ML20005A166

Partial List of Staff Responses to Commission 780621 Questions Re Environ Qualification

ML20005A166
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/19/1981
From:	NRC
To:
References
FOIA-81-97 NUDOCS 8106290469
Download: ML20005A166 (16)

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Did the applicable environmental, qualification regulations for all cperating power plants specify actual testing prior to granting of an operating license?

(page2)

Resoonse There.are three regulations that relate to environmental qualification.

The applicable section of the Regulations which addresses testing is Criterion

(,9 III of nppendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

General Design Criterion 4 (GDC-4),

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2 Environmental and Missile Design Basis, establishes the principal design basis

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0 for envircnmental qualification, but does not address testing. The specific

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regulatory requirement which addresses environmental qualification testing of -

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electrical equipment is 10 CFR Part 50.55a(h). The regulations do not require j

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actual environmental qualification testing as the only method to demonstrate j

ijI adequate safety margins.

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j There is no indication that the Commission, in its prcmulgation of Appendix B

$i to 10 CFR Part 50, intended that the provisions concerning quality assurance programs for design, f'abrication, construction, and testing to be established y

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by applicants for construction permits, be applicable to licensees already C

holding construction pemits. The provisions relating to applicants for a

operating licenses dealt principally with "information pertaining to mana-

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4 gerial and administrative controls" (see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, y

Introduction). Accordingly, the quality assurance requirements governing h

1 the design, fabrication, construction, and testing for plants which received k

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connruction pemits prior to July 27, 1970 was 10 CFR ? art 50, Appendix 4

A, GDC-1, rather than Appendix B.*

The provisions of GDC-1 are rather i

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. general.

Specifics concerning how the goals set forth in GDC-1 are to

'jl be effectuated are found in the application documents for each nuclear H '.

pcwer plant granted a construction permit.

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As discussed in response to question 4, and in SECY-78-348 (discussing

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directive 6 in the Commission's April 13, 1977 Memorandum and Order), not h

A all plants required testing before granting of operating licenses.

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c2 With respect to establishing that structures, systems, and components

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important to safety are able to meet GDC-4, Environmental and Missile

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Design Basis Requirements, the staff has endorsed the use of IEEE-323-1971

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d and subsequently IEEE-323-1974.

The accepted practice for demonstration of environmental qualification using IEEE-323 is by (1) type testing;

-E (2) partial type testing with analysis and/or operating experience; and

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(3) analysis or operating experience. Type tests are the preferred C

I.2 qualification method; however, use of analysis and operating experience T

':Q is also acceptable.

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"As discussed inThe footnote on page 67 of the Staff's December 15, 1977 J

Report,10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A (unlike Appendix B) was not the pri"ul-rj gation of new requirements, but rather, the codification of the regulatory 5*

practices which the AEC regulatory staff had used for many years previously.

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4.

UCS asserts the Commission concluded that no violations of NRC

'i regulations were presented in spite of the follcwing facts:

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a.

Failure of the licensees to meet the co=itments made by them in SERs and required by the regulations to environ-mentally qualify equipment.

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b.

Failure to have perfortned tests to qualify equipment before 97 operation, g

c.

Installation of equipment which actually failed when testing 7't was finally done.

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M Evaluate and comment on these asserted " facts."

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b

Response

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In statement a., which is a direct quote from page 3 of the UCS Petition

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.j for Reconsideration, refer,ence is made to commitments made by the licensee in SERs.

It is presumed that this is a typographical error and that SARs

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.s was intended.

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.,g The alleged facts contained in stataments a, b, and c above are repre-c sented in the petition as violations (items of noncompliance) which

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..c where the environmental qualifications of certain electrical equipment

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Our evaluation and n

..e coments on each of the asserted " facts" are as follows:

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a.

This statement is not factual.

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E For ten reactors initially identified is possibly having unquali-

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'4 fied connectors, a detailed revi'ew of licensee Safety Analysis

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P.eport (SAR) commitments on electrical connectors was made.- This review concluded that SAR statements on electrical connectors were ta vague or nonex N ent. Although the documentation of this review does A

not specifically address teminal boards or splices, the same conclu-

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sion may be reached.

For the earlier p1' ants, environmental qualifica-

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.1 tions were addressed in general tems and where specific environmental 3t

( y-parameters were listed, they applied only to specific electrical w

components. Where connections or connectors were addressed by the

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licensees, the statements were in terms " environmental conditions will 2-be specified or designed for" or "the equipment is selected to meet

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1 the conditions."

Clear commitments were not made that such components i

.t would be environmentally qualified and thus it would be incorrect to y

.h characterize the licensee's statements as commitments which were not

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ll2 met.

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b.

While it is true that some plants had equipment installed which had jg 4

not been qualified before operation, it is not correct that for them 9

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.e NRC regulations required such testing.

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-See Enclosure 2 of SECY-78-348

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-Ibid, page 22 l?

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• 3 The specific regulatcry requirpent which addresses environmental qualification testing of electrical equipment i.s 10 CFR 50.55a(h).

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, -g Gj This regulation states that it applies to facilities for which 1-2 construction permits were issued after January 1,1971. Appendix

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-..p B to 10 CFR 50 in Criterion III also addresses testing as a method I.]

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O for design control, but it was not femally adopted until June 1970.

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~1 All of the plants in question received their construction pemits

.m before the end of 1969. The Statements of Consideration issued j

when Appendix B became an effective regulation says, "The criteria

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will also be used for cuidance in evaluating the adequacy of the

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quality assurance programs in use by holders of construction per-t mits and' operating licenses."

(Emphasisadded).

Since there were _

g no formalized backfit requirements for Appendix B, none of these c

_ f acilities had or were expected to h..a.ve. fully implemented programs meeting all aspects of Appendix'B.

Nevertheless, some of the plants implemented formalized QA programs to some degree during their q,

construction.1/ In fact, the licensee for D. C. Cook, Unit 1, was cited for noncompliance with Appendix 3 as implemented by their own QA program as the result of an IE investigation into the connector issue.2/ In view of the lack of backfitting requirements for 1 SECY 78-348, page 3 USECY 78-348, Appendix A.

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Appendix B, the licensee for D. Q. Cook would not have been cite

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for violations of Appendix B but' for the fact that the licensee x:

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committed to implement Appendix B.

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t*dQi, SAR commitments by these licensees to QA programs were verified during

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c plant construction.

Acceptable implementation was found. A reinspection of QA. relative to connectors was made of D. C. Cook, and for Pilgrim jgg

2 the inspection record was reviewed.

These results were reported 3 :pt Further expenditure of manpower reviewing construction

. gg in SECY 78-348.

$x QA at the remaining plants is not planned since specific QA programs

.j,h under Appendix B were not required during construction of these

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however, the"correcti,on of deficiencies in environmental

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pl ants.

'jk qualifications is actively being purs'ued by all licensees and the

.9 Today's QA programs, which have greater specificity and are 7

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jj superior to those in effect when these older plants were being built, rjf function to prevent the occurrence of repetitive errors.

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Currently, NRC must approve an applicant's specific QA program 9

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before a Construction Permit (CP) is issued.

program implementation is not satisfactory, the CP is conditioned to preclude work in that area pending a finding of satisfactory For plants under construction when Appendix B was impl ementation.

approved, QA programs were required to be implemented for future work to the extent practicable considering the stage of construction of It was decided that enforcement should only be taken the facility.

against specific quality program commitments made by permittees as to do otherwise would have had the effect of making Appendix B retroactive.

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It is true that scme equipment which was installed subsequently 3_

failed under test.

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The previous discussion responds to why in these particular cases jj

E noncompliance has not been found even though some equipment which z}E P

. 61 was installed subsequently failed specific tests. This apparent

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inconsistency arises because of the lack of specificity in earlier 14 FSARs and regulations.

In the absence of a clear commitment or j

-r regulation, enforcement action is not appropriate because these

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ment or Commission regulations.

fictwithstanding the lack of

.j.E specificity in the licensee'.s commitments, there is 'no indication that any licensee intended to use equipment that was not qualified.

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f.y It should be noted that the I&E inspections resulting from I&E g

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.5 Circular 78-08, and the additional reviews of eleven plants under the

,w SEP Program will result in improved environmental qualification 2w

'E requirements for these older plants.

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Please provide the rationale for net backfitting IEEE-323 (1974)

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to all operating plants. Pldase provide the record of the Regu-latory Requirements Review Ccamittee's detemination that this f

standard was not to be backf.itted.

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3, Resoonse l

The rationale for not backfitting IEEE-323 (1974) to all operating plants I, was discussed in Enclosure 4 of the staff report to the Co.m. mission dat,ed30 ;

March 23, 1978. This subject was also discussed in AppendgoQhe 3l gff report to the Cocc:issicn dated December 15,_1_977.

The informa-l tion has been sur=arized in ijUREG-0458, "Short Tem Safet1ALsessment F cn the Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment of SEP Operating Plants."

After publication of IEEE--323-1974, the staff uncertook to develop Regu-latory Guide 1.89 to endorse it for use in the licensing review piocess.

One of the changes in this standard relative to IEEE-323-1971 was the consideration for establishing a qualified life for safety-related aquipment.

In 1974, during the deliberations of the tiRC's Regulatory Requirements Review Ccmmittee on the implementation of this guide, con-E

.d sideration was given to the incremental improvements to safety it affordedg {

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in ccmparison of the then current staff review practice.3, The Committee qy b,

proposed Regulatory Guide 1.89, "Qualifi:ation of Class lE Equipment for 'tuelear Power Plants," dated Septe-ber 26, 1974,. attached as Appendix D.

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reccmmended that the guide be app]ied only to future CP applications; ff 1

1.e., it.hould not be backfitted. The decision was based on the

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consideration that the incremental improvements were not significant 2;;

to safety and that full implementation 'of IEEE-323-1974 required the

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s further development of other ancillary standards to provide guidance on specific safety-related equipment and components.

Subsequent public coments,and review by the ACRS did not alter the recomendation con-cerning implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.89.

We recognize frem our current licensing experience in implementing i

Regulatory Guide 1.89 and our participation in the development of IEEE-323-1974, that additional guidance is needed in the area of accelerated aging techniques used to establish a qualified life for electrical equip-ment and assemblies.

Our Category A technical activity on equipment

- qualification (Task Action Plan A-24) and the NRC research program are ' intended to provide additional guidance for the cevelopment or test methods and licensing review procedures on aging. These efforts are _ M cescribed in our December 15, 1977 report. ~ Applications for construction permits, filed since issuance of Regulatory ] Guide 1.89 in 1974, have been made subject to a requirement for documenta- ,d f tion, at the 01. stage of review, which shows that a qualified life for j

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^ 37 - i* safe:y-related equipment has been established in accordance with IEEE-323-1974. No OLs have yet been issued for plants falling in this [ M c ategory. There continues to be a need for development of additional test methods in this area, hence, the high priority of this subject [ in the NRC research program. The st:'l will take into consideration the available information per-tair ng to the effects of aging on the functional capability of safety-related equipment based on operating experience and our evaluation effort of 11 SEP facilities. This will provide some information on aging effects of electrical equipment that will prove useful in our generic efforts. Currently, we do not intend to backfit the aging requirements of IEEE-323-1974 in the SEP review. Huwever, should the 3h results of the ongoing activities described in the December 15, 1977, h M E 23, 1978, and NUREG-0458 recorts_ pro 1Ldr new infonLation contrary ' .~ ~ to what we currently have,_And in any avent inlinwing completion of r i' development of a staff position regarding aging test methods for new plants in connection with Task Action Plan A-24, we will reconsider our l I position on backfit of aging considerations. j .8 g A r O 5 9 g e 9 4 e

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?.t.m n*s. s .v. d.~ J c ~ M'- Antirtpaled operc*ioncf c: cur en:c:. An- ~ '.'.' C.r; h y'.~ & &..Q'T W Cons:ceratien of the po's!b!!ity of sys. ticipated cperational occurrences rnean i.W.f*i-tematie, nenrandom. con:urrent f !1ures of those conditions of normal operatten sh!ch ml 3.'i M1*.y.M E-g-t .d,Wg.n-:; redunda.nt clernents in the design of protec. are expected to occur one or inore times l gpOW# tien rystems and reactivity centrol systems. during the life of the nuclear peser unit ..;.fh TL- %gg.G.gg.%-n (Ste Criter;s 22. 24. 6, and 29.) and include but are not limJted to loss of i u.g.dyggy.g.i-R It is expected that the criteria will be aug. pos'er to all recirculation pumps trfpping of '1ic tnInted and changed from time to 1:me as the turbine generator set, isolsticn of the %@g 44 w.w; q,gg 3.g, g-important new requirements for these and main condenser, and loss of all offsite .- a.it ,1-- Ether features are des eloped. pos er. fqM.*@'@ g h, .accsg,W.57'f.-C w.N( There s111 be some water-cooled nuclear Criteria rc not suffielent and for shich ad-N.'2J._'iS b N 5 N N power phnts for which the General Design 1r T,j $ M K M 5 M s W & r M F M/J G :. C [e*=j ditional criteria tsust be Ident!!ied and satis.

1. Ot ercI? I:cetirement4 fled in the interest of public safety. In par.

C'iterion J-Queffly standcrds cnd ree. WQ.. ts c. ' c f* ud;f.74gsM,.M' W{*f: ticulu, it is expected that additienal or dif. crds. Structu.res. systems, and components WO ferent criteria wi}) be needed to take into ac, linportant to safety shs.!J be des! ped, fabri. . g*4%.g, e..c g evg p .:f".'.ggy 7Z count unusual s!tes and environmental con-cated, erected and tested to quality stand.

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ditions e.nd for sster-cooled nuclear pos'er ards comtnensurate with the importance of c.q.a # t.:.c a qs. g _y-,. g g-g $ g units of advs.nced des!rn. Also the safety functions to be performed. [ sa*.cr-cooled nuclear power un, there may be m c, J.u m@ & -* q r p q 3~ q -.:f its for which Where generally recognl:ed codes and fu!!!!! nen* of some of the General Design standards are used. they shall be identified - fQQ Criteria may not te necessary or appropri-and evaluated to determine their applicabil-

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'~~~.G' ata. For plants such as these, departures Ity, adequacy, and sufficiency rsnd shall be z.mg from the General Design Criteria must be supplemented or modified as necessary to 'a r&MQUgy hys identif;ed and just!!ied. assure a quality product in keeping sith the JE% 7Qh Qgy,. requ!ied safety function. A cuality assur. M @hiW T-s .- af.idrO : gg fne-g-tmsmo.Ms AND ET.F:.A.WitoN3 anCe program shal] De established and im-Mi'[M C-%&y "h[sd~ N'N:s.-k .d Naefcar power unit A nucles.: twer unit piemented in order to provide adequate as. LWyh81 rnea.s a nucle:: poser reactor and associat-surance that these structures, systems. and .-C.hh If~#fff: ed equ!pment neceuary for electric pouer ccmponents will satisfactorUy perform their ET MM-((% dh LD XTOW generation and in:lu::es those structures, safety functions. Appropriate records of the J1Q -^

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$n$ systemt, a.d ccmponents recu! red to p o-design, fabrication, erection, and testing sf V-$NfMMg3Y -pU$j vide reascnable assurr.nce the fari. ty can be structures, systems, and components linpor-cperated uthout undue risk to the health tant to safety shall be maintained by of D-Si -W&~sV.i 'Q$ ~ and safety of the public. under the control of the nuclear pos er unit @1 W L:ss of coo?cr.! cccident.s. Loss of coolant licensee throughout the life of the unit. "E~ cecidents mean those postulated accidents Crittricn 2-Design bc.scs for protection ~w 'M y 5::? $$ that resuh frorn the loss of teactor coolant crcins! ncturef phenomenc. Structures, sys-NIMME*"M db!N=.)

l t,t a rate in excess of the capat:11ty of the tems, a.nd components important to safety

'NC E reteter coolant makeup system from breaks shall be des!gned to sithstand the effects of % "2.NiW W,S Dr'#'48 in the resitor coolant pressure boundary. natural phenomena such as earthquakes. - Dd@fdM up to and including a break equivaJent in tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunarn1. and N9;$MM' N-[cl'g%;%y g*;, W

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.e.7 stae to the double ended rupture of the lart-seiches without loss of capability to perforrn j s est pipe of the reactor coolant systern.' their safety functions. The design bases fot g- ' g g g d' y *. g@g Single fei!ure. A single failure means an these structures, systems, and components 3i a 1 ( C.4 oc:urrence ahich results in the loss of caps-shall reflect: O) Appropriate cons!deration j

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bility of a component to perform its intend-of the snort severe cf the na* ural phenom- %f"g MM .e ed tafety functions. Multiple fauures result-ens that have been historically reported for @ @N i - f F

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Q* % N h h. Q ing from a single oreurrence are considered the site and surrounding area, with auffi-N4 ' -- D a to be a single faDure. T2uld and elretric sys-cient margin for the limited accurtcy, quan-tity, and period of time in whleh the histort-5"-Q,. -.q tems s.re censidered to be designed against cal data hav. an assumed single fa!!ure if neither (1) a been a cumu*ated (2) appro-( single failure of any mettre cc.nponent (as-priate combinations of the effects of norma 3 .%g, 3 c .w.;g M M surning passive components function pro; r. and accident condWns sith the efferta of ..b j.y%~ 4 .'S.;g.5f.,. 9[O rW$i ly) nor (2) a single fallure of a psssive com-the natural pheaoment and (3) C.e i=por. .C64 n e-4 3 ponent te.ssuming methe components fune- .W"3ff.S d tion prcperly), results in a loss of the capa- ,SP.de faHures of Wye components in i "NL - N g.rie systerns should be assumed in de- ~ #;g%. MEM@* .It ' Turther details relating to the type.12e, signing areinst a single faDure. The condi- { 47 M 2 p a,g d g% /J tiens under which a single faDure of a pas-e 9,J,;M and crfentation of postuisted breaks I s e e. sd5M:-gs q. dk d.e component in a fluid system should be

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sociated coolant. contro!. and protection sys. 8

;Q 2.-Nd fj fermei te.s shat; be deCg.ed to resure that po.er

.,,p-;7.q:f 7;j-45*1$t:-:g.p*-y,t,r.,F; Crster.on 3-Are protectisn. Structures. o.se:Untions s hich can result L7 conditiar.s r-j, f g.:.,g g;., g-, 'M.3rh;;$ systerns, and cornpenents important to exceeding ypecified acceptable fuel design 3* safety shall be designed and lo sted to mini-tim!ts a.re not 7 :.s!ble or c:n be reliably and GQv i~;.**;Ap*,c #.:e.TY: p a. ~ ...i.*I.',S.. "M.,O.,'@. m!:e. consistent wi,th other safety require. readily detected and suppressed. rnents, the probab.hty nnd effect of fires Crite-ion 13-instrumer.tation and con. -+e'- i.4'4 ?g'Oj3]CE.id.WM'd.g.* and exp!cslons. Noncombustible and heat trol Instrumentation shan be provided to - --f3--M. - -i7 resistant rnaterials shall be used sherever monitor va.riabl-s and systems over their an. '--MI*. ~e $$' ' W d A"f'l.E'c$O.aM'@$ff.N./,$.d.(* przetical throughout the unft. partleu!s.r!Y tie! pated ra.rses for normal operation, for 5.M* in It,catiens such as the contain=ent and anticipated operat!onal occurrences, and for rGry g ~-- -d-3*'.7.,'y.t;' y a . W(.,.Ql *J. ~."'.?:;:;-h. @. i contrsl room. y'.re detection and fighting accident conditJons as appropriate to assure hf .ps. sN' :*f.4 AQ:.~@."*-Yp,y#2 syster:s of appicpriate capacity and espabD. adequate amfety. includmg those variables 6 .e.. i' -h Ity shall be provided and des!gned to min!- and systerns that can affect the fission proe-YM' 3 M mize the adverse c!!ects of fires on strue-ess the integr!!y of the reactor core, the re.

• !I. N[ M.Y If/ W tuits, systems, r.nd ec=penents i=portant actor coolant t ressure boundary, and the

. 'M X/IMd dir to cafety, y'nefighttng systems shall be de-containment and its assoelated systems. Ap.

• -'Wt*D N[@D fr W.4" signed to s.Asure that their rupture or inad* propriate controls shan be provided to

[2-i*"t 'i" N* I O'%

• 1. 'f-Md.

vertent operation does not significantly maintain these varlsb!es and systems within -I DJ'#-M .W

• b'IA. C-1mpair the safety capability c! these strue.

' N 2 D E8[2' ' #*7*k'@' Y '*? prescribed operattnc ranges. tures, systems, and components. b .f 'n ~x~'M.K'~0:f \\.%. $'I E'M,..%e M b Cdtenon J#-Recetor coolenf ressm C.riterion #-Er.viront.entc! cnd missile boundary. The reactor coolant pressure destgn bcses. Structures, systems, and com. rv-

• 8. fo.c.

w-.2 d.ab %',.t.. 5.e d Wi"*aEsb# - N U+PM boundary shall be designed. fabricated. ponents important to ssfety shan be de- =s wf.gspp. < ; r ;- s!gned to accorntnodate the effeets of and to erected, and tested so as to have an ex. rg d.. be co cpatible sith the environmental con. tremely low probability of abnormal leak. G;.Q qQ]4g*g--Q g g f.jg3;,gg,g j, j f,.gg,..g-d!tions e.ssocInted v.ith normal operation, age, of rapidly propagating fa!1ure, and cif g m.intenance, testing, and postulated acci. gross mpture.

..,gg@y; %*hg[i.r *, g,3 g

{r.QQ.g dents, including 1 css.c!. coo 1Lnt r.CcIdtnts. Criterion 15-Recetor coolc"t system gs. Q. l[gg:.;-pp r ThIst structures. systems, and cor:ponents desirs The reactor coolant 54 tem and as. gy.s og,.y. shall be appropriately protected against dy-sociated auxiliary, contQ. and protection , Q

y @;. 7 g g-h ;.u g ?; n.g.;*9 namic effects. Includ't.g the effects of rots.

systems shaU be Gsigned with sufficient (. w. c.:;.2 y s!1es. p!pe whipping sr.d discharging fluids, margin to air.i.. that the des 1gn conditions

y.Maf/ gyp.gygIgr.gtrE th 1 may result frcm equipment failures of the tactor coclant pressure boundary 1 ;l Q' ;f-h p,p 3 g Q e

• ;=.; =: q.7 g-g-

.g C and frem esents and conditions outside the are not exceeded during any condition of normal operr.tlon. anticipated b3 of structum, sys '.operntfona1 occurrenc, including nuclea.t pos er un!t. < s-t i i$. f & k-g g,a.f:4 Q ) p- ,g yp. y MQ:.2.+. Criterion 5-sharing es. tems, cnd ec:.ponents. Structmes. tystems. Critedon 16-Contcinnent design. Renc. ' i: W? M S 3 f %:S*'W fM1-T {V.,K and ce;nponents importe.1 to safety shall tor containment and associated systems ,,./,6 [4yl4"-y$^i":.E.h nit be shared a: er.s nuclear poter units shall be provided to establish an essentially g. L 7g *ff'4^^ 'gjgg i I.c unless it can be shown that such sharing leak tight barrier against the uncontroDed 5111 n t !!gnificantly != pair their abibty to release of radioacth1ty to the environrnent . p'$7E1,.gg, 3 gp per*ra:n thei. safety functions. IncludZg. In nnd to rxure th:t the cent-inment design '7 ~1

1. M.W_MM i L' ~i.'JQQN Q ihr itsent of an accident in one untt, an or.

conditions important to safety are not ca-it derly shutdosn and cooldosts of the re. ceeded for s.s long as postulated accident !11$Td.NM.-,E!YN-Yn.-NEM QD-Dimq.?g' N maining units. conditions require. !; 7 y T I "I'S*.**SY' $h"M.h ?-t '$5 DM ? Criterion 27-Electric power rystems. An II. Protection Ly l.fu:*iple Tission Product onsite electric power system and an offstte .h %d^* ~ m% I electric poser system shall be provided to Ecrriers .-w^~- Criterion 10-Reactor desfas The reactor permit functiontng of structures, systems. . T._ s.r.=- w- ~m.g; - 2.,,. ; gg .- y* y core s.nd artsoc!sted coolant, control, and and cornponents important to safety. The .t. 4 L,.,,"t*. n g.,,g,- p ' g. L,. - f.Q sM.,, j.cy. e., protection systems shall be designed with safety function for each system (assuming apptcpriate margin to assure that specified the other systern is not functioning) shan be 8; g g g kg ; g. nq 54Q-1:~, 1 .5 acceptable fuel design hm!ts are not eaceed. to provide sufficient capacity and capab!!!ty .fe --o." b:-M:C.W J'. m ed during sny condition of normal oper. to assure that (1) specified seceptable fuel ation includmr the effects of anticipated design limits and design conditions of the ~-PC .u - [;gg /Qh --. y- -

g. w A. g k.e e~. (U. $

operationn) occurrenees. reactor coolant pressure boundary are not Cnterion JJ-Recetorinherent prottelios exceeded as a result of anticipated oper. s,e.%.. M qw ".L~ :*. Q -o - - - - w he reartor core and assxisted coolar:t sys. attonal occurrences and (2) the core is t ?cyga#,,Q '?g,Ju.a,, ..4+ N.'q'"--,.y r-f. tems shall be designed so that in the power cooled and containment integrity and other J7-M*ET '* O,[,.h e cperating rsage the net c!!cet of the vital functions are maintained in the event ,.,g,h~DCc4.QC' gu;LL,s,;,h[, gy,ggg.d' h.y;.h prompi inherent nuclear feedback charat. of postulated accidents. g g teristes tends to comp-nsate for a rapid in-The onsite electric poser supplies,includ-

3 crease in reactivity.

Ing the batteries. and the onsite electric dis. [@.h:5*$h:-='g p%.r".p.% e *- * ="=c@ M.w M s>TE Criterion J -Suppression ctf recetor tribution systern. Shall have sufficient inde-

pf w

,

3.TT-d-h:[W". poirer eseCletion.a The reactor core and as. peadence, redundancy, and testability to w=..M tg- -a <rc ~m.@.%..,~..;s,,. ~. n. g.. r A.y. pM,W. d. *t,.U, .m m 353 ~~~ .a ~'~Wm:G.e O.d d:-s.m..v.,:.D.MICU 72 3y.D -w-4s .a - r hY-r-Ncw 8 p*"L'r-h. M % E h

g

- - ~ - - %Q b.%c:c .,pr-2.7.'Th.63'??b4?k.t q d.r

• .ia v a.w o m.s.s.,... g.

--M mo-u u s Q-M..l.N_"W.i.-...:. ; O.O.cw.Q'.9::1'^ - W--WT'M'b#:P'-" ~*:.--.:m :s w c; v-.x y.[%y-hart sy,ge.-v:p6u-:ws_+:s/a-9,,~:cWv,-(t.e::c,wa.v <c.:c.:.,.>3 2 M."J'~r r' N NSNNDr$'b kE-2 i e.... Wy-;..- m

-;3

- ? tG, s;.nb ie.

r

.n..m hn.s.d e#

g yc:.s. o. myg ucA. .w;;;wu: w..g.,.4 c i;;:M:-w; ;'Mv*,.f*f.P S+cy:, n:@,?.4-M'M=;1wwA4%E-- MGM2%.E' ~: r. R.v;r::d:Tr. ; -vde.* l.: d:,:.c;::::.5 p.1: qWv.0- G MMym?M;:2.;: -- ar"%%qsht& .e-- w.EA c HbhM &a b

r 5 ....:a.. s:.g. z,-::h. .[h k. I h hlN. f.{Nh.h.hh- .q,-f- .-f h,ff,:.kI- .",[(. . ~-?;d. :. : +:'.-%:l*:g%, 97.M..:. $..p.*y@:.:.y. ' :p.;r cy.'. g,. ....g.: Q -l-m: N:.r. g.:: 4 *.+ T:%-: g.y <- - P 00 R O RI G I N M E.., c. tr....< r.s... .,.s ?.M.M . dM.:dr3:.;R.:.=,.:.-:.;. .QY.5 :':.f.*;; ,.'. W v: a c -:2 - o.. Chapter l-Hudect Rergvictory Comrninion f 50.55a ' C7 '.O. '$: *}}jfN.,.. ;.h'$N.T.. ( y -s -~.

h.hs;3@.t.v,y..

~~ hbd..= h uu ~ (h-) h. serv!ce tests to verify cTer-operr. tion tsnd each subsequent 120 ct!cnal readmess of pur: ps sad valves month period of operation durmg . ArpH p ji. g.t,;.r.4,,ip g;Q.y;;y.,- whese function is required for safety which the e'xamination or test is aeter. j and system pressure tests conducted rrdned to be impractical. t q. y g,.fi; e @y.,*c g i g yfr during successive 20 month ' periods (6)(1) The Commission will evaluate -s. bM.5#3q ;f h,3 r throughout the senice Ilie of the fa. determinatio.s tader paragraph (gM5)

• - f.R f;c T, p*f:w g{-**i. h',p; of this section that code requirements cility shall comply with those require, are impractical. The Commission may i f..i N gQ'y-:7 $.:h}q.g:

rnents in ed!tions of the code and ad. grant such rellet and may impose such y 4)[@ftdg dinda in effect no more than 6 fh'.d

.. W.e.

g < % g.;f.,Q/, r.lternative requirements rus it deter-j , }. k"f{4. 9'c.,, ,? mrnths prior to the start of each 20 mines is authorhed by law and will .R g,yg. g;. .,(s trenth period. not endanger life or property or the t _g-(v) For a.n operat!ng bo!!!ng or pres, common defense and security and is g.f.7 % %.d/.c.d:.s Ts #y ' p"yp .jrM4 M-g. c e n -: q; p: s w;._, rtj M surl::d water cooled nucitar power fa-otherwise in the pubile interest giving

w. h m

, _q.qg:y:l i. W. g,.g c!11ty v hose operating license was due consideration to the burden upon g u.. sued pr,ior to March 1.1976, the pro-slons o. paragraph (gX4) of this see-r.uirements were impos ' m m.r. a:cc,_7. T.W &.?.-u..%w.l, is the licensee that could result if the re. A u- %.- ',4.:s. w..m. x"W r w f - ff ;gg.q yy.ry,Mt..g b-.-- tion shall become effective e.fter Sep- , y! "E,p. 'i:,. y~ ty. - N ^ W-7 k / 2'- tember 1* 1976* at the start of the next (ID The Cornmhslon may require the -~ M - -~ '9M'h@W.@; . #-D.m-w '"ffru'i'v + reguitar 40 month period of a series of licensee to follow an augmented inser- " W> ez.gN.'.k,n-M. s,uch periods beginning at th start of vice inspection program for systems n . D. 4.g,~. h -BF:M$ff @M 6 4 4 6.g .acility ecminercial cperation, and components for which the Com-Cpyd ."'#'Nk M,y;WM!cd g h (5KD The insenice inspection pro-mission deems that added assurance of 3r f N gram for a boding or pressurhed structural reliabinty is necessary. ' 1',@k' 'Zh@jM MNY Nb.r water cooled nuclear power facilitT (h) Protection systems: For con- ' ybEdh[)'if.dEh;N@g shan be revised by the licensee, as nee-struction permits issued afG Muarv ~ .f essary, to meet the requirements of T-bu. protection systems shau meet (Q g s{'d p:. rag aph (gX4) of this section-The requifements set forth in editions M. $'Tp? f J@0TM 7 'l9-(11) If a revised insenice inspection or revisions of the Institute of Electri-i dh g-d.'.u"4--UDSNd W% i pro;rt.m for a faculty conflicts with cal and riectronics Engineers Stand-th2 technical specification for the fa-ard: "Cr!teria for Protection Systems Q '87@:d i J W h-3 cnity, the licensee shan apply to the. for Nuclear Power Generating Sta-i' V5[MN'MW.g-g'hSS3 hi+ 1 Com:. Salon for arnendment of the 'tions," (IEEE-279) in effect' on the

1. h MOhw

'.OgbfN8E*f@. 4MT'j technical specifications to conf orm the formal docket date 8 of the application t;chnical specification to the revised A.'iF@Mi'56-dyM'-MkyE,N progra n. This application shan be

• These incorporation by reference presi-yty.

! 28b'E-M's. subm!!!ed at least 6 months before the stons sere approved by the Director of the 6.47;g: g:W,$g}'ggg,]:i'P ~ gg,. start of the perlod during which the Fatut, Rccasin on March 17,1972. May 4, -gal'

1. M-.

s-t 8 Components which are co: nected to the .[T '4K-@~fgp.gggs-:: prevblens become appUtable as deter-1973. and February 7.1978. min:d by paragraph (gX4) of this sec. reactor coolant system and are part of the c -K 6-ii-A ff9,y,s g.. 3.R

• L st '

e i G Q'M ':t4 Z'.t, N tion. reactor coolant pressure boundary defined G.MQ4" (111) If the licensee has determined in 150.2(v) need not meet these recutre- ..4G-M : 4*WMarM ! ' ik%{-p*. 'M: that conformance with certain code re-ments, provided: !'f~/. 2; Mg% b M U dvW quirernents is impractical f or his f acili-(a) In the event of postulated fatture of T yQ>%@M4.(?' -~ ty. the licensee shaU notify the Co:n-the component during normal reacto oper-ygfRfgg.gg-g4L. j e ry mh3!on and submit information to ation, the reactor can be shut cost and -.b e 7.-p. 4:.rg cooled dosn in an orderly manner, assum-support his determinations. int makeup is provided by the reactor cool. cj,j,-j; g%g. :n ,;ygg f- .e 4 .. rc (iv) Where an examination or test ant makeup system only, or lM jimi,. (%6.r%df"Qf'g. N, 3 i s'M,. requirernent by the code or addenda is (b) The component is or can be isolated ~'" "1 lM:-c: ~ M h (r ^*T h'i [g 8-determined to be impractical by the 11-fro:n the reactor coolant system by two censee and is not included in the re-valves (both closed, both open, or one closed 4q.g, #.gv.;w 1 [..., dsed inservice inspection program as and the other open). Each caen valve must j,e,.g

tggy,M e W.

-6M 3_.. ,- 6. /v.g perm!:ted by paragraph (gX4) of this be espable of automatic actuation and. as- ,f g suming the c,ther valve is open, its closure rection, the basis for this determina, time mus,t be such shat. In the event of pos- ' X;c

. s ~k': - m+- m g.re.,m

'm E - y - I ?.6..,;te,,Ctf. p +"-fcAc $- tion shall be demonstrated to the sat-tulated.a!!are of the compenent during w q" M M gw ' N.c9 4'e 2 ~ ' ~ ' [ isi;etion of the Commission not later ne,nnal reactor operation. each salve re-tha initial 120-month period of oper. down and cooled dovn in an orderly .1 4:DTi:26SN.%N' 'D.,-WI:l 6;- i. thm 12 rnonths af ter the expiration of r=ains operable and the reactor can be shut .i

'rh I

~ '{ r.tlen from start of faculty con.:ncretal Footnotes continued on next rare i Y,r3$.W,...M:;. A@-,.-em-mwa-L pEJM 343 IW.:.:.5.r..4{ YYT? -Y .t f* U OO&s ?r Qer 'NS [... M,, $. _rY, .. u.. n m .O q f? I . m - m' E k*N d'kNbh 'p.x.

yL-m

~- ~ Q*L*Qg . - u - __ q v._.-- -, %,.%., -j,s.,.~.";*r;w-%% -., ' t Me n. cc, ..mp g% g,,... hhh%g'I, DYh*- d'. $ Ek" bkk / ,.m. v -- ---~ sc.s-.:m.j[*bh7h'.m-4 m y;g;. g g..Qgggggggg h b. A bh.* 3,g s J. i =...,, 8("Z m e

u.m... ..~1. .. i t.'. ;; ',- ~ - - - -; *. '. :. '.'.,..= ~... - . ~. '...t-t.: ~?..::. M.,.-:. . - 5 :v o ? : = - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ Si&1a!i-n..:l.%. . -v.~~ -n" :T ' ; * ' =, ' gr.4/:,'::::2: a..!. W;. nv..

n e.

.r?

1. @Wil.W.f(m"?.v.M :[*1.3N. N.:k<. :... *

' } ;.. .f p.w:'Q.l.2., N'e.t p.R fs.M d '*F 1. f 50.56 Energy

1. • k:

r.5 %,.6.Q, i for a construction permit. Protection 93-439. 23 Stat.1242. Pub. L P4-79. PP Stat. { 2 T'N.hnt.TS.A 't.f'8 U.b,0 : @4.7 syste:ns may meet the requirements 413 (42 U.S.C. 5341H N ':'fi,D.^ h n / N.;.":. 6*%,,4 a MO/ set forth in subsequent ed!!!cns or re. [36 m 11424, June 12,1971 as amsnded at p,.h f$rt :'CW.p.*2,%;e*% visions of IEEE-279 which beceme ef. 31 FR 17021. Aug. 24.1972: 2E TR 15014 f s ggeggye July 17.1973; 38 FR 2Sc29, Oct.11.1973; 39

h..h (1) Fracture toughness requirements:

IQ Q gk7, r d'5 I 18I r Q. d.. Md"Tl!,$aM*y --j. 42, 1 Pressure retatning components of the 23931. June 14,1976; 42 FR 22667. May 5 $o. P[8 M @% F.t.CJ'7 @ -i# prpJ a- -h..- -' Wn;- - reactor coolant pressure boundary 1977; 42 TK 2c804. July 18.1577; 43 rR - p-2 shall meet the requ!rements set forth 17337, Apr. 24.1978; 43 FR SC015. Nov. 30 '7 W N. 3.hk'w]- ].vt of.y:s. gr in Appendices G r.nd H to this part. 1978) "iM W ffg6-YM$'d f5.'CF.* (j) Power reactort for which a notice h$ [ of hearing on an application for a pro. f 50.56 Con ersion of construction permit .w-MtI3'.- i:sWP M W $g3'p-7 61.d.' on or before December 31,1970, may or alteration of a faculty, in comp 11 j -E l visional constructlon permit or a con. to license; or amendrnent of license. fG]h.DC'If-f W struction permit has been published Upon completion of the construction hk <<"c.Q-@ff. -hT r %.c1 N-;q p., %.a.r. w.:.-d meet the requireinents of paragraphs ance with the terms and cond!!!ons of b5f'Mm8h.@%g*:3.'-Q.*D (c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), and (f)(1) of this the construction permit and subject to $r.!$1.E. Q%jNTS section instead of paragraphs (c)(2), any necessary testing of the facility %ffE5$7bt.u-We V'T: (d)(2), (e)(2), and (f)(2) of this section, for health or safety purposes, the fd d g M Q Q g;3,M ff: M M respectively. Com-hston will in the absence of %.':OUEW#$D. di9.<*fi;M Y6 aim (See.102. Pub. L 91-100, E3 Stat. f 53 (42 good cause shown to the contrary IM.:27.@-g'u$ed4Dy,;."9 3. the construction permit wcs !ssued or g.WA; (Q U.S.C. 4332); sec. 201, as amended. Pub.1. issue a license of the c! ass for which M f 5 E 2. N M Y b D. b; q

ocinc.tes continued fren last pace an appropriate amendment of the 11

@NN.WMMj%%%Sc'1*?g).'s 2 manner, assumine makcup is prosided by cense, as the crse may be. ( M.$* Nv5G:w M.::_Q.p?'N*/

• 6':~-

C the icactor coclant makeup system only. 7 .c;*5 --Dra- *-?5 'Cc;!es may be obtained from the Ameri. (Sec.185. 68 Stat. 955; 42 U.S.C. 2235) { F#.4'MM/.4'$ D dhyMM71 cut So:lety cf Mechanical Engineers. [21 FR 355. Jan.19.1956 as amended at 35 h-D.D *. N8N71'D.DfM.-5 '!7d";I Un!!ed Engineering Center. 345 East 47th FR 11461 July 17,19~0) fey $eg@-QJ'%g.$M.fiY.$3~%,"~ 5-{qf' ( M$d:"=: St tiew York, NY 10017. C pies ue avafla. M[- tie for inspection at the Commlulon's l 50.57 Issuar.cc of operet.ing !! cense.' ( M MO.v Public Document Room.1111 H St. NW., (a) Pursuant to i50.56, an operating W5 -r I O :.g g. Washington, D.C. license may be issued by the Co::unfs-CkNA *e7,N'b N r._, Cod dden a a e e id ed "in ect sien, up to the full term r.utheri:cd by t l'$h,'7@$'M'$3ph ptMi@ I.D months after their date of issuance, f 50.51, upon finding that: MIT6 :'d TtM%k$.M*. 'The Code hsue ar;1Tcable to a compo. (1) Ccastruction of the facility has F.$ bS Q4.n $.N.,WM. '-D gg'v'J.-] date for the nuclear energy system. and the application as amended, the nent is roserned by the order or contract been sabstantially completed, in con. Ny(ky: .Jg"?fh.

$f:.

date for the component, not the centract formity with the conrtruction permit t tf-Q 7- %cj; g%.- 'The use cf specific Code Cues may be provisions of the Act, and the rules ',dh' g.I,4-Q'* *Si.;c.,g: ;W.-:ll;'.*.f'.A g ']

p. v.--LI-authorized by the Commlulon upon request

../,pd*@ <%:ye a pursuant to i 50.55at aX2X11). and regulations of the Comitsion;. d 8 N [ EYb9 beca eIf 7$ (2) The fac!!!ty will operate in con-pos d e t c @TQ*WWid. d.-U _%M August 30.1968. and the revhed hsue IEEE forrnity with the appil:ation as 9;,*Ak NI . M W h.'h'*- 279 1971 became

• in effect" on June 3.1971, amended, the provisions of the.Act, M*y.*.pede.G.d.M@1 $.@hi-i h'

.ekT Copies may be cbtained from the Institute and the rules and regulations of the M W.6,.CWad.. ; v /'i-j of Dectrical and Dect ytes Engine ers. Committion and i Md.'frhN*03,h{e.W;..,43*\\(.e,h: ;! f c United Engineering Center 345 East 47th (3) There is reasonable assurance (1) lr. hM*.j Street. New York, NY 10017. A copy is grail. that the activities r.uthorized by the MAU5b,Y.MA@Q/,WWih.p [ $ $ J5 2..r-g 'q able for Inspection at the Commissien's %qc-n.>.y g:q;4".g:d ? Y.. - Public Document Room.1711 H Stitet NW operating I! cent: can be conducted

Q h, y.

'$.y Washington. D.C. Without endangering the health and c e ( N6.$*h.f* -;.r-< %.? - m

• Where an application for a construction Y

d? "'MP '.71'h 4 permit is submitted in four parts pursuant

• The Com=hslon may issue a provisional

'N'b; @T17db,-g;"C' - :/j .e to the provisions of I 2.101(a.1) and Subpart cperating lleense pursuant to the regula. 5" -pf F of Put 2 of this chapter. "the fonnal tions in this part in effect on March 30 r N-f. 4 docket date of the gp11 cation for a con-1970, for any itdlity for which a notice of //M@Q'ETS*yf .M. :%1 si,jWh.'.;;.e:.f:pf%#?.g;W." ; struction permit" for purposes of this see. hearing on an application for a provisional " 1?d --A.<".4-F.r.:7.C q'FA tien shall be the date of docketing of the in-eperat!ng !! cense or a notice of proposed is. fT.*iUNIM'-J $y:'[<rM@dNdh f fer:.ation required by { 2.101(a-1)(2) or (3), suance of a provisional operating !! cense has h hY ~ h h 5 h lt' N N g @%

• s* C 1 whlahever is later.

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.,n '{l** N*. .. m., n .~ ,c.. P00R ORIGINAli(' @i.7M s App.5 Title 10-Energy IL. ?. O ~ w... ~ &. r ;.?,l 5 $ ratu:rto autherit) s.nd urgkn!:s'ional free. of the f:us!!!) ass"rance p?cg r-) v.h :h ]t

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.:!ud.nr sufNcivnt Ind ner. den:e they are emuung.

I fre. eest 2 M : h.dule s tv.. opposed to [f~~,.)g:*,t47'.;r W.4 J safet) tonsiderations. are prosided. Because Itt. ersics co.nPot J rZ - 9.. of the many sariab!es imched, such as the

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that appDestle restlatory requirements and Q =Jg.',M'.JN.7'k M$

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tions where actirities are performed. the or. the design bas!s, as defined in 150.2 and as f2 ""***=.*a-speelfied in the license appliestion, for I'E N garutaticnal structure for executing the '".*.*.*.*,**w% # it.ose Mructma systems, and cernponents I'[/ quahty a.ssurrnte pregiarn may take sarious

• • " "**=.f 7 h forms provided that the persons and orgsal-to whkh th!s appendix app]les are correctly M l*M d

f.ations assfgned the quality assurance func. translated into specmcadens. &asings, pm u.g ,,a w g.g,;,,$,J., _ o u .,,,g'

ft, tions hase this required authorit, and orga.

cedures. and Instructions. These rnetsures ni:stienal freedom. Irrespecthe of the orga. shan include provisions to a.ssure that sp. .a ._ F

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- - -m e nl:stional structurst. the indh!dualts) as. propdate quaHty s.aMards are spnhd .s %,;-a gg,gg. s!gned the respons!tuity for assuring effee. and included in design decurnents r.nd that 3 3.r e 4 the etecution of my portion of the quality deviations from such standards are con-NT ..g{s WQ, -=+ s.ssurance program at any location shere troUed.1.!easures shall s.lso be established 3) gfR.y$g,1.j$,4 acth1tles subject to this Append!x are being for the selection and review for suitab!11ty g. 3 j g,y perfcrmed sha!! have direct access to such of appilcation of materials, s arts, equip.

1 p.a 2e.,g =g @gt gp levels of msasgement as may be necessary ment, and processes that are essent!al to the

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safety.related ful.ctions of the structures. %"b7k $aAr- -. cr systerns and compor.ents. N $? 'k$Y 9Nf. II. cvAtt:r assrather reocr.thf Mea.sures shaR be estab fshed for the The apph.eant shall establish at the cartl* Identification and control of design inter. 3 ) ..;;.;f'. Q y @**. @.g. 7

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-s est pacti ab!e t!rne, cons! stent with the faces and for coordination among partici. " **** A. ht(iW pd hhedule for accomplishing the activities. E pating des!gn organ!:stions. These rneasures d N***Y'l M. quality t.ssurance preparn shich ccrnp!!es shad Include the establishment of proce.

pM.i s,his picgram sh&U be documented by writ.ith the requirements of this appendix. dures arnong partleipa

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• D..Y! #.*4 t.de d tions for the review, approval, release, dis.

[ 7.nM p'N. ,).W(r./.h[@ ten policies, procedures, or instructicns and tribution, and revision of documents involv. M *~ shrt te carried out throughout plant life in ing des!gn interfaces ~# A ' %/ - acesrance sith these policies, procedures. The des!gn control measures sha!) provide N- .:, gly >g. $.bN ~ or instructions. The arplicant shal! Icentify 9,r ver;;ytng r ch eking the adequacy of 3 M... pgj.y the structures, systems, and components to f such as b the p rf .anc6 of .g 2 be cosered by the quality assurance.pm ,y ,g, gram and the major organi:ations partici. sirnplified calculat...ial rnethods, or by the O n,h d 'b pating in the prognm. together sith the perfortnance of a suitable testing program. 4 h,G5.W-. 7" rh 6 des!gnated funetlons of these organi:ations, The verifying er checking process shall be -1 M4'h' p.lc's/ " S.,*,N L-M .he goality assurante program shah pm perferrned by individualr. or groups other side control over sativities affecting the than those sho performed the origtnr.! 'i A. .O /. i

• L. r S L wr. EMS DE*;dWj des!cr. but sho rnay be from the same orga.

'd . i.d.a.ht r.h ME. TAM dc po .4. nt co t t g e a test propam is md to n <Qf.n,,n]..Qg.h]n g sith their 1:r.portance to safety. Activities serLfy tre adequacy of n speclisc design fea. ..e.-s. s. affecting qua:ity shall be accomp!1shed ture in lieu of other serifying or checking 'f.., .' F*-N n% c. i.c 1 9 FY processes, it shall include suitable qualifica. . m_ w r-_ apprg tions testing of a prototype unit under the 4 ro led to d t I de e eo priate equipment: suitable environmental most adverse design cond!tions. Design con.

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1. tM' conditions for accomplishing the activity. trol rneasures shall be applied to items such Ikb -

4'4M such s.: adequate cleanness; and assurance as the foDowing: reactor physics, stress. T' ~5N d that all prerequisites for the ghen activity thermal. hydraulle. and accident analyses; E

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h M-a hate been satisfied. The program shaU take compatibuity of rnaterials; accessibluty for b .-hh8

• • Tii. W O %.K Ir.to account the need for special centrols, insenice inspection. maintent.nce, and 4

. 3Nt '" p.Y W. S O~ h' $ processes, test equipment, tools, and skHis repair; and delinestion of acceptr.nce crite-F-I eM *W to attain the required quality, and the need ria for trupections and tests. M1..*7Q M Y, N Ed -n:: for s erification of quahty by inspection and Design changes, including fleid changes.. M g.. h. m v.=g. prg.% y A test. Tne prcgram shau provide for indoctri. shall be subject to design control rnessures c. -- e ,g. g g,..;.;r2E.e - Q g tv *:en ud training of personnel performing '"'"" rM #".'@,.gMNN M - -n attivtties affecting quality as riecessary to original design and be approved by the orgd . M c..s. y, qpe ~ n ation that performed the oragmal design <T.=py;..g.Eqqr;yp;.,, . fL; gty, assure that suitable proficiency is schlesed unless the sp;1 rant designates another re-tr.d ma#.tair.ed. The applicant shat regu. %,.gp.u..s,QjWjr.g. g g g g g.e sponsible organt:sthn. larly review the status and adequacy of the $phhhNNN*g gg quality r:surance prog 7am. 7.!uagement of cther organhations participating in the tv. rmoceP.mn7 poet $ tov ax7 sos. 5. gf;73 M .<.J -;% gg.: gy+{-[. :[4 g quahty assurance program shall regularly }feasures shall be estab!Lshed to assure h.-)E/J.;+g. 4 [e-rirlew the status a.nd adequacy of that part that applicable regulatory requirements. T.?W gt,g - ac:b r ~d...h.h.*? gg .J46 S..-..%. r'S. f753S.M.>w' *: c<.?'"'M ~k::m,' *.h St 360 w n~=~ - +r v.n?.s M,;..;:V".,?:a:m. w %-n w9.-* + rw q

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j W '.hc ;c.inimum numkr Imd iccation of systun thall, with pucition ;.nd rdiability, f[b s,cpt:s icquired te n.onitor adequately. / t automatically initis e appropriate prc,tective (c protcetive function purposes, those vari.' action whenever a ec.ndition tnonitoted by :he Q. , cbles lirted in Section 3(2) that have a spatial systern reaches a preset. level. This re. tcpendence: quirement applies for the full ran::e of condi. (4) prudent operationallimits for each vari-tions and performance enumerated in Sec-oble listed in Section 3(2) in each applicable tions 3(7),3(8) and 3(9). reactor opera tion mode: (5) the margm, wan a'ppropriate inter-4.2 Single Failure Criterion. Any single fail. ute with.m the protect. ion system shall no.t o. pretive information, between each oper-a t.sonal h.mst and the level cons.dertd to mark prevent proper pro'ective action at the system i the onset of unsafe conditions: level w, hen requ. ired. .,n a 9 (6) the levels that, when reached, will re. NOTE "sinste tailure" includes stich events as the quire prstective a tion. sh ning r cpen cirpnr opntuconnutine sicn=1 or, Q g (7) the range of transient and steady. state pow er cables. It also meludes single credible malfunctions or esents that cause a number of conseque'ntial com. )$ ? cc nditions of both the energy supply and th : ponent modute, or channel failures. For exemple, she 3 environment (for example, voltage, frequency, even though several transistor failures result, h!echan.l C 'I "# temperature, hum.dity, pressure. vibration. ca i damace to a mcde switch would be = " single failure" etc) dering normal, abnor.nal, and accident sithough severalchannels misht become involved. circ 6mstances throughout which the system must perforra: 4.3 Quality of Components and Modules. (S) the malfunct. ions, accideML or other Components and modules shall be of a quality that.is consistent with m..mimum mam-unusual events.(for example, fire, explos. ion, m issies, lightn.mg. flood earthquake, w. d, tenance requirements and low failure rates, m etc) wh. h could phys.ically damage protect-Quality levels shall be ach.ieved through the ic son system components or could cause enva. specificat. ion of require.nents known to pro. ronmental changes leac..mg to funct:.onal de;- mote high quality, such as requirements for d es.ign, for the derat.mg of components, for radation of system p erformance, and for manufa ctur.ing, quality control, m.spection, which provisions must be. incorporated to re-lain necessary protective action: calibt /, and test.?. 7 7 l Y 71 '3 (9) minimum performance requirem:nts in-4.4 Equipment Qualification. Type test data cluding the following: or reasonable engineering extrapolation cased la) system response times; ~7i fest data shall be available to verify that o (b) system accuracies: "Frotection system equipment shall meet, oH a (c) ranges (normal, abnormal, and acci-c"o n o n u i n g oasis, the performance r'e-dent conditions) of the magnitudes and rates qYrements cetermined tc be necessary for of change of sensed variables to be accom-achievir g the system requirements. ~ Inodated until proper Conclusion of the pro-NOTL Attention is directed particularly to the re-tective action in assured. qwirusents of Sections 3t7) and 3(9). No rD The development of the specific infor. nation to be used in fulfillment cf the above requirements as not 4.5 Channel Inter,rity. All protection system vithin the scope of these criteria.: channels shall be des.igned to ma. tain neces-m sary fun-ional capability under extremes of conditions (as applicable) relating to environ-M'

4. Requirements ment, energy supply, m'alfunctions, ant' acci-y d en ts.

y 4.1 General Functional Requirement. The F nuclear power generating station protection 4.6 Cha.nnel Independence. Channels tha: M provide signals for the same protective func-y 'The development of standard criteria and re-tion shall be indepcndent and physically sepa-h cuirements reisting to the deterrnination of such desien rated to accomplish decoupling of the effects 3, bcsis inforrn.: tion as unsafe conditions reauirine protee* tive fur.cticas. variattes to be rnenitored. operational of unsafe environmental factors. electric tran-k Jim;ta. rnarrins. set points. etc. are under consideration sients, arid phys.ical acc. dent consequences i in American Nue est $seiety Standards Sutwommittee 4. documented in the d; sign basis, and to reduce ,.r r P00R ORlGlNH ~

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