ML20010B479
| ML20010B479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry, Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1980 |
| From: | Feit R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010B468 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-81-204 NUDOCS 8108170044 | |
| Download: ML20010B479 (8) | |
Text
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TRIP REPORT AUG2 21980 flame of Author:
Ronald Feit Places and Dates; Brunswick July 28-29,1930 Browns Ferry July 31, 1980
Purpose:
To discuss plans for full-scale replication fire tests requested by the liRC Comission Discussion:
In December 1978, the NRC staff decided that full-scale replication testing of actual plant configurations and fire protection systems should be implement 9-These plans were reported to '.he Comission on August 8, 1979,'TCY-79-478. The recent Commission Order (CLI-80-21, May 27, 1980) emphasizes the importance that the Comission places on tests and requests that they be expedited and that a fim schedile be established.
Planning for these tests was initiated in early 1979, culminating in a user request memorandum to the Division of Reactor Safety Research in July 1979.
Detailed plans werg nde for a full-scale replication test of the fire protection system for the Rancho Seco Make-up Pump Room.
Prior to a final inspection and meeting with the utility in September 1979, it was learned that the fire protection system had been rodified and that the planned test was no longer relevant.
Accordingly, it was decided to alter the test plan (Schroeder and Eisenhut to Murley, September 21,1979) and to begin planning for a full-scale. replication-test of the fire protection system for the Arkansas Auxiliary Building Corridor. A plant visit was conducted in November 1979, but final plans were delayed by problems in obtaining information, from the utility,
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needed to replicate the test configuration, l
As a result of the recent Comission Order (May 27,1980), which requested the *,taff to test first the configurations of greatest concern to the staff, it was decided to test the Browns Ferry Reactor Building first, and the Brunswick intake structure basement next (Vollmer to Murley, June 26,1930).
The following a scussion reflects the conclusions from site visits to these plants:
8108170044 810604 hAN N 81-204 PDR
{S AUG2 21980 2
Browns ferry _
The site designated in the user request memo was visited by the NRC and The fol W ing represent my laboratory personnel listed in this report.
conclusions as RES program manager but also reflect a conscreus of views from the other team members.
Although the area designated by the user request probably does (1) not represent the worst plant situation in an operating plan m dified.
The test configuration consists of t. r vertical cable trays and (2) conduits leading into a stack of horizontal trays that are at least The user request was based on the assumption 20 feet from the ground.
The that the horizontal stack was much closer to the floor level.
most expensive part of the test will be to reproduce the horizontal Accordingly, we intend to conduct a trays below the high ceiling.
separate effects test of the vertical trays and conduits with appropriate barriers to simulate the horizontal trays, and with the Design Basis Fire to see if propagation occurs up the trays, or if temperatures in the vicinity of the horizontal stack approaches the This test will be conducted with the cable ignition temperature.
fire suppression system disabled as specified in the user request The Design Basis Fire will be allowed to burn for the time that is agreed to be a reasonable fire brigade response time plus memo.
detector response time and some time to account for variability of If any fire propagation up the vertical trays or conduits resul ts.
The is observed, then the full-scale test will be conducted.
extent of the horizontal tray configuration utilized will be determined by considering a 30-degree fire spread angle from the point of entry intc the horizontal stack of the vertical trays.
The Design Basis Fire will be about two gallons of flamable (3) fluid and will use the existing dyke arrangement around the vertical tray floor penetrations instead of the proposed 25 square feet.
The penetrations will be reproduced to allow leakage through the floor although, with the method of construction at the plant, this should be small.
The ventilation rate will be r.easured by TVA personnel during (4) operation of the p,lant.
The brigade response time test conducted by TVA appeared to be (5)
The reasonable, and I see no need to have them repeat the test.
interpretation of the results should be done by HRR with a consistent basis for the detennination of the time to be used For example, the first two brigade members arrived for the test.
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AUG2 21980 at the fire site within 2 minutes with portable extinguishers, The response and the full brigade was available within 5 minutes.
time chosen should be consistent with other liRR guidance on fire brigades.
The plant was licensed on the basis of protecting redundant sdfety (6) divisions and no consideration was given by NRC to the actual functional redundancy that might exist between the redundant Since the replication test is directed toward safety divisions.
evaluating the effectiveness of HRC guidelines and the regulatory review process, failure of any cable in the redundant safety divisions will be considered a test failure.
It was agreed that all fomal comunications for the test program (7)
- However, will be through Dick Clark (NRC) and Ralph Thompson (TVA).
infonnal discussions will be directed towards the following respon--
sible individuals:
Ralph Thompson TVA Overall Coordination Howard Crisler TVA Technical Detail Overall Technical Coordination Ronald Feit NRC Leo Klamerus Sandia Technical Detail Official Request and Responses Dick Clark NRC The TVA personnel agreed to furnish the technical data _needed by Sandia and Unde 1 writers Laboratory to procure the equipment and construct the mock-up of the test area by September 1, 1980.
Brunswick _
The site designated in the user request memo was visited by the NRC and The following not only laboratory persennel listed in this report.
represents my conclusions as program manager, but also reflects a 1
consensus of views from the other team members.
The area uesignated by the user request memo does represent a (1)
After review of the reasonable test in the category designated.
area, a specific location in the northeast corner of the basement (14 feet long,14 feet wide and 14 feet high) was chose It was not clear during the visit whether or water ruke-up pumps.
not the two pumps are considered to be in separate safety divisions because of the possibility of cross connecting the pumps from the The utility personnel indicated that they other operating plant.would examine the pump and circuit arrangement an If the northeast corner proves to be unacceptable, because point.
there is no exposure of redundant divisions, then an alternate location on the west wall of the building will be utilized for the replication test.
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-(2) 'The Design Basis Fire will be between two and five gallons o u
The flamable liquid placed in a 25-foot dyke beneath the pumps.
f final choice will be mde prior to the test.
The ventilation rate will be de+cnnined by consideration of the l
These ventilation fan flow rate and the total building volum (3) l personnel.
The UE&C personnel agreed to conduct an un (4) by an NRC. representative.
i It was agreed that all fonnal comunications for the test program i
test.
.will be through me as NRC program mnager for the replicat on l
(5)
Hannon andRobertPorterfield(UE&C),withtheunderstandingthatJohn Infonnal (NRC) be kept infonned of the progress of -the program.
discussions will be directed towards the following individuals:
Overall Coordinator R UE&C Robert Porterfield
!Overall Coordinator NRC Ronald felt Sandia Technical Detail Leo Klamerus d d by Sandia and
.UE&C personnel agreed to furnish the technical data 30, 1980.
up of the test area by September l
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BROWNS FERRY HEETING JULY 30,1980 Cl{ATT Supy.. Fire Prot. Engr. Nuc. Pr.
Ralph E. Thomason CilATT Jerry E. Wills Regulatory Staff TVA e
OEDC Licensing l
David Wall ENDES Thermal Des. Proj.
Charles M. Burton ENDES Charles H. Sudduth -
EEB 110 ward E. Crisler MEB ENDES Sandia Leo J. Klamerus BNL Ed MacDoygall Underwriters Leon J. Przybyla NRC/NRR Scott fludson APL/JiiU Lawrence liunter NRC/RES Ronald Feit NRC Dick Clark '
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f July 30, 1980 MTlW H. L. Abercrombie
Subject:
FIRE DRILL - JULY 28,1980 - BFNP
Reference:
Memorandum from J. G. Dewcase to H. L. Abercrombie, dated July 23, 1980 concerning NRC Fire Suppression Testing (LOS 800718 801)
The following unannounced fire frill was conducted as requested in the raferenced memorandum. Observers were Ray Phifer, Safety Engineer; Clen Jones, Safety Engineering Aide; and Jim Chase, NRC Resident Inspect-tor.
Date of fire drill: July 28, 1980 Time drill initiated:
1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> Alarm initiated from: Plant phone, unit 2 reactor building, elevation 593 Time location announced on PA system:
1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> Reported location and simulated fire condition: Unit 2 reactor building, elevation 593, R8, P-line, north wall.
The simulated fire consisted of spilled combustible liquid covering a floor area of approximately 25 feet square below exposed cable trays.
Applicable prefire plans: None First fire brigade members arrived at scene:
1632 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20976e-4 months <br />. Two members with protable dry chemical. fire extinguisher and radiological survey equipment.
Other fire brigade members arrived at scene:
1634 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.21737e-4 months <br />.
Five members arrived with, three portable dry chemical fire extinguishers, one por-toble carbon dioxide fire extinguisher, four self-contained breathing apparatuses, and four 2-way radios.
Fire brigade 1cader arrives at scene:- 1635 houcs. (Two of the members arriving at 1674 v6re-qualified fire brigade leaders and offered to take command).
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Time drill terminated:
1636 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.22498e-4 months <br />.
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2 H. L. Abercrombie FIRE DRILL - JUL,Y 28, 1980 - BFNP Evaluation of fire drill _ response The overall response was excellent. The amount and type of equipment brought to the scene was adequate for initial attack.
The fire brigade le5 der evaluated the simulated fire and recognized the availability of the nearest fire hose station and automatic or manually activated water spray system.
Communications Observers at the ccene encountered problems understanding the information announced on the PA system.
This problem appeared to be with the clarity of the system.
' Re commenda t ions Perform test and determine clarity probica with the plant PA system.
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