ML20005D642
| ML20005D642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/31/1988 |
| From: | King T NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8912130204 | |
| Download: ML20005D642 (3) | |
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Title:
. ASME Intersociety Energy Conference July 31 - August 4, 1988, Denver, Colorado Date L Place:
u TAILpV EVA!UATION DI* THE MODU 1AH Hlu,1 TLMPl.RATi'RE CAS. COOLED 'RLACTok i;
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. Thomas 1.. Klog 2
ip U.S. Nuclear Rtgulatory Cornission f
ABSTPACT; of accident ' conaitions.
This helped us to identify-
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f ailure thresholds where accident consequences become:
Thls paper provides a status of ERC's review of the unacceptable, as well as, identify any lasues
- Modular ell;fa Temperature Cas. Cooler 1 keactor (MHTCR),
relating to calculational' methods and the base-I In addition.- several factors which influenced the technology. programs supporting 'he design.. Tho' tevieJ of the MHTCR are discussed, review was complemented by a series of meetings b
between NRC staff and the MHTCR Program (See Table'1)-
' 5TAtt's to discuss specific p51D chapters or specifle-
' issues.
In addition - Advisory Committee on Reactot
- A eunmary of whSt has transpired over approximately Sa fe guards (ACRS)- views were - solteited on-the MHTCR
-the past two ye4.to with regard to NRC's review of the.
and the staff's evaluation.
~
MHTCR is discussed first, At the time of the MHIC1 concept ' selection (approximately two and one. half Carly on in the review two key topics associated with
!l; years ago) : series ~ of detailed interactione were
. the MHTCR were ider44 led which needed ta be brought pl at< ed c between NRC and the' MHTCR Program to the Commission's ettention since they were related
..partic pants.
These were to concentrate on the to policy matters, review;.l.a pr 11minary f afety Information Document
-(PSID) submit.ed by DOE for review in September These two topics are 1980. The to wits of the NRC review were t o ' be documented in n Safety fvaluatton Report (SER).
At Treatment ' of severe accidents, including, that time the' ocheduled completion of the NRC review aource
- teya, adequacy.of
,.b and issuance of the $ER wa January 198B.
C ontainme nt/ confine, ment. and - eme r{ency
- Planning, The main: purpose of' our review la to e stablish.
prellrainary guidan*e regard!ng licensing cif rAria for e
plans for standardisatlan, including scope
' the.MHTCR and to L.ke an assessment cf the potential of plant to be standaro4:ed, level of detail of the.propor.ed design to eeet those criteria.
to be a t a n s' a r d 1 : e d - a n d : operating experience /R6D requireo before Commission Tha way in. which we conductet' the review was to approval or certification.
SM concentrate our evaluation on she design with respect i to dts ability to perform the key ' safety functions of The NRC staff has prepared papers for the Commission reactor shutdown, decay heat temoval and containe.ent on both of these topics recommending a position on ofJ fission products.
In doing ; this - we developed each and soliciting Commission guidance.
Meetings
- preliminary licensing' criteria and assessed the with the ACRS have been held with the objective of potent'.al of the MHTCR design to seet these getting the Committee's views on these papers, s.
criteria.
The licensing criteria were developed by
. buildint.upon existing LUR criteria, where Other Commission actions, which directly' influenced applicable, and by developing additional criteria, as our revlew of the MHTCR were:
necessary to address the unique asp
- cts.of the MHTCRJ-The MHTCR Pawgram ' had also proposed those e
lasuance of a Severe Accident policy criterls'which they believed apply to their plant and Statement on August 8, 1985.
.these were ' considered also.
The assessment of t.he ability. of the design to meet these criteria var done e
Issuance of an Advanced Reactor Policy
[
by f independently. evaluating the performance of the Statement on July 8,1986.
h
-. key safety attributes of,the design over a full range Q
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2 Rathr dir gilco e issuance of n Safety Coal policy Statement on A r e v i t. e d Commission policy Statement on August 4, 1986, standardiration has been issued.
This policy statement s t r ongly enc our a ge s s tandardir at ion by e lasuance of a policy $tatement on Standatditation on Septenhet 15, 1987, design certifichtion.
Along with this polic; statement the NkC staff 16 developing a rulemaktro These policy statements provide Ernetal guidance (IDCIW ) which, after Commission approval, vili applicable to all types of power reactors and were provide addit ional guidance on the ptocedural ar.pect o and t e quirements f or de sign eti tif ication.
lettoted into our teview of the MitTC R.
Additional guidance r e ga r ding implementation of these policy s t a t ement e,
.i s fortheosing; however. <ettain facture fitsL_fretotypt.JtM asshclated with terplementation of these policy A8coI'31og to the Commir,sion's policy on Advanced peartora, a prototype test reactor is not required to stat emeMs had ala s.ady been developing and influenced our teview pl advanced teactors.
I woul; lke to be const rut t ed and operated in order to receive a bilefly dia. cuss these as they relate to the MHTCk design approval or tortification of an adunad perspective on the reactor from the NRC.
The steiff will, however, need with the putpobe of providing to be sat t s's ied that, f or the design being reviewed, a
there is a basis f or each claim regarding system and staff's review.
equipment perfornance and reliability.
In PIP $plITlvp pasticular, for designs without a conventional containment butiding, an option being considered by As a result of ttw above Comm!*ston policy statements the staff 15 to tequire a prototype plant be a the staff has been assessing their duplications regarding a dv anc e d reertors.
Although a final prerequisite to design certification, determination on their impact for the MitTCR is DLEllJL11111:LEptIR11De hoJIltInt dependent upon implementatton tuidance beitg Ih our review of the MHTCR P511) we considered both developed for IVks, several factors related to these domestic and foreign gas c oc, led reactor ope rat tr1g policy s t at ement s as they apply to advanced t eact or s can be discussed at this time.
These factors apply e x pe r i e nc e'. This is in accord with the Commissilon's Policy Statement f or Advanced kenctors which includes in genetal to any advanced re ac t or type and are the statement:
- The commission expects that these listed below f onowed by a short discussion on each.
designs (for a dvanc ed reactors) will reflect the benellt of air.ntitcant rescatch and development work, o I.nhanced Fafety and include the experience gained in operating the perf ormance Critella/Def ense in Depth many power and de ve lopme nt reactors both in the e
o Standaldtration l'ntted States and throughout the world.'
Such o Use of a prototype 1est information provides additional c onf idenc e regarding e its e of Isisting Opet at ing lxpe t tence the pot ent ial to achieve the goals and level of e itse of Industry Standatds saf et y required f or the Mil %R.
11thMKLd Ldtsy b t A llndstrY.J.lctu}n da 1he Commission's poliry St at est nt on Advanced The' u6e of industry standards for the technical Reactors encour age s the development of designs with details of tenctor design has been a fundamental part certain attributes which, if incorpoteted into a of teactor licensing for many years.
Over the years destrn, should lead to enhanced safety.
To help a great body of such st andards have been developed by ensure that e nhanc ed safety is incorporated into advanced designs the steif is considering taking the experta in c onj unc t i on with the NRC and provide in most c ase s the essent ial det alla of how higher level f ollowing approach:
criteria, policies, guides, rules and regulations are e Giving s tedit f or designs which have enhanced ac t ually met, 1.1 k e the use of appropriate safety chai ac t e r i t.t t e s by a reduction in the orelational experience, the use of these existing standards, wherever practicable, in advanced design number of and/or types of safety systens in encourated.
required or in changed administrative requirescots.
$UWMRY e Requiring a dva nc e d designs evaluate selected design changes to see !! they would result in for the past two ye ars the NRC has been teviewing MHRP licensing document s and developing preliminary cast ef f ec tive saf et y impt ovement s,
ruidance regarding licensing criteria.
These o Requiring advanced designs to document theft criteria along with out assessment of the potentini of the MHTCR design to meet the criteria will be enhanced saf et y characterist ic s, dac ument e d in a Safety p. valuation Report to be issued Wia fisoa1 y m.
EtIf,McAULtJI1Ltllaltt11mt_1 tot p.Lb There has been much discussion over the past several years about utilizing less prescriptive or performance based licensing criteria, Alternatives ranging tros p r ob ab ili s t ic based criteria to desctlptive goal based criteria have been sugrested.
While the use of such ctiteria is still being exploted and will be considered f or advanced reactors it in the staff's opinion that such criteria cannot be used to tutally displace engineet ing judrement or the defense in depth philosophy, 2
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