possession of the examinations since July 24 when their report issued on August 11.
NRC graders had previously missed o bvious and numerous similiarities on an initial gradin6 of the examinations of the two operators who cheated.
Id. at 1, 5.
NRC either lacks expertise to the kind of job the private consultant did, or worse yet, may have plan:.ed not to notice signs of cheating.
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3 Id at 9, paragraphs 2, 3.
NRC failure to be thorough is further evidenced by their review of the mock exasinations (on which the two operators also cheated.
NRC reviewed only 14 of the 36 RO
=ock exa inations and 12 of the 20 mock SRO examinations. II - 8/11 at 17.
Action Required:
All NRC licenring examin'ations and mock
^
licensing examinations (given by ATT and FQS, April 1980 following the OARF) should be reviewed by experienced independent auditors and this evidence examined in the hearing.
3.
There are a number of references in the NRC reports to the possible use of " crib sheets".
Although the NRC inspector would not discount the possibility and an operator declined to co==ent, the NRC investigation did not pursue this method of cheating.
Id. at 13, 39.
The consul tant who graded some cf the examinations proposed that management may have provided answers on slides or screens.
IA - 7/31 at 5.
The consultant appeared to have curtailed further review of the examinations after dis-covering cheating, concentrating instead on the comparison of the two clearly suspect examinations.
He may well have noticed. indications of widespread irregularities to have made such a sweeping statement.
Two operators noted that some of the questions on the licensing examinations had been asked in prior tests.
IE - 8/11 at 21, 31.
Were the NRC examinations made available t, the ATT auditors?
Action Required:
The NRC consultant should be questioned l
on his. statement regarding possible management complicity.
The candidates, proctors and training management should be cross-questioned relative to " crib sheets" or other reference material available l
during the examinations.
The ATT audit (and FQS audits) should be co= pared to the NRC examinations for similiarity of questions.
4.
One of the two operators (who admitted cheating) indicated l
that the option of cheating was suggested by the other operator.
Id. at 7, 37 and inclosure 5.
The motivations and actions of this j
individual need to be examined.
This individual also supplied answers in a cheating incident in July 1979.
I d. at 7, 8.
In an l
investigation of that earlier incident; management stated that this individual was a "perran of unquestioned integrity" and that
S Id.
there was no " malfeasance on his part" / Management again _ supported this individual after his confession of cheating on July 31, 1931, not firing him as they did the other individual who confessed.
In fact, management indulged one individual to allow the matter of his termination to wait until vacation plans were completed and, subsequently, allowing him to resign rather than be fired. letters of E. C. Arnold to Victor Stello, Jc. August 4 and 10.
This indi. idual may be msnagement 's tool.
He persisted it lieing on the third interview and rworn statement, according to the conclusions of NEC.
Whereas NRC notes that the operators had clearly " conspired to chear",
this individual denied that.
II - 8/ 11 at 1, inclosure 4. at 6, 7, 8.
This individual also denied cheating on the ATT audit in conflict with the statement of the other candidate who cheated.
Id.
This favored individual also lacked candor relative to first awareness of rumors of cheating on July 27.
Id. at 3 NRC notes the striking differences in the statements of these candidates who cheated, however NRCifailed to discern any signifigance.
Id. at 1, 2.
NRC also deletsd ' the file:bn the earlier cheating incident.
Action Required:
The file of the earlier cheating investigation should be.made availa' ole.
The candidates and others should be cross-questioned.
5.
The NRC investigation did not question management's certification (for eligibility to sit for the licensing examination) of operators who persistently and readily engaged in cheating.
KRC testified that management's involvement, knowledge and subsequently, certification of their operators was a requirement to assure competent personnel.- The operators who cheated were amployees of long-standing in the company, therefore management had adequate opportunity to te acquainted with the personal characteristics of these individuals.
The certification of an individual who had recently aided and abetted the cheating cests serious doubt on the capability of management.
Since the posi.tions for which the two operators were certified were that of shit t supervis:
s, management's responsibility is to be questioned.
Further, management heard rumors of cheating and failed to foll ow-up on them.
Id. at 8.
Action Required:
The requirement of certification for eligitility to sit for the NRC licensing examination,and licensae's capability to select suitable operator candidates must be established
I 5
through cross-examination.
Mr. Arnold's (and other management'c) failure to investigate rumors of cheating must be examinea.
6.
The NRC did not inquire into the contribution that inadequate training made to cheating on the NRC examination.
There was extended training of operators over a two year period, fnformal study sessions (shift and individual), and intensive coaching prior to the NRC examinations.
However,the operators continued to fail audits on =ock-ups of the NRC examination; only 11 of the 29 operations candidates passed an audit two weeks before the licensing examination.
Why didn't the extended training and testin6 since the TMI-2 accident adequately prepare the candidates to confidently and consistently pass testing?
The NRC testified that they would require candidates for licensing to pass audits on their training to be eligible to sit for the examination, however NRC dropped these pre-examination requirements according to testimony given shortly after the licensing examinations were administered.
Action nequired:
Inquiry should determine why an employee of long-standing in the position of shift supervisor had not received training to adequately and confidently prepare him so that he would have no inclination or need to cheat in order to retain his job.
Why did HRC administer' licensing examinations.
l to candidates who failed to pass testa given after training, and j
teen allow testing sessions to go unproctored or be casually proc-tored, thereby creating a situation conducive to cheating?
Why l
did licensee certify candidates who failed or cheated on mock-ups of the NRC examinations.
Cross-examination of licensee management and NRC licensing personnel is needed as well as licensee's experts who reviewed licensee's training.
7.
NRC did not investigate cheating on prior tests given to licensee personnel, other than a partial review of AIT audits.
The cheating incident puts ' prior testing, including that of non-licensed and contractor personnel, in question.
The Board has expressed interest in the propriety of other testing.
Board Order -
8/20 at 3.
TheAapgdgsgavebeenaware(sincethecheatigincident) s l
of other cheating /at TMI-1 since the TEI-2 accident.
l Action Required:
The Aamodts are prepared to present a witness i
l
6 to testify to management's involvement in cheating of personnel on a test given at TMI-1 since the accident.
All tests given at Thl-1, particularly since the accident, should be reviewed by competent and independent consultants for evidence of cheating.
8.
The 13 report of the test room arrangements is not consistent with the I A report.
The latter stated that seating arrangements were " shoulder to shoulder".
Did management have a part in planning arrangement of the testing rooms to facilitate cheating and in planning activities which drew the proctors away from the testing rooms?
The IE report focuses on the length of the tables and does not indicate whether management made appropriate arrangements or was a party to hindering proctoring.
II - 8/11 at 6.
Action Required:
Cross-examination on this issue.
9.
The NRC fails to address the impact the resignatiois of the'two shift supeivi' sors whp; cheated will have on the capability of the licensee to meet the shift manning requirements and overtime restrictions required for restart, and particularly for July, 1982.
Licensee had only six shift supervisors and planned to use a six shift rotation.
As of July 1982, NRC will zaquire two SR0s on each shift.
Licensee had 13 operations candidates for SRO liceasing, however the cheating incident reduced that number to 11.
NRC found a five shift rotation acceptable, however the number.of candidates does allow for attrition or failure on the examination. (Two failed the SRO examination, however the NRC reports are not clear; these failures may have been attributed to the other seven candidates for SRO licensing, while failure (six) on the RO examination may have involved SRO candidates.
IA - 7/31 at 7.
Action Required:
The potential for licensee being able to meet manning requirements for restart and for July 1952, less than a year away, needs to be examined.
10.
The NRC reports fail to identify the individuals who cheated or those others who wers interviewed.
The consideration afforded by snield,ing of those who have admitted cheatingis not justified.
Lid either of these individuals testify in hearing?
-n-
7 11.
Tne IGC has called for retesting of all the remaining candidates.. Although this is essential, it does not respond to the unanswered questions regarding the integrity of lice:.see management and o tner personnel, and other issues discussed...
above.
!?RC also fails to explain how they will assure valid and reliable retesting.
In response to Board Memorand.:m and Order relative to the appt intment of Professor ~ Gary 1 Milho11in as a technical interrogator, specic1 Master and informal assistant, the Aam'odts do not oppose.
Respectfully sub.mitted, b
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Marjo$da M. Aamodt LA'v m
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Norman O. Aamodt September 4, 1981
UNIE STATES & A9dCA NrI.c FuniAm c2rcsSICN BE:mE >E A2a'.IC SAFErt xo uCesrc asro Service of Aamodt Restonses to Board Orders Aurunt 20 and 25.1111 FelatQ'e te Submissinn of Views en the Investiration of CheatinE and tr.: Artoint ent of Frofessor l'.ilhollin to Assist in Investi-Kation of Cheating was Se"va S. F. ail, September 6, 1951.
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