ML20009H097

Technical Evaluation of Licensee Response to IE Bulletin 80-06 Re ESF Reset Controls for Tmi,Unit 1, Interim Rept

ML20009H097
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/31/1981
From:	Laudenbach D EG&G, INC.
To:	Bender P, Wilson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20009H095	List: ML20009H097
References
CON-FIN-A-0250, CON-FIN-A-250 , EGG-1183-4196, EIB-80-6, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, IEB-80-64196, NUDOCS 8108060007
Download: ML20009H097 (6)

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j ENERGYMEASUREMENTS GROUP ' ~ E'GG 1183-4196 manca 1981 I!

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l TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO I&E BULLETIN 80-06 l' CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE l' THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 l

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(D OC K ET NO. 50-289)

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i 8108060007 810717 SAN RAMON OPERATIONS PDR ADOCK 050002

{ asos oto cAaw oANYCN ACAO SAN AAMON. CALIFC ANIA 94583

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i) - DISCLAIMER s

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United

{i States Government.

! Neither the United States nor the United States Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, s

express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for i the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe i on privately owned rigt:ts. Reference herein to any specific commercial

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i product, process, or service by trade name, mark, manufacturer, or other-r wise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommend-

' ation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof.

t The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state j or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

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F INTERIM REPORT ,

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NRC TAC No. 42781 Report No. EGG 1183-4196 Contract Program or Project

Title:

Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control System Support Subject of this Document:

Technical Evaluation of the Licer.3ee's Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06 Concerning ESF Reset Controls for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Type of Document:

Informal Report Author (s): .

D. H. Laudenbach Date of Document:

March 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and NRC Of fice or Division:

P. Bender /R. Wilson, ICSB This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use. It has not received full review and approval. Since there may be substantive changes, this document should not be considered final.

EG&G Energy Measurements Group San Ramon Operations San Ramon, CA 94583 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.

j Under 00E Contract No.B&R 201904031 NRC FIN Nc. A-0250 i

! INTERIM REPORT l

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• Energy Measurements Group EGG 1183-4196 San Ramon Operations -

March 1981 a

i i TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO I&E BULLETIN 80-06 CONCERNING ESF RESET CONTROLS FOR THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 a

(D OCKET NO. 50-289) by ,

0. H. Laudenbach 1

) Approved for Publication I

dA An Vd. R. Radosevic Department Manager I l This document is UNCLASSIF.IED 2

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~ NicholaVii. draderick Department Manager Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore f ' >

.at Laboratory unider U.S. Department of Energy Contract No. bt.-ACO8-76 NVO 1183.

INTRODUCTION

' On March'13, 1980, the USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E), issued I&E Bulletin 80-06, entitled " Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)

Reset Controls," to all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses.

I&E Bulletin 80-06 requested tnat the following actions be taken by the licensees:

(1) Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic / elementary diagram

' level to determine whether or not upon tne reset of an 4

ESF actuation signal all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

(2) Verify that the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating . signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or i

' actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the per-formance of the testing in your response to this bulletin.

'; (3) If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of .an ESF signal at your f acility, describe proposed system modification,

' design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.

i (4) Report in writing within 90 days the results of your review, include a list of all devices which respond as discussed.in Item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a senedule for implementation of corrective action.

3 This technical evaluation addresses the licensee's response to i I&E Bulletin 80-06 and the licensee's proposed system modification, design cnange, and/or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem. In evaluating the licensee's response to the four Action Item requirements, of the bulletin, the following NRC staff guidance is also used:

1 Upon the reset of ESF signals, all safety-related equipment J

shall remain in its emergency mode. Multiple reset sequencing shall not cause the affected equipment to deviate from its emergency mode. Justification should be provided for any exceptions.

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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS In a letter dated July 2,1980 [Ref. 1], Metropolitan Edison Company, the licensee for Tnree Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1) replied to I&E Bulletin 80-06.

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The licensee reported [Ref.1] that the elementary diagrams for all _ Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuated components at TMI-1 were reviewed.

It was- found that tne only equipment which would not remain in its emer-gency mode was the sampling valves tnat are listed below. Inese sampling

valves are closed by a containment isolation _ signal. Under certain con-ditions, whicn are discussed below, the following sampling valves will return to tne open position when the containment isolation signal is reset following an actuation

CA-V1 Pressurizer Steam Space l

CA-V2 Reactor Coolant (RC)

CA-V3 Pressurizer Water Space CA-V4A Steam Generator A CA-V4B Steam Generator B -

l CA-VSA Steam Generator A Feedwater l

CA-V5B Steam Generator B Feedwater CA-V13 RC Letdown Eacn of the valves listed above nas a control switcn in tne control room and on a local sampling panel. Tne sampling panel switches are momentary-contact CLOSE-OPEN switches with spring return to a neutral position. Ine control room switenes are maintained-contact, tnree-position, CLOSE-REMOTE-UPEN. When tne control room switen is in tne REMOTE position, the valve may be controlled from tne sampling panel. When the control room switch is in either the CLOSE or OPEN position, valve control i from the sampling panel is disabled. If tne control room switen is left in l the OPEN position after a containment isolation signal, the valve will l

return to the open position wnen the actuation signal is reset. Since tne control room _ switch is normally returned to the REMOTE position after use, it is unlikely that sucn a situation would occur. Tne review of tne elementary diagrams snowed tnat the remainder of tne ES-actuated components l

at TMI-1 remain in tneir emergency position after reset of tne actuation signal. We conclude tnat tne licensee nas complied witn the requirements of Action Items 1 and 4 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 by completing the drawing review of ES-actuated components and identifying the devices that do not remain in their emergency mode upon ES actuation reset.

Tne licensee reported [Ref. 1] that following modifications of the ESAS systems for the revised containment isolation and block five load, a test will be conducted to assure that the response of tne components is consistent with the design. Tne test will be conducted when plant con-

, , ditions permit and is expec'ted to be completed by February 28, 1981. We conclude that the licensee has complied with the requirements of Action l Item 2 of I&E Bulletin 80-06 by providing a schedule for tne performance of l testing. ,

The licensee reported [Ref.1] that the problem, as discussed in response to Action Item 1, will be corrected by replacing tne control room switches with ones that are maintained contact in tne CLOSE position and l momentary contact in the OPEN position, with spring return to the REMOTE l position. These control room switch modifications will be designed and

! installed by the first refueling outage after restart of TMI-1. In the interim, the problem will be prevented by adherence to procedures wnicn will specifically prohibit any of tne control room switenes in question from being left in the OPEN position. The control room switen modifica-tions, as presented, will assure that the identified sampling valves will remain in their emergency-mode position (CLOSE) upon ES actuation reset.

We conclude, therefore, tnat the licensee has complied witn the require-ments of Action Item 3 of I&E Bulletin 80-06. '

FINDINGS Based on our review of the information and documents provided by the licensee, we find tnat the ESF reset cortrols for Three Mile Islaad Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, satisfy tne raquirements of I&E Bulletin 80-06.

The " testing" in response to Action Item 2, scheduled for com-pletion by February 28, 1981, will make it necessary to conduct additional testing after the switen modifications nave been installed (scheduled for installation by the first refueling outage after restart of TMI-1).

REFERENCES

1. Metropolitan Edison Company letter (J. G. Herbein) to NRC/I&E (B. G.

Grier), " Response to I&E Bulletin 80-06," dated July 2,1980.

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