ML20006A986
| ML20006A986 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1990 |
| From: | Blake J, Newsome R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006A985 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-90-01, 50-424-90-1, 50-425-90-01, 50-425-90-1, NUDOCS 9001310112 | |
| Download: ML20006A986 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1990001
Text
.
[>R#8?pq4
.
UNITED STATES
,
.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
_[
n
REGION 11
4'
'b
y
101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.
2-
ATLANTA GEORGI A 30323
's
/
.....
Report Hos.: 50-424/90-01 and 50-425/90-01
Licensee: Georgia-Power Company
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201
' Docket Nos.: ,50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.:
Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
-
'!
Inspection Conducted: January 8_thru 12, 1990
l
Inspectors:
owa[e
/A2
tamu
/-/8 - 90
R,A
some
{
Date Signed
Approved by:
/
/
P fo
'l
J J Blake, Chief
Date 51gneo
4
t ials and Processes Section
n neering Branch
Di ision of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope
This routine, announced inspection was conducted on site in the area of licensee
response to previously identified NRC opened items and Temporary Instruction
j
(TI) 2500/27.
j
Results
!'
I
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
1
All items reviewed are considered closed as indicated in this report. However,
l
resolution of Unresolved Items 50-424/88-03-02 and 50-425/88-02-02 resulted in
1
the licensee agreeing to the commitments documented in Paragraph 2.a. of this
report.
i
!
i
9001310112 900123
ADOCK 05000424
O
]
I
j
_
.
>
.
.
<
.
i
REPORT DETAILS
?
,
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
P. Burwinkel, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Supervisor
- G. Frederick, Safety Audit Engineering Review, Supervisor
-
- C. Garrett, Engineer
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager, Operations
- G. McCarley, Independent Safety Engineering Group, Supervisor
- A. Mosbaugh, Assistant General Manager, Support
- R. Odem, Nuclear Safety and Compliance, Supervisor
-
M. Sheibani, Plant Review Board, Supervisor
- J. Williams, Plant Engineering, Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
'
engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative
personnel.
Other Organizations
1
Southern Company Services
R.Keck,InserviceInspection(ISI) Project. Coordinator
!
NRC Resident Inspector
- D. Starkey, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Opened Items
a.
(Closed)UnresolvedItems(URI) 50-424/88-03-02 and 50-425/88-02-02,
'
i
Potential For Banded Microstructure In Cold Leg Accumulator Piping.
This item identifie.d a concern with the metallurgical adequacy of
certain 10 inch, Schedule 140 type 316 pipe manufactured to SA-316
that had been installed in the safety injection system.
Ultrasonic
(UT) examinations of the welds joining this' material had indicated
that the material was not American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) Code testable using conventional shear wave examination due to
"
an unexplained angle shift from 45 degrees, Las required by the ASME '
Code, to an angle of approximately 20 degrees.
However, it was
!.
determined that inspection of the material was possible using a
refracted longitudinal 45 degree ultrasonic wave, which is allowed'and
meets the. requirements of the ASME code.
'
I
!
.
'
.
-
--
-
.
-.
. -
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
._
-.
_
i
'
.
.
-
.
'
2
In an effort to determine why inspection ~ of this material was not
possible with conventional shear wave examination methodt, the
licensee requested Associated Metallurgical Consultants.-Inc. (AMC) to
perform metallurgical analysis on~ a sample of the subject material.
The AMC report, dated February 27, 1985, indicated'the following:
.The material appeared- to be uniform with no defects or lack of
-
uniformity.
!
Both longitudinal and transverse sections indicated .the
-
microstructure is entirely austenitic with the grain structure
l
highly banded, whereas a
uniform equiaxed austenitic
microstructure is normal for this material.
l
Rockwell hardness of the material is' 880 - 82, which is normal
-
'
for Type 316 material.
Magnegage test showed no ferrite detectable, which is normal for
-
l
Type 316 material.
-
The report concluded that the banded microstructureiof the
-
material, which can result from incomplete annealing, was the
probable cause of the- change in angle of the ultrasonic waves
during ultrasonic testing.
This material was certified to ASME Section III, Class 1, ASME SA-376
and SA-655.
ASME SA-376 requires a fully-annealed structure (unless
"
otherwise indicated).
As noted above, this material does not' appear
l
to be fully annealed as' evidenced by the banded microstructure.
Based on the above AMC report findings, concerns were expressed-
regarding the subject materials strengths properties and. the
possibility that the material may not have been properly annealed and
therefore might be susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion
cracking (IGSCC).
In order for the licensee. to resolve these concerns,- additional
metallographic examination of the subject material was accomplished
i
and a corrosion test, ASTM A-262, Practice A, was performed.'
The NRC inspector reviewed the following reports relative to this
material:
- .
Associated Metallurgical Consultants
Inc., dated February-27, 1985
L
Law Engineering, dated March 15, 1988-
'
Cortest Columbus, dated August 30, 1988
)
.-
- - - -
, __
_
_ _ _ _ _
_ . _ _ . _ . _ _ __
.
.
. _ _ _ _ _
___
_
_
- ;
.
.
-
.
,
3
,
All of the metallurgical examinations conducted generally concluded
that the strength properties of the material met the requirements of
ASTM A376, Type 316 material.
However, the photographs of - the
microstructures shown in each report revealed what appeared to be
microstructure banding which could indicate that the material might be
susceptible to IGSCC.
Since material strength properties are not a concern with this
material but there is still some concern that the material might be -
susceptible to IGSCC, the licensee has agreed to the following
commitments to assure that should IGSCC develop in the heat affected
zone at the welds joining this - material it will be promptly _
,
identified:
1)
The welds involved with this material-will be flagged in the Unit-
i
1 and Unit 2 ISI plans.
- f
2)
The welds will be UT examined during future inservice inspections
.
using a_ qualified IGSCC detection procedure.
!
3)
The welds will be UT examined using personnel who are IGSCC
'
4
qualified UT examiners.
1
Based on the documents reviewed by the NRC inspector and:the actions
committed to by the licensee, this item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/88-18-01, Failure To Install HVAC System In
'
Accordance With The FSAR.
Inspection confirmed that all corrective actions committed to by the
licensee were implemented as required, namely:
A deficiency card was written on April 8, 1988, to document the-
-
installation of improper bolting material for Engineered Safety
,
Feature filter housings and resulted in the initiation of six
Maintenance Work Orders (MW0).
The MW0's were initiated to
accomplish the following:
1) Replacement of the A-307 type bolts:
with the stronger and appropriate diameter A-325 type bolts, 2)
"
<
'
Installation of appropriate washers for high strength joints, and
3) Adherence to the proper tension requirements for the A-325'
>
bolts.
An engineering evaluation was completed that concluded that the.
-
mounting conditions currently existing would maintain the seismic
,
integrity and function of the HVAC filtration units. - The:
evaluation did state, however, that the mounting bolts were to be
,
replaced in a timely manner to achieve the original design
configuration. This resulted in the six MW0's referred to above.
i
.
4
"
-
t
_ _ _ _
_ --_ __ _ _- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
T
1
.
!
-
,
-
.
4
In order to verify the adequacy of the licensees actions in this
matter, the NRC inspector accomplished the following:
"
1)
Reviewed Deficiency Card 1-88-923
,
2)
Maintenance Work Orders packages were reviewed for MW0's
'
18802363 and 18802425.
These packages contain the following '
'
listed documentation:
.
Work instructions and replacement material' requirements
-
- t
Documentation of actual work performed, including bolt
4
-
tensioning
Quality Control Hold Point Sheet
-
Quality Control Inspection Report
-
Environmental Quality Evaluation Checklist
-
Material issue and material traceability documentation
'
-
3)
Reviewed Deficiency Card 1-89-1189-and associated MWO 18803483
for the- Unit 1, trains A and B control' room emergency filter
units.
4)
ReviewedRequestforEngineeringReview(RER) 88-0221 and
i
documentation of the final disposition of this RER.
'
5)
Reviewed the licensees Root Cause Determination Worksheet.
6)
Reviewed American Air Filter's letter of April 1,1988 which
detailed the actions that should be taken by the licensee in
order for the filtration units ' to meet' required seismic
a
qualification.
7)
Reviewed several_ vendor drawings, that had not originally
specified bolting requirements, which were revised to include
,
bolting requirements.
8)
Conducted a Unit 1 in-field examination of 2 HVAC fan housings
and 2 HVAC filter housings.
During these examinations the NRC
inspector visually verified that the correct type and size bolts
were instal?cs.
In addition, observations indicated that
required washers were installed and that the installed bolts had
been tensioned.
Based on the above NRC reviews and in-field examinations, this
violation is considered adequately resolved.
.
- e-ts
m
W
& a
- - .
. - -_.
1
'
-
n
.
.
5
c.
(Closed)URI 50-424/88-45-01, Unrecorded Support Spring Can Readings.
'
'
This item identified spring can type supports and hangers that were
marked satisfactory on examination data sheets even though there wa y
no spring can dimension. setting recorded and there was no indication-
as to system status,
i.e., hot or cold.
It was further deternined
that an adequate evaluation of these items could not be made if the
spring can dimension and system status were not known.
~ At the time of this finding, 9 ASME required supports had been
examined and an additional 22 non ASME supports had been examined due
-
to other licensee commitments.
At that time the licensee agreed to
re-examine these items to determine the spring can dimension settings
and the system . status.
In addition, the items were to be evaluated
based on the additional information provided.
At the conclusion of the original NRC inspection all of the
re-examinations of the ASME required supports had been completed with
all but 1 support being determined as acceptable.
Final acceptance of
the remaining ASME support was to be determined through engineering
evaluation and submitted for review at a later date.
The licensee has re-examined all of these supports and hangers and
during the re-examinations used the revised procedure-examination
i
criteria for examination documentation and spring can' dimension
acceptability criteria, as noted in paragraph d. below.
,
The NRC inspector reviewed data for 15 of the re-examinations,
including the one ASME support that originally required engineering
evaluation.
The acceptability' of the supports was based on- the
additional information provided by the re-examinations.
Also, the
final determination of the ASME support by engineering evaluation
l
indicated the support was considered acceptable as-is..
l
Based on the corrective actions taken by the licensee and the
subsequent reviews' conducted by the NRC inspector, this' item is
considered closed.
d.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/88-45-02, Revisions To-
Procedures 85052-C and 54171-C.
This item identified an omission in Procedure 85052-C,- Revision 0, as
not having specific information relative to what constituted an
acceptable spring position on supports with spring cans and did not-
require that the spring position indicator dimension or the. system
temperature be determined- and recorded during the course of. the
examinations.
This procedure has been revised and a review of the
procedure by the NRC inspector indicated that the procedure now
requires the spring position indicator dimension be recorded at the
time of support examination and that the temperature of the pipe be
determined and recorded during the examination.
-
-
.
.
- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
,
-
.
6
.
This item also identified Procedure 54171-C, Revision 6, as dealing
primarily with snubbers and not having sufficient engineering
evaluation criteria to determine the acceptability of spring can type
hangers.
This revised procedure was reviewed by the NRC inspector.
The procedure now contains sufficient evaluation criteria to determine
the acceptability of spring can type hangers.
Based on the above reviews, this item is considered closed.
e.
(Closed)IFI 50-425/88-33-02, Protection Of Permanent Plant Equipment
!
From Uncontrolled Leakage.
>
This item was. addressed and closed in Region II Inspection Report
~
50-425/88-78.
f.
(Closed) Violation 50-425/89-03-01, Failure To Report Potential
10CFR50.55(E) Item On Class 1 Forge Fitting As Required By Quality
Assurance Department Procedure QA-04-02.
This violation was issued as a result of the licensee's failure' to-
report a potentially reportable deficiency.in Unit 2 within the time
restraints required by 10CFR50.55(E).
The discrepancy concerned the
replacement of a Class 1 Forged Fitting which took place on May 21,
1987 but was not thought to be a reportable deficiency by the licensee
at that timet however, ' the discrepancy was identified during a
subsequent NRC inspection.
The deficiency was subsequently reported-
to the NRC on November 14, 1988
The licensee's system for control and implementation of their program
to identify, track, and review deficiencies for reportability has been
in place for several years and has been reviewed and determined
,
acceptable by the NRC on several occasions during that period.
I
The licensee has not received any additional NRC citations for
violation of the time restraints imposed by 10CRF50.55(E) for
,
potential reportable deficiencies since November 14, 1988.
.
Based on the abovi observations and the fact that this violation of
requirements ' appears to be an isolated ' incident, this matter- is-
,
considered closed,
g.
(Closed)TI 2500/27 Inspection Requirements- For NRC Compliance
<
'
Bulletin- 87-02, " Fastener Testing To Determine Conformance ~With
Applicable Material Specifications".
The objective of this TI was to verify that licensees ensure that
fasteners used in licensed nuclear plants meet' the requisite
-
specifications and that operability of safety-related components is
,
'
not affected.
<
_
. . . , _ . ,
_
, - - - , .
_
-i
.
I
-
!
,.
,
7
The licensee has completed all testing of fasteners as stipulated in
As a result of-these tests one Unit I stud.. sample
VEGP-029, that represented a population of 4 studs in a non-safety
j
related application, failed the chemical analysis for Molybdenum and
The sample was ordered as A-193 grade B16.
The test
results indicated, however, that the material- should meet - the
requirements of A-193 grade B7, a higher strength stud.
. Plant
application for the stud is non-nuclear safety pressure boundary. The
difference between grades ' B7 and B16 is related -to the expected -
temperature of the - application.
Grades B7 and B16 have the same
allowable stress up to 700 degrees Fahrenheit which is above .the
service temperature application.
Therefore..the VEGP-029 stud could
be used in the non-nuclear safety pressure boundary without any safety -
significance.
Based on the NRC inspectors review of documentation supporting the
above this discrepancy is not considered significant and this TI is
considered closed.
3.
Exit Interview
'
The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 12, 1990, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas
inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary
information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting coments were not
i
received from the licensee.
.
.
4
-
>
.d
,
'
1
^
,
.