|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20012E9841990-03-29029 March 1990 Ro:On 900228,chamber Door of Primary Reactor Continous Air Monitors (CAM) Left Partially Open,Causing Filter to Be Several Centimeters Further from Detector than Normal. Backup CAM Will Be Wired Into Damper Isolation Sys ML20006G2261990-02-22022 February 1990 Ro:On 900126,reactor Room Sealing Dampers Did Not Fully Seal When in Closed Position During Triga Ventilation Sys Insp. Air Monitoring Sys Showed No Release of Fission Products or Release of Contaminants in Reactor Room.Dampers Repaired ML20006F1561990-02-0707 February 1990 Ro:On 900126,discovered That Reactor Room Sealing Dampers Did Not Fully Seal When in Closed Position During Insp of Ventilation Sys.Dampers Repaired & Returned to Svc on 900126 ML20006G2281988-11-0808 November 1988 Ro:On 881011,reactor Operator Left Console Unlocked While Tracing Electrical Circuit.Discovered by Another Operator Who Locked Console & Removed Key.Two Corrective Actions Were Taken to Prevent Recurrence.Operator Counseled ML20006G2311988-03-23023 March 1988 Ro:On 880229,reactor Room Primary Continuous Air Monitor Accidently Left in Test Mode During Operations.Two Sets of Corrective Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence Including Flashing Visual Light Installed on Console in Control Room ML20040A9341981-12-29029 December 1981 Ro:On 811222 & 23,intermittently Changing But Fixed Vertical Position of Transient Control Rod Noted.Caused by Failure of Bolt That Secures Telescoping Section of Transient Connecting Rod.Section Removed & Secured W/Bolt ML20010B4051981-07-31031 July 1981 Ro:On 810730,operator Failed to Measure k-excess Prior to First Reactor Power Operation.Excess Reactivity,Measured on Daily Basis,Has Not Varied Outside Normal Operational Conditions.Internal Administrative Procedure Instituted ML19322E5831980-03-25025 March 1980 Ro:On 800315,scram Indicators on Reactor Control Console Were Illuminated,Indicating Power Failure or Outage of Console.Caused by Damaged Operational Amplifier.Circuit Board Replaced.Relay,Requiring Manual Reset,Installed 1990-03-29
[Table view] Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML20012E9841990-03-29029 March 1990 Ro:On 900228,chamber Door of Primary Reactor Continous Air Monitors (CAM) Left Partially Open,Causing Filter to Be Several Centimeters Further from Detector than Normal. Backup CAM Will Be Wired Into Damper Isolation Sys ML20006G2261990-02-22022 February 1990 Ro:On 900126,reactor Room Sealing Dampers Did Not Fully Seal When in Closed Position During Triga Ventilation Sys Insp. Air Monitoring Sys Showed No Release of Fission Products or Release of Contaminants in Reactor Room.Dampers Repaired ML20006F1561990-02-0707 February 1990 Ro:On 900126,discovered That Reactor Room Sealing Dampers Did Not Fully Seal When in Closed Position During Insp of Ventilation Sys.Dampers Repaired & Returned to Svc on 900126 ML20006G2281988-11-0808 November 1988 Ro:On 881011,reactor Operator Left Console Unlocked While Tracing Electrical Circuit.Discovered by Another Operator Who Locked Console & Removed Key.Two Corrective Actions Were Taken to Prevent Recurrence.Operator Counseled ML20006G2311988-03-23023 March 1988 Ro:On 880229,reactor Room Primary Continuous Air Monitor Accidently Left in Test Mode During Operations.Two Sets of Corrective Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence Including Flashing Visual Light Installed on Console in Control Room ML20040A9341981-12-29029 December 1981 Ro:On 811222 & 23,intermittently Changing But Fixed Vertical Position of Transient Control Rod Noted.Caused by Failure of Bolt That Secures Telescoping Section of Transient Connecting Rod.Section Removed & Secured W/Bolt ML20010B4051981-07-31031 July 1981 Ro:On 810730,operator Failed to Measure k-excess Prior to First Reactor Power Operation.Excess Reactivity,Measured on Daily Basis,Has Not Varied Outside Normal Operational Conditions.Internal Administrative Procedure Instituted ML19322E5831980-03-25025 March 1980 Ro:On 800315,scram Indicators on Reactor Control Console Were Illuminated,Indicating Power Failure or Outage of Console.Caused by Damaged Operational Amplifier.Circuit Board Replaced.Relay,Requiring Manual Reset,Installed 1990-03-29
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20205B1161998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor. with ML20216H7451998-03-12012 March 1998 Ro:On 980224,SRO Left CR Leaving Key Unattended in Console. Caused by Personnel Error.Rso Was Reprimanded for Failing to Follow Procedures & Operators Participated in Special Training Class ML20217F0331997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Rept of Affri Triga Reactor ML20137H5161996-12-31031 December 1996 1996 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor ML20108A1291995-12-31031 December 1995 Corrected 1995 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor ML20107K1921995-12-31031 December 1995 Corrected Copy of 1995 Annual Rept of Affri Triga Reactor Facility. W/Undated Ltr ML20101D5791995-12-31031 December 1995 1995 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor. W/Undated Ltr ML20081K3101994-12-31031 December 1994 1994 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor ML20065A0221993-12-31031 December 1993 1993 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor ML20058F6191993-11-30030 November 1993 Ro:On 931105,during Radiation Measurements in Exposure Room One,Core Support Shroud Came in Contact W/Lead Shield Doors When Interlock Failed,Causing Subj Doors to Close.Caused by Lack of Communication.Operators Involved Reprimanded ML20056C0691992-12-31031 December 1992 1992 Annual Rept of Afrri Triga Reactor ML20106B4991992-09-25025 September 1992 Ro:On 920904,discovered Operating Anomaly on Console Which Would Drive Out of Core in Pulse Mode If Square Wave Button Pressed While Pressing Rod Drive Up Button.Caused by Failure to Remove Transient Rod.Second Switch Installed ML20091A8621991-12-31031 December 1991 Afrri Triga Reactor 1991 Annual Rept. W/Undated Ltr ML20070Q1571990-12-31031 December 1990 1990 Annual Rept,Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst, Reactor Facility ML20055J4821990-07-23023 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 19 to License R-84 ML20042F0431990-05-0303 May 1990 Comparison & Correlation of Proposed & Current Emergency Plans. ML20042F0291990-04-30030 April 1990 Fuel Follower Control Rod Safety Analysis for Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst Triga Reactor Facility. ML20012E9841990-03-29029 March 1990 Ro:On 900228,chamber Door of Primary Reactor Continous Air Monitors (CAM) Left Partially Open,Causing Filter to Be Several Centimeters Further from Detector than Normal. Backup CAM Will Be Wired Into Damper Isolation Sys ML20006G2261990-02-22022 February 1990 Ro:On 900126,reactor Room Sealing Dampers Did Not Fully Seal When in Closed Position During Triga Ventilation Sys Insp. Air Monitoring Sys Showed No Release of Fission Products or Release of Contaminants in Reactor Room.Dampers Repaired ML20006F1561990-02-0707 February 1990 Ro:On 900126,discovered That Reactor Room Sealing Dampers Did Not Fully Seal When in Closed Position During Insp of Ventilation Sys.Dampers Repaired & Returned to Svc on 900126 ML20245G8781988-12-31031 December 1988 Reactor Facility Annual Rept 1988 ML20006G2281988-11-0808 November 1988 Ro:On 881011,reactor Operator Left Console Unlocked While Tracing Electrical Circuit.Discovered by Another Operator Who Locked Console & Removed Key.Two Corrective Actions Were Taken to Prevent Recurrence.Operator Counseled ML20196D2731988-07-0505 July 1988 New Reactor Control Console QA Program ML20196D2821988-05-11011 May 1988 Description of Old & New Reactor Instrumentation & Control Sys for Affri Mark F Reactor Facility ML20196D2531988-05-11011 May 1988 10CFR50.59 SER of New Reactor Instrumentation & Control Sys at Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst ML20006G2311988-03-23023 March 1988 Ro:On 880229,reactor Room Primary Continuous Air Monitor Accidently Left in Test Mode During Operations.Two Sets of Corrective Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence Including Flashing Visual Light Installed on Console in Control Room ML20150E6021987-12-31031 December 1987 Reactor Facility Annual Rept Jan-Dec 1987 ML20140B8901985-12-31031 December 1985 Reactor Facility Annual Rept 1985 ML20100D0301984-12-31031 December 1984 Annual Rept for Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst Triga Mark-F Reactor ML20100D0521984-09-30030 September 1984 Revised SAR for Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst Triga Mark-F Reactor ML20082B0791983-10-31031 October 1983 Annual Rept,Oct 1982 - Sept 1983 ML20066C1541982-09-30030 September 1982 Annual Operating Rept for Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst for Oct 1981 - Sept 1982 ML20040A9341981-12-29029 December 1981 Ro:On 811222 & 23,intermittently Changing But Fixed Vertical Position of Transient Control Rod Noted.Caused by Failure of Bolt That Secures Telescoping Section of Transient Connecting Rod.Section Removed & Secured W/Bolt ML20038B2551981-08-26026 August 1981 General Atomic Triga Mark F (GA-TRIGA F). ML20010B4051981-07-31031 July 1981 Ro:On 810730,operator Failed to Measure k-excess Prior to First Reactor Power Operation.Excess Reactivity,Measured on Daily Basis,Has Not Varied Outside Normal Operational Conditions.Internal Administrative Procedure Instituted ML20009B0231981-05-12012 May 1981 SAR for Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Inst Triga Reactor Facility,License R-84 ML19345C8651980-12-0303 December 1980 Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst R-84,Annual Rept Oct 1980. ML19338E8641980-10-0303 October 1980 Eia Data for AFRRI-TRIGA Reactor. ML19338E8531980-10-0303 October 1980 Reactor Operator Requalification Program. ML19345C8661980-09-18018 September 1980 Section VI Safety Analysis of Fsar. ML19338E8501980-09-18018 September 1980 Safety Analysis of Hazard Summary Rept,Chapter 6 to Fsar. ML19338D0441980-09-17017 September 1980 Proposed Reactor Operator Requalification Program. ML19322E5831980-03-25025 March 1980 Ro:On 800315,scram Indicators on Reactor Control Console Were Illuminated,Indicating Power Failure or Outage of Console.Caused by Damaged Operational Amplifier.Circuit Board Replaced.Relay,Requiring Manual Reset,Installed ML19242C4621979-08-0101 August 1979 Deficiency Rept Re Malfunction of Fuel Element Temp Sensing Circuit.Grounding Strap Installed at Main Ground to Lock Signal & Sys Ground Together ML19242C4971979-07-31031 July 1979 Amended Deficiency Rept Re Malfunction of Pool Water Level Sensing Switch,Submitted by Defense Nuclear Agency.Switch Unit Replaced & Addl Sleeving Placed at Wear Point ML20062A4411978-10-0606 October 1978 Forwards AFRRI-TRIGA(R-084 Yae)Annual Rept 1998-03-12
[Table view] |
Text
- ~. ,
So-lb
- - i w
R 9,.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY ARMED FORCES RADIOBIOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
< BET H ESDA, M ARYLAND 20814-5145
)
l
SUBJECT:
Licensee Event Report February 7,1990 l
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I
- Division of Reactor Projects, Projects Branch No. 2 Attention: Mr. Paul Kaufman 4
. 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 i
Dear Sir:
Please find enclosed the Licensee Event Report prepared in accordance with 10 i CFR 50.73 as per telephone communications and facsimile transmission of January ,
30, 1990.
~ '--
/GEORG . IRVING, III -
Colonel ' AF,BSC i Direct
Enclosure:
as stated L
l l --
l l
t 9002270218 900207 PDR ADOCM 05000170 ~-
S PNV .
np
\S
4 . j
. 1 Licensee Event Report 3
for the ,
AFRR1 TRIGA Reactor Facility Prepared by:
1st Lt Matt Forsbacka hit. Tom Wright Mr. Mark hfoore c h Reactor Facility Director l
Approv d for Release:
' George . Ihving,dIl f Colone . SAF, BSC Direct r AFRRI
' Abstract On 20 JAN 90, the AFRRI TRIGA ventilation system was inspected by a contractor and a reactor staff member to ensure the full isolation capabilities of the reactor room sealing dampers as specified by contract and SAR. During this !
inspection it was found that the dampers did not fully seal when in the closed ~
position. No power operations were in progress at the time of the discovery, and no power operations were permitted until the dampers were adjusted to specifications. It is unknown how long the dampers have been in this condition, 1 however, it can be stated with certainty that the public was fully protected as the dampers are backed up by a bank of high efficiency filters prior to exhausting reactor room air to the atmosphere. In addition, the continuous air monitoring
\/ system has shown no release of fission products nor has periodic testing of the reactor pool water shown any release of radioactive contaminants in the reactor room.- The reactor room scaling dampers were repaired on 20 JAN 00 and were returned to service that same day.
Page 1
i 4
Narrative Description of Event I DEkKInnd. Air from the AFRRI building ventilation system is supplied to the AFRRI TRIGA Reactor Facility through a single supply damper. As shown in i Figure 1, the supply air is delivered to the exposure facilities, reactor control room i
and offices, and the reactor room. To provide isolation capabilities of the reactor room, and thus mitigate the consequences of potential airborne contamination, the reactor room air supply and exhaust ducts are provided with positive sealing dampers (D-29 itnd D-30 in Figure 1).
a !
% ven**easwas emse 8?'88 J, i
Vai (99 g
,,. ... =
EPG
'eehafism
. ggg gg supety ,, 4,,,, j i as a _ ,
, Ma ,, else mim Saaspsag
- g ,r p.g: r WWIMM l
DMA 0M amyg i
i r Saaspes i p s'L"n a IP 'P g g g g L contac6 seems ( ) news, no l
sWitt.Oppoggs atact a sitten sesop. 993 asses i.e i .i l eenmtens l M3 0-27 g 0 33 aanses g o ,ge _ ,
I I I Z -h '
asastes neaeres usias .ame occom on i a . d en.: ens .,
e i .e i sto.a I _x 1 m a ;
omes crues Scg _ aosei6tge Figure 1. Diagram of Ventilation System Page 2 1
y -
p .
Technical Specifications for the AFRRI Reactor Facility require the ventilation system to the reactor room to be secured via closure dampers which are activated by a signal from the reactor deck continuous air monitor. The Safety Analysis Report specifies that the dampers, when in the closed position, will restrict air movement in or out of the reactor room via the ventilation system.
Event Description. The AFRRI TRIGA ventilation system was inspected by a contractor and a reactor staff member to ensure the full isolation capabilities of the reactor room scaling dampers on January 20, 1990. The inspection was performed with a vane anemomuer placed at the inlet and outlet of the exhaust and supply air ducts respectively. While the dampers were in the closed position, the vanes of the anemometer were observed to be rotating -- this was an indication of some air movement through the ducts. No power operations were in progress at the time of the discovery, nor were any power operations permitted until the dampers were adjusted to specifications. Although it is not known how long this condition has been in existence, continuous air monitoring shows with complete certainty that there has been no release of fission products or any other airborne radioactive contaminants from the reactor room to the atmosphere.
Chronolorv of Events. The following is an approximate chronology of events regarding the discovery and correction of the reactor room sealing damper leakage:
20 JAN 90 0000 Air dampers are found to be leaking air in the closed position during routine testing by SFC Wayne Reed, an AFRRI SRO, and a ventilation technician from Comfort Air. The problem is reported to the RFD immediately: all power operations for that day are cancelled.
1000 investigation shows that the rod connecting the damper section of the reactor room exhaust duct is hitting the bottom of the duct and preventing the ducts from completely closing. Repairs are initiated at this time.
) 1200 investigation shows that the gasket material on the reactor room supply duct is worn. New gasket material is applied at this time.
Page 3 l
_ ____.____________.____s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.__ ___
y x
,j-( '
. 1500 All repairs are complete. System is retested by SFC Reed and the contract technician Dampers are found to be fully operable at this time.
1530 MAJ Felty, Reactor Operations Supervisor, attempts to call hir.
Paul Kaufman, USNRC project engineer, at Region I. Mr. Kaufman
- is unavailable at this time.
29 JAN 90 0900 MAJ Felty attempts to call Mr. Kaufman, but is again unsuccessful.
30 JAN 90 0900 MAJ Felty contacts Mr. Kaufman and apprises him of the now corrected situation.
Method of Discoverv. As has been previously mentioned, the positive scaling dampers were found to be leaking air during a routine inspection of the ventilation systern. The in trument used during the inspection was a vane anemometer.
Although the vane anemometer is a good instrument to determine volumetric flow rates through an open duct or pipe, it is only useful as a leak detector for highly restricted Dow through a closed or partially closed air damper. Thus the volumetric leakage rate through the closed dampers could not be determined.
Automatically Initiated Safety System Restionse. Air that passes through the reactor room is passed through a bank of high efGeiency Glters as is shown in Figure 1. The absolute filters shown insure the stoppage of particulate material 0.3 Inicrons or larger with an efficiency of 09.07% This filtration system, which is engaged at all times, protects the general public frotn any release of airborne l particulate contaminants. The Oltration system was dioetyphthalate penetration tested on November 4,19S8 (the date of new filter installation) and was determined to be fully operable with no change of filter to this date.
Page 4
C Assessment of the Safety Consequences The high efficiency air filtration system previously mentioned serves as - % ekup system to' protect the public in the event of a damper failure during a W.ase of airborne particulate contaminants. Since the air is continuously monitored in the reactor room as well as in the reactor exhaust stack, it can be easily determined if radioactive contaminants are completely being contained by the alt filtration system. In the highly unlikely event that contaminants pass through the air filtration system, the reactor staff could completely isolate the reactor facility by ;
closing the isolation dampers or activating a shutdown of the main supply and exhaust fans shown in Figure 1 as a tertiary protective measure.
i Description of Corrective Actions ;
The AFRRI TRIGA staff has increased the surveillance of the reactor room isolation dampers by including a semi-annual leak test which will be done in addition to the monthly visual checks of damper operability. This leak testing will be accomplished by using a vane anemometer to detect air motion near the damper inlet and exhaust.
Reference to any previous sinnilar . events None.
Point of Contact for any Questions Points of Contact for further information are the Reactor Facility Director, Mr.
Mark Moore and/or the Reactor Operations Supervisor, MAJ James Felty, telephone (301)-205-1200.
Fag o l
_ __ _ . _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - . - .