ML20010A357

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Safety Evaluation Re SEP Topic II.1.C, Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Industrial,Transportation & Military Facilities. Topics to Be Submitted for NRC Evaluation Were Listed in Schedule Provided in Licensee
ML20010A357
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 07/15/1981
From: Linder F
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-02-01.C, TASK-2-1.C, TASK-RR LAC-7668, NUDOCS 8108110350
Download: ML20010A357 (8)


Text

.

D DA/RYLAND

/__/

k!

C,00PERA TiVE ' P O BCX 817

  • 2615 EAST AV SOUTH
  • L/, CROSSE. WISCONSIN 54601 (608) 788 4 000 July '.5,1981 In reply, please refer to IAC-7668 DOCKET NO. 50-409 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission S

k(k )\\

p rL 5

ATTN:

Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director

(

Division of Licensing V

L.

j

'y Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Aub 10 gggj e Division of Operating Reactors Washington, D. C.

20555 p,

y,s.njxul,,,,

g s

SUBJECT:

DAIRYLAND ECWER COOPERATIVE

//

O LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)

_yg PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 SEP TOPIC II.l.C, POTENTIAL IIAZARDS DUC TO NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION AND MILITARY FACILITIES

REFERENCE:

(1)

DPC Letter, LAC-7387, Linder to Eisenhut, Dated February 27, 1981 Gentlemen:

Enclosed find Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for SEP Topic II.l.C, Potential llazards Due to Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military racilities which hau been prepared for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor.

Our letter, Reference 1, identified topics for DPC to submit for NRC evaluation.

The subject topics were listed in the schedule submitted with Reference 1.

If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact us.

Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWE COOPERATIVE

'A 6~v

<b~

Frank Linder, General Manager FL:LSG:eme 035 cc:

J. G. Keppler, Reg. Dir., NRC-DRO III j

NRC Resident Inspectors 8100110350

%9 4

PDR ADOCK PDR P

}

=.

uA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR SYSTEMATIC EVALUANON PROGRAM SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT TOPIC II.l.C POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO NEARBY INDUSTRIAL.

TRANSPORTATION AND MILITARY EACILITIES The safety objective of Topic II.1.C, " Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military Facilities" is to assure that the nuclear plant is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to potential accidents rhich may occur as the result of activities at nearby industrial, transporta-tia..a.d military facilities.

The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance of SRP's 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.

There is little industrial activity in the vicinity of LACBWR.

There is a fish hatchery located approximately three miles south of the plant.

The nearest concentration rM industrial activity is located in La Crosse, approximately 18 miles north.

The Dairyland Power Cooperative site on which LACBWR is situated also contains a 14 MWe eil-fired unit, which is maintained on standby status and a 350 MWe coal-fired plant.

The nearest highway to the plant is Wisconsin State Highray No. 35.

The minimum distance between the traveled portion of the highway and the reactor building is approximately 520 feet.

The guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1, was utilized to evaluate the con-sequences of a postulated explosive accident on the highway.

Area specific statistics were not available, so general statistics were used.

The accident rate for hazardous material shipment is approx-imately 1.69 per million vehicle miles.

Fire occurs in 1.57% of reportable truck accidentn.1 Most fires involve only the fuel from the vehicles fuel tanks.

A conservative assumption was made that the proportion of truck accidents in which the cargo explodes is not greater than the percentage in which fire occurs.

The exposure distance for trucks carrying explosives was determined to be 0.53 r

u Using the' formula mi as[s, sing the method in Regulatory Guide 1.91.where r is exposure rate, n is the explosion ra r=n frequency of shinments and s is the exposure distance, r is approxi-ma tely 1. 4 x 10-8f The frequency of shipments of explosives on Highway 35 is not known, but a review of the surrounding area shows there would be ex?eemely few, if any, truck shipments of explosives past the plant.

Highway 35 is a two_ lane highway passing through towns along the Mississippi River.

The largest city to the south of the plant is Prairie du Chien, while La Crosse is the major city to the north.

There are no known manufacturers of explosives near either city.2 La Crosse is serviced by Interstate Highway I-90, on J

which the majority of non-local generated traffic travels.

Since there are no industries in the vicinity of hACBWR which utilize explosives, the number of trucks carrying explosives passing the plant would be extremely small.

Therefore, it is our judgement that the threat to the safe operation of the plant posed by highway accidents involving explo-sives is suffic22ntly remote so that such accidents need not be consid-i ered as a design basis event.

The potential consequences of highway accidents involving chemicals were 1

also evaluated.

Toxic chemicals which form a gas cloud when released could possibly reach the plant in concentrations high enough to be of concern depending on such factors as spill size and atmospheric disper-aion conditions.

The wind blows from the direction of the road towards the plant less than 10% of the time.3 No data exists for the likelihood of uccidents involving toxic chemicals occurring on Highway 35 Accident data has been compiled for the neighboring state of Michigan, however.

The expected frequency of an accident involving hazardous chemicals on the approximately ten-mile stretch of US Route 31 past Big Rock Point was calculated to be about 1.3 x 10-3 per year.4 Wisconsin State Highway 35 is a two lane road, as compared to US Route 31, which is a four lane highway.

Therefore, traffic and hence, the frequency of an accident, should be no greater on Highway 35 than US Route 31.

The percent of tanker truck accidents which involve a significant loss of material is about 2%.5 Thus, the potential annual exposure rate to the plant'due to toxic chemical accidents on Highway 35 can be conservatively estimated j

at 3 x 10-6 per year.

The probability of toxic chemical exposure is higher than the NRC staff objective of approximately 10-/ per year.

SRP 2.2.3 does state that expected rates of occurrences of approximately 10-6 is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguementa, the realistic probability can be ebown to be lower.

The frequency used for toxic -

chemical accidents is based on toxic chemical traffic on highways throughout the state of Michigan.

S ~ ace there are no industrial com-plexes in the (2cinity of LACBWR which would generate toxic chemical traffic, the rate would probably be somewhat lower on Wisconsin State Highway 35.

Therefore, it is our judgement that the threat to the i

safe operation of the plant posed by highway accidents involving toxic chemicals is sufficiently remote so that such accidents need not be

+

considered as a design basis event.

minimum distance of 475 feet east of the reactor.gd pass LACBWR at a Two main tracks of the Burlington Northern Railro There are approx-imately 20 - 30 freight trains daily.7 The consequences of a postu-lated explosion on the railroad were evaluated in accordance with the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1 The accident rate involving fire is approximagely 2.1 x 10-9 train accidents involving fire per car mile traveled.

4 -

The explosion accident rate should be less than the fire accident rate, since while the majority of explosions cause fires, the majority of fires do not result from explosions.

Burlington Northern Company searched their records and found one train car carrying explosives had passgd LACBWR during a one month period, a rate of 12 train cars per year.

The track Therefore, the exposure rate is con-exposuredistanceig0.76 miles.per year, which is less than 10-7 per year.

servatively 2 x 10-Tuerefore, the risk to the plant for a train carrying explosives is sufficiently low.

The probability of a train accident involving hazardous chemicals was also examined.

Burlington Northern Company had performed a survey on hazardous chemicals passing through the area of the Prairie Island Site.

They identified seventeen hazardous chemicals which were transported past Prairie Island. (See Table 1).

Since the tracks near Prairie Island are the same as those passing LACBWR, it car be assmned that approximately the same amount of toxic chemicals were shipped by train past LACBWR.

Regulatory Guide 1.78 requires that chemicals shipped mor'. than 30 times annually should be considered in the evaluation of contral room habit-ability.

Control room habitability is being evaluated

.s part of the TMI Task Action Plan, NUREG-0737, *ask III-D.3.4.

PoteTtial problems and their solutions will be icantified as part of that r mime, independ-ent of the SEP Program.

This evaluation will, however, identify chemicals of potential interest.

The results of the Burlington Northern Company survey showed two chemicals, anhydrous ammonia and hydrochlorie acid, which 'ay be hazardous and are evaluated under the TMI Task Action Plan.

The bank of the Mississippi River is approximately 300 feet from the Reactor Building.ll A survey of al] barge traffic on the Mississippi River, from Minneapolis to the mouth of the Missouri River, excepting upbound traffic going to the Illinois River was consulted.12 Conserva-tively, all other traffic was assumed to pass LACBWR.

The amount of hazardous chemicals shipped is shown in Table 2 Chemicals whose shipping frequency exceeds 50 shipments per year were identified as posing potential hazard to the plant.

These chemicals were categorized as Basic Chemicals and Products, Nitrogenous Chemical Fertilizers (Ammonia), rectilizers and Materials, Gasoline and Distillote fuel Oil.

These chemicals will be considered further in doing the evaluation of control habitability under the TMI Action Plan.

U. S. Lock and Dam No. 8 is about 3/4 mile north of the plant.

The contents of barges passing through the lock are required to be identi-fled.

Personnel at Lock and Dam No. 8 were consulted and had no recollection of barges carrying explosives passing through the lock.

Therefore, it can be concluded the frequency of barges transporting explosives past LACBWR is very low.

The probability of a severe barge accident causing a fire lasting %-1 hour is 1.3 x 10-9 per mile, while that for a severe accident resulting in a longer fire is 9.3 x 10-11 per mile.13 An accident causing an explosion can definitely be cate-gorized as a severe accident, if not en extra severe accident, which has an even lower probability.

Due to the low probability of a severe barge accident, it is our judgement that the threat to the safe operation of the plant posed by accidents resulting in explosions of barge shipments is sufficiently remote so that such accidents need not be considered as a design basis event.

a The closest airport to LACBWR is the La Crosse Municipal Airport, 25 miles north of the plant.

A four-mile wide airway does include the airspace over the site.

The airway's minimum allowed flying altitude is approximately 2,000 feet above the adjacent coal plant's 500 foot smokestack.

In 1980 there were 89,000 flightsl4 utilizing the airport.

If the number of flights was conservatively assumed to be 100,000 and the target area to be the entire protacted area, rather than plant buildings, the probability of an aircraft crashing into the plant can be calculated to be 6 x 10-7 per year using the methodology in SRP 3.5.1.6.

The calculated probability is greater than the actual probability would be, since it was assumed that all aircraft utilizing the La Crosse Municipal Airport would be fly-ing over the plant, while the majority do not.

It can be concluded, therefore, that the airport does not represent an undue risk to the safe operation of the nuclear plant and meets the acceptance criteria of SRP 2.2.3.

The two closest military facilities are Fort McCoy, a National Guard training center, about 35 miles from LACBWR, and Camp Marshall, an air force reserve facility.

LACBWR is not within the military operat'.ng area of Volk Field at Camp Marshalll5 nor does Fort McCoy schedule any flights in the vicinity of the plant.16 Flights ori-ginating from the Des Moines, Iowa National Guard Hendquarters may pass over the plant.

There are up to 15 flights per month during the summer in light or utility helicopters and about 5 trips per year in a light twin engine aircraft from Des Moines to Fort McCoy.17 The number of these military flights is negligible compared to the La Crosse Municipal Airport traffic.

Therefore, there is no addi-tional risk to the plant from military aircraft.

There are no gas pipelines in the vicinity of the plant.18 We conclude that LACBWR is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to industrial, transportation and military activities in the vicinity of the plant.

Possible hazardous chemicals resulting from a barge or train acci-dent have been identified as an item for further consideration in the overall evaluation of the habitability of the control room which is being done as part of the TMI Task Action Plan.

This completes the evaluation of SEP Topic II.l.C. -

-c J

. TABLE 1 i

CilEMICALS SifIPPED BY BURLINGTON NORTIIERN PAST PRAIRIE ISTAND (1 July 1979 - 5 July 1980)

NUMBER OF GFOSS WEIGIIT OF SIIIPMENT (TONS)

CIIEMICAL SIIIINENTS AVERAGE MAXIMUM Acetaldehyde 21 87.6 111 Ammonia,Anhydroun(l) 526 126.6 132.5 Carbon Bisulfide or Carbon Disulfide 1

30 30 4

Chlorine 15 88.3 98 Chlorine Trifluoride 1

32 32 Dimethyl Amine, Anhydrous 11 83.9 1 214 Ilydrocyanic Acid 1

Ill

-41 Ilydrofluoric Acid, An;iydrous 8

53.9 76 Ilydrochloric Acid (1) 162 90.2 127.9 liydrochloric Acid Mixture 1

71 71 IIydrogen Sulfide 29 117.5 12tl.8 Irritating Agent, N.O.S.

1 30 S0 Monochlorodiluoro Methane 2 119.5 127 Nitric Acid il 51.5 51.5 Sulfur Dioxide 13 66.6 85 Vinyl Acetate 14 90.3 108 3

Vinyl Chloride 1-131 131 Chemicals shipped over 30 time / year need to be evaluated to determine the effect of an accidental spill ~on the control room operators.

4 4.

. TABLE 2 BARGE TRAPPIC ON TIIE MISSISSIPPI RIVER CALENDAR YEAR 1977 f

SIIIINENT PREQUENCY CifEMICAL TONNAGE SifIPMENTS/ YEAR Alcohols 50131 17 Benzene And Toluene 109942 37 Sulfuric Acid 31037 10 Basic Chemicals And Products 577983 193 Nitrogenous Chemical fertilizers 532410 177

. Potassic Chemical Fertilizers 23714 8

Phosphatic Chemical fertilizers 97700 33 Pertilizer And Materials 606711 202 Miscellaneous Chemical Products 9862 3

Gasoline 2718821 906 Jet Fuel 107506 36 Kerosene 25373 8

Distillate Fuel Oil 1337511 446 Naphta, Petroleum Solvents 6310R 21 2

Liquified Gases 55325 18 l

Shipment frequencies were calculated using 3000 tons / barge capacity.:

4 = - -

REPERENCES

1.. " Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive' Materials to and from Nuclear Plants", WASH-1238, AEC, December,1972.

2.

Personal Communication with La Crosse Chamber of Commerce and Prairie du Chien Chamber of Commerce, June 25, 1981 3

La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Safeguards Report, August.'067.

4.

NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Hoffman (Consumers Power), dated May 13, 1981.

5.

Ibid.

6.

Safeguards Report 7.

Personal communications with Burlington Northern Canpany, La Crosse Office, June 24, 1981.

8.

" Environmental Survey" 9

Personal Communications with Burlington Northern Company Transportation Department, June 25-July 14, 1981.

10.

" Prairie Island Control Room Toxic Chemical Study", Northern States

Power, 11.

Safegnseds Report.

12.

" Prairie Island" 13

" Environmental Survey"

{

14.

Personal Communication with La Crosse Municipal Airport Tower, June 24 and 25, 1981.

15.

Personal Communication with Volk Fiela, Camp Marshall, June 24, 1981.

16.

Personal. Communication with Fort McCoy, June 26, 1981.

17. LPersonal Communication with Iowa National Guards Headquarters, Camp Dodge, Operations Division, June 26, 1981.

18.

Personal Communications with Northern Natural Pipeline, Wisconsin Gas Company and Northern States Power, June 25, 1981.