ML20009H486
| ML20009H486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos File:GEH Hitachi icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1981 |
| From: | Edgar G GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009H484 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8108100175 | |
| Download: ML20009H486 (16) | |
Text
8/6/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
Docket No. 50-70
)
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Operating License
)
No. TR-1 (Vallecitos Nuclear Center -
)
(Show Cause)
General Electric Test Reactor)
)
LICENSEE'S REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND INTERVENORS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW GE has reviewed the NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July 31, 1981, and has determined that no further Reply is warranted.
GE is in subs tantial agreement with and endorses the Staff's proposed findings and conclusions.
The Intervenors have presented a series of proposed findings and conclusions, virtually all of which have been anticipated and addressed in GE's July 6,1981 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
For the convenience of the Board, the following Reply will attempt to order and group the Intervenors' Findings and Conclusions in terms of five central themes, and provide the corresponding response by to GE's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1I referenc2 The five central themes addressed herein are:
A) the controlling geologic features and their relevant characteristics, B) design basis for vibratory ground motion, C) surface displacement, D) the seismic design of GETR systems, structures, and components necessary to achieve and maintain shutdown, and E) conclusions of law.
In what follows, GE will demonstrate that none of the Intervenors' arguments are supported by substantial 1/
Additionally, Appendix A hereto contains an index to each Intervenor Proposed Finding and the Licensee and NRC Staff re spon s.e s to each such Finding.
e108100175 810806 PDR ADOCK 05000070 G
-2 2/
evidence-or sound law.
A.
The Controlling Geologic Features and Their Relevant Characteristics There is no disagreement that the Calaveras and Verona faults are the controlling geologic features.
Stip.
111; Int. Findings 75, 83, 93, 97.
The Intervenors apparently take issue concerning certain relevant characteristics of those faults and argue that:
- 1) a magnitude 7.5 event on the Calaveras fault could break new ground on the GETR site 3/
(Inc. Findings 8, 12);-
- 2) the Calaveras fault is in a state of seismic gap (Int. Findings 19, 70-74, 76-78, 83, 87, 92);
- 3) movement on the Calaveras fault could cause sympathetic movement on the Verona fault (Int. Findings 9, 11, 16, 19, 32-40, 48, 49, 53, 79-81); and 4) given possible connections to the Verena fault, a magnitude 6.5 event on the Verona fault could be exceeded (Int. Findings 37-40, 46-54).
None of these arguments are supported by substantial evidence.
1)
The record demonstrates that it is extremely unlikely that a magnitude 7.5 event on the Calaveras fault will break i
l new ground on the GETR site.
No reliable evidence exists to show that this is a credible event.
L. Findings 8-13.
l 2/
The Intervenors' Findings numbered 22-27, and 75-102 cite statements of Mr. Barlow, which on the basis of the Board's
(
ruling, do not constitute competent expert testimony.
TR:944.
t 3/
Citations herein will employ the format:
Intervenors' Proposed Findin and Conclusions of Law, dated July 23, 1981 (gs of Fact Int. Findings", or " Int. Conclusions");
Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July 6, 1981 ("L. Findings", or "L. Conclusions").
-3 1
2)
The Intervenors' formulation of the seismic gap theory is not only of doubtful validity, it is also of no relevance to these proceedings.
The GETR design bases assume that a magnitude 7.5 event on the Calaveras fault will, in fact, occur during the facility lifetime.
L. Finding 14, note 14, 3)
The evidence in the GETR trenches precludes sympathetic movement between the Calaveras and Verona faults.
L. Finding 12.
Even if the Calaveras and Verona faults were connected in a direct structural relationship, it does not follow that a magnitude 7.5 event on the Verona fault can be expected.
L. Finding 25, note 21.
4)
Taking into account the possibility and likelihood of connections to the Verona fault, a magnitude 6.5 event is a conservative design basis for events on the Verona fault.
L. Findings 16-25.
B.
Design Basis for Vibratory Ground Motion The Intervenors do not accept and apparently do not understand the manner in which the vibratory ground motior design bases were derived and used in the GETR analyses.
L.
Findings 3-7; 26-31.
In spite of the facts that the NRC Staff selected a design basis consisting of the Regulatory Guide 1.60 Response Spectrum, anchored to.75g effective and.6g effective for the Verona and Calaveras faults, respectively, and did not
-4 contemplate direct use of instrumental accelerations in the structural analysis, the Intervenors still argue that:
- 1) the design basis should be 1.25g horizontal, based upon the San j
Fernando (Pacoima Dam) instrumental earthquake record (Int.
Findings 4, 75); 2) the design basis should be 1.74g vertical based upon the Imperial Valley 1979 station 6 instrumental earthquake record.
(Int. Findings 26, 84-85); 3) U.S.G.S.
Report 81-365 indicates that peak instrumental accelerations exceeding 1.0g could be experienced at the GETR site from an event on the Calaveras fault (Int. Findings 3, 6); 4) the design basis vertical accelerations should be greater than 2/3 times the design basis horizontal accelerations (Int.
Findings 1, 2, 17, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 84, 85, 86); and
- 5) seismic focusing could cause accelerations in excess of 2-3 g's (Inc. Findings 7, 10, 13, 19, 24, 101-102).
None of these arguments are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
1)
The Regulatory Guide 1.60 Response Spectrum, anchored to
.75g effective, envelopes the Pacoima Dam instrumental record in the frequency range of importance to structural l
analysis.
Findings 30, note 24; 33.
4/
For the first time, the Intervenors also argue that the consequences of aftershocks beneath the GETR from a magnitude 7.5 event on the Calaveras fault were not analyzed.
Int. Finding 11, 19.
This is simply not true.
L. Findings 134, 147-150.
I
-5 2)
The unique site conditions associated with, and the frequency content of, the Imperial Valley Station 6 ins trumental records were such that this earthquake record is inapplicable to the GETR design basis for vibratory ground motion.
L. Finding 37.
3)
U.S.G.S. Report 81-365 was fully considered by the NRC Staff and its consultants, and since the Staff's design bases contemplated instrumental accelerations exceeding 1.0g at the GETR site, Report 81-365 did not affect their conclusions as to the validity of the GETR vibratory ground motion design basis.
L. Finding 32, note 26.
4)
The NRC Staff's recommended design basis for vertical accelerations (2/3 x horizontal accelerations) is well supported by the evidence in the record.
L. Findings 14-37; 37, note 32.
The single values of peak instrumental acceleration relied upon by the Intervenors are not applicable to the GETR design basis for vibratory ground motion.
L. Finding 37 i
i and note 32.
5)
Seismic focusing effects are speculative and insignificant in the context of the GETR design basis for vibratory ground motion.
L. Finding 38.
l
-6 C.
Surface Displacement The Intervenors argue that the 1.0 meter design basis for surface displacement along the Verona fault is non-conservative since:
- 1) surface faulting from the Calaveras fault must be considered (Int. Findings 22, 88-91, 93); 2) it is possible that there are faults directly under the GETR foundation (Int.
Findings 28, 55-56); 3) 2.5 meters of surface displacement were observed during the 1971 San Fernando earthquake (Int.
Findings 31, 57); 4) the U.S.G.S. believes that the evidence in trench T-1 indicates five to seven feet of offset and that one meter of offset could be exceeded on a single strand of the Verona fault (Int. Findings 41-45, 62, 64-67, 75); and
- 5) the probability analyses are sufficiently uncertain that they should not be used as the sole basis for decision-making 5/
(Int. Findings 20, 21, 58, 59, 60).-
None of these arguments are supported by substantial evidence.
l 1)
There is no evidence at all to project surface displacement from the Calaveras fault onto the GETR site.
L. Findings 10-13, 41, note 35.
Further, the geological investigations conducted for surface faulting met 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A in all material respects.
L. Finding 43, note 37.
Finally, 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A does not
-5/
The Intervenors also apparently argue that maximum vibratory ground motion and surface displacement must be assumed to occur co-seismically.
Int. Finding 61.
The GETR design basis includes the assumption of co-seismic maximum ground motion and surface displacement.
L. Finding 40 and note 34.
1 l
-7 require that the GETR design bases include surface faulting associated with the Calaveras fault.
L. Conclusions 14-15.
2)
Although it is "possible" that there are faults directly beneath the GETR foundation, it is highly unlikely.
There is no reliable positive evidence of faults beneath the foundation.
L. Finding 48, note 38.
3)
Although a maximum sarface displacement of 2.5 meters was observed during the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, analysis of the entire body of surface displacement data available from that earthquake demonstrates that surface displacement in excess of 1.0 meter is not representative of future offsets for the Verona fault, and that the 1.0 meter surface displacement design basis is conservative for the Verona fault.
L. Findings 59-66.
4)
The five to seven feet of offset in trench T-1 was based upon an after-the-fact interpretation which is fraught with difficulties in terms of:
a) unrepresentative conditions, b) unreliable observations, and c) physical inconsistencies.
Direct measurements of offsets in the GETR trenches, including those along the same shear as that associated with the T-1 trench, indicated no offsets in excess of three feet.
Even if the 5 foot interpretation for T-1 were credited, the stipulated.0004 ft/ year slip rate value would not change in any significant way, and thus the T-1 interpretation does not detract from the conclusion that the 1.0 meter design
-8 basis is suitably conservative.
L. Findings 51-58.
5)
The probability analyses are not the sole basis for decision-making, but serve as an additional tool to supplement deterministic methods.
L. Finding 77 and note 48.
Th..
probability of a 1.0 meter surface displacement under the GETR foundation is 10-6 or less per year.
L. Findings 69-74.
The corresponding absolutc upper bound probability for this initiating event is 10-4 per year, which is:
a) the threshold for consideration of a given natural event as the basis for nuclear power plant design, and b) the annual probability of certair core melt events in nuclear power plants.
L. Finding 79; see L. Conclusion 34 and note 109.
Thus, a requirement for uesigning against any surface displacement, much less 1.0 meter, is conservative.
D.
The Seismic Design of GETR Structures Systems cnd Components Necessary to Achieve and Maintain Shutdown Although the Intervenors agree that the structures, systems, and components necessary to achieve and maintain shutdown have been correctly identified by GE and the NRC Staff (Stip.
17), they nevertheless assert that:
- 1) no modifications would be adequate to assure safe shutdown of the GETR (Int. Findings 93-97), and 2) no one can guarantee that GETR could withstand the effects of surface displacement i
(Inc. Findings 98-99).
Neither argument is supported by substantial evidence.
.-9 1)
GE has performed, and the NRC Staff has reviewed, extensive analyses of the GETR systems, structures, and components necessary to achieve and maintain shutdown which demonstrate that the GETR will achieve and maintain shutdown under design basis seismic conditions.
L. Findings 116-175.
There is not even a shred of substantial evidence in the record to the contrary, and the Intervenors arguments are nothing more than bald assertions.
L. Finding 149, note 62.
2)
There is reasonable assurance that the GETR can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety.
L. Conclusions 1-36.
The standard of safety urged by the Intervenors -
" guarantee" or " perfect safety" --
has no place in the Atomic Energy Act.
L. Conclusion 2.
E.
Conclusions of Law The Intervenors' Conclusions 3 through 20 rest entirely upon their proposed Findings of Fact.
Since none of those Findings of Fact are supported by substantial evidence, Conclusions 3-20 are likewise without support.
In Conclusions 1 and 2, the Intervenors also argue that 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A applies to GETR 1) since GETR is a testing facility within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. 5100.1(a), and since : 2) it is not within the definition of 10 C.F.R 550.21(b), and 3) it is j
not within the definition of 10 c.i.R. S 50.22.
These arguments j
have no merit.
l
-10 1) 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A applies only to
" nuclear power plants", and not to testing facilities.
L.
Conclusions 5 an d 6.
Even if 10 C.F.R. Part 100 did apply to i
the GETR, Appendix A, by its terms, clearly does not.
In any event, the geologic investigations for the GETR met 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A in all material respects.
L. Finding 43, note 37, L. Conclusions 14-16.
i 2) 10 C.F.R. Part 100 does not apply to GETR.
Section 50.21(c) describes a "tes ting reactor" as one :
a) which is useful in the conduct of R&D activities described in Section 31 of the Atomic Energy Act, and b) which is not of the type described in 5 50.21(b) or in 5 50.22.
GETR is a testing facility if it fa not a reactor of the type described in 5 50.21(b) or 550.22.
Although the GETR was originally licensed under 5 104(c) of the Atemic Energy Act, the 1966 amendment to increase power level was issued under 5 104(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, There is nothing in 5 50.21(b) l which restricts its application to reactors initially licensed under 5 104(b).
Rather, it refers to re:.ctors " licensed" under 5 104(b).
This places GETR clearly within the category of reactors defined in 10 C.F.R. 5 50. 21(b) (1).
3)
In 1973, the applicable regulations governing licenses originally issued under 5104(c) were changed to include all facilities originally licensed under 104(c) in the 5 50.22 category, except those operated by non-profit educational institutions for education and training purposes.
38 Fed.
Reg. 11445 (1973).
GE is hardly a non-profit institution, and
-11 GETR is devoted entirely to commercial activities.
As such, it is for commercial and industrial purposes, and falls within the S 50.22 category.
Thus, the GETR is within both the S 50.21(b) and 550.22 categories.
In order to not qualify as a testing facility, it need fall into only one of those categories.
Therefore, by definition, the GETR is not a testing. facility within the meaning of Part 100, and Part 100 does not apply.
CONCLUSION:
The Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are without factual or legal merit.
The Board should reject the Intervenors' arguments, adopt the NRC Staff's and Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusicas of Law, and authorize the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to remove the Order suspending operation of the GETR effective immediately.
Respectfully submitted, George L. Edgar James B. Vasile Attorneys for General Electric Company Of Counsel:
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Edward A. Firestone General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 DATED:
Augus t 6, 1981
~ Appendix A to Lic nsen 's Reply to Intarvenors' Proposed Findi1gs of Fact and Concit;sions of Law INDEX TO INTERVENOR PROPOSED FINDINGS VS. LICENSEE'S RESPONSE AND STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Intervenor Finding /
Staff's Proposed **I Conclusion Licensee's Response #f Findings 1
L.R. B 4) ; L.F. 37 and note 32 S.F.
109 2
L.R. B 4); L.F. 37 and note 32 S.F. 109, 111-112 3
L.R. B 3) ; L.F. 32, note 26.
S.F.
110 4
L.R. B 1) ; L.F.
30, note 24; L.F.
33 S.F.
107-108 5
L.F. 29, note 23 S.F. 46,104 6
L.R. B 3) ; L.F. 32, note 26 S.F.
110 7
L.R. B 5) ; L.F. 38 S.F. 113 8
L.R. A 1) ; L.F. 's 8-13 S.F. 20 9
L.R. A 3) ; L.F.
12; L.F. 25, note 21 S.F. 25 10 L.R. B 5) ; L.F. 38 S.F. 113 11 L.R. A 3) ; L.F. 11 S.F. 25 12 L.R. A 1) ; L.F. 8-13 S.F. 20 13 L.R. B 5); L.F.
38 S.F. 113 14 no response -- relevance unknown 15 no response -- relevance unknown 16 Incorrect; see L.W. Bolt TR: 1992-3, L. E xh. 47 S.F.
113
- /
As used herein, Licensee 's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 6,1981 are abbreviated as "L.F. " (Licensee 's Finding), or "L.C. " (Licensee 's Conclusion),
while Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July 23, 1981 are abbreviated as "I.F." (Intervenors '
Finding), or "I. C."
(Intervenors ' Conclusion). The Licensee 's Reply to Intervenors ' Prop'L.R."
osed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is abbreviated as
- /
The NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July 31, 1981, are abbreviated "S.F."
(Staff's Finding) or "S.C. " (Staff's Conclusion).
~
Appsndix A Pege 2 Intervenor Finding /
Staff's Troposed Conclusion Licensee's Response Findings 17 L.R. B 4) ; L.F. 's 34-37, and 37, note 32 S.F. 111-112 18 L.F. 29, note 23 S.F. 46, 104 19 L.R. note 4; L.F.'s 134, 147-150; L.R. 's A 2), A 3) and B 5) ;
L. F. ' s 14, n o te 14 ; L. F. 12; L.F. 25, note 21; L.F. 38 S.F. 57-60,113 20 and 21 L.R. C 5) ; L.F. 's 69-74; L.F.
77; L.F. 79 and note 48; L.C. 34 and S.F. 40-42, 77-78 note 104; L.F.
75-78 S.F. 66-69
- /
22 L.R. C 1) ; L.F. 's 10-13 and 41, note 35 ;
L.F. 43, note 37 ; L. C. 's 14-15 S.F. 20 23 L.R. B 4) ; L.F. 's 34-37; L.F. 37, note 32 S.F.
111-112 24 L.R. B 5) ; L.F. 38 S.F.
113-114 25 L.R. B 4) ; L.F. 's 34-37; L.F. 37 note 32 S.F.
111-112 26 L.R. B 2) ; L.F. 37 S.F.
107-108
-*/
27 L.R. B 4) ; L F. 's 34-37; L.F. 37, note 32 S.F. 114 28 L.R. C 2) ; L.F. 48, note 38 S.F. 34, 55-56 29 L.R. B 4) ; L.F. 's 34-37 ; L.F. 37, l
note 32 30 TR: 1060 refers to statement by Intervenors' counsel, Mr. Cady, which is not evidence.
But see,
L.F.'s 1-184; L.C.'s 1-37 i
l
- /
Findings 22-27 cite statements of Mr. Barlow appearing at l
TR: 946, 950, 950, 953, 955, and 972, respectively.
l These statements are not competent expert testimony.
TR: 944.
l l
t
Appendix A Pegs 3 Intervenor Finding /
Staff's Proposed Conclusion Licensee's Response Findings 31 L.R. C 3) ; L.F. 's 59-66 S.F. 48-54 32-40 L.R. C 3) ; L.F. 12 ; L.F. 25, note 21 S.F. 17,18,22,23 24,25 30 37-40 L.R. A 4; L.F.'s 16-25 S.F. 22,23,24,30 41-45 L.R. C 4) ; L.F 's 51-5 8 S.F. 29,35,36-38, 46 46-54 L.R. A 4) ; L.F. 's 16-25 S.F. 20-26,30,44,46, 100-102, 100 note 10 55-56 L.R. C 2) ; L.F. 48, note 38 S.F. 55-56 57 L.R. C 3) ; L.F. 's 59-66 S.F. 48-54 58-59 L.R. C 5); L.F.'s 69-74; L.F. 77 and note 48; L.F. 79 ;
L.C. 34 and note 109 S.F. 40-42,77-78 60 Incorrect.
See, L.W. Brabb TR: 1675.
Dr. Brabb did not do a thorough review or study of the modelling or geologic data for the probability studies.
61 L.R. note 4; L.F. 40 and note 34 S.F. 25, 5 7-60 62 L.R. C 4) ; L.F. 's 51-58; L.F. 42, note 36; L.F. 48, note 38 S.F. 31-33 63 L.F. 85 64 L.F. 87, note 52 S.F. 31-33 l
65-69 L.R. C 4) ; L.F. 's 51-5 8 S.F. 34-38 70-74 L.R. A 2) ; L.F.
14, note 14 S.F. 99
- /
75 L.R. C 4) ; L.F. 's 51-5 8; L.R. B 1) ;
L.F.'s 30, note 24, and 30 S.F. 105-106 76-78 L.R. A 2) ; L.F. 14, note 14 S.F. 18
- /
Findings75-102 cite statements of Mr. Barlow appearing at TR: 924-43.
These statements are not competent expert tes timony.
TR: 944.
App *ndix A Paga 4 Intervenor Finding /
Staff's Proposed Conclusion Licensee's Response Findings 79-81 L.R. A 3) ; L.F.12 ; L.F. 25, note 21 82 no response -- relevance unknown 83 L.R. A 2); L.F.
14, note 14 S.F. 18 84-86 L.R. 's B 2) and B 4) ; L.F. 's 34-37; L.F.
37, note 32 S.F. 107-108, 114 119-120 87-91 L. R. C 1) ; L. F. 's l'0-13 ; L. F. 41, note 35 ; L.F. 43, note 37; L.C. 's 14-15 S.F. 20,25, 98 92 L.R. A 2) ; L.F. 14, note 14 93-97 L.R. D 1) ; L.F. 's 116-175 ;
L.F. 149, note 62 S.F. 123-127 98-99 L.R. D 2) ; L.C. 2 S.F. 123-127 100 L.F.'s 1-184; L.C's 1-37 S.F. 123-128
- / 101-102 L.R. B 5) ; L.F. 38 S.F. 113 Conclusions 1-20 L.R. E l
i
- /
Findings75-102 cite statements of Mr. Barlov appearing at TR: 924-43.
These statements are not competent expert tes timony.
TP: 933.
-- _ - - - - -. - - - - - ~. - -
~
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-70 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
)
Operating License (Vallecitos Nuclear Center -
)
No. TR-1 General Electric Test Reactor)
)
(Show Cause)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the foregoing has been served as of this date by personal delivery or first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Herbert Grossman, Esq., Chairman Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel OELD U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D. C.
20555 Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. George A. Ferguson School of Engineering-Howard University Daniel Swanson, Esq., OELD 2300 - 6th Street, N. W.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20059 Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Harry Foreman Docketing & Service Section Director of Center for Office of the Secretary Population Studies U. S. Nuclear Regulatory University of Minnesota Commission Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 Washington, D. C.
20555 (original and 3 copies)
Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, M.C.
Attention:
H. Lee Halterman, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing 201 13th Street - Room 105 Board _ Panel Oakland, California 94617 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Glenn W. Cady, Esq.
Washington, D. C. 20555 Carniato & Dodge 3708 Mt. Diablo Blvd., Suite 300 Atomic Safety and Licensing Lafayette, California 94549 Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Edward A.
Firestone, Esq.
Commission General Electric Company Washington, D. C.
20555 Nuclear Energy Division 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125
/
(Mail Code 822)
Georggp2; Edgaf' Attorney for l
General Electric Company Dated:
Augus t 6, 1981 1
c.
, - -