ML20009H003
| ML20009H003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/11/1981 |
| From: | Barnes I, Kelley W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009G999 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900734 NUDOCS 8108050349 | |
| Download: ML20009H003 (10) | |
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d-Ok9 U.S. NUCLEAR RE ;LATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPEC.0N AND ENFORCEMENT RI. ON IV Report No. 99900734/81-01 Program No. 53400 Company:
Comsip, Incorporated Delphi Systems Division 3030 Red Hat Lane Whittier, California 90601 Inspection Conducted:
April 6-9, 1981 Inspectors:
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.de Wm. D. Kelley, Contractor - Mechanical Engineer Date Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Approved by: [ 8: s; 6-'t-ri I. Barnes Chief
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Date Reactive Inspection Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on April 6-9, 1981 (Report No. 99900734/81-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR Part 21; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and applicable codes and standard:: including:
initial management meeting and CI-OSD 10 CFR Part 21 Reports of containment gas monitoring system shaft failures.
The inspection involved 27 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
Within the cna area inspected, ne nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
8108050349 810615 PDR GA999 EMVCOMSD 99900734 PDR
2 DETAILS SECTION A.
Persons Contacted Comsip, Incorporated - Delphi System Division (CI-DSD)
P. Durneck - Test Technician J. Garcia - Test Department Supervisor
- W. Mercer - General Manager
- J. L. Pugh - Corporate Quality Assurance Manager A. D. Robinson - Vice President & Technical Director
- C. Varinois - President
- Denotes those persons who attended the Exit Interview (See Paragraph D.).
B.
Initial Management Meeting 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to accomplish the following:
To meet with the CI-DSD management and those persons responsible a.
for the admi.iistration of the Quality Assurance Program, for the purpose of establishing channels of communication.
b.
To determine the extent of the company's involvement in the com-mercial nuclear business.
To explain the NRC direct inspection program including the LCVIP c.
l organization, VIB inspection methods and documentation.
l 2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by a meeting on April 8, 1981.
The following is a summary of the meeting:
a.
Attendees were:
W. Mercer - General Manager J. L. Pugh - Corporate Quality Assurance Manager C. Varinois - President b.
The VIB organization was describea and its relationship to Region IV and Headquarters component of the NRC-Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
c.
The LCVIP functic.. was described including the reasons for its establishment, its objectives, its implementation structure, and the more significant program cnanges.
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3 d.
The conduct of VIB inspections was described and how the inspec-tion results are documented md reported, and what the responses to reports should include.
How proprietary information is handled, the Public Document Room, and the White Book were also explained.
The company's contribution to the nuclear industry was discussed e.
including current and projected activities.
3.
Results Management acknowledged the NRC presentation as being understood by them, and provided the inspectce *.ith the following information concerning the company's activi*ies and products.
Delphi Industries (DI) was formed in 1965 to manufacture and supply:
(a) gas analyzers and instrumentation to the air liquefaction industry; and (b) instrument panels to the power industry.
In 1972, DI began selling th3ir standard commercial hydrogen analyzer to the nuclear industry for monitoring of contaicant atmosphere.
Comsip Incorporated (CI) became the owner cf DI in 197S and the company became the Delphi System Division (DSD) of CI.
CI currently consists of the following three divisions:
(a) Comsip Custom Line, which as.sembles instrument panels and is located in Linden, New Jersey; (b) Delpni Instruments Division, which is an instrument manufacturer and is located in Whittier, California; and (c) DSD, which assembles instrument panels for i.he power, chemical and nuclear industries and is also now located in Whittier, California.
DSD moved from South El Monte, California, to their present facilities in Whittier in March 1981.
The. resent DSD facility has 18,000 square feet of shop area for l
receiving, storage, assembly, testing, and shipping and 7000 square l
feet of general office space.
The present work force is approximately l
45 employees, which includes ten pipefitters, five electricians, l
six engineers, and four quality assurance / quality control personnel.
DSD has 40 contracts to furnish a total of 87 hydrogen analyzers for use in nuclear plant containment g s monitoring systems.
These contracts represent 90% of their present production.
The hydrogen analyzers being supplied for these contracts are thair standard Delphi K-III and Delphia K-IV models.
All componert parts for these hydrogen analyzers are purchased "off-the-shelf" items, which are j
assembled in a purchased cabinet.
The operations performed by DSD are wiring, crimping cf terminals, l
bending of one quarter inch instrument tubing, welding of approxi-mately 20 one quarter inch welds, testing and celibration of completed i
analyzers.
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4 C.
CI-DSD 10 CFR Part 21 Reports of Containment Gas Monitoring System Electric Motor Shaft Failures
===1.
Background===
CI-DSD notified Region V of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE) by letters dated April 3, and July 31, 1980, of containment gas monitoring system (hydrogen analyzer) electric motor shaft failures in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
Notification was also made to the customers who had received their monitoring system.
Subsequent to receiving the DI-DSD notification, Mississippi Power and Light Company (MP&L) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) notified Region II of NRC-IE concerning the 10 CFR Part 21 reports.
2.
Objectives Objectives of this area of the inspection were to arcertain whether CI-DSD had determined the cause of the electric motor shaft failures and whether these failures had been processed, evaluated, and reported in a manner consistent with NRC regulations and 10 CFR Part 21.
3.
Methcd of Accomolishment The objectives of the inspection were accomplished by:
Review of customers' purchase orders and accompanying technical a.
specifi<ations on the CI-OSD Job Numbers 80004, 80014, 80024, 80063, 80102, 80216, 80620, and 80942 to determine:
(1) The applicable codes and standards.
(2) The design operating conditions, pressure, temperature and functions.
(3) Whether Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50 and/or 10 CFR Part 21 had been imposed.
b.
Review of CI-DSD " Operation Manual for K-III Containment hydrogen Monitor" Revision 1, to determine the manufactures operational requirements of the monitor (analyzer).
Inspection of the test equipment used for the pralong t?st of c.
the motor with the redesigned shaft, to verify that the pump by-pass system modification had been installed.
d.
Review of CI-DSD letters of Apri! 3,1C90, July 31,1980, and August 22, 1980, tc Region V of NRC* 1E,
5 to verify that CI-DSD had evaluated and reported the electric motor shaft failures in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 require-ments.
Review of the following Engineering Analysis and Test Company, Inc.
e.
(EA&T) documents:
(1) " Test Plan:
IEEE-323-1974 Qualification of Delphi IV Hydrogen Analyzer, " Project 1035-1, Revision 2, and (2) " Test Report IEEE-323-1974 Qualification of Delphi IV Hydrogen Analyzer," Project 1035-1, dated December 1980, to verify that the hydrogen analyzer had been tested in accordance with an approved program and the Test Report had been certified by a Registered Professional Engineer.
f.
Review of the CI-DSD Quality Assurance Manual to verify that they had a quality assurance program that met the requirements of NRC rules and regulations, Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, and the customer's purchase documents and/or design specification.
g.
Review of the following Reliance Electric Dimension Sheets:
(1) 602531-689, Issue Date March 16, 1978, and (2) 611081-101, Issue Date July 21, 1980; to verify tr.e design change of the electric motor shaft (for enabling withstanding o' the force imposed when the pump is
" dead-headed") had Deer, accomplished.
h.
Review of ten shop travelers to verify that the hydrogen analyzers (i.e. containment gas monitoring system) were being assembled in accordance with the qualit, assurance program.
i.
Review of CI-DSD letter of April 8,1981 to Region IV of NRC-IE rescinding their 10 CFR Part 21 Report to verify that it contained the basis for their final evaluation as to why the electric motor shaft failotes were not caused by a generic defect.
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Inspection of the bulletin board to verify compliance with 10 CFR Part 21 posting requirements.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
b.
CI-DSD is supplying their hydrogen analyzer systems Model Delphi K-III and Model Delphi K-IV to the nuclear industry to analyze the hydrogen in the containment atmosphere.
A sample of the containment atmosphere is withdrawn by a two stage diaphragm pump located within the CI-DSD hydrogen analyzer cabinet, the sample is analyzed, and the sample gas returned to the Con-tainment Building.
The entire hydrogen analyzer system is contained within a steel cabinet and a contractor (installer) has to connect the containment atmosphere sample suction and discharge tubing and the site electrical supply to the cabinet.
The hydrogen analyzer has been qualified by an independent testing company (EA&T) in accordance with IEEE-323-1974 and the test report was certified by a professional mechanical engineer registered in the State of California.
The hydrogen analyzer was designed by CI-DSD and all component parts are purchased as "off the shelf" items with the exception of the cabinet, which is fabricated by an outside vendor in accordance with CI-DSD purchase specifications.
CI-OSD assembles the component parts in the cabinet, installs the wiring and instrument tubing and tests the completed hydrogen analyzer.
Some customers exercise their option to witness the system and calibration tests.
Section II of the instruction manual gives detail instructions for connecting the analyzer sample tubing and electrical sypply.
c.
CI-DSD received an order from Georgia Power Company (GPC) for replacement pump diapiirages for the hydrogen analyzer installed at E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.
CI-DSD became concerned because of the short life of the diaph agms and was informed on contacting GPC, that repeated and prolonged closure of the valve in the discharge piping from the hydrogen analyzer to the Containment Building with the pump continuing to run, was the cause of failure.
This indicates that either the low sample flow alarm (located at both the hydrogen analyzer system and the remote station) was ignored by the operator, or the low flow alarm was not installed and/or connected.
f 7
While the diaphragm failure was being investigated, a Model Delphi K-IV hydrogen analyzer system was sent to EA&T for IEEE-323-1974 qualification test.
Prior to starting the qualification test the two stage pump was disconnected from the test stand and the tubing helium leak tested, which required the capping of the discharge of the second stage of the pump.
EA&T notified CI-OSD by telephone that they had started the test without removing the cap, thus " dead-heading" the second stage of the pump and after approximately 20 seconds of operation the electric motor shaft failed.
CI-OSD evaluated the shaft failure as being reportable in accor-dance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and notified Region V of NRC-IE on April 3, 1980 of the existence of a defect. CI-OSD notified the purchaser of the hydrogen analyzer for the following utilities of the defect:
(1) Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station -
Units 1 and 2, (2) Mississippi Power and Light Co. - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station -
Units 1 and 2, (3) Detroit Edison Co. - Enrico Fermi Unit 2, (4) Alabama Power Co. - Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant -
Units 1 and 2, (5) Houston Lighting and Power Co. - South Texas Project -
Units 1 and 2, (6) Tennessee Valley Authority - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant -
Units 1 and 2, (7) Tennessee Valley Authority - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -
Units 1 and 2, (8) Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3, (9) Georgia Power Co. - E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2.
Subsequent to CI-DSD notification of their customers of the shaft failure, TVA and MP&LC notified Region II of NRC-IE of a con-struction deficiency.
CI-DSD letter of April 3, 1980, states
. 3) The pressure build up caused the connecting rods to separate from the crank shaft causing a tremendous strain on the diaphragms." The letter does not clearly state that it was a failure of the electric motor shaft that caused the separation of the connecting rods with the eccentric cams from
8 the balance of the shaft.
The broken shaft was not avaisable for the NRC Inspector to inspect.
However, he was informed that the friction between the rotating shaft and the broken parts had destroyed the broken faces and the fractured area could not be evaluated.
The NRC inspector was also informed that m tor overload protection could not be used to prevent damage when the pump is " dead-headed,"
since the pump require:. approximately a one third horse power motor and the smallest IEEE-323 qualified motor available is one horse power.
d.
The one horsepower electric motor shaft was replaced with al identical shaft manufactured to RE Dimension Sheet A02531-639 Issue Date March 16, 1978.
The IEEE-323 qualification test was completed on the hydrogen analyzer in accordance with the qualification test program and there was no additional problem and the test results were certified by the independent testing laboratory as meeting the requirements of IEEE-323-1974.
CI-DSD designed a by pa:;s around the pump, installed it on a test pump, set the relief valve at 100 psi, and ran the unit with the pump discharge tubing valve shut.
After approximately four hours the electric motor shaft failed.
CI-DSD evaluated the failure as a reportable defect as defined in 10 CFR Part 21 and reported the failure to Region V of NRC-IE by letter dated July 31, 1980.
Subsequently, all customers that had hydrogen analyzers with the RE IE one horsepower motors installed were notified.
An electric motor with the redesigned shaft, manufactured to RE Dimension Sheet 611081-101, issue date July 21, 1980, was installed in a test pump and a test was conducted with the by pass valve set at 85 psi and the pump discharge tubing valve closed.
The unit operated continuously for 15 days before the test was interrupted for a short period of time and the test continued for an additional eight days.
Motors with the new shaft design are being furnished to all customers, with operating nuclear plants given priority.
Approxi-mately 30 hydrogen analyzers had been shipped to the field that have motors that are to be replaced.
Also, customers have been advised that by pass kits are available to provide electric motor shaft and pump protection.
Some customers have purchased the kits and others have stated that they do not intend to operate their hydrogen analyzers with the pump in the " dead headed" mode.
CI-DSD has 40 orders in house at the present time for 87 hydrogen analyzers.
All of these analyzers have been or will be equipped with pump by passes and RE IE motors with the new shaft design.
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f.
The NRC inspector examined the test analyzer with the new electric l
motor shaft design and pump by pass and reviewed the test records to verify that the 15 day test had been completed.
A review was made of 10 shop travelers for hydrogen analyzers in various stages of assembly and test and verifieo that operations were controlled in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program.
The NRC inspector verified that 10 CFR Part 21 and implementing Procedure 16.1, Revision 3, "Significant Deficiency Substantial Safety Hazards" were posted on the bulletin board and employees had access to these documents.
It was also verified that the two 10 CFR Part 21 Reports concerning the electric motor shaft failures were processed in accordance with Procedure 16.1, Revision 3.
On August 22, 1980, CI-DSD notified Region V of NRC-IE by letter, that after a review of circumstances of the second failure, they had concluded that their letter of July 31, 1980, should not have been a second 10 CFR Part 21 Report but should rather have been an expansion of the original April 3, 1980, 10 CFR Part 21 report.
Prior to the exit interview the NRC inspector was handed a copy of a CI-DSD letter to Region V of NRC-IE dated April 8, 1981, rescinding their 10 CFR Part 21 Report.
CI-DSD stated in their letter that the hydrogen analyzers have low sample gas flow alarms at the cabinet and at the remote station.
When the low flow alarms are ignored by the operator, there is no way without reducing the reliability of the analyzer to insure against operator error.
5.
Evaluation of Reportability CI-DSD evaluated and reported the two electric motor shaft failures in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 requirements and their implementing Procedure 16.1, Revision 3, in a timely manner.
The NRC inspector reviewea a;e CI-DSD letter of April 8,1981, rescinding their 10 CFR Part 21 Reports and concurred with their final evaluation, in that the identified failures occurred in an operational service mode, i.e. dead-headed, for which the hydrogen analyzer was neither designed nor permitted by the CI-DSD Instruction Manual.
D.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on April 9, 1981, the inspector a t with the company's management, identified in paragraph A, for the purpose
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10 of informing them as to the results of the inspection.
During this meeting management was informed no nonconformances or unresolved items were identified.
The company's management acknowledged the inspector's statement and had no additional comments.
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