ML20005B803
| ML20005B803 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308, 07200001 |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1981 |
| From: | Voiland E GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005B802 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109020275 | |
| Download: ML20005B803 (6) | |
Text
'
STATE OF ILLINOIS
)
Dated:
August 28, 1981
)
SS:
COUNTY OF COOK
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Consideration of Renewal
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Docket No. 70-1308 of Materials License No.
)
SNM-1265 Issued to G.E.
)
72-1 Morris Operation Spent Fuel
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Storage Installation
)
AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE E. VOILAND Affiant, Eugene E. Voiland, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.
Affiant is Manager-Morris Operation of the Nuclear Fuel and Services Division of General Electric Company and is authorized by General Electric Ccmpany to make this l
l Affidavit.
Further, affiant knows the contents of this Affidavit of his own personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, he would be competent to testify to the matters set forth herein.
2.
Morris Operation maintains cooperative agreements with Dresden Nuclear Power Station pursuant to which Dresden will assist Morris in the event of an incident involving radioactive materials at Morris.
Dresden is required to and does maintain a staff of personnel with training and expertise 8109020275 810828 APPENDIX B PDR ADOCK 07001308 C
in nuclear safety and nuclear accident response capability.
Fut*her, Dresden can make available a wide variety of specialized tools, equipment and supplies to supplement those which are available at the Morris operation.
3.
The storage basin at Morris Operation consists of a reinforced concrete basin 1.t
.with a stainless steel liner.
The basin is poured fluPJ against low-porosity shale in an area where the perch..; sater level is always higher than the top of the spent fuel.
This provides a hydrostatic barrier to limit the loss of water from the basin in the event of leakage.
The basin is equipped with a leak detection system which collects water from the interstice between the basin liner and the concrete, and alarms when a small specified amount (40 gallons) has accumulated.
The leak detection system is emptied into the Morris operation's low activity waste vault.
Water intakes for the cooling and filter systems are located at a shallow' depth in the basin to assure that no significant reduction in water depth can occur, by accidental or deliberate pumping of water from the basin through a failed or damaged pipe.
The water recircu-lation system is designed so that the flow direction cannot be reversed without nechanical changes, thus providing protection against accidental removal of basin water.
In the event of leakage of basin water, the Morris Operation has available between 10,000 and 20,000 gallons of demineral-ized water and essentially unlimited quantities of raw water from the site wells.
Additionally, Commonwealth Edison has 1
I
agreed to make available substantial amounts of demineralized water from Dresden Nuclear cower Station.
In the event of escape of enough water to expose stored fuel, or to drain the basin, the unshielded fuel would pose an immediate radiation hazard only in the vicinity of the basin building, to which access is controlled.
4.
The potential risk to the public from sabotage of the storage basin is almost non-existent because of the manner in which the spent fuel is stored and the very nature of the spent fuel itself.
The heavy-walled reinforced concrete basin is built into and is therefore literally a part of a thick, impermeable shale formation which effectively isolates the basin (and its water) from aquifers which supply potable water.
Thus, sabotage events which affect the integrity of the basin structure would not result in contaminated water reaching the aquifer.
The amount of radioactive materials contained in the fuel material which would be damaged by the use of explosives would be small, but more important, damage by explosion would not release radioactive material in a dispersible form.
The basin water l
acts as a highly effective explosion shield for the fuel, and the form of the fuel itself - hard, ceramic pellets in ductile metal tubes and baskets - makes it extremely resistant to shattering into pieces small enough to be dispersible.
Recently developed explosives of higher power than those l
previously analyzed have potential for only fractional 1 -.
change in the saboteur's ability to remove radioactive materials from the fuel matrix to the air or water, 5.
Spent nuclear fuel stcred at Morris can be removed from Morris in the same way it was put there: by shipping in-NRC-approved shipping casks to, for example, a reprocessing plant, or a reactor storage pool.
About one ton of fuel was recently transported in this manner to the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor.
Contents of the vaults and contaminated pipes, pumps, filters, storage hardware and the like, can be cut up, packaged, and disposed of as low-activity waste.
Contaminated structures at Morris can be decontaminated by sand blasting, acid etching or detergent scrubbing.
In this manner, all licensed radioactive materials related to spent-fuel storage at Morris can be removed from the site.
6.
The control room at Morris Operation can be entered by any of three doors, respectively, at the east and west ends and at the north side.
Access to the main building is possible from the two principal entrances on the north and south sides of the building and from any cf three doors at different elevations on the north side of the building which are accessible by an exterior staircase.
Once inside the building there are a number of ways to get from any of the l
building entry doors to any of the control room doors.
Thus, access to the control room cannot be prevented in any practical way.
However, manning of the control room is completely unnecessary to the safe operation of the storage facility.
Cooler and filter pumps, and ventilation fans.
could be turned off - in fact, the whole electrical system could be " killed" - without threat to the public.
At the current heat generation rate of the fuel, it would take over six months for the water to evaporate to the top of the fuel and the water temperature would not exceed 120 F.
7.
The operator training and certification program conforms to the requirements of 10 C.T.R. Part 72.92.
The program applies to technicians and supervisors who may be required to perform safety-related activities.
Certified operators must (1) meet certain physical and medical require-ments (2) successfully complete classroom and on-the-job training sessions related to radiation and industrial safety; equipment design and operating characteristics, instrumentation and control; and management systems and procedures, and (3) successfully demonstrate proficiency by completing a written examination and an oral (hands-on) examinatisn.
Examinations are administered by a knowledgeable engineer, independent of the operations organization.
Provisions are made for retrain-ing and testing if weaknesses are identified.
Records generated in the training program are maintained for five years.
Recertification, including testing, is required
[
every two years.
8.
The storage basin at Morris contains no known damaged spent fuel.
Morris Operation has the capability to store most damaged spent fuel without any adverse impact on l
the health or safety of the public or of Morris personnel.
1 __ _
Acceptr.nce of damaged fuel for storage at Morris Operation would be determined on a case-by-caae basis after considera-tion of the extent of damage, the radioactive material release characteristics, the impact on basin water contam-ination, the need for " canning" etc.
Further affiant sayeth not.
A M.A.+<4.)
Et;gline E. Voiland SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO jf before me this ffdd[ day of MM.
1981.
Oh
' % ".ary Public~
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