ML20005A980
| ML20005A980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/28/1981 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1826A, NUDOCS 8107060164 | |
| Download: ML20005A980 (26) | |
Text
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9 SAFETY PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY AND CRITERIA [ 85- /8hh MEETING FEBRUARY 4, 1981 The ACRS Subcommittee on Safety Philosophy, Technology and Criteria held a meeting on February 4,1981 at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the status of the NRC Staff's develop-ment of requirements for near term construction permit (NTCP) and manufac-turing license (ML) plants. Notice of this meeting was published in the Federal Register of January 19, 1981. A copy of this notice is included as Attachment A, a list of attendees is included as Attachment B, and the schedule for this meet'ing is included as Attachment C.
Selected handouts for this meeting are included as Attachm:nt D.
A complete set of the handouts for this meeting is included in the ACRS fines. Oral presentations were given by Off-shore Power Systems, Houston Lighting and Power Company, and Boston Edison No written statements or requests for time to make oral statements Company.
were received from members of the public. The meeting was attended by D. Okrent, Chairman, D. Ward, J. Ray, P. Shewmon, and C. P. Siess, Subcomittee members, and R. Savio of the ACRS Staff.. Dr. Savio was the designated federal employee for this meeting. The meeting was opened at 3:00 pm on February 4, 1981 with a short presentation given by Dr. Okrent summarizing the schedule and goals for the day's meeting. The discussion was adjourned at 9:10 pm on the same l
day. The entire meeting was held in open session.
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Date Issued: Apr 28, 1981 SAFETY phi'.050PHY, TECHNOLO'GY AND CRITERIA MEETING FEBRUARY 4, 1981 PRESENTATION BY OFFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS (OPS) - B. HAGA, R. ORR. D. WALKER _
Mr. Haga discussed the manner in which OPS would implement the requirement for dedicated three foot diameter penetration. Four 18 inch diameter penetrations would be provided. The pipes from these penetrations would be routed through the annular space between the containment and the shield building and would The vent pipes be submerged in the water basin to a depth of about 30 feet.
would be sealed with a rupture disc and additional shielding would be provided on the floor of the control room and around the areas where the vent pipes penetrated the platform. A schematic of the proposed arrangement is shown on page 1 of Attachnent D.
In the event that the rupture disc would burst the vent pipes would be sealed by the water seal which would. be provided by the 30 foot heat of water (about 15 psig). The current containment design has Mr. Orr discussed the pressure capabilities of the FNP a pressure of 15 psig.
containment design. An analysis was performed to determine the functional capability of the containment. The results of this analysis are shown on page 2 of Attachment D.
The assumption was made that yield strength of the materials used would meet or exceed 1.2 times the minimum specification require-The weakest section is the 5/8' inch thick plate section dire ~ctly below ment.
wne dome, This will withstand 49 psig. The analysis was later refined using the von Mises yield criteria and inela! ;ic analysis in the treatment of the platform hoop stiffeners on the shelves In this analysis the weakest sections of the containment were the equipment access hatch and the 5/8 inch thick i These refined calculations indicated that these areas would plate section.
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4 withstand 55 psig.
Increasing the thickness of.the 5/8 inch plate section and strengthening the equipment hatch and the platform at the junction to the containment shell could increase the ultimate capability of the contain-ment to about 80 psig. This is believed to be the limit to the present design Mr. Walker discussed capability of the FNP design for dealing with concept.
T h table given in page 3 of Attachment D summarizes the a hydrogen burn.
results of calculating the effectiveness of containment venting in a hydrogen CLASSIX analyses were performed under a variety of conditions (adiabatic burn.
burn, conduction to the containment surfaces, and the effects of safeguards).
z The containmeht sprays are the most effective of the engineered safeguards in OPS feels that the peak reducing the peak pressure during a hydrogen burn.
pressures resulting from hydrogen burns can be held within the containment functional capability with the ute of distributed ignition sources and mini-f The degraded core requirements proposed by OPS num engineered safeguards.
are summarized on page 5 of Attachment D.
The highlights of these require-ments are that the plant be designed to cope with hydrogen releases up to 50 percent Zr-Hp0 reaction with hydrogen release rates up to a maximum uniform rate of one pound per second. The design basis for the hydrogen control systems should be based c. realistic methods of analysis, the availability of AC The calcu-power, and one single active failure of containment safeguards.
lated containment capabilities should.be defined utilizing inelastic analysis methods which consider the effect of local deformations and the actual material properties.
NRC POSITION WITH REGARD TO NTCP/ML REQUIREMENTS - R. PURPL_
Mr. Purple summarized the NRC Staff's current position on NTCP/ML degraded core rulemaking requirements. These would require NTCP/ML applicants to:
Perform a site / plant probabilistic risk assessment and incorporate the 1.
results of this assessment into the design facility.
To demonstrate by analysis that the the containment and the associated systems 2.
will provide reasonable assurance that uniformly distributed hydrogen concentrations do not exceed 10% following an accident that releases the hydrogen generated from a 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction, or demonstrate that the post accident atmosphere will not support hydrogen combustion.
To demonstrate by analysis that the containment integrity (based on ASME 3.
Code yield criteria and ASMEService Level C assuming a single load con-dition) will be maintained following an accident that releases hydrogen generated from 100% fuel-clad metal-water reaction accompanied by the most severe condition for either hydrogen burning or the added pressure from post-accident burning, assuming that carbon dioxide is the inerting agent.
Systems necessary to assure containment integrity should be demonstrated to be capable of performing their intended function under these conditions.
To demonstrate, by analysis and by test, that the containment structural 4.
loadings produced by an inadhertent full inerting (assuming carbon dioxide as the inerting agent) plus mechanical and other stress producing loadings did not produce stresses in excess of acceptable maximm specified ASME codesSection III, Subsection NE limits. The seismic loading and design basis loadings need not be included in this analysis.
It will be required that ;he containment be pressure tested at 1.5 tires the pressure calcu-lated to result from the inadvertent of fall inerting, assuming that car-bon dioxide is the inerting agent.
l The containment design should include prohisions of one or more dedicated 5.
penetrations equivalent in size td a single three-foot diameter' opening to accommodate a future possible requirement to vented containments.
BWR plants will be required to incorporate capability for natural convection decay heat remohal by the inclusion of'an in-containment isolation condenser as a backup to the RCIC and HPCS. This dehice will be capable of operating L
4-ehen if all AC power is lost.
Ice condenser and large dry containment PWRs
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will be required as part of the required probabilistic risk assessment to ehaluate the feasibility of incorporating additional capability, functionally similar to the in-containment isolation condenser being required for the BWRs, for prohiding the natural conhection decay heat remohal. Thisdehicewillalso be capable of operating with the loss of all AC power.
The NRC indicated that, although this is the current position, it is still being discussed within the NRC Staff and that some changes td this position The Subcommittee comments would be considered in this process.
may occur.
ALLENS CREEK TECHNICAL STUDIES ON DEGRADED CORES - HOUSTON LIGHTIN G. OPREA, HL&P; G. GOLDBEPG: HL&P; S. LEVY, SLI Mr. Oprea gahe a brief introt'uction and stated that the speakers to follow would describe the results of a study performed by HL&P which ehaluates the effectiheness of the various plant ' safety improhements. Mr. Oprea indicated that HL&P's purpose was to inform the ACRS of the results of these studies and to discuss the results and their relation with the NTCP/ML requirements for rulemaking being undertaken by the NRC Staff. Mr. Oprea indicated that the stable and reasonable NRC Staff position on construction permits must be deheloped before licensing could proceed. He stated that clear cut criteria must be deheloped for dealing with degraded cores and that sufficient NRC He stated that the resources must be allocated to NTCP license applications.
design of the Allen's Creek plant is currently 80% Omplete and that the 4
Houston risk associated with this plant is lowei than the WASH-1400 BWR.
Lighting & Power beliehes that the present design is adequate and will result in a plant that does not po'se undue risk to the public heaMh and safety.
Houston Lighting & Power has, howeher, undertaken a study inholhing S. L Inc., and EBASCO whose purpose it was to look at and ehaluate harious plant modifications which would further lower the risk which would be associa with this plant.
Mr. Goldberg stressed the need for an early decision on near term CP require-ments and the issuance of the construction pennit for the Allen's Creek plant.
The probability Str. Lehy described the results of the Allen's Creek Study.
of core damage or containment failure for the Allen's Creek design is com-The major contributor pared to the WASH-1400 BWR on page 6 of Attachment D.
to the containment failure probability is failure to remohe the decay heat load tz om the containment. The probability of causing core damage by a failuretoprohidewatermakeuptothereactorcore.isapproximatelyhalfof Various dehices for reducing the probability of the containment failure this.
A list of the features which or core damage were ehaluated in this study.
A summary of the features were considered is gihen on page 7 of Attachment D.
l which were studied in sone detail and their relatihe effectiheness is gihe The most effectiheness of the igrohements con-on page 8 of Attachment D.
Thisdehiceissimilarin sidered was the internal isolation condenser.
I concept to what was used on earlier BWRs and uses the fuel storage, pool as The use of post eccident inerting of the containment is being a heat sink.
considered as the most attractihe option for controlling a post accident is being considered. The hydrogen release.. The use of either halon or C02 Houston Lighting & Power proposal for' degraded core requirements for the The proposed require-Allen's Creek plant is gihen on page 8 of Attachment D.
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ments stipulate the installation of a post accident inerting system and the An option of substituting prehentatihe features for mitigation features.
example cited was the use of the isolation condenser instead of the prohision for a 3-foot diameter dedicated penetration which might later be used in conjunction wi'w. the filtered-vented systems.
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sullihaa discussed the post accident inerting system and The the capability of the Allen's Creek containment to withstand pressure.
post accident inerting system being considered would hahe the capability of Halon and CO2 are inerting the ' containment within approximately 15 minutes.
The injection of halon would increase the pressure in the being considered.
containment by 6.5 psi. The injection of CO2 would increase the pressure in The containment shell can be upgraded to a ASME the containment by 22 psi.
SerhiceLehelCpressurecapabilityof45psigwithsomestrengtheningofthe containment-shell-to-basemat junction. This is the limiting feature of the Fur-The shell has a pressure capability of 60-65 psig.
containment design.
ther strengthening cf the shell.-basemat junction would require a substantial thickening of the basemat.
GENERAL ELECTRIC PRESENTATIONS - R_.
BUCCHOLZ, S. STARK _
Mr. Buccholz and Mr. Stark described GE's assessment of the capability of the They noted BUR Mark VI design for dealing with the degraded core accidents.
that the BWR Mark VI has substantially improhed from the WASH-1400 BWR and GEbeliehes stated that a factor of 20 in risk reduction could be expected.
that the present design is adequate. They also noted that the suppression A factor pool would act as a filter in the ehent that there was core damage.
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of 1000 reduction in the iodine dose was claimed. This was discussed to It is noted that in hiew of the uncertainty in the source term some extent.
and the form of iodine that might be released in a core melt that this con-clusion needed to be carefully examined.
It was noted that iodine trapped in the suppression pool could be released later if the integrity of the sup-The GE Mark III design has a ASME Serhice Lehel A pression pool was lost.
TheSerhice rating of 22 psig and the Service Lehel C rating of 41 psig.
Lehel A rating could be raised to 45 psig and the Serhice Level C rating could To achieve be raised to 79 psig without hiolation of the basic design concept.
these improhements the headshape would haYe to be changed from a spherical to a hemispherical shape and plat'e thickness in the shell walls would have to be increased to one and three-quarter inches.
BOSTON EDISON PRESENTATION - R. BUTLER AND R. JAEGELS Mr. Butler and Mr. Jagels described the capability of the Pilgrim containment for coping with a degraded core condition. The containment is the large dry pre-stressed concrete design with a free volume of 2.5 x 106 cubic feet and the pressure is 60 psig. The pressure capability of the containment is beliehed to range between 108-115 psig. Boston Edison beliehes that with the use of igniters the containment could withstand the hydrogen released from a 100% metal-water reaction without exceeding 80 psig.
For additional details, a complete transcript of the meeting is NOTE:
available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washincjon, D.C. 20555, or at cost from Alderson Reporting Company Inc., 400 Virginia Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20024 Y
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i PROPOSED MEETING AGENDA FOR THE ACRS SUBCOMMllTEE SAFETY PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY, AND CRITERIA 1717 H ST NW, WASH, DC, RM 1046 15 MIN 3:30 en 1.
EXECUTIVE SESSION 3:45-4:30 2.
STATUS REPORT ON THE NRC DEVELOPMENT OF 45 MIN NTCP REQUIREMENTS - (NRC) 4:30-5:15 3.
PRESENTATION BY OFFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS ON PROPOSED SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE FNP 45 MIN 5:15-7:00 4.
PRESENTATION BY HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER 1 HR 45 MI'N (A)
INTRODUCTION-(5 MIN)
(B)
DESCRIPTION OF HLP STUDY AND PRINCIPAL RESULTs-(40 MIN)
(c)
GENERAL DISCUSSION-(45 MIN) 7:00-COB 5.
PRESENTATION FROM NTCP APPLICANTS TIFE FOR PRESENTATIONS HAS BEEN RE0LESTED BY GENER (30 MINUTES) AND BOSTON EDISON 0 5 MINUTES)
REQUESTS FROM D. OKRENT FOR MAT 4,1981 SAFETY PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY, AND MEETING.
PRESENTATIONS / COMMENTS FROM TH EIR CON-l Ill WHICH THEY COULD INCREASE THE DESIGN 1.
E AL.
TO THE TAINMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NRC STAF S THE SPECI-EXTENT POSSIBLE THE NTCP/ML APPLICANTS S l
FIC CHANGES THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED.
s PRESENTATION FROM THE NRC STAFF ON AS ADVANTAGES OF REQUIRING A DEDICATED 2.
REQUIRED OF A FILTERED / VENTED FACILITY PRESENTATIONS BY THE NRC STAFF AS T
)
PRESSURES OF THE CAPABILITY OF INCREASING CONTAINMENT D 3.
NTAINMENTS, LARGE DRY CONTAINMENTS, STEEL SHELL ICE CONDENS THE MAX-AND MARK} CONTAINMENTS IN ACCORDAN IMUM STRENGTH FROM THE PROPOSED CONTAI PRESENTATION BY THE NRC STAFF ADDR MUM 60 DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED REQUIRE 4. PSIG CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE. kN A LIST OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANC MODIFICATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE MARK 5. l l O ~
STAFF POSITION RE. CP REQUIREMENT.WITH RESPECT TO DEGRADED CORE RULEMAKING /?2A i-r All Pending CP's .Conai.t to performing a site / plant probabilistic risk assessment and incorporating the results of the assessment into the design of the The commitment must include a program plan, acceptable to facility. the staff, that demonstrates how the risk assessment program will be scheduled so as to influence system designs as they are being developed. Demonstrate by analysis, that the containment and associated systems will provide reasonable assurance that uniformly - distributed hydrogen' concentrations do not exceed 10% following an accident t' hat releases . hydrogen generated from 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction, or demonstrate, . that the post-accident atmosphere will not support hydrogen combustion. i D monstrate, by analysis, that containment integrity (based on ASME i Code yie'id criteria and on ASME Service Level C assuming a single load condition) will be maintained following an accident that releases' hydrogen gerierated from a 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction accompariied by the more severe condition of either hydrogen burning or the added pressure from post-accident inerting assuming carbon-dioxide is the inerting agent. I i Systems necessary to ensure containment integrity shall also be, demonstrated i to perform their function under these conditions., C Demonstrate, by analysis and test, that containment structure loadings t( 1. produced by an inadvertent full inerting (assuming carbon dioxide), plus mechanical and other stress-producing loadings, (but not including seismic l I I e .e
W t es in excess ar design basis accident. loadings) do not produce s ress Section III, Subsection itE. d Cf the acceptable maximum specified in ASME Cc e ll inerting Also demonstrate,. by analysis and test, that the inadvertent fu The containment shall shile'at operation can be sa'fely accomodated. lt from be pressure-tested at 1.15 times the pressure calculated to resu inadvertent full inerting (assuming carbon dioxide). dedicated Containment desi,gn shall include provisions for one or more diameter penetrations', equiva. lent in size to a single 3-foot t the opening, to accomodate a future" possibl,e requirement to ven containment. [ ord b-Y 3 $1R's 4 W rw tr-"- r ncorporate e*-+d#'4e=o4 capability for pr.ee'.S;m 0 including.an in-Containment isolation 59Mc J,4Sd-CNEnf -3GGd4! GAM by ting with loss condense'r as a br.ckup to the RCIC and HPCS, capable of opera of AC power. For Ice Condenser and targe Dry Containments h ftasibility As part of the required probabilistic risk assessment, evaluate t th'e cf incorporating an add +t+$rrai capability, functionally similar to A for w a @ in-containment isolation con' denser being provided in BNR s% Cck'U so%myH%cnwaM7ree irsseF-wJWch ble of d/ q Vcek Vcmova8;coF I cotwee.hwa oyevorQ wiA toys of AC yov'ex- ................,q,. e
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FNP H VENT RESULTS 2 UNIFORMLY MIXED,6 FPS FLAME SPEED 30 FT SUBMERGENCE PEAK PR:ISSURE VENT 3 FT H O IN PIPE 2 30 FT H O IN PIPE 2 AREA %Zr.H O (FT ) 45 PSIG RUPTURE 22 PSIG RUPTURE 22 PSIG RUPTURE 2 2 25 0 45.7 45.7 45.7 5 45.5 42.9 42.8 10 45.5 40.4 40.1 i 50 'O 83.1-83.1-83.1 b l I 5 76.2-74.9 74.9 i l 10 70.0 67.9 67.9 4 75 0 114.9 114.9 114.9 5 101.5 100.8 100.6 i 10 90.4 89.3 89.2 100 0 142.6 142.6 142.6 5 122.6 122.3 122.1 10 107.0 105.1 t04.7 g l l 1 1-t
W i CLAStX ANALYSIS OF A UNIFORMLY MIXED H. BURN 2 l 90~ n9 ADIABATIC PAtslVE HEAT SINKS v> (L v w 80-cc FULL SAFEGUARDS o PASSIVE HEAT SINKS Q No ICE ( FANS-u w r nu o c..v,,,,unsr>r e 70-0- sne v s F Z W E 60-r l Vz 850-i<w o FULL SAFEGUARDS 40 2ISSWE HEAT StNKS l 2200 100% ZR-H.0 t 30 0 5'00 1000 15'b0 2600 MASS OF INDROGEN lN CONTAINnENT AT lGNITION (LBM) (e san e rc eue,owa is s"~c") ~
- * ~ ~
' " ' N"N ' ^ ^ ' ' ' ' ^ NYY U"_bA N B= ^
~ ~ y,. . - x, _ r, ' ~.., PROPOSED DEGR ADED CORE HYDROGEN REQUIREMENTS - M ANUFACTURING LICENSE
- 1. DEGRADED CORE ACCIDENT SIMILAR TO TMI UP TO 50% ZR H2O REACTION
- 2. HYDROGEN RELEASE RATES UP TO MAXIMUM UNIFORM RATE OF 1.0 LBS./SEC.
- 3. CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CALCULATIONS RESULTING FROM HYDROGEN COMBUSTION (IF ANY A.
REALISTIC METHODS OF ANALYSIS B. REALISTIC HEAT LOSSES TO HEAT SINKS REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR OPERATION OF SAFEGUARDS AND MITIGATION FEATURES C. D.
- BURN INITIATED BY DISTRIBUTED IGNITION SOURCES,IF PROVIDED E.
ONE SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT SAFEGUARDS i l F. ' ELECTRIC POWER IS AVAILABLE l
- 4. CALCULATED CONTAINMENT PRESSURE SHALL BE LESS THAN FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY DEFINED B A.
PLASTIC ANALYSIS METHODS INCLUDING CDNSIDERATION OF EFFECTS OF DEF0F!MATIONS B. ACTUAL MATERIAL PROPERTIES
l "I(OliABILITY OF CORE DAMAGE OR 60NTAIN, MENT FAILURE LEGEND l l WASH-1400 ESTIMATE FOR ALLENS
- 1. 4 -
gi,i: CREEK WITH ATW5 FIX 4 AND WITHOUT FEATURES
- 1. 3 -
ADDED .n
- 1
- 1. 2 -
m 'c; 1.1. a L. =
- 1. 0.
\\:.- To t '.i, D.9 - -c N 0,.\\ 3 , :(*: .c is l s. 0.5-b(, #,/ S , 1/ 4.o 0.1 - B 0.5-t O 0.5- .q t o f g 9 .T 0.4. A gr 2 0.3-c. 3' O.2- = 0.1 w.= i:is ~ l Failure to Remove Fhilure to Shut Failure to Provide Water Decay Heat Down Reactor Makeup to Reactor (Leads to Contain-(Leads to Contain. (Leads to Core Damage) ment Failure) ment Failure) i o
~ FEATURES STUDIED l' PREVENTIVE FAILURE TO REMOVE DECAY HEAT IMPROVED ON-SITE POWER SOURCE / CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RELIEF INTfRNil ISOLATION CONDENSER EXTERNAL ISOLATION CONDENSER d I ALLURE 10 PROVIDE WATER MAKEUP TO THE REACTOR IMPROVED ON-SITE POWER EDURCE REACTOR VESSEL DEPRESSURIZATION AUGMENTATION COMBINED CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RELIEF AND REACTOR DEPRESSURIZATION AUGMENTATION MITIGATION IlYDROGEN CONTROL CONTAINMENT PRE-INERTING CONTAINMENT POST-INERTING CONTROLLED HYDR 0 GEN BURNING INCREASED CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CAPABILITY OVERPRESSURE CONTROL VENTING OR VENTING / FILTER OF CONTAINMENT i p LOW CARBON CONCRETE v g,. GASEMAT PENETRAT10N FLOODING OF CONTAINMENT AND r:0LTEN CORE CATCHER V AND LADLES j ~ 7 ~~~ "" ' ~~ ~ l aw -= => 7., g -~ 4x;w
FIRST SCREENING OF FEATURES PREVENTION 1. CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RELIEF (2) 2. INTERNAL ISOLATION CONDENSER (5) .t. ict.Acl~ ult VI:..Lt.1)Li'l(LSSUl(1/AT10N AUCMENTATION (1.1) 4. COMBINATION OF (1) and (3) ABOVE (3) l l l M.I.T 1 GA,T,1,0,N 1. CONTAINMENT POST INERTING (< 1.3) CONTROLLED HYDROGEN BURNING WITH PRESENT CONTAINMENT SP 2. INCL (CASEli CONIAiNMENT l'l(ESSUl(E CAPABILITY (< l.3) a. 4. VENTING 0F CONTAINMENT (< 1.3) . -M ( } & Cb "g W me l e G
I 2/4/81 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY'S PROPOSED RULE CONSIDERATIONS 1. The containment shall be equipped with a post accident inerting system to preclude detonation of hydrogen re-sulting from a 100% fuel clad metal water reaction. 2. The containment pressure, integrity should be such that it can accommodate: The anticipated peak containment pressure a. resulting from a postulated 100% fuel clad metal water reaction without loss of functional integrity. i l b. The anticipated peak containment pressure l resulting from the accidental initiation of the post accident inerting system with the reactor at power without resulting in the containment stresses exceeding code allowables for normal operation. A provision for a preventive feature should be allowed l 3. in place of additional mitigative features.. Fcr example, l a provision for an isolation condenser for decay heat l removal should be accepted in place of a three foot diameter dedicated penetration for a processed vent and I ether potential mitigative f,eatures. l c....:u.. amu =w-..==a=.a=a=.==u :== t. ~ 8108 Fed:r:I R5 gist:r / Vcl.'46, Nh.12 / Mondry, January it.1981/ Notices the NRC Drsmag-Rcnge Research Further information regarding topics operation or licensing activities may bi
- Plan, to be discussed, whether the meeting discussed following this session.
Further information regarding topics, has been canceUed or rescheduled, the Persons wishing to submit wTitten to be discu'ssed, whether the meeting Chairman's ruling on requests for the statements regarding Regulatory Guides ? has been canceDed or rescheduled, the opportunity to present oral statements with Task numbers RS 705-4. SC 705-4, ( Chairman's ruling on requests for the and the time allotted therefor can be and Regulatory Guide 1.136. Revision 2, opportunity to present oral statements obtained by a prepaid telephone call to may do so by providing a readily 3 and the time allotted therefor can be the cognizant Desig.iated Federal Jeproducible copy to the Subcommittee obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Employee, Mr. Paul Boehnert (telephone at the beginning of the meeting. the cognizant Designated Federal 202/634-3267) between 8.15 a.m. and However, to insure that adequate time is . (telephone 202/634-3267) between 5:15. 5:00 p.m., EST. available for fall consideration of these I Employee, hit. Sam Duraiswamy comments at the meeting,it is desirable Det @ @ 4.lest. a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EST. to send a readily reproducible copy of the comments as far in advance of the 3 Dated. Jan"'714.1981. Advisory Couuittee Management Oficar. meeting as practicable to Mr. Sam i FR Da el-m W 3-M ae =J Duralawamy, the Designated Federal i l Advisory Committee Mancgement Ojpcer. _ em,a onog ym g y g g pn om m-ism rw i-nes aos a=1 ACRS, Nucleat Reguletory Commission. Washington, DC 20555 or telecopy them ~ * * * * ' ' * * * ' Advisory Committee on Reactor to the Designated Federal Employee Safeguards, Subcommittee on (202/N310 as fatin advance of the 3 Advisory Committee on Reactor houratory Activities; Meeting i Safeguards Subcommittee on PM meeting as practicable. Such comments Features Impedant to D'Hy.;keeting Yhe ACRS Subcommittee on shall be based upon documents on Gle Regulatory Activities willhold a ans! avallable for public inspection at ) ~ ': --The ACRS Subcomm.ttee on Plant ' meeting on M~~v 't 10" !n Room the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H i a Feetures Important to Safety wdl hold a lot 0.1717 ITStreet, N.W., Wa shington, Street, N.W, Washington, DC *0555. lj( nj meeting at too p.m. on FAnmv 3.1981 DC. Notice of this meeting was Further information about topics to be j l,, 1, - in Room 1167,1717 H Street, h.w., published Deceml er 22,1980. discussed, whether the meeting has !]- Washington, DC to begin discussion of in accordance with the procedures been canceUed or rescheduled, the the NRC definitions of plant features - outlined in the Federal Register on Chairman's ruling on requests for the po ent to safe d re! ted ent a October 7,1980 (45 FR 66535), oral or opportunity to present oral statements . pe by written statements may be presented by and the time allotted therefor can be f 'I Staff in connecte.n with the nc-1 members of the public, recordings will obtained by a prepaid telephone call to f-
- j nadart nvi'g 9 da a e the pdra of the meeting wher. a transcript is bemg Employee, Mr. Sam Duralswamy, be permitted only during those portions the cognizant Designated Feders!
i l[I L outlined in the Federal Register on kept, and questions may be asked on!y (telephone 202/834-3287) between 8:15 October'7,1980 (45 FR 66535), oral or by members of the Subcommittee,its a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EST. q i written statements may be presented by consultants. and StaH. Persons desiring Dated. January 14,19el. k'" members of the public, recordings will to make oral statements should notify te John C. Hoyte, I L ' be permed only during those portions Designated Federal Employee as far in g.isory Comminee Mancsement Oficar. j ' i. of the meeting wben a transcri t is being kept, and questions may be asfed onlyadvance, as practicable so that g,, om,, 1,,,w,_,y,,,,,,, k t
- ppropnate arrangements can be made
% coag - by members of the Subcommittee,its to aUow the necessary time during the / consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring nieeting for such s,tatements. ~ ' to make oral statements should notify %e entin m eting will be open to' Advisoy Committee on Reactor I ko ~ the Designated Federal Employee as far in advance as practicable so that Public attendar. Safeguards, Subcommittee on Safety d appropriate arrangements can be made The agenda for subject meeting shall fgpfophy.Technotopyrrf Criteria; be as follows: Meeting ~ d r to allow the necessary time dur* g the m meeting for such statements. 7besday,Februaryk 2MJ The ACRS Subcommittee on Safety i Philosophy, Technology and Criteria b The entire meeting will be open to The meetm.g mllcommence of H5a.m. will hold a meeting at 300 p.m. on <" # J %e agenda for subject meeting shall %e Subcommittee will hear ffAg41,93 in Room 1048,1717 H ~ ? ? ,1 public attendance.. be as follows: presentations from the NRC Staff and Street, N.W., Washington, DC to discuss will b Id discussions with this group . requirements for new Near-Term Tuesday, February 3, 2MJ Construction Pernut reactor plants.. J 00p.m. untillhe conclus/on ofbusiness. pertinent to the following:(1) Regulatory Guide (Task No.RS In accordance with the procedures l l f During the initial portion of the 7054),'tightning Protection for Nuclear outlined in the Federal Register on U meeting, the Subcommittee, along with Power Plants"(Post comment). October 7,1980 (45 FR 66535), oral or I any of its consultants who may be (2) Regulatory Culde 1.136. Revision 2, written statements may be presented by present, will exchange preliminary " Materials. Construction and Testing of members of the public, recordiras will views regarding matters to be Concrete Containments"(Post be permitted only during those portions il considered dunng the balance of the comment). of the meeting when a transcript is being meeting. (31 Regulatory Guide (Task No. SC kept, and questions may be asked only I he Subcommittee will then hear 7C 1.* Ultrasonic Testing cf Reactor by members of the Subcommittee,its presentations by and hold discussions Vessel Welds During Pre-Service and consaltants, and Staff. Persons desiring with representrtives of the NRC Staff,
- Inservice Examination" (Post comment).
to make oral statements should notify their consultants, and other Interested Other matters which may be of a the Designated Federal Employee as far person's regarding this review. predecisional nature relevant to reactor.,L1 advance as practicable so that }I ~ l a A u ., ~ _ l
Tzderal Rrgister / Vcl. 46. No.12 / Monday, January 19. 1981 / Notic:s 5109 l i cppropriate arrangements can be made CCA Corp., Common Stod.100 Par Value referred 12 the applicatiin on file with to a!!ow the necessary time during th) - (Fds No.74827) the Commission for o statIment cf the fr.eeting for such statements. Clobt! Mar;ae. Inc Common Stock. 8.25)ar representstions conteined therein. 1 The entire meeting will be open to which are summarized below. y,,a Ro a T ta of Beneficial public attendance. Interest, No Par h. e IFde No. 7-M:0) Applicant states that it registered The agenda for subject meeting shall Oak Industries. Inc. Common Stock, st Par under the Act en March 24,1980, and be as foDows: Value (Tile No. 74430) that it simultaneously registered an Ocean Drilhng & Exploration Co, Common indefinite number of its shares of Wednesday, February d.19ef, acop.m. Stock. S So Par Value ilde No.7-5831) beneficialinterest of common stock Untilthe ConclusJon ofBusiness. Patnck Petroleum Co Common Stock.8.10 under the Securities Act of1933. During the initialportion of the Far Value (File No. 7-5832) According to the application, the l snecting. the Subcommittee along with "*' C,rp Common Stock,81 Par Value registration of those shares became N any ofits consultants who may be Southland Royalty Co, Common Stock,8.12 effective on April 2,1980, at which time present, will exchange preliminary % Par Value (Fde No.74834) ~ commended. Applicant further states an initialpublic offering of thoss shares wiews regarding matters to be Southwest Airlmes. Common Stock. 81 Par considered during the balance of the Value (Fde No.74435) that it was dissolved pursuant to its { meeting. These securities are listed and Declaration of Trust and applicable The Subcommittee will then hear registered on one or note other national state law on Au et 18,19ea g presentations by and hold discussions . Accor&ng to e applica securities exchan es and are reported in August 18,1980 Applicant,Uon, on a 'LJ with representatives of the NRC Staff, Jbe consolidated transaction reporting e Trustees 9 thel consultants, and other Interested recommended to its shareholders that stem. li t-persons regarding this review. Interested persons are invited to app cant's affairs be wound up and !f - Further information regarding topica submit on or before February 3,1981 terminated and that unanimous consent to be discussed, whether the meeting written data, views and arguments of shareholders appro,ving such has been cance!!ed or rescheduled, the concerning the above-referenced termination was obtamed on August :8 Chairman's ruling on requests for the ' applications. Persons desiring to make 1m App!mt states eat it vc untarh opportunity to present oral statements written comments should file three rt. 2emed all of its 10.523.121 and the time allotted therefor can be copies thereof with the Secretary of the outstan&ng shans at adr $1 net asset obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Securities and ExchanEe Commission. V8lue per share and that such the cognizant Designated Federal Washington. D.C. 20519. Following this redemptions were completed on August Employes Mr. Richard Savio (telephone opportunity for leating, the Commission 18 m Appht furbr states eat au its portfolio securities either matured or 302/834-3267) between 8.15 a.m. and will approve the applications ifit finds, wena to Money Market 520 p.m, EST. based upon all the information available h "*,8eme ~ (' ! und [ Dated:Jenaary se, test, to it, that the extensions of unlisted s ) d 6c Ac pursu Joha C. Heyla, trading pnnleges pursuant to such Advisory comunirtee Monosement offmer, applications are consistent with the Rule 6C-5(T) under the Act. According to the a plication, that liquidation ~ y, w,,, w,_ _,3 maintenance of fair and orderly markets resulte[in transfer agent and amis caos pseo.om and the protection ofinvestors. administrative fees of $24.801.75, which For the Comm!ssion, by the Division of were assumed by Federated Income Market Regulation, pursuant to de!cgated Research Corp., Applicant's investment autherny. adviser. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION George A w -u - Applicant states that as of the date of Secretary. . the filing of the applicationit had no Boston Stock Exchange,Inc.; yn nw. si-im rn.4 3-sm. nes.-3 assets or liabilities and was not a party Applications for Unlisted Trading awwa cocc setoes.a to anylitigation or administrative Prtviteges and of Opportunity for proceeding. Applicant further states that (Release No. itS47;(stt-30tB}} 11is not engaged and does not propose
- E January 12.19et.
to engage in any business at.livities The above named national securities Federated Cash Reserve Trust; Fifing other than Gose necessary for the exchange has filed applications with the of Application Pursuant to Section 8(f) winding up ofit affa s and that there pp ant to Securities and Exchange Commission of the Act for an Order Declaring that QDrn HWiMo a pursusn't to Section 12ifM1MB) of the Applicant has Ceased to be en, ,g Securities Exchange Act of1934 and Investment Company been made. According to the Rule 12f-1 thereunder, for unlisted January 13. seet. application. Applicant intends to file tra:!ing privileges in the following Notice is hereby given that Federated Articles of Dissolution with the stocks: Ccsh Reserve Trust (" Applicant"),421 Secretary of State of the Comrnonwealth Advanced Micro-Devices. Inc., Common Seventh Avenue. Pittsburgh, PA 15219,' of Massachusetts. Stock. 8 0.1 Par Value (Fde No. 7-5822) which is registered under the Investment Section 8(f)of that Act provides,in Ct.nodore Intemational. U.S. Capital Company Act of1940 ("Act") as an pertinent part, that when the Sriares. $2 Par Value (Fde No. 7-5823) open-end dit ersified, management Computerdson Corp., Common Stock. 805 investment company, filed an - ^ Commission, upon application, finds that a registered investment company Par Value (File No. 7-5824) application on October 21,1980. - has ceased to be an investment ^ Do i s Co m;non Stock,8.10 requesting an order of the Commission, comp'any as defined by the Act. It shall p g, ) Federal Express Corp, Par Value (File No. y. Pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, so declare b order 3 d, upon taking 5825 declaring that Applicant has ceased to. effect of sue order, e registration of flower)s Industries Inc, Class A Commonbe an investment company as defined such company under the Act shall cease " ) Stock, $.s2 % Par Value (Fde No. F-4828) by the Act. Allinterested persons are to be in effect \\ l ' ~ ~ 5 ,~ q *. j-; =- b$.gr m s. m. e - - ._,,,,,n ,,,,,}}