ML20006A699
| ML20006A699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006A698 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9001300037 | |
| Download: ML20006A699 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES g
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r,,
a WASHMTON, D. C. 20656 k..... p SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE-0F NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 49 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43 1
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY WOLVERINE POWER SUPPLY COOPERATIVE. INCORPORATED l
l FERMI-2 DOCKET NO. 50-341 i
l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 26, 1988, as supplemented by letters dated August 24, 1988 and May 31, 1989, the Detroit Edison Company (Deco or the licensee) requested amendment to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 for Fermi-2.
The proposed amendment would allow primary and secondary containment penetrations located in locked high radiation areas be verified closed each Cold Shutdown (if not performed within the >revious 31 days) rather than every 31 days. Also the proposed change. clarified t1at-primary containment penetrations located in locked areas, which remain high radiation areas during the Cold Shutdown, may be verified by review of high radiation area access controls.
In addition, the proposed change also modified Bases Section 3/4 6.1.1.
The initial determination of No Significant Hazards Considerations was published in the Federal Register on May 4, 1988'(53 FR 15910). Subsequently, Deco modified their application by letter dated May 31, 1989. The revision to the application restricted the verification of penetrations in high radiation areas to only those penetrations listed in the proposed TS Table 4.6.1.1-1.
New penetrations prior to being added to the table would require regulatory review.
Since the actual original proposed TS change is not modified by the revision to the application, the initial determination of No Significant Hazards Considera-j tion is still applicable.
2.0 EVALUATION j
a.
Technical Specificat. ion 4.6.1.1.b Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.b, surveillance requirement of primary containment penetrations, requires that primary containment integrity be demonstrated by verifying at least once per 31 days that all penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves, and required to be closed during accident conditions, are closed by locked valves, blank flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position except as provided in TS 3.6.3.
The TS also notes that valves, flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which 9001300037 900118 PDR ADOCK 05000341 P
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are located inside containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured-in the closed position need only to be verified during each cold shutdown, but not more often than once'per 92 days.
The licensee proposed to change TS 4.6.1.1.b by requiring that for such penetrations the valves located outside the containment in locked high" radiation areas be verified closed during each cold shutdown, but not more often than once per 31 days.
For penetrations in-locked areas which remain high radiation areas during cold shutdown the licensee proposes verification by review of high radiation area access controls.
In their January 26, 1988 letter, the licensee did not identify:
- 1) the penetrations for which the change was being proposed, 2) the mechanisms in place to control access to those penetrations, and 3) how the loss of isolation would be detected in the event it occurs.
By letter dated August 24, 1988, the licensee listed.the affected penetra-tions (15); the valves involved (28); and the locked high-radiation areas (4) where the valves or flanges are located (reactor water cleanup valve j
pit, reactor building second floor, steam tunnel, and TIP room).
The i
containment penetrations for which relief is being sought consist of 3/4" vents, drains, or test connections, all-of which are in accessible areas
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when the plant is in the cold shutdown.
The. only penetration located in an area which may remain a high radiation area after unit-shutdown consist of a blank flange (Penetration X-35A) in the TIP room.. In the August 24, 1988 letter the licensee also described the administrative access-controls 3
l utilized (Radiation Work Permit plus Key Controls) to prevent unauthorized entry into these four areas.
In addition, the licensee stated that if. any of the isolation devices.are tampered with, the following systems or station practices would detect the abnormal ~ condition:
4 1)
Actuation of one of the plant's numerous leak ~ detection for fire i
detection systems caused by sensing excess flow in process piping.
l systems, sensing pressure and temperature changes in primary H
containment, monitoring temperature in areas containing equipment-and piping systems, or monitoring activity of drain sumps.
2)
Actuation of area radiation or continuous air monitors.
3)
Abnormal systems function or response (e.g., increase in nitrogen.
usage, abnormal flow rate deviations, unexpected-liquid storage tank level decreases or increases, etc.)
4)
Some locked high radiation areas are normally checked daily at the dtor for abnormal conditions, e.g., steam, leaks, high temperatures, unusual noises, etc. The on-dcty Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS)'may alter these checks of high radiation areas based on Health Physics and/or Al. ARA concerns.
Daily operator hours through open areas of the plant can also detect steam leakage from some areas due to communication between plant spaces.
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-a Staff review of the licensee's August-24, 1988 submittal determined-that the proposed TSs change was acceptable only if th specific isolation devices affected by the proposed TSs are listed in the TSs.
The staff was concerned that the existing list of affected isolation devices, as transmitted by the August 24, 1988 letter could increase in number and in the size of.the isolation devices (e.g., valve i
diameter)duringthelifeoftheplantwithoutreceivingregulatory t
J review.
By letter dated May 31 1989 the tablelistingallapplicablepen,etratIons.licenseeproposedaspecific-With the inclusion into the TS of the table of isolation devices located in locked high radiation areas, the proposed TSs will specifically address t1e existing plant _ configuration and radiological conditions.
The TS Index has been modified to address the inclusion of the proposed Table 4.6.1.1-1.
/
The staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee in their August 24, 1988, and May 31, 1989 letter and has determined that it is extremely unlikely. that primary containment integrity would be violated as a result of-the extension in-the surveillance i
requirements requested by the ifcensee. At the same time such an 2
extension will reduce the cumulative occupational radiation exposure of plant personnel.-.The staff finds the licensee's proposal acceptable as modified, b.
Technical Specification 4.6.5.1 Technical Specification 4.6.5.1, surveillance requirement of secondary containment integrity, requires that all secondary containment penetra-tions not capable of being closed by operable secondary containment isolation dampers / valves, and' required to be closed during accident conditions, be verified closed by valves blank flanges, or deactivated automatic dampers / valves secured in the closed position at least once per 31 days. The licensee proposes to change TS 4.6.5.1 by exempting the secondary containment penetrations located in locked high radiation areas from the 31 day surveillance-requirement. The licensee proposes to check such penetrations during each COLD SHUTDOWN, but not more often than 31 days.
In their letter of August 24, 1988, the licensee identified the blowout panels for the steam tunnel as the
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penetrations for which relief was being sought. After reviewing the i
information provided in the August 24, 1988 letter, the staff has detennined that it is extremely-unlikely the secondary containment integrity would be violated as a result of the licensee's request, given the bulkiness of blowout panels and the licensee's administrative i
controls in place to prevent unauthorized entry into the high radiation The licensee's proposed TS language has been modified to apply p
areas.
only to the blowout panels in the steam tunnel to avoid future-interpretation problems. The staff finds the licensee's proposal j
acceptable, as modified.
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Bases Section 3/4 6.1.1 The licensee in the May 31, 1989 letter proposed a change to Bases Section l
3/4 6.1.1 to clarify the plant configuration for test, vent and drain (TVD) connections which are part of the primary containment boundary.
For TVD which are part of the' primary containment boundar, a threaded l
pipe cap, in addition to the containment isolation valve (y), provides i
s protection equivalent to a blank flange. This configuration is described
'in UFSAR Section 6.2.4.4.3, and represents doubled barrier protection.
The staff finds the proposed change to the Bases acceptable,
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change in a requirement with respect to the installa-tion or use of a facility. component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements.
We have determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents which may be released offsite, and that there is no siDnificant increase in individual or cumulative occupa-tional radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental im)act statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with tie issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be i
l conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors:
F. Maura, J. Stang-Date: JaEuary 18, 1990 l-
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