ML20010B670

Addl Info Requested by Usaec on Pipe Breaks Outside Containment. Travel Voucher Encl

ML20010B670
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	12/03/1974
From:	Cookson B, Laguardia T, Manion W AUTOMATION INDUSTRIES, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20010B666	List: ML20010B665 ML20010B670
References
NES-81-A-0013, NES-81-A-0013-R01, NES-81-A-13, NES-81-A-13-R1, NUDOCS 8108170388
Download: ML20010B670 (24)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. y e i ,1 f4ES-81 A 0013 Revision i 1m) '1 i l ADDITICt1AL filFORMATICid REQUESTED BY USAEC Gil PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE C0tiTAlttMEt:T l l December 3, 1974 Prepared under NES Project 5!01 for DAl RYLA!!D POWER COOPERATI VE J I;UCLE AR Er1E.GY SERVICES DIVI S ICf3 Au t cma t. i on Industrics, Inc. Dant.2ry, Connecticut 06810 Frcpared by: B. f.. Cooksen and T. 5. LaGuardia. Approved by: / sC e (r <- W/J. Manion / t -. 8108170388 810805 PDR A00CK 05000409 P PDR. 2 r

_ -_m p +. i, ' 1-TABLE Ce CONTE!iTS + \\' i. 4 4 + j-I. Summary........................................................... l s. 4 2. Introduction....................... 3 ,1 J 3 Calculated Peak Pressures within Turbine Building.......... ..... 4 'f i t 3.1 Assumptions made for Calculat ing Peak Pressures...... .....4-I j 3.2 lic t ho d o f C a l cu l a t i o n....'....................... 5 i j 33 Turbine Building Peak Pressure......... 5 a 3.4 High Pressure Icedwater Fla hing-to Stean... .5 i 7 ] 3.5 Conclusions........ 5 4 i j 4. Ad ve r s e En v i r onn en ta l E f f e c t s......................... ..7 1 1 5 Pos t ulated Breaks and Sa fe Shut dow.. of Pl an t s.................... 8 r i i 5.1 Discussion... 8 fh 5.2 Conclusions.... 9 1 1 i I ATTACHNEllTS 4 A. Calculations for High Energy Pipe Creak i n Turbi ne Bui l ding...... 13 .i l B. Cal cu lat ions for Feedwa te r Fl ash i ng to Steam...................... 2 0 i i I L FIGURCS A-1 S t e a m F l cu i n t o T u r b i n e B u i l d i n g................................. 17 i l A-2' Pe ak P res s ure i n T urb i ne Bui l di ng................................ 18 [ A-3 11er za n i ne F l oo r P i p i ng P l a n...................................... 19 i Refe ences................................ ........................... 21 ~.;= F i i O i l

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SUMMARY

The Directorate of Licensing requested additional information on pipe lailures outside containment (O. L. Ziemann to J. P. fladget t let ter dated April 8, 1974) to supplement analyses previously submitted by Dairy-4 land Power Cooperative (LAC-2102, dated January 17,1974). The addi-tional information ennrerns nenk nressures due to pipe breaks in speci-fic areas, environmental effects on specific rooms,and the effect of whipping high energy pipe on the safe shutdown of the LACBWR plant. a I 1.1 PEAK PRESSURES i An evaluat ion of t he turbine building arrangements concludes that there is sufficient comunication between the specific areas identified la the information request (condenser compartment,- turbine building, feed-water pump area and high pressure heater compartment) to preclude the l buildup of significant differential pressures between these areas. Therefore, the peak pressure was determined for the _ turbine building treated as a single volume. The calculations show that the maxinum peak pressure wilI be produced by the main steam Iine break and uilI greatly exceed the turbine building desion pressurr (3.39 psiq as com-J pared with 0.17 psi). Due to the type of building construction, it has been concluded that no significant structural damage will occur since wall (or roof) panels will be blovn out before structural eieraents can be d fected. i lt has also been concluded that the resulting. radiological release to the public wili be no greater than the release occurrinq l f -t he bul id-4 ing withstood the pressure buildup and t!)e steam was exhausted through the turbine building intake vents. 1.2 ADVERSE EtlVIR0fiMErlTAL EFFECTS 4 Adverse environmental effects on the control. room,' electrical equipment room and diesel generator room with respect to the postulated pipe break were evaluated and it was concluded that these rooms were suffic-iently isolated from the potential braak regions as to be adequately. 1 protected. '~" 1.3 EFFECTS OF JHIPPltJG PIPE Ori SAFE SilVTD0Vil -The effects of whipping high energy piping on the safe shutdown of the LACBWR plant were considered. The high energy piping systems incio 7d' _in the study were feedwater, main steam and steam. bypass. The_ high j pressure service water system was not considered because its maximum d 1' _],_____________ ______,_______[_

Ih F ~ m .O pressure is only.150 psig and maximum temperosure.is less than 125"F. The consequences of whipping pipe damage were' considered with the reactor' isolated (main steam isolat ion valve and feedwater check valve closed) and with the reactor not isolated because of the failure of an isolation valve. The following conclusions have been developed: 1. The High Pressure Core Spray (ECCS) systen.is the only cooling system which has sufficient reliability to ensure c, safe shutdown for either an isolabic or non-isolable pipe break. 2. The High Pressure Core Spray' system will be capable of providing long-term core cooling if either the High Pressure Service Water system or t he Demi ne ra l i zed Wa t e r Supply system reuaios opera-t ional af ter a pipe break out side containnient. Eiiher. system is able to' resupply the overhead storage tank which is the source of water for the liigh Pressure Core Spray system. 3 The High Pressure Core Sprt.y sys tem combined wi t h t he Al ternate Core Spray system will be capable of providing adequate short-term and Icog term core cooling to' ensure a safe reactor shut-doan even if both the iligh Pressure Servica. Water and Ihe Demin-eralized Water Supply systens are damaged by the pIiid break out- } side containment. 4. The Auxiliary Core Spray piping is more easily protected f rom the consequences of a high energy pipe break outside contain-ment than either the liigh Pressure Service Water or Denineralized Vater Supply piping. 5 The Alternate Core Spray system is preperly designed through re-dundancy of control circuits, control valves, and its direct-diesel-driven pumps to function if one active component fails. Conversely, 'he High Pressure Service Water systen and t'he Oe-i l minera!ized Water Supply system have not been designed as vital L systems. 6. Pire Breaks outside containment will not prevent the t.ACBWR re-i a% tor from being shutdown'and maintained in a safe condition if the following measures are taken to assure the functioning-of.the Alternate Core Spray system: o { a. Provide pipe restraints for-the main steam line and the steam bypass line where they are in close proximity to i the Alternate Core Spray piping. ~ b. Provide a manual valve to isolate the Alternate Core Spray systen from the High Pressure Service Water system. 'o ~ r 4 1 ) u

..( o L 2. lllTRODUCTION 1 lho USAEC ' Directorate of 1.icensing (D. L Ziemann to J. P. fladget t, letter dated April 8,19/4) requested additional informat ion on pipe failures out side of containment. to suppleinent the report on the subject previously submitted by Dairyland Power Cooperativo (LAC-2102, dat ed January 17, IN4). Speci fica l ly, information was requested on the foilowinq topics: Calculated peak pressures and design pressures for condenser cruipart-a. ment, turbine building, feedwater pump room and high pressure heater compartment. b. Poss.ble adverse envirornnental ef fect s to the control room, electrical equipw nt room, and the diesel generation room. c. Effects of whipping feedwater (out side-of main s tcant tunneI). steam bypass or high pressure service water lines on a safe plant shu t do>.n. Inforrut ion and conclusions developed for these topics are presented in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respect ively. 5,, A-U

- - ~. _. p w SPr N 'm . o 3 CALCULATED PEiK PRESSURES WITillr1 THE' TURBINE BUILDiliG 3.1 ASSUMPT10ris MADE FOR CALCULATitiG PEAK FRESSURE Information was reques ted on the peak pressures which would result f r om high energy line breaks in the folicwing areas: a. Condenser Compartcent b. Turbine BuiIding c. Feedwater Punp iloom d. High Pressure Heater Corrpartment. All of the above ar eas (including the tunnel-containrrnt building pipe penetration area) are interconnected uith large epen asthusys, stairs, pipe chases and floor gra:inc;s, retul t i ng in extremely le<> pressure drops between areas. Therefore, the buildep of dif ferential pressures between these areas is not conceivable. On this basis, t he en t i re turbine building-has been considered as one volure v.hich contains all of the above areas. The assumptions used in the analysis include the following: 1. All doors are closed and the steam released in the turbine bui ldi ng ) only vents through a sing!c six foot by six. foot louvered intake vent. There are three intcLe vents, but only one is heated for winter us e and therefore is the Iiciting. venting area. 2. High pressure steam cools to saturated steam and high pressere feed-0 water flow flashes to saturated steam at 212 F. 3 No credit is assun.ed for condensation.of released steam in the bui_lding. 4. flo credit is assumed for ventilation ai r flow through the turbine building tunnel to the stack. The t irro dependent stean flow rate into the turbine building is based on the Gd f United Report " Adequacy of L ACBUR Energe ncy Core Coolino Sys tem" (55-942) and supporting RELAP computer analysis for a 0.604 f t.2 break (10" sch 80 pipe) in the containment building (see riuure AI). In.the turbine building the piping is 10"s ch 120 wi th a break ficra area of 0.448 ft.2, so that flewto the pipe-area ratio (yrge building would be fron c-break in the t break would continue for four seccnds until the.60f). Flou out of the directly proportional 0 reactor pressure drcps below 1,000 psig whereupon-the main steam isolation valve (dslV), starts. = ! j to close (ten second closure time). Hence, 14 seconds after the break occurs, the stcan release will stop. fio reduction in flow is considered i + as the MSIV closes. [ t .I a i .. I

l;E i 1 2 32 HETH00'0F CALCULATION The steam release to the turbine building and resultant pressure buildup is calculated by integrating the steam release over a small time step, calculating the pressure due to the resulting increased building mass (air plus steam), and calculating the air-steam flow out-of the building vent with the turbine building-to-ambient pressure differential as the driving force. This process is repeated for subsequent one second time steps until the HSlV closes fully,a't 14 seconds. A sample calculation is shown in Attachment A, and the resultant curve of turbine building pressure versus time is shown in Figure A2. 3.3 TURBINE BUILDING PEAK PRESSURE The curve on Figure A2 shows the turbine building peak pressure to be 18.09 psia or 3.39 psig. The corrugated aluminum and steel building design in-ternal pressure, as specified in Sargent and Lundy specification No. W-1902, is 25 psf or 0.17 psi. Accordingly the turbine building walls and roof would not be expected to withstand the 3.39 psig pressure. 3.4 HIGH PRESSURE FEEDVATER FLASHING TO STEAM T J Attachment B shows the calculation of the feedwater that flashes to steam associated with a high pressure feedwater line break. Considering the flow out of the feedwater line break to be a throttling process, (isen-thalpic hy = h ), the quantity of steam flashing from water is determined 2 by h2 = hr +x2 rg. The turbine building pressure is assumed to be 14.7 h psia and the temperature 212 F for calculational purposes. No credit is 0 assumed for condensation f rom 212 F to room temperature. The break generating the largest amount of steam is that-downstream of feedheater No. 3 where the feed tenperature is the highest. For this case only 13.49 lbs/sec of steam are generated by flashing which is a factor of 200 loacr than the 2,622 lbs/sec main steam line rupture flow. Accordingly, this amount will not produce a significant pressure in-crease within the turbine building.

3.5 CONCLUSION

S The following conclusions have been developed from this study: 1. Communication between the condenser compartment, the feedwater pump areas, the high pressure heater compartment, the tunnel-containment building pipe penetration area and the remainder of the turbine building is sufficiently open to preclude the buildup of any signi-ficant di f ferential pressures between these areas. Therefore, i n-ternal building structural elements will not be subjected to con- - e@ sequential pressure loadings. (/

r l -) S' f( f e -Q' 2. The pressure buildup resulting from'a-nain steam line break will substantially exceed the building design pressure.(3.39 psig vs'. 0.17 psig respectively). Since the turbine building construction is 4 . basi: ally insulated corrugated metal panels mounted externally on a structeral stcel frame, the ' pressure buildup will ble.r out wall (or roof) panels.well bef ore the structural elements of the building will be af fected, i l, I 3 The peak. pressure buildup for a main steam pipe break outside of containrent occurs before any reduction in flow i s a s s u..c d fo r closure ' of the tiSIV. Conseque'ntly, this peak pressure does not i depend upon the closure of the it51V and therefore is applicable to both isolable and non-isolable main steam pipe breaks outside con-- I l t a i nn.cn t. j 1 4 The radiological release to the public resul t ine; f r om the s ter venting f through bleun-out wall (or roof) panels will not be any greater than the release resulting f rom the steam being erhausted through the t urbine bui lding intake vents. Consequently. na changes to the j building are required. [ s t i l l

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4 s ' k t -- 4. ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS The control room, electrical equipment room and the diesel generator room will not bi dar.uged by a hi<f. energy line break since all of these ' rooms are protected by concrete walls and are renote from the piping runs. Wi th respect to pressurizat ion, the -control reor, electrical room and the diesel generation rcom are isolated from the turbine building by concrete walls or substantial steel personrel acce ss Joors which open out into the turbine building and are set in steel frames. The electrical and diesel generation rooms are located of f the machine shop so that two perscnnel doors are interposed between these rcoms and the turbine building, if the ability of the turbine building corrugated aluminum and steel insulated wall panels (and their attachments to the structeral frare) to withstand the internal turbine building pressure is compared wi th the structural integrity of a personnel access steel door set into a steel f rame or compared to structural concrete walls it can only be concluded that the turbine building wall panels will blea out to relieve building pressure before the walls cnd doors isolating the speci fied rooms are daraged. ) It is conceivable that the transient cessure buildup will cause steam to scep into the specified ccoms through the closed personnel doors. Seepage into the electrical and diesel generatinn rooms will be minimal because of the doubic door isolation. Scapage into the control room of any low tempera-ture steam /aater vapor can easily be stepped by control roon personnel by taping or blocking access door joints. Consequently, no adverse environnental ef fects are anticipated in the control roon, diesel generator or electrical equipment rooms. e 1 s==Wuc

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5. POSTULATED BREAKS. A!!D EFFECT Oil SAFE SHtlTD0Vil 0F Tile PLAtlY I

5.1 DISCUSS 10ft Protective systems or devices are provided to prevent the LACBVR reactor system from blowing down in the event that a pipe break occurs outside containment. For example, i f the mair.s t eam line breaks outside containment. the Main Steam isolation Valve will automatically close when system pressure decays to.1000-psig. Closure of the it51V will initiate a reactor scram, if the feedwater line breaks outside conm: ent, the feedwater line check valve will automatically swing closed to iso' ate the reactor system from the break. The loss'of feed-water u>uld ultimately result in a-reduction of vessel water level and, at -12 inches, a reactor scram would be initlated as well as closure of the rtSIV (to isolate the reactor systen) and initiation of the High Pressure Core Spray sys-tem (the ECCS system). For an isolated reactor system (flSIV closed), a safe shutdo. n of the LACBWR plant is assured if either of the two following systems remains operational: a. Emergency Shutdown Condenser System. flote: The Decay Heat Cooling System can be substituted for the Emer- '} gency Shutdown Condenser afLer the latter has reduced reactor tempera-ture to under 4500F. b. High Pressure Core Spray (ECCS) System tiote: The Alternate Core Spray Systen can replace the HPCS Systen after the latter has reduced reactor pressure to less than ^'120 p s ig. The cooldown resulting from use of the Emergency Shutdrwin Condenser Sys-tem with transfer to the Decay lleat Cooling System most closely duplicates the cooldown method used during a normal plant shutdown. Transfer to the Decay Heat Cooling System is not necessary, ho< sever, since the Emergency Shutdown Condenser l's capable of bringing the reactor temperatore down to less than 2000F. iberefore, the reactor system is no longer a high energy systera. The ability of the Emergency Shutdown Condenser to provide sht'down cooling depends upon the availability of cout ing water. The shell side of-the Shutdown Condenser is supplied automatically by either the high pressure service water system or the demineralized water supply. Common mode failure of both water supply sys-tems by the pipe break outside of containment is possible because of pipe whip and would effectively disable the Shutdu.en Condenser. The High Pressure Core Spray (ECCS) System caa a!so be used to cool down the reactor system by periodically venting or blowing down' the reactor system to permit long term addi t ion of cold ile The HPCS system obtains i ts ini t ial supply of water from the. overhead storage tank which is located within contaii-ment. A minimum of 15,000 gallons is reserved for the HPCS system and at the maximum flow rate of 100 qpm (2 pumps in operation) provides for r, continuous

.V i 1 L _k. injection. period of 2.5 hours which can be increased to ^/5 hours if one' of the HPCS pumps.Is secured. The overhead storage tank is resupplied automatic-4 [ ally by either the high pressure service water system or the demineralized water. I supply. Common mode failure of both water supply systems by the pipe break out-i. side of containment would limit the use of the HPCS system to the available over-head storage tank inventory. However, the alternate core spray system could be used to backup the HPCS system and insure an uninterrupted supply of cooling j water if reactor pressure is less than F l20 psig. This pressure can be achieved prior to termination of the HPCS system operation by venting or blowing down the reactor system. Thus continuous core' cooling can be maintained during the trans-4 Ition from HPCS system cperation to Alternate Core Spray operation, if a pipe break occurs outside containment and one of the isolation devices fails,

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a non-isolable condition could exist. For example, if the main steam line breaks outside of containment and the MSIV falls to operate, the reactor system will blow down to essentially atomspheric pressure. Adequate core cooling for this type of incident (a loss of coolant accident) is provided by the HPCS systen (sup-4 plemented by the Alternate Cor-Spray system as discussed previously) as shown by the LACBWR ECCS analysis (References I, 2, 3 and 4). 5.2 CONClusicuS { The following conclusions have been developed in the study based on the discussion presented above, a review of piping arrangements, and a review of auxiliary sys-tems design: i 1. The High Pressure Core Spray (ECCS) systen is the only cooling system which will ensure a safe reactor shutdown for either an isolable or non-isolable j pipe break. L The HPCS system is totally within the containment building and is designed to withstand the environmental ef fects of t' loss of coolant accident. Furthermore, planned modifications to this s3, tem wili provide the re-quired redundancy to make the systen function even with the failure of one active component. Consequently, it has been concluded that any pipe hreak outside containment will not adversely affect the operation of the HPCS system except possibly to limit _its operation to a period not less 1 - than 2.5 hours. 2. The High Pressure Core Spray system will be capable of providing long 4 term core cooling if either the High Pressure Service Water gystem or_ the Demineralized Water Supply system remains operational af ter a pipe break outside containment. r i 3 The High Pressure Core Spray combined with the Alternate Core Spray system will be capable of providing adequate short term and long term core cooling to ensure a safe reactor shutdown even if both the [ High Pressure Service Water and the Ocmineralired Water Supply sys-l- -( ) tems are damaged by the pipe break outside. containment. j i i I i t

4. A review of the lACBWR pipinq arianqcments shnus that tir Auwiliary (,o r e Spray piping is more easily protected frm the c onsequenc es of a high energy pipe break outside containment than either the liigh Pressure Servico Water or Demineralized Water Supply piping. The Alternate Core Spray piping is in relatively close proximity to the main steam line and the bypass line in only one locatiuo c.ad that is for a distance of about 10 feet. Pipe restraints have b cn designed which will hold the main steam line and the bypass line so that they cannot whip into the Alternate Core Spray line in the event they break in that area. These main steam and bvoass line restraints which are shown in Figure A3 uill also protect t he liigh Pressure Service Water and Deminerali/ed Water Supply piping run. The High Pressure Service Water and the Deninerali/cd Water Supply piping, however, run parailel with and very close to the main stcau line in other areas, it was concluded that pipe restraints or pro-tective coverings w2re not feasible in these areas. 5 The active components of the Alternate Core Spray System will not be damaged by a pipe break outside contairnaent. The Alternate Core Spray pumps and pump controls are located in the Crib llouse and, therefore, are well isolated from any potential main steam line break locations. The Al ternate Core Spray control valves are located the Turbine Building fic//anine floor where the main steam line and on bypass 1ine restraints wiiI he i m. c a l l ed. These restraints preclude damage to the valves from pipe whip. Damage cau.ed by direct jet imp i nger. cn t of steam from a pipe break is not probable lezcause of the location of the control valves relative to the patential break loca-tions for the main steam line and the bypass line. Figure /3, a plan view of t he fiezzanine f loor, shows t he location of thr Alternate Core Sp n y control valves relative to the potential break locations (I through II). The main steam line break locations (I t hrooyh 5) are so oriented that the resoltinq stcan jeis are not itirected at the control valves. Indirect and, therefore, lou ene n;, inpinspeent of s t eam and/or wa t er varer -i s poss ib le f rm s.oe of these break locations. The control valves, howev"r, uiti perform satisfactorily c since t hey are equipped wi t h total ly enc losed, non-vent i la t ed, n.ot or operators. The main steam bypas. line break localions (6 thi nogh 10) , _, ace _oriente.d so t ha_t 1.be resulting steam j e t s a re d i rec t ed aw.w f,,ryn,, _ the Alternate Core Spray control valves. Only the jet from break location 11 (s t eam-ttr o land s team genera t or) is directed to.rard the - Alternate Core Spray control valves. This jet will not affect valve operation since (1) the break size is sac.ll (only 1-inch nominal pipe size), and U) t he break location is 5 feet above the Alternate Core Spray valves. _m .s e - e ~N

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The High Pressure Service Water system and the Demineralized Water' Supply system have not been designed as vital systems. Therefore, active.com-i ponent redundancy is not provided. Furthermore, their pumps are not tied Into emergency power sources. 6. It wi11 be necessary.to_ install a manual valve (norm.nly closed is preferable) in-the branch line outside containment which connects the High Pressurc Service Water system to the Alternate Core Spray system. While the High Pressure Service Water system is not a high energy sys-tem (It operates at less than 150 psig and under 125 r), and therefore unlikely to break, it might be damaged by the whipping of a high energy line (e.g., main steam IInc). A break.of the High Pressure Service ~

• Water piping could, therefore, divert sufficient flow to adversely affect core cooling.

7 Based on statements I through 6 above, it has been concluded that pipe breaks outside containment will not prevent the LACBWR reacto'r ) from being shut down and maintained in a safe condition if the fol-i lowing measures are taken to assure the functioning of the Alternate i Core Spray system: 1 a. Provide pipe restraints for the main steam line and the steam p bypass line where they are in close proximity to the Alternate Core Spray piping. 1 b. Provide a manual valve to isolate the Alternate Core Spray system form the High Pressure Service Water system. If normal operation does not permit the valve to be closed, sufficient time is available to cl.ose it since the High Pressure Core Spray can operate for a least 2.5 hours before the Alternate Core Spray system must be available. e e 4 's ) i .i 1 Q.I m, nm g g +,, 'j 4 . -v7 w bh ' ['I N ~ 7 '.,:." k'p(( j.y .J J ; R.; [ n ml ~ _ a{ h h a ~. . n..hN ~ n, y[ n ^ Nt w w n.,,

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1 L ~s i ATTACHMENT A STATEllENT OF PROBLEM Calculate turbine building pressures resulting from a high energy pipe break in the following areas: A. Tunnel - containment building pipe penetration area B. Condenser compartment C. Turbine building D. Feedwater pump room E. High pressure heater compartment. The.7bove 5 areas are ell interc'onnected with large open doorways, pipe chases, stairways or floor gratings. Therefore, pressure buildup in any one area is not conceivable. Accordingly, the entire turbine building and tunnel entrance will be considered as one interconnected volume. Assumptions: 1. Pressure drop through turbine building is negligible. 2. All doors are closed and turbine building vents through a 6' x 6' vent with louver. 3 High pressure steam cools to saturated steam at 212 F and high pressure water lines flash to saturated steam at 212 F. 4. No credit is assumed for condensation. 5 No credit is assumed for ventilation air flow through turbine building to stack. Turbine building free volume 70,168 ft 3 Grade floor = 3 76,807 ft Mezzanine floor = 3 199,576 ft Main floor = 3 346,551 ft Total 9,630 ft 3 Tunnel entrance area = 3 356,181 ft Total free volume = ) 13 P

w i j Pressure Calculation PV = nkT Where: P = press - Ib/ft 2 V = volume - ft3 n = lb moles E = universal gas constant ft Ibf 1545 Ib moles R T = temperature, R 2 A. Main Steam Line Brcak in Tunnel Entrance Area Per Gulf United Report S5-1155, for a break in the 10" schedule 80 main steam line in the turbine building, the total leakage was calculated to be 11,000 lbs steam through the 0.518 ft2 break, after 14 seconds. For turbine building free volume in lbs air 356,181 ft 3 21,522 lbs = 16.55 ft>~ Tb Air molecular weight = 23.97 18.016 Steam molecular weight = Nair = 21,522 =742.9 lbs moles 28.97 From Relap run of 10-18 71, supporting calculations for S5-942 report, 2 steam flow vs. t ime may be obtained for a 0.604 f t area break at the steam header in the containment building (Figure A-1). The steam line in the turbine building is 10" sch 120. 2 Tr (9.064)2 0.448 ft break area = = 4 x 12 x 12 Integrating the graph of Figure A-1 for i second to obtain steam f'ew into turbine building. 1355 lbs/sec 1 sec = 1355 lbs 1520 + 1190 = 2 . el e b .)

I i } For the 10" schedule 120 pipe 0.448 1355 1005 = 0.604; 1005 6 n = steam 55.78 lb moles 18.016 = 742.9 + 55 78 = 798.68 lb moles = ntotal P = nRT v P = (798.68 lb moles)(1545 ft Ibf. )(672 R) Ib_ moles "R 356,181 ft> P = 2328.1 lb P2 16.16 psia ftl Loss Through Turtine Building Vent The turbine building vent has a minimum opening of 6ft x 6ft with a louver. The flow rate through the louver is as follows: From the " Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance" b/ l.E. Idelchik (trans-lated from Russian) Section IV, for a stamped louver with adjustable slats in a large wall: [f = /\\ H 1.6; or dP = 1.6 O W2 = 29 y'W z / i 29 ilhere V is mean velocity. For the turbine building internal pressure of 16.16 ps?a and outside pres-sure of 14.7 psia. 16.16 - 14.7 = 1.46 psi AP = For the steam-air mixture assume weight average density: Air. 2i 522 x 0.0604 lb 1299.9 = fT3 37.4 steam. 1,005 x 0.0373 lb = TT3 22,527 - TOTAL - 1337.3 0.0593 lb/ft3 -} (7 = 1337.3 ~22527 ~ Y p ze

-.~ i .( k s Exhaust through the vent (2)(32.2 f t j (l'.16 lb -) (144_ in ) 2 29 A PI 2 W = = i 1.6.P sec ind ft' 4-I.6(0.0593 lb/ft ) 3 2 2 Wi . I13378.8 ft 4 'sec (113378.8)I - 336.7 ft/sec W g fyAW = (0.0593)(6 x 6)(336.7) ~ 7.818 lb/sec out of vent Q = = Net steam in building af ter i sec 972.8 lb's 1005 j(22527-1005) (718.8) O Q. -Q = = out nt 1 4 i The attached graph, Figure A-2,shows the resulting calculated pressures from 0-to-14 seconds in one-second increments _with.a peak pressure of' 18.09 psia or 3.39 psis. l l 4 s. I -m 6 n + '? '{ y ,') 4 v; ~ p a. 6 ~ 0% Y *'fijff ' ~ ' yf ' '..Af 3 , % ) { '. '. ; _ ~

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3 1 ATTACHitEtJT B DETERMitJATI0rl 0F THE LDS OF FEEDWATER FLASHitJG TO STEAtt From Mark's Handbook - 7th Edition Pg. 4-67, Throttling Flow is a Coastant Enthalpy Process, i.e., h3=h' 2 Known: A. Feed pump dischar,ge parameters: 610,233 lbs/hr 220.9 F 191.9 Btu /lb B. Feedwater heater flo.3 flow parameters: 610,233 lbs/hr 285.6 F 257.3 Btu /lb h h2

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(; I m. I References I. Gulf' United Report S5-942, TechnicalfEvaluation,. Adequacy of. ~ LACBWR' Emergency Core Cooling System. .. -o 2. Gulf United P.cport SS-1075 Rev. I, Response to Questions by- ' l AEC/DL'with regard to SS-942, dated November 15, 1973 ~ 3 Gulf United Report SS-1085, Review of Densification Effects in LACBWR, dated May 15, 1973 4. Gul f Uni ted Report S5-1126, Supplemental information on LACBWR Emergency Core Cooling System,-dated October 10, 1974'.- g. i .f, ' z'; ~ .s g z. 2

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I Yorm A StI e 10-79 ~ TRAVEL REQUEST Requestor C. W. Angle Employee Number 26502 ~ Date Requested 7/23/81 D'ESTINATION: City and State Richland, WA U Street Address Horn Rapids Road Firm Name Exxon Nuclear Co. Date O Time of Meeting 8/6/81 - 8:30 AM Others in Party (and firm represented if other than DPC) : J. Taylor R. Shimshak S. Raffety (or Alternate) Travel Preferred Travel Confirmed Date Time Method Date Time Method DEPARTURE: DPC Leave lax-Med. 8/5/81 TBA Air l Arrive Richland, G 8/5/81 Leave Pasco-Fri. 8/7/81 6:30 P Ptpublic Arrive Portland, OR 8/7/81 7:30 P Icave Portland 8/12/81 11:10 P Air Arrive IaX 8/12/81 6:16 P Air Arranged By: Richland Portland Motel Required: lX) No (x) les

1) Richland-Hanford Pouse Portland Richland Motel Preferred 2) Ibl W v Tnn Confirmed:

Yes ( X) No ( X) Pasco or Richland, Portland-Unknown (Cinda: I will arrange for Renta1 Car Required: YU3 (x ) No ( ) ground transportation) Rental Car Confirmed: Yes ( ) No ( X) Personal Car Authorized Purpose of Travel' Richland, WA: Inspect fuel, review resolution of out-standing deviations or Iuel tabrication items, audit materials certifica-tion records. Present technical paper on Fuel Storage Racks, FESW repair and ruel ::, nipping of ruelS PerIormance ConIerence (at Fortlanc, Oregon). '~ APPROVALS Immediate Supervisor Date Account to be Charged Cost Center Manager (if different than supervisor) Date Asst. Gen. Mgr./ Controller (if dif ferent than Cost Center Mgr. ) Date _ _ _ _ -_-_ _}}