ML20006E707
| ML20006E707 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006E703 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9002260248 | |
| Download: ML20006E707 (3) | |
Text
.,
. p uor p'
'9{
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
- E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.. i -
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE CF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 31 TO FACILITY OPERt. TING LICENSE NO. NPF-62 CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1_
ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-461
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated May 18, 1988, the Illinois Power Company (IP), et al. (the licensees) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 for the Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1.
The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.5-1, " Accident Monitoring-Instrumentation," which specifies Operability requirements for the Drywell/ Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Concentration Analyzers / Monitors and includes Action to be taken if one or more of the monitors are inoperable.
-This revision would make the action consistent with guidance provided in NRC GenericLetter(GL)83-36.
2.0 EVALUATION-
.NRC Generic Letter 83-36 provided guidance to licensees on the Technical Specifications requirements for several NUREG-0737 items. This guidance included specific operability and action requirements for accident monitoring) instrumentation. The action recommended for an inoperable hydrogen monitor (s reads as follows:
a.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the required number of channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The action that is currently specified in the CPS Technical Specifications for the monitors states that with the number of OPERABLE channels-(monitors) less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1 the inoperable channels (monitors) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
l 9002260248 900208 PDR ADOCK 05000461:
P PNV
i_ N-1
... e J o,
ItfurtherstatesthatwiththenumberofOPERABLEchannels(monitors)less
.1'
.than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.7.5-1, the inoperable channels (monitors) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48
' hours or be in at least HOT SHtJTDOWN within.the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
-]
lJ As can be seen, the action requirements that are currently specified for j.
Clinton are more restrictive than the requirements-that were provided in
-GL 83-36. The actions are consistent with guidance that was provided in the standard technical specifications prior to GL 83-36.
However, difficulties
- associated'with performing. repairs on the hydrogen monitors have created operational difficulties. Since the units operate at a high temperature (280-300 degrees F), maintenance and troubleshooting activities-are time consuming. Extreme caution must be exercised when working on the units due to-the high temperature or a cooldown period must be allowed.
In addition, there is a 12-hour heat up time associated with the monitor to allow the system to return to operating temperatures.
L The hydrogen monitors are not used during normal operation of the plant. They are only intended to provide information to the operations staff under post-6 accident conditions.
In addition, the hydrogen monitors do not initiate automatic mitigation functions. The post-accident sampling system can provide
, limited compensatory measures for the hydrogen monitors, although the sampling i
system results.are delayed and not continuous.
NRC GL 83-36 and previous guidance provided only the more restrictive recommended ACTION statement for the Oxygen Concentration Instrumentation.
i However, the installation of an Oxygen Concentration Instrumentation was not required for the Clinton Power Station since they did not have an inerted 1-
-containment. Therefore, the analysis of the ACTION recommended for the Hydrogen l-Concentration Analyzer / Monitor applies to the combined Oxygen and Hydrogen Concentration instrumentation at CPS. As a result, the less restrictive action requirements may be used at CPS without affecting the safety of the plant.
3.0. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment-only involves a change in a requirement with respect to the use of.a facility component located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increased in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consider-ation and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment' meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in
,10CFR51.22(c)(9). Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLilSION The proposed changes to Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.5-1, in order to revise the ACTI0h statement for inoperable Drywell/ Containment Hydrogen and
. 5
. l
- ]
1 0xygen Concentration Analyzers / Monitors, are acceptable. The CPS Technical
. Specifications will remain consistent with NRC guidance, operational flexibility will be increased, and safety system operation will be unchanged.
We have concluded, based on the' considerations discussed above, that: (1) i
'there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be: endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and, (3) the issuance of_this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to_the health and safety to the public, j
Principal Contributor: John B. Hickman,-NRR/PDIII-2
- Dated: February 8, 1990 f'
i 6
i 4
j..
-ee v
w---