ML20005D607
| ML20005D607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1984 |
| From: | Mcalpine E, Richards B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19327A915 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-88 70-1113-84-06, 70-1113-84-6, NUDOCS 8910200033 | |
| Download: ML20005D607 (6) | |
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Report No.:
70-1113/84-06 Docket No.:
70-1113 Lic'ense No.:
$NM-1097 Safeguards Group No. III f
l Licensee: General Electric Company l
P. O. Box 780 Wilmington, NC 28402 j
l Inspection Conducted: April 2-6, 1984 l
Inspector: $. I.
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Richards, Statistician Date Signed Approved by:
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E. J. McA41ne, Chief,TMaterial Ccntrol and Date Signed Accountability Section, Nuclear Materials i
l Safety and Safeguards Branch l
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Insoection Summary r
Areas Inspected:
Followup on Items of Noncompliance and Previous Inspection Findings.
The inspection involved 31 inspector hours on site by one NRC inspector and was begun during the regular hours, j
Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas examined during the inspection except' for the following items:
1.
Failure to notify appropriate itcensee management when significant shipper-receiver differences occured.
i 2.
Failure to correctly calculate limits of error associated with a receipt of uranyl nitrate solution.
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3.
Failure to complete sample request form in accordance with written procedure which resulted in improper analysis of a receipt of uranyl nitrate solution.
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rriwt mon ometosum 10 cra 2.no nepoemAnces REPORT DETAILS Report No. 70-113/84-06 1.
Key Persons Contacted R. L..Bruca, Analyst, Licensing and Nuclear Materials Management
- J. L. Hanson, Manager, Manufacturing Technology and Engineering Operations W. 8. Haverty, Analyst, Licensing and Nuclear Materials Management
- W. J. Hendry, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- G. R. Mallett, Senior Engineer, Measurements and Statistics
- R. M. Mcivor, Acting Manager, Planning and Projects
- R. C. Pace, Acting Manager, Fuel Chemical Operations
'R. I. Parnell, Engineer, Chemet Laboratory
- H. Stern, Acting Manager, Manufacturing Technology and Engineering Operations
- C, M. Vaughan, Manager, licensing and Nuclear Materials Management j
- J. R. Watkins, Acting Manager, Powder Production
- T. P. Winslow, Manager, Chemet Laboratory i'
"P. E. Younghans, Manager, Materials Operations
' Denotes those present at the exit interview 2.
MC 92701B Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) 83-17-03 (Inspector Followup Item) Resolution of shipper receiver-differences caused by discrepancies in gross heel weights.
During the inspection conducted June 13-17,1 (reference NRC inspection report 70-1113/83-17), it was' determined that iscrepancies in gross heel weights between the licensee and gaseous dif usion plants were causing significant shipper-receiver differences (SR0s) uranium hexafluoride receipts which the licensee was unable to reconcile. Upon receiving uranium I
hexafluoride cylinders from the gaseous diffusio plants, the licensee empties the cylinders except for some residual material in the bottom of the cylinder referred to as a heel. The licensee ships the cylinders containing the heels back to the gaseous diffusion plants with a measured gross heel weight, determined prior to shipment. The gaseous diffusion plants, upon receipt of the heels, gross weighs each of the cylinders containing the heels. The gross heel weight, as determin d by the gaseous diffusion plant, was found in a number of uses to be signifi antly difftgent from the licensee's gross heel weighJt In addit on to discrepancie,s)noted in the ross heel weight, it has been determined that for some cylinders the icensee and the gaseous diffusion plant sed different values for the certified tare weight of empty cylinder These types of discrepancies cause significant SRDs which the gaseous fusion plants do not reconcile.
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Thus, when the gaseous diffusion plants refill the cylinprs with uranium hexafluoride to ship back to the licensee, these weight (,, discrepancies are causing significant s for the licensee which at the present time they are unable to resolve. The licensee performed a study comparing the tare weights associated w empty uranium hexafluoride cylinders determined by the licensee and the gaseous diffusion plants. The licensee presented their findings to the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NRC i
Headquarters) in a letter dated January 5,1984 Included in the letter was an evaluation of the resulting data and comments on the licensee's review of the gaseous diffusion plants' procedures. Among the observations that the licensee presented was the gaseous diffusion plant's apparent use of steel standards (as opposed to the licensee's use of artifact standards), which caused tare weights to be understated. The NRC is currently reviewing the licensee's study and will direct further corrective actions. Therefore, this item remains open.
3.
MC 92702B Followup on Items of Noncompliance a.
(0 pen) 83-17-01 (Violation) Failure to investigate and reconcile significant shipper-receiver differences.
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During an inspection conducted June 11-17,1983 (reference NRC Inspam-tion Report 70-113/83-17), it was determined that the licensee faiTed to properly investigate and raconcile significant shipper-receiver differences (SR0s). Among the corrective actions to which the licensee committed was a modification of the applicable procedure to assure compliance with the appropriate requirements, and an internal memoran-due to appropriate staff members which addressed the deficiencies referenced in the Notice of Violation. These modifications were reviewed and appeared to be adequate with regard to correcting the deficiencies. referenced in the Notice of Violation.
During this inspection, an in-depth review of current _ NRC-741 forms was performed to determine whether the licensee was investigating and reconciling l
investigating significant SR0s properly (. The licensee was still unable significant SRDs.
In most instances.
he licensee was detecting and i
1 to reconcile significant SR0s however, caused by discrepancQs in weights between the licensee and the gaseous diffusion plantsj. This concern was addressed in paragraph 2 above.
While examing the licensee's progrJa for evaluating SR0s with regard to the existing violation, gard to the llcon(see's investigation of significant a new discrepancy was identified by tne ins tor with SRO. Section
.2.3.1 of the licensee's Fundamental Nuclear Material Con 1 (FNMC) lan ecifies that significant SR0s are be reeval-uated as appropriate.
It further states that if the reevaluations confirm the discrepancy, the discrepancy is reportes t Licensing and Nuclear Materials Management '(LANP94)(.1 Procedure 109the Manager,
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Sectten 5.2.13.2 of the procedure spec ies that hgnificant SR0s are to be reported to the Manager, The inspector determined, however, that significant $RD1 that occured on a shipment of uranium hexafluoride received December 6,1983 from Goodyear Atomic were not r tported to t Manager, LANM.
This is a violation (44-06-01).
S' gnificant SR occured in this receipt for both the total shipment nd for indivi al cylinders. The reason for the violation appeared to be failure to follow procedure. Although this concern is similar to the concerns associated with the violation issued during the June 13-17, 1983, inspection, the causes are dif ferent.
Therefore, this violation is not a repeat violation, but rather an additional violation in the area of SRD evaluations. The violation issued during the June 13-17, 1983, inspection will remain open pending licensee's corrective actions to adequately investigate and reconcile SR0s.
b.
(Closed) 83-17-02 (Violation) Failure to reweigh cylinders of uranium hexafluoride receipts in accordance with written procedure when gross weight discrepancies occur.
During the inspection conducted June 13-17, 1983,- the licensee's methods for receiving uranium hexafluoride cylinders were examined.
It was determined that the licensee had failed to roweigh individual cylinders when gross weight discrepancies occurred between the licensee and the shipper' for several receipts, as required by an internal procedure (Procedure 109, "N ar Material Receipts). The licensee's corrective actions included modification of the applicable procedure to assure appropriate actions re taken, and an internal memoranLua to appropriate staff members which emphasized procedural complianc]e. A j
review of current receipts of uranium hexafluoride showed that the licensee was reweighing cylinders and taking appropriate actions when gross weight discrepancies occurred. This item is closed, c.
(0 pen) 83-21-01 (Violatioi) Failure to correctly calculate limits of error associated with receipts of uranyl nitrate solution.
During an inspection conducted July 25-29, 1983 (reference NR Inspec-tion Report 70-1113/83-21), the licensee's methods for cal:ulating limits of error associated with receipts of uranyl nitrate volution were examined.
It was determined that the licensee had incocrectly calculate 1 11mits of error for a number of receipts. The licenste had applied (!ncorrect parameters to the limit of error calculation,ghich resulted in the limits of error being significantly understated,( In their response to the. violation, the licensee stated that procedure 109
" Nuclear Material Receipt would be modified to include an instruc-tional requirement for personnel to check the appropriateness of parameters used in the it of error calculations for receipt Q This would assure that the parameters being us6d were consistent with the actual weighing, sampling, and _ analytical methods applied to each receipt.
The licensee committed to be in full compliance by November 1, 1983.
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The licensee has received two shipments of uranyl nitrate solution since November 1,1983. The limit of error reported on NRC-741 fore ZQM-YLJ 273 (received February 20,1984) was examined and fcund to be incorrectly calculated.
The ur concentration which was applied to the batch was date ed from naly s.
The licensee incorrectly applied a factor of rather than to the random analytical (uranium) error com nt used in calcu ing the limit of error. The licensee made a similar mistake in determining the limit of error for-grams U-235.
s inecc ect parameter caused the limits of er r to for the limit of error (uranium) and grams 4 graag(U-235).
understated b error The licensee's failure to correctly for the limit o calculate limits of error associated with urany) nitrate receipts is a violation (84-06-02). This is a repeat of the violation issued during the July 25-29, 1983, inspection.
scussions with licensee staff members and management in11cated that 11 appropriate personnel were not included in discussionllconcerning he original violajion detected during the July 25 *9,
- 1983, nspec-tion. Therefore, all responsible staff members were not awar of the procedural modification which attempted to prevent recurrence of this violation.
A contributing factor in the licensee's use of incorrect parameters is noted as follows.
Procedure 2.1.1.18 (Prod 16.96) entitled "UNH Transfer", revision 4, requires ample request forms be completed uplicateanalyses(uranium)y to the Chemet J orator specifying amples per and submitt shipment an concentration d enrichment) on each samp for receipts o# uranyl nitrate. It was disclosed that for the shipment of uranyl nitrate geceived Februa 0, 1984, the sample request form did not speciff duplicate analyse asgequired by the procedure. Therefore, each samite was only anal e(ApncQ The licensee's failure to complete the sample request form in accordance with the written procedure is a violation (84-06-03). The riumber of nalyses uset to determine the uranium concentra n 21 this case was nree (threQfsamples obtained and each analyzediconseehadfollowedthesamper@e nc as discussed regiously. I(the gst procedu i
woi(d have been apoled for this receipt.l samples obtained and each analyze in duplica six analyses thre Because of he licensee i
departure from the routine sampling and analytical technique, the limits of error were incorrectly calculated as noted previously. The licensee's modification to procedure 109 was not adequately imple-mented, as it did not prevent recurrence of the repeat violation. It is apparent that the two violations issued during the current inspec-
' tion relating to uranyl. nitrate receipts were caused by weaknesses in two different areas, and that their. occurrences resulted from disparate causes. The violation issued during the July 25-29, 1983, inspection will remain open, pending the licensee's corrective actions.
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Exit Intervias The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 6,1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abse.
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