ML20005D687

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Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 89-042 on 891129.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl
ML20005D687
Person / Time
Site: Palisades, South Texas, 05000000
Issue date: 12/01/1989
From: Haughney C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-89 OREM-89-042, OREM-89-42, NUDOCS 8912140131
Download: ML20005D687 (18)


Text

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DEC 011989

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MEMORANDUll FOR:

Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:

Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEETING November 29, 1989 - MEETING 89 42 On Novenber 29, 1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89 42) to brief senior managers from NRR, AEOD, ACRS, RES, Consnission staff, and regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting 1

on November 22, 1989. lists the attendees.

, presents the significant elements of the discussed events. contains a summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 11/26/89. One significant event was identified for input into the NRC i

performance indicator program.

c.t p mi signedbY8 g esJ.Haud.n0Y Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

Enclosures:

As stated l

cc w/ Encl.:

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T. Murley, NRR A. DeAgazio, hRR F. Miraglia, NRR L. Yandell, NRR J. Sniezek, liRR G. Dick, NRR J. Fartlow, NRR F. Hebdon, hER E. Jordan, AE00 J. Taylor. EDO E. BeckJord, RES W. Russell, R1 S. Ebneter, RII B. Davis, RIII R.D. Martin, RIV J.B. Martin, RV W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, RII E. Greenman, Rill J. Milhoan, RIV R. Zirzerman, RV S. Varga,i:RR 0, boger. 11RR G. Lainas, NRR F. Congel, liRR E. Weiss, AEOD B. Clayton, EDO J. Lieberman, OE J. Guttiaann, SECY

/s. Thadani, L'RF; J. Richardson, NRR S. Rubin, ALOD J. Forsyth, II;P0 R. Barrett, llRR M. Harper, AE00 R. i;ewlin. GPt.

J. Roe,I;RR H. Aldertaan. ACRS e

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS0lON n

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WASHINGTON, D. C,20656 N...../

December 1,1989 i

I:EMORAliDUl1 FOR:

Charles E. Rossi Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FF.0M:

Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment SUEJECT:

THE OPERATItic REACTORS EVEliTS MEETiliG liovember 29, 1989 - MEETING 89-42 On 1;ovember 29, 1989, we conducted an Operating Feactors Events meeting (89-42) to brief senior managers from liRR, AEOL, t.CRS, RES, Commission staff, and regional offices on selected events that occurred since cur last meeting on hovember 22, 1989. lists the attendees, j presents the significant elements of the discussed events. contains a surr,ary of reactor scrams for the week ending 11/EC/89. One significant event was identified for input into the flRC perforrance indicator program, l

Charles J. Haug.ey, Chief Events Assessment Eranch Disision of Operational Events Assessment I

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

Ses tiext Page

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ENCLOSURE 1 l

LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING T.EACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-42) i Noventer 29, 1909 i

NAME ORGAN 17AT10N NAME ORGANIZATION 4

V. Eenaroya AE00/DSP R. Gramm NRR/CRIS S. Saba NCR/SELB R. Kendall NRR/00EA D. Prochnow NRR/00EA E. Brown AEOD/DSP D. Trin61e OCM/JC L. Norrholm OCM/KC L. Reyes Rll H. Alderman ACRS P. Prescott hRR/LPEB R. Ramirez NRR/DLPQ M. Case NRR/DLPQ R. Karsch NRP/LOEA J. Certer NRR/DOEA Y. Asii NER/SRXB W. Minners RES/DSIR R. Auluck NRR/ADSP

f. Hebdon NRR/ERSP D. Thuni hRR/ DST W. Troskoski OE R. Benedict NRR/E0EA D. fischer NRR/DOEA C. Posiusny NRR/FD-4 J. Partlow NRR/ ALP J. Roe NRR/DLPQ W. Jensen NRR/90EA J. Calvo NRR/DOEA M. Reardon NRR/00EA R. Perf etti OE J. Richardson NRR/DLT R. Kiessel hRR/00EA J. Tholaa NRR/PDS-1 J. Zwolinski NRR/DLFQ

w OPERAT!!iG REACTCRE EVEliTS LEIEFil!G 89-42 L. VENTS AEEESSEERT 2 %hEB iffATJDE:

]EE-U, hHITE FLINT h'EENESE/.Y, I;CVEMBER 25, 1989, 11:00 A.M.

PAllSADES EFl.F.10VS P0f.V CFElilNG Allt fl.lLUhE OF LLCCI' VI.LVE TC ELOSE SCL'TI: TEXI.S UhlT i fi.lLURE OF r.lESEL GEhlhATOR PABT 'I F01Ef;TIAL FI.lLURES Of PhESSURE RELUCIh6 SLLLVES Ili DRESEEL li!EUSTRIES' FUMPS I

I

r 89-42 pal.lSADES SPURIOUS PORY OPENING AND FAILURE OF BLOCK VALVE TO CLOSE NOVEMBER 21, 1989 PROBLEM A PRESSURIZER PORV (TARGET ROCK BRAND) OPENED WHEN Ti1E BLOCK VALVE WAS OPENED.

THE BLOCK VALVE COULD NOT BE CLOSED TO ISOLATE THE OPEN PORV, A 485 PSIG BLOWDOWN ENSUED BEFORE THE PORV RECLOSED, 2 1/2 MINUTES LATER, A SECOND SMALLER BLOWDOWN OCCURRED, CAUSE THE INITIAL PORV OPEHING WAS CAUSED BY THE PRESSURE SURGE SET UP BY OPENING THE BLOCK VALVE, Tile CAUSE OF TiiE SUBSECUENT PORV OPENING IS UNDER INVESTIGATION, THE BLOCK VALVE COULD NOT INITIALLY BE CLOSED SINCE Tile CONTR01 S HAVE A SEAL-IN FEATURE S0 TilAT THE VALVE WILL NOT BEGIN TO CLOSE UNTil IT IS FULLY OPEN, TliE CAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF TiiE VALVE TO CLOSE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE SPURIOUS OPENING OF A PRESSURIZER PORV HAS THE EFFECT OF A MEDIUM BREAK (4-INCH) LOCA, CLOSURE OF PORV BLOCK VALVES IS RELIED UPON IN THE PROCEDURES AT PWR'S T0 ISOLATE LEAKING PORV'S, POSSIBLE GENERIC IMPLICATIONS, DISCUSSION o

1HE PORV's AND DLOCK VALVES HAD BEEN REPLACED WITH VALVES OF LARGER CAPACITIES, o

A BLOCK VALVE WAS OPENED TO HYDRO-TEST THE NEWLY INSTALLED

SYSTEM, l

0 AS Tile BLOCK VALVE OPENED THE PORV OPENED, o

NO ELECTRICAL SIGNAL TO OPEN PORV, o

REACTOR SYSTEM PRESSURE WAS 2150 PSIG, PORV SETPOINT IS l

2200 PSIG, AIT:

YES CONlACT:

B. JORGENSEN, Rlll/W, JENSEN, DEAB SIGEVENT:

YES

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50,72 # 17158, AND MORNING REPORTS OF 11/21/89, 11/24/E9 AND 11/27/09, AND PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION PNO-ill-89-76

PAllSADES 89-42 o

RCS PRESSURE DECREASED TO 1680 PSIG - REACTOR TRIP, o

SEAL-IN OPEN SIGNAL TO BLOCK VALVE PREVENTED MANUAL CLOSURE FOR 20 SECONDS, o

BLOCK VALVE FULLY OPENED BUT WOULD NOT FULLY CLOSE, o

PORY CYCLED OPENED AND CLOSED ON TWO OCCASIONS ABOUT 2,5 MINUTES APART, o

RCS PRESSURE DECREASED TO 1570 PSIG, o

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION AT 1605 PSIG NO FLOW INTO RCS, o

BLOCK VALVE CLOSED IN ABOUT 3 MINUTES, ADOUT 30 SECONDS AFTER PORV HAD CLOSED FOR THE SECOND TIME, o

ALL PORV DISCHARGE CONTAINED IN PRESSURIZER QUENCI' TANK, o

PLANT TAKEN TO COLD SHUTDOWN.

o DLOCK VALVE IN UdAFFECTED TRAIN OPENED FOR LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION, o

PAllSADES NORMALLY OPERATED WITH CLOSED BLOCK VALVES - MOST PLANTS HAVE OPEN BLOCK VALVES, o

PORV MANUFACTURED BY TARGET ROCK, o

BLOCK VALVE MANUFACTURED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL, o

BLOCK VALVE OPERATOR BY LIMITORGUE, o

BLOCK VALVE HAD BEEN TESTED TO OPEN AGAINST 2500 PSIG BUT HAD NOT BEEN TESTED TO CLOSE, FOLLOWUP o

AIT SENT TO SITE, o

INVESTIGATING CAUSE OF SUCCESSIVE PORV OPENINGS AND FAILURE OF BLOCK VALVE TO FULLY CLOSE ONCE SEAL-IN OPEN SIGNAL CLEARED, l

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.E0DIB_IEM1Jh.II_I EhlLDLL1EJJEBLLLEFERATDB h0VEMBER 28, 1989 EEDELLb FAILULE Cf LILSLL CENERATOR !!O. 21 LhDhl UNKN0hb S11LL l;htLh INVESTICA110h.

MEII.LSJ.0liJfJfAhfL FAI!hhE CF A LILSLL CLhthA10h RESLLTS IN THE LCSS CF CAPALILITY T0 Pi,0 VILL CUSITE LMERCLl;CY PChlt 1C Ct.L TRAlh Cf LSF LCulFt'.LLT.

TilERE ARE TlihtL DIESL'L CLbERATORS PLh LhlT AT SOLTH TEXAS.

Tl;0 CLT- 0F Till lhhEE LIESEL GEhELATORS ( ALL THE ASSCCI ATED ESF ECUIPMENT) l,f,E hlELLL TO MITIGATL THE C0hSECUENCES OF ELSICh BASIS ACCIEEhlS.

LJfLMSJ01' o

All SIX DillLL CENERAT01:L (LG) AT TliE ECUTH TEXAC EllE AkL hCLEL LEMC MANUFACiUf,EL In CLCPER-LESSEMER, o

ll.E NO 22 LG lli.L LCMPLLlET APPR0XIt'I.TELY 10 Hi,S Cf A 24 HR FULL LCAl' TEST (RECL'li.EL PER TLLHlilCAL SPEClfiCAT10h5) KFLN PEF.SCNf,EL II; Tl:L AREA llLAI.T LCUL BAl:CII.'C/Kh0CKil.C hCISES Al:L SAk SMCh[ C0llihG FRCf. TliE LG ELCil:E.

THE LC SlCFPEL OG 11S 0\\ll,.

c lNSPECllCh REVEALEL LG PARTS ELLI.15 Oh THL FLCOR (PIECEE Of L

PIS10kC ANL CChhECTING RCES, ANL Oll).

EDTH BLOKCUT CCVLRS, l

LOCATEL lh 1HE lhEPECTION PLATES Ch LACil SILE OF THE DG, llEhE FCULL SLPARAlEL FROM THE Fl.ATLS, ANL 1HE PLATES THEMSELVES WERE FOUL:t 10 EL DEh1Er.

CNE OF THE lhEPEClict. PL ATES WI.E FCit!E LETACHEE FICM THE LC.

c TEST IE APINGS TAl:EN hCURLY Ph;Cf. TC Tile FAILLRE INDICATE [

LCIJ1AL EG GFLf:ATION.

CONTACT:

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SOUTH TEXAS UNIT 2 89-42 DISCUSSION (CornItturD) o NO ALARMS WERE RECEIVED IN THE CONTROL ROOM PRIOR TO THE FAILURE.

o THE FAILED DG llAD APPR0XIMATELY 50 HRS OF OPERATION.

A WEEK PRIOR TO THE FAILURE, THE DG HAD SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 11 HRS OF A 24 HR FULL LOAD TEST WHEN THE TEST WAS STOPPED BECAUSE OF INSTRUMENT PROBLEMS.

A 24 flR FULL LOAD TEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED IN DECEMBER 1988 FOLLOWUP THE LICENSEE AND THE DIESEL GENERATOR VENDOR ARE INVESTIGATING TO DETERMINE THE ROOT CAUSE FOR THE FAILURE, THE NECESSARY REPAIRS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, AND THE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED FOR THE OTilER DIESEL GENERATORS TO ENSURE THEIR OPERABILITY, NRC HEADQUARTERS AND REGIONAL PERSONNEL llAVE BEEN SENT TO THE SITE TO MONITOR Tile INVESTIGATION.

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89-42 PART 21 POTENTI AL FAILUPES OF PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVES IN DRESSER INDUSTRIES' PUMPS NOVEMBER 13, 1989 PROBLEM THE PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVE IN VARIOUS DRESSER INDUSTRIES' PUMPS MAY HAVE A BRITTLE CRACK FAILURE DURING PUKP START WHICH MAY RESULT IN EXCESSIVE VIBRATION AND/0R PUMP SElZURE.

CAUSE AN INADE00 ATE MANUFACTURING PROCEDURE CAN PRODUCE A PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVE THAT HAS A THROUGH HARDENED CONDITION VICE THE INTENDED SURFACE HARDENED CONDITION, JAFETY SIGNIFICANCE THE POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR FAILURE OF HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS, REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS, AND AUXILIAPY FEEDWATER PUMPS, DISCUSSION n

PACIFIC PUNFS OPERATION, PART OF THE DRESSER PUMP DIVISION, MANUFACTURED THE POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVES, o

ONE OF THE THREE PROCEDURES THAT CAN EE USED TO SURFACE HARDEN THE SLEEVES WAS DETERMINED TO BE INADE0VATE.

THIS INADEQUATE PROCEDURE WAS IMPLEMENTED IN 1982, o

ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVE HAS BEEN FOUND TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO A UTILITY IN THE THROUGH HARDENED CONDITION, THE POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR ANY SLEEVE THAT WAS MANUFACTURED USING THE INADEQUATE PROCEDURE TO DE IN A THROUGH HARDENED CONDITION, i

o APPR0XIMATELY 50 PLANTS HAVE SAFETY RELATED PUMPS THAT HAVE THESE l

POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVES, l

o DRESSER INDUSTRIES HAS STATED THAT THE THROUGH HARDENED PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVES SHOULD Fall DURING PUMP START AND WILL DEFINITELY Fall WITHIN ONE HOUR OF PUMP START, CONTALT:

D. PROCHNOW, OGCB

REFERENCES:

30 CFR 50,72 170E0 AND MORNING REPORT 11/]L/89

.' PARI 21 89-42

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o BASED ON THIS FAILURE PREDICTION, DRESSER INDUSTRIES BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO CONCERN FOR INSTALLED PUMPS.

o DRESSER INDUSTRIES HAS ISSUED APPROXIMATELY 100 REPLACEMENT SLEEVES TO LICENSEES AND hAS ALSO PROVIDED REPLACEMENT SLEEVES TO WESTINGHOUSE AND COMBUSTION ENGINEERING.

FOLLOWUP o

DRESSER INDUSTRIES RECOMMENDS THAT A HARDNESS TEST BE PERFORMED ON SPARE PRESSURE REDUCING SLEEVES T0 IDENTIFY SLEEVES IN THE TilROUGH llARDENED CONDITION.

O DRESSER INDUSTRIES INTENDS TO CALL THEIR AFFECTED CUSTOMERS AFTER THEY DETERMINE WHICH SLEEVES WERE MANUFACTURED USING THE INADEQUATE PROCEDURE.

o DRESSER INDUSTRIES HAS DISCONTINUED PERFORMING THE SURFACE IIARDENING PROCEDURE IN ll0VSE AND IS N0W RELYING ON A VENDOR.

c OGCB IS PREPARING AN INFORMATION NOTICE.

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PIRFMMNCE1 Elf 610RSllGNIFICANTIVINTS PLCf MME EVENT ' EVEETDESCRIPT10N OIRSION!FICMCt

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.11.fCD,MPARISDN OF WEEKLY S1ATISTICS WITH lNDUSTRY AVERAGES f -

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. SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 11/26/09

SCRAM CAUSE' POWER NUMBER 1989

'1988 1987 1986

'1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY e

SCRAMS (5)

AVERAGE-AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE-AVERAGET YTD.

(3)(4)

(B)(9)

.l e.41.eOwER >13%-

Ji EQUIP. RELATED'

>15%

1 2.9 3.1 3.9

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J PERS.-RELATED(6)'>15%

0 1.0

1.0 1.3 1.8 2.0' 01HER(7):

>1b%

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.O.1 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.6 e itt Subtotel'**

1 4.0 4.6 6.4

' 6. b 8.0.

' - 4t POWER <15%.

EQUIP.= RELA 1ED

<15%

0 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.3' f

-PERS.' RELATED

<1b%-

0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9

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- te Subtotal 44 i

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$ 4 4-l' 4.7 b.S 0.5 8.9 10.4.

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MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAM 5 1 YPE-NUMBER 1989 19H9 1987.

1986 198b OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY-WEEKLY SCRAMS. AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE-YTD 1

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MANUAL SCRAMS O

O.cr 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.O-AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 1

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m NOTES 1.

PLANT SPECITIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNICHT SUNDAY.

SCkAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICh RESULT lh ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED i

TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN lh ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.

THERE ARE 111 hEACT0FS HOLDING AN i

OPERATING LICENSE.

2.

00kPLICAT10t;S: RECOVERY COMPLICATEP BY EQUIPMENT FA' LURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATIL TO CAU5E OF SCRAM.

1 3.

PER50hhEL RELATED FROBLEMS lhCLUDE HuttAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STE/Ji GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL 1

PROBLEMS.

1 4.

  • 0THER" INCLUCES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO E!;YlRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNihG), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UhKNOWN CAUSE.

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