ML20006G108
| ML20006G108 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1990 |
| From: | Curran D HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG & EISENBERG, LLP., MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006G104 | List: |
| References | |
| ALAB-924, LBP-89-32, OL-1, NUDOCS 9003050056 | |
| Download: ML20006G108 (11) | |
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. s o' HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY NRC Commissioners February 28, 1990 Page 2 bulletin also broadens the scope of affected equipment beyond that addressed by Applicants, including two additional models of transmitters, plus transmitters and transmitter components that may be installed under different manufacturers' labels, including labels of unauthorized manufacturers and refurbishers.
Given the potential undetectability of Rosemount transmitter failures, and given that during full power ascension the reactor safety systems are deliberately challenged and subjected to increased stress, we urge that you require the Applicants to identify and replace potentially defective Rosemount transmitters kgfgra commencement of full power operation.
Our views are more fully stated in the enclosed motion to the Appeal Board to reopen the record and admit a late-filed contention regarding this issue, and in the supporting affidavit of Gregory C.
Minor, a qualified nuclear engineer.
Finally, we wish to draw your attention to a recent inspec-tion report which cites Applicants for yet another violation of operational procedures.3 During routine surveillance, the NRC inspector found that a supply breaker for a safety injection pump was not locked, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (89-20-01).
Idx at 8.
Because Applicants had racked off and tagged the breaker, the inspector did not consider it a serious violation.
However, he noted "the importance of attention to detail in adhering to station procedures."
Idx While in this particular
= instance such inattention to detail may not have caused a safety problem, it constitutes part of a pattern of poor training and operator error that we believe must be addressed and resolved before the plant is allowed to operate at full power levels.
I look forward to receiving your response to this letter and to my letter of February lat.
incerely Daane Curran Encl.
cc w/o encl.:
Seabrook service list (continued) issue the bulletin in final form this week.
3 Inspection Report 89-20, dated February 20, 1990.
The inspec-tion report was not received by Intervenors until February 27.
9003050056 900220 PDR ADOOK 05000443 G
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February 27, 1990 1
i UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
BEFORE'THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
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'In the Matter of
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i Public Service Company of
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i New Hampshire,Let al.
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Docket No. 50-443,OL
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(Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)
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INTERVENORS' MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD
'AND ADMIT LATE-FILED CONTENTION REGARDING
' DEFECTIVE ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS Introduction l
Seabrook intervenors New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollu-P tion, Massachusetts Attorney General, and Seacoast Anti-Pollution i
-League (hereafter "Intervenors") hereby move the Appeal Board to reopen the record and admit a late-filed contention challenging the adequacy of measures'taken by Applicants to assure that faulty Rosemount Transmitters will not cause, contribute to, or fail to operate during an accident at Seabrook Station.
The NRC plans to order the monitoring and replacement of defective l
Rosemount transmitters in a bulletin that is scheduled to be l
released this week.
At least 61'Rosemount transmitters are installed at Seabrook, and there may be more.
As discussed in the contention j
below, the Applicants' plan for monitoring and replacement of these transmitters is inadequate because its scope is too narrow end because it does not call for replacement of the potentially defective transmitters before full pcVer operation.
Given the
' broad safety applications oi' Rosemount transmitters and the dif-4 i
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i ficulty of detecting failures, especially during initial power ascension and full power _ operation, the inadequacy of Applicants' program is a serious safety issue that should be addressed on the record before licensing of the plant.
This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Gregory C.
Minor, dated February 26, 1990, which also describes the basis E
for the contention and the nature of the testimony that Mr. Minor would give in a hearing.
I.
CONTENTION Applicants do not satisfy the Commission's standards for domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities because Applicants have not taken adequate measures to assure that Rosemount Transmitters will not cause, contribute to, or i
fail to operate during, an accident at Seabrook Station.
10 CFR S 50.34 (b) ; $ 50.34(f)(3); $ 50.36(c) (3); $ 50.49; $ 50.55 a(h);
5 50.57; S 50.71(e); Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria 13, 20 and 21; and Appendix B II, VII, X, XI, XIV, XV and XVI.
Basis:
In support of this contention, Intervenors hereby adopt and incorporate by reference the Affidavit of Gregory C. Minor, dated February 26, 1990, (hereinafter " Minor Affidavit"), which is attached hereto.
In addition, Intervenors state the following:
Rosemount,-Inc, manufactures transmitters to measure pres-sure and differential pressure in nuclear power plant safety sys-tems.
On April 21, 1989, the NRC issued NRC Information Notice No. 89-42 " Failure of Rosemount Models 1153 and 1154 Trans-mitters," which alerted the industry to a series of reported l
[ f' failures of these models.1 The failure mode has been identified as a gradual loss of fill-oil from the transmitter's sealed sens-ing module, resulting in potential failure of the component.
No
-action by licensees was required by IN 89-42.
On January 29, the NRC released, for comment by Rosemount and the industry, draft Bulletin No. 90-xx:
" Loss of Fill-oil in I
Transmitters manufactured by Rosemount" (herafter Draft Bul-t, letin").2 The draft bulletin confirms loss of fill-oil as the cause of Rosemount transmitter failures, and notes that there may have been more Rosemount failures than the 90-odd cases on record.
The Draft Bulletin also sets forth requirements for monitoring and replacement of the defective transmitters, includ-5 ing Models 1133 and 1154 manufactured before July 11, 1989, as vell as Models 1151 and 1152.3 In addition, th's Draf t Bulletin notes that Rosemount transmitters and transmitter parts may be installed under different manufacturers' names, including unauthorized manufacturers and refurbishers.
Ist at 2-3.
1 IN 89-42 is appended as Attachment 3 to the Minor Affidavit.
2 The Draft Bulletin is appended as Attachment 4-to the Minor Affidavit.
3 Reportedly, the NRC plans to issue a final version of the bul-letin this week, from which models 1151 and 1152 have been
" exempted" from compliance with the bulletin's " enhanced sur-veillance" requirements.
Franklin, "NRC Bulletin on Replace-ment of Rosemount Transmitters Due Soon," Inside NRC, dated February 26, 1990, at 2.
(Attachment 5 to Minor Affidavit.)
However, the article does not describe the NRC's reasons for exempting them.
Moreover, Models 1151 and 1152 do not appear to be exempted from all requirements of the bulletin.
This contention remains addressed to all four models of the Rosemount transmitters.
1
i I 6 In discussing the safety significance of the defective transmitters, the bulletin states
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The. performance of a transmitter that is leaking fill-oil gradually deteriorates and may eventually lead to failure.
Althouah some failed transmitters have-shown symotems of loss of fill-oil orior to failure. it has been renorted that in some cases the failure of a transmitter that is leakina fill-oil is not detectable durina operation.
Loss of fill-oil may result in a transmitter not performing its intended safety func-tion.
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Draft Bulletin at 1.
(Emphasis added)
The Draft Bulletin also i
notes that fill-oil leak rates may be application and pressure dependent.
Thus, previous predictions that faulty transmitters
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2 would fail within 36 months of in-service time can no longer be considered accurate.
Draft Bulletin at 2.
Prior to the release of the draft bulletin, the NRC dis-cussed the subject of Rosemount transmitters at Seabrook in Inspection Report' 50-443/89-13, dated January 9, 1990.
Section 8.2 at 18-19.
According to the Inspection Report, Applicants r
have found 61 Model 1153 and 1154 Rosemount transmitters at L
Seabrook.
According to the Inspect. ion Report, Since the problem with potential oil loss occurs slowly over time, the licensee's corrective action plan includes a special calibration program, transmitter performance trending, and replacement of the pres-surizer pressure transmitters and any spare Rosemount transmitters in stock on a schedule which is consistent with the suonort of station activities.
Id2 at 18.
(emphasis added)
.Thus, apparently Applicants intend to replace the transmitters slowly over time, on a schedule that allows them to operate at full power with the defective trans-mitters in place.
The NRC inspector approved Applicants' f
m-I !
i monitoring program as adequate, "(g)iven the slowly developing nature of the problem."
Idi The Applicants' corrective action plan is inadequate for a i
number of reasons, including the following.
Neither the Model o
1151 nor 1152 transmitter is discussed in the Inspection Report v
and there is no indication given that those models are included l
in any program to address potential safety implications.
More-over, there is no indication that the Applicants have sought to identify Rosemount transmitters installed under other manufac-turers' names, or instruments that incorporate potentially defec-tive Rosemount transmitter parts.
For all of these components, an analysis of the safety applications and the implication of failure at various power levels should be prepared.
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In addition, the testing, inspection and calibration regimes
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currently in the Seabrook Technical Specifications are not i
directed toward the detection of the failure or potential for failure of Rosemount Transmitters.
Therefore, the Technical Specifications must be amended to establish an enhanced surveil-I lance program capable of de.tecting such failures or potential I
failures..
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Finally, given that full power ascension of the Seabrook j
reactor entails deliberate challenges to plant safety systems, f
and'given the fact that-leaking fill oil may not be detectable during operation, potentially defective Rosemount transmitters l
and components should be identified and replaced before full I
power operation.
See Minor Affidavit, pars. 11-14.
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II.
Intervenors Meet the Standard for Reopening the Record.
As set forth below, Intervenors meet the standard for t
reopening the record in 10 C.F.R. 2.734.
A.
The Motion is Timely.
This contention is timely because it is based on a recently proposed inspection and enforcement bulletin that would require monitoring and replacement of potentially defective Rosemount transmitters by affected licensees.
The draft bulletin was issued for comment by the industry on January 29, 1990, and is scheduled to be released in final form this w'ek.4 While the NRC e
had previously expressed concern about problems with Rosemount transmitters, not until issuance of the draft bulletin did it confirm the nature of the problem, fully describe the scope of affected equipment, or require any mandatory response by licensees.
Thus, this contention could not have been filed ear-t.
lier.
B.
The Motion Raises Significant Safety Issues.
The Commission has declared that the principle of environ-mental qualification, i.e. that " safety systems must perform
.their intended functions in spite of the environment which may result from postulated accidents," is " fundamental" to nuclear reactor regulation.
Petition for Emercency and Remedial Action, CL1-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 711 (1980).
This motion raises serious questions with regard to the adequacy of environmental qualifica-tion at Seabrook --
i.e., whether the Seabrook reactor can safely 4
See Franklin, "NRC Bulletin on-Replacement of Rosemount Trans-mitters Due Soon," Inside NRC, February 26, 1990, at 1-2.
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[' be allowed to undergo the rigors of full power ascension and operation using safety equipment whose reliability has been called into serious question, and whose failure may not be detec-table through plant monitoring.
There are 61 known Model 1153 and 1154 Rosemount trans-mitters installed in the Seabrook reactor, an unknown number of f
Models 1151 and 1152, as well as Rosemount transmitters and transmitter parts that may be installed under different manufac-turers' labels.
Some of the known applications of Rosemount transmitters are safety-related.
Several years ago, the Applicants replaced faulty Veritrak/Tobar transmitters with Rosemount transmitters.5 These transmitters, installed inside containment, perform such safety-related functions as measurement of steam generator level, pressurizer level, and pressurizer pressure.
Idt Other potential applications of the transmitters or transmitter components are unknown.
Thus, the problem is potentially very serious and pervasive throughout the reactor.
C.
Granting of the Motion Will Achieve a Materially Dif-forent Result.
The Applicants have na'rrowly focused their investigation of Rosemount transmitters on only two models, and apparently intend to operate the Seabrook reactor with the transmitters in place, with the intention of replacing faulty. transmitters on a schedule that does not compromise their ability to operate at full power.
Granting of this motion would materially change this result, 5
Letter from George Thomas to V.S.
Noonan, dated October 9, 1986.
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-g-t because Intervenors seek to have Applicants identify applications l
of all Rosemount transmitters and components, evaluate their safety applications, and replace defective transmitters before they begin full power ascension.
L III. Intervenors Meet the Late-filed contention Standard.
Intervenors also meet the late-filed contention standard.
As discussed in Section III above, this filing is timely; there-fore Intervenors have good cause for filing late.
- Moreover, there are no other satisfactory means for protecting,Intervenors' I
interests.
This is the only forum in which Intervenors can obtain a hearing on the issues raised in the contention, and no other party now has or has previously raised the issue before the Licensing Board or Appeal Board.
Intervenors' participation in this proceeding may reasonably be expected to lead to the development of a sound record.
This contention is supported by an affidavit by a qualified expert which outlines the matters to which he would testify in an evidentiary hearing.
Thus, Intervenors have demonstrated that they have the technical resources to fully ventilate the issues raised in their contention.
Finally, it is simply unclear to what extent litigation of this contention will broaden or delay the Seabrook operating license proceeding.
While the issues raised by the contention are discrete in the sense that they relate to only one type of safety component, it may be time-consuming to determine whether the safety components are installed under different manufac-m
o 4
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L turers' labels.
However, any potential for delay caused by this inquiry is far outweighed by its safety importance.
It is also unclear whether admission of this contention i
r would delay licensing.
Intervenors are now awaiting a ruling i
from the Commission as to whether it will reverse LBP-89-32 and give ef fect to ALAB-924, which remanded several emergency plan-ning issues to the Licensing Board.6 If the Commission reverses LBP-89-32, this contention may be heard along with the remanded emergency planning issues and should not unduly delay licensing.
Even if the Commission renders.LBP-89-32 immediately' effective, the contention could be heard in conjunction with the numerous appeals that are now before the Appeal Board, without unduly delaying the Commission's ultimate merits decision.
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6 Intervenors expect the Commission to make this ruling in conjunction with its immediate effectiveness determination on March ist.
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as
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s CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the record of this proceeding should be reopened and Intervenors' contention admitted for liti-h
gation.
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Respectfully submitted, on behalf f Intervenors, ne Curran-HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY H
2001 "S" Street N.W.
Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009
,(202) 328-3500 February 27,,1990 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on February 27, 1990, copies of the foregoing
'i document were served by first-class mail or as otherwise indi-i cated on the parties to the attached service st.
i Diane Curran e
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.o SEABROOK SERVICE LIST Acred V. Sargent, Chairman Gary W. Ilotmos, Eng.
I
?J. Paul Douwerk. Chair Iberd of Snlectmen llotmes & Ells
. Atomic Safety & Ucensing Town of Salabury,MA 01950 47 Winnacunnent Road L Appeal Board llampton, h1103642 UA Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Rep. Suzanne Dreiseth
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(Attn. Tom Durack)
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