ML20009E771
| ML20009E771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1981 |
| From: | Bergess B, Feierabend C, Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009E761 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-81-13, 50-306-81-15, NUDOCS 8107280428 | |
| Download: ML20009E771 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000282/1981013
Text
.
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLFJ.R REGUIATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report Io: 50-282/81-13; 50-306/81-15
Docket No: 50-282; 50-306
Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Cenerating Plant
Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN 55066
Inspection Conducted:
June 1-30, 1981
Inspectors:
[
7 4 /r/
C. D. Feierabend
/
B g
Approved By:
W. S. L t
e,
~tief
[f
i
Reactor Projects Section 2C
'l
/
Inspection Summary
Inspection on June 1-30, 1981
(Report No: 50-282/81-13; 50-306/81-15)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operation, mainten-
ance, surveillance, security, radiation protection, independent _verifica-
tion of systems, and followup on IE Circulars. The inspection involved a
total of 167 inspector hours onsite by' 2 NRC inspectors including 37 in-
spector hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified in six areas. One
item of noncompliance was identified in one area, failure to maintain
integrity of the auxiliary building special ventilation zone.
(Unit 1
only.)
8107280428 810715
~~
PDR ADOCK 05000282
G
- - -
-
- - -
~
-
.
_ - . - . . .
_,
_
_
j
I
_
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
.
.
DETAILS
1.
Personnel Contacted
F. Tierney, Plant Manager
J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
E. Watzl, Plant Superintendent, Plant Superintendent, Plant Engineering
and Radiation Protection
A. Ilunstad, Staff E:sgineer
R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations
J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance
J. Ilof fman, Superincendent, Technical Engineering
M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering
D. Schuelke, Surerintendent
D. Ilaugland, Engineer
G. Lenertz, Engineer
G. Miller, Engineer
G. Sundberg, Engineer
D.
Stember, Engineer
W. Gauger, Instrument & Control Sapervisor
J. Bierbrauer, Instrument & Control Coordinator
D. Cragoe, Shift Supervisor
P. Ryan, Shift Supervisor
M. Balk, Shift Supervisor
D. Walker, Shift Supervisor
P. Valtakis, Shift Supervisor
2.
Operational Safety Verification
a.
General
Unit 1 operated routinely throughout the month. Unit 2 was shut-
down on June 11, 1981 to investigate a high vibration problem
with #21 Reactor Coolant Pump. The pump has beer. removed from
the casing and is being decontaminated prior to inspection.
Visitors to the site during the month included W. S. Little,
RIII, on June 29, 1981.
b.
Control Room Observstions
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, conducted discussions with control room operators and observed
shift turnovers. The inspector verified the operability of selected
emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified
proper return to service of affected components.
c.
Tours
Tours of the auxiliary, turbine and containment buildings, and ex-
tornal areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance
work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanca.
-2-
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .
. _ _
_
u
\\
.
.
.
By observation and direct interview, the inspector verified that
security procedures were being implemented in accordance with the
plant security plan.
The inspector conducted numerous tours of the Unit 2 containment
and auxiliary building areas to determine status of #21 Reactor
Coolant Pump maintenance progress, adherence to radiation pro-
tection controls, and housekeeping / cleanliness conditions. House-
keeping in both the auxiliary building and Unit 2 containment has
been adequate.
d.
Independent Verification
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the accessiblu portions of
the Fire Protection and Emergency Diesel Generator Systems. Obser-
vations included confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's
procedures, checklists, and plant drawings, and verification of
correct valve and power supply breaker positions using a plant
specific checklist developed by the inspectors, to assure that
plant equipment and instrumentation are properly aligned.
e.
Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone Integrity
While conducting a tour of the auxiliary building at approximately
10:25 A.M. on June 22, 1981, the inspector observed that both doors
of the shield building airlock to the Unit 2 containment personnel
airlock were ajar. The doors were held open about 8 inches by
airflow through the airlock. The inspector notified the Unit 2
Shif t Supervisor via plant telephone, closed the outer door and
waited for the auxiliary building operator. The operator arrived
in about two minutes, and verified that the inner door had closed.
Apparently the door closer had sufficient force to close the door
when the airflow was stopped by closing the outer door. The in-
spector had passed the area approximately 15 minutes earlier in the
tour. At that time the doors would have had to be closed or the in-
spector would have heard the audible alarm. Discussions with the
operator in the control room verified that the annunciator indicated
that both shield building airlock doors were open, but he did not
know just w*aen the alarm was received. Operations in progress at
the time included starting a diesel generator for surveillance
tes ting. This would generate some alarms but would not have an
af fect on the doors in question.
It appears that the operator
acknowledged the alarm without observing the annunciator.
There was nc indication of personnel traffic thrcugh the doors at
the time.
It appears that the doors opened by a pressure differ-
ential together with a failure of an interlock and/or latch. Attempts
to duplicate the failure were unsuccessful. The licensee secured the
inner airlock door so that it cannot be opened from the outside.
This will remain secured while the containment and shield building
maintenance airlocks are open.
-3-
-
a
.
.
.
.
Technical Specification 3.6.A.8 states that "During maintenance,
construction and testing activities, containment integrity is
considered intact if the auxiliary building special vent zone
boundary is' opened intermittently, provided such. openings are
under direct administrative control and can be reduced to less
than 10 square feet within 6 minutes following an accident."
The area of the opening was approximately 8 square feet, but
was not under direct administrative control.
The licensee logs control of openings in the ABSVZ. The inspector
confirmed that no other openings had been authorized during the
period that the doors were observed to be open. ABSVZ testing
verifies that negative pressure in the zone can be maintained
with a 10 square foot opening, thus the ABSVZ function does not
appear to have been degraded during the occurrence.
Because the doors were not under direct administrative control,
the occurrence is considered to be noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.6.A.1.
3.
Fire Protection (FP) System
The inspector conducted a detailed audit of the licensee's fire pro-~
tection system including independent verification.of component status
and valve positions, review of completed surveillance tests and work
requests, ve'rification that Technical Specifications operability re-
quirements were met and observation of portions of surveillance testing
in progress,
a.
Technical Specification Operability Requirements
the inspector verified status of the following subsystems and
confirmed that requirements were met.
1) TS3.14.A Fire Detection Instrumentation
2) TS3.14.B Fire Suppression Water System
3) TS3.14.C Spray and . Sprinkler Systems
4) TS3.14.D Carbon Dioxide System
5) 'TS3.14.E Fire Hose Stations
b.
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirementa -
l
The inspector reviewed records of surveillance tests, observed 'por-
tions of hydrostatic tests of fire hoses, observed fire pump oper-
!
ability testing and performed an independent verification of all
valve positions that could affect FP supply to safety related areas
!
or equipment. The.following surveillance test results_were reviewed.
Tests were: performed as scheduled with satisfactory results.
1
4
4
-4-
'
t
f
.
.
.
.
.
SP-1203 Ilydrostatic Test of Fire lloses
The fire hose hydrostatic test pressure of 300 psig required
by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R appeared to be excessive as it caused
failute of several hoses. The hoses were replaced with test-
ed spares. The licensee is reevaluating the test pressure
requirements to determine appropriate pressure for future
tests that will be performed in accordance with Technical
Specification requirements.
SP-1053 Fire Protection System Monthly Fire Pump Running Test
The inspector observed testing i progress and confirmed
test results to be satisfactory.
SP-1187 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Battery Inspection
SP-1188 Carbon Dioxide System Weekly Test
SP-7189 Fire Detector Check
SP-1192 Safeguards Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Inspection
SP-1194 Cardox System Test
SP-1195 Valve Cycle Checklist
SP-1200 Supply Valves to Safety Related Areas
In addition to reviewing test results, the inspector in-
dependently verified valve position of all main and branch
headers and approximately 907. of all root valves to local
hose stations.
No discrepancies were favnd, however, the
inspector observed that the position of two of the under-
ground valves were controlled by a seal, where it appeared
more appropriate for a lock to more positively control the
valve positions. The licensee replaced the seals with
locks prior to the end of the inspection period.
4.
Surveillance
The inspectors witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety re-
lated system and components. The inspection included verifying that the
tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification require-
ments, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified opera-
tors, that LCO's were not violated, that system andequipment restoration
was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Techni-
cr.1 Specification requirements.
In addition to fire protection system
tests (paragraph 3.b above), the inspector witnessed the following test:
-5-
.
-.
- .
- - - -
. - - ~
. . - . - . - -
-
.
.. . .
.
.
.
.
.
1
i
j
SP-2181 Overpressure Protection System Setpoint Verification Test
,
j
This test is performed prior to cooldown to cold shutdown to
l
insure that a low pressure protection system is available and
j
will function at the required setpoint.
!
The test was satisfactory.
5.
IE Circulars
.
The inspector verified that the licensee had received IE Circulars (IEC's)
4
and had taken actions to review for applicability and implementation
where required.
,
!
j
a.
IEC No.80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator Luk Oil Cooler Failures
I
(Closed)
b.
IEC No.80-14 Radioactive Contaimination of Plant Demineralized
Water System (Closed)
c.
IEC No.80-15 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural
Circulation Cooldown (Closed)
d.
IEC No.80-21 Regulation of Refueling Crews
(Closed)
e.
IEC No.80-23 Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency
Generators
(Closed)
f.
IEC No.81-01 Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches
Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated- (Closed)
g.
IEC No.81-05 Self Aligning Rod End Bushing for Pipe Supports
(Closed)
h.
IEC No.81-07 Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material - (Closed)
1.
IEC No.81-06. Potential Deficiency Affecting Certain Foxboro 10 to
50 Mil 11 ampere Transmitters.
The inspector observed a portion of licensee's actions
in response to the circular. The licensee determined
that some of the transmitters identified in the circu-
lars are installed.
Inspection of the transmitters verified that the sus-
pect insulation sleeving was not installed, but that
some suspect capacitors are installed.
The licensee is continuing to evalutate the transmitters
-
in accordance with the circular and will replace any
suspect capacitor boards in accordance with the vendor
recommendations.
(Open)
-6-
1
_.--..,-,,,,-.e,,,+,w-
- --
.-..,ma
.nn.,v,-
-
>n--
-n-~-,
..--,w-,,
w - - . ~ ,. -, -
T
.
.
-,
.
6.
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)
The inspector observed licensee activities associated with identifica-
tion of excessive vibration of the No.21 RCP'and with preparations - for
inspection and repairs. The plant was shut down on June 11, 1981 to
investigate increased vibration and an increase in the pump seal leak-
off flow. After inspection of the pump seals, the pump was run to
attempt to eliminate the vibration by balancing. This was not success- -
ful, so the licensee continued investigation and determined that the
problem was in the pump, as it could not be rotated by hand. The lic-
ensee has successfully removed the pump from the casing and is in the
process of decontamination to reduce exposure levels during disassembly
and repair. The cause of the problem has .not yet been identifiad.
The inspectors observed portions of the initial: investigation of vibra-
tion and seal leakage and observed planning and briefing sessions-prior
to preparation of detailed procedures and prior to initiation of work.
'
The inspector attended Operations Committee (OC) meetings, and reviewed
detailed procedures that were initiated and approved prior to use.~
This-
included use of specially fabricated tanks for decontamination and for
lift and movement of the pump in accordance with control of heavy loads.
7
No areas of concern were identified.
i
The inspector observed final preparations for lifting the pump out of
,
i
the casing, while maintaining a protective covering around the pump to
minimize spread of contamination. This consisted.of a skirt around the'
pump as it was raised and a large bag raised up around the pump af ter L
it had been allowed to drain for a period of time.
.
The only problem with the movement of the pump was that there was some
=
additional dripping into the bag, so that the bag accumulated 15 or 20
gallons of water while the pump was being moved. The pump was moved to
where the bag could be drained into a barrel by puncturing the bottum
of the bag, and then the transfer of the pump to the rinse tank was
satisfactorily completed.
I
The licensee maintained good radiological control of' the operation,
,
minimizing exposures with additional shielding and by closely contro11-
ing exposure times. Maximum exposure indicated by dosimetry during the
l
operatton was 240 mr to one of the maintenance supervisors.
i
1
The licensee is preparing to decontaminate the pump impeller and diffuser
areas prior to any disassembly and repairs. Highest measured reading.
during the initial survey was 10 R/hr at contact with the pump impeller.
The licensee is continuing deliberate investigatiaa of the pump problem
and the inspectors are following progress toward identification and
!
resolution.
l
.
,
!
-7-
.
.
k
.
.
. .
.
7.
Exit Interviews
The inspectors attended an exit interview conducted by RIII inspectors
A. G. Januska and M. J. Oestmann on June 16, 1981. No areas of concern
were identified.
The inspector conducted an exit interview with Messrs. Tierney, Watzl,
and Hunstad at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector dis-
cussed the scope and results of the inspection.
)
1
,
1
i
a
4
i
-8-
.
-
. - -
.,-
.
.
.
.
..
-
, - , _ . .
--
- -