ML20005B610

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Responds to NRC 810505 Ltr Re Safety Concerns Associated W/Pipe Breaks in BWR Scram Sys.Consequences of NUREG-0785 Scenario Are Not Applicable.Containment Temp Sensors Are Located in Area of SDV Piping Headers
ML20005B610
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/02/1981
From: Davidson D
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To: Tedesco R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0785, RTR-NUREG-785 NUDOCS 8107080436
Download: ML20005B610 (1)


Text

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THECLEVELAND E L E C T r l C ; L L U M I N AT I N G C O M P A N '.'

'O r 5000 e CLEVEL AND oHlo 44101 e TELEPHONE ut6) 622-9800 e ILLUMIN ATING BLDG e 55 PUBLIC SoU AM Semng The Best Location in the Nation DJwyn R. Davidson i PRESIDENT LO ATEM ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTICN 4 M July 2, 1981 se-Mr. Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director i JUL 0 7 L9siw iB Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Scram Discharge Volume Pipe Freak

Dear Mr. Tedesco:

In response to your letter dated May 5,1981, on the subject of " Safety Concerns Associated with Pipe Breaks in the BWR Scram System," we reference the General Electric Report IEDO-24342 which was transmitted with GE's letter MFN-091-81 from Glenn G. Sherwood to Darrell Eisenhut dated April 30, 1981. This report provides the results of the GE generic evaluation of BWR scram discharge piping i breaks as required by Items 1, 2, and 3 of your letter. Our review of the report l confirms the applicability to the Ferry Plant with the following additional in-formation, i Since Ferry utilizes a Mark III containment design arrangement, the consequences of the scenario postulated in NUnEG-0785 are not applicable. This is because the scram discharge volume (SDV) is inside the primary containment while the core cooling and heat removal pumps are all outside containment in the auxiliary build-ing. Any water discharged from an SDV pipe break will return directly to the suppression pool and the postulated common mode failure due to equipment flooding is not present. Thus, tnere is no threat to the long term cooling capability provided by the Ttergency Core Cooling Systems.

Also, containment temperature sensors are located in the vicinity of the SDV piping headers. These safety grade instruments would provide indication of a pipe rupture in such areas.

We believe that the information in NEDO-24342 also addresses much of 120-day plant-specific response requirements; however, we will be submitting a Ferry plant spe-cific response by September 16, 1981.

If you have further questions, please let us know.

Very truly yours, I B107080436 810702 ^

):PDR ADOCK 05000440 (A PDR Dalwyn d. Davidson, Vice President System Engineering and Construction #pk DRD:dlp cc: G. Charnoff, J. Haghes, Resident Inspector hi P

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