ML20004F302
| ML20004F302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1981 |
| From: | Chesnut S, Donaldson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004F298 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106180127 | |
| Download: ML20004F302 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000289/1981015
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STAFF 06/16/81
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Ur41TED STATES OF AftERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATURY C0HillSSION
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY A!4D LICENSING BOARD
In the flatter of
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METROPOLITAN EDIS0li COMPAi4Y, ET AL.
Docket No. 50-289
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island siuclear Station,
Unit 1)
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NRC STAFF TESTIt10:4Y OF DALE DONALDSON
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AND STEPHEii CHESiiUT 04 LICENSEE'S RESP 0ilSE IN
JUNE 2, 1981 EXERCISE AND NRC STAFF's EXERCISE REPORT
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June 16, 1981
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OUTLINE'
NRC STAFF TESTIMONY OF DALE DONALDSON
AiiD STEPHEN CHESNUT Olt LICEWSEE'S RESPONSE IN
jut 4E 2, 1981 EXERCISE AND NRC STAFF'S EXERCISE REPORT
Tnis testimony, witn the attached NRC Staff Exercise Report, addresses
the Licensee's performance and response in the June 2,1981 THI-1 exercise.
The onsite accident scenario utilized for the exercise is described and the
functional areas of onsite energency response tested during the exercise are
identified. The adequacy of the Licensee's energency response as well as the
Licensee's provisions for correcting response deficiencies are addressed.
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STAFF 06/16/81
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0HillSSIOri
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
In the itatter of
)
HETROPOLITAN E0lS0l1 COMPAi4Y, ET AL.
Docket No. 50-289
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(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
)
Unit 1)
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HRC STAFF TESTIM 0!iY UF DALE DONALD 50ii
Ailu STEPHEil CHES;10T Oil LICENSEE'S RESP 011SE IN
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JUNE 2, 1981 EXERCISE AND ilRC STAFF's EXERCISE REPORT
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State your names and positions with the NRC.
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A.
(Witness Donaldson). My name is Dale Donaldson.
I am a Radiation
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Specialist assigned to the Emergency Planning Section, Region I, Office of
Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "My statement
of professional qualifications was attached to qy testimony of February 9,
1931 and was admitted into cvidence following Tr.17354 when I testified in
this proceeding on April 3,1981.
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(Witness Chesnut). fly name is Stephen Chesnut.
I am a Nuclear
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Engineer
~ assigned to the Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch, Division
of Emergency Preparedness, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
egulatory Commission. My statement of professional qualifications was
attached to my testimony of February 9,1981 and was adaitted into evidence
following Tr. 15007 when I testified in this proceeding on March 11, 1981.
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Q.2.
What is the purpose of this testimony?
A.
The purpose of this testimony is to address and present infor-
mation on the Licensee's response and performance in the June 2,1981
emergency response exercise for TMI-1.
Q.3.
Wnat were your roles in that exercise?
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A.
(Witness Donaldson). The NRC's observation, evaluation and critique
of the Licensee's performance and response in the exercise was carried out by
an liRC Exercise Evaluation Team made up of ten individuals from NRC Region I
and liRC rieadquarters.
I was the tean ' reader for this NRC Exercise Evaluation
Team.
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(Witness Chesnut).
I was a member of the NRC Exercise Evaluation
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Team.
In this capacity, I monitored and observed specific assigned aspects
of the Licensee's response during the exercise, evaluated tnat response and
participated in the post-exercise critiques.
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Q.4.
Have you prepared a report on the 11RC Exercise Evaluation Team's
findings with regard to the Licensee's response and performance in the
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exercise?
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(Witness Donaldson).
Yes.
Based on the Tean findings I prepared
an exercise report on the Licensee's performance.
That report, Inspection
Report No. 50-289/81-15, issued on June 11, 1981, is attached to this testi-
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cony and is incorporated herein.
It is true and correct to the best of my
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knowledge and belief.
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y.5.
Briefly suumarize the onsite scenario for the exercise conducted
on June 2, 1981.
A.
The exercise scenario was initiated at 5:15 a.m. on June 2,1981
at THI-1 which, for purposes of the exercise, was simulated to have been at
100% power for eight days.
Initial indications of a developing abnormal
condition were provided by simulating increased radiation levels and an
alara on radiation uonitor RMA-5, the condenser off-gas monitor, an indi-
cation of a possible steam generator tube leak.
The RMA-5 radiation levels
exceeded tne Emergency Action Level (EAL) for 4:n Unusual Event. This con-
dition was allowed to worsen until the operators determined the reactor
coolant system leak rate, which was computed to exceed technical specifi-
cation limits and required plant shutdown. The condenser off-gas monitor
continued to increase to the point of exceeding the Alert EAL. Due to
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simulated power grid limitations, the plant was ran9ed down in power at 3
rate of 2k/ minute.
While actions were being taken to assess the events and initiate a con-
trolled plant snutdown and cooldown, a faulty waste gas compressor seal was
simulated, requiring a demanstration of emergency corrective actions to
isolate the compressor.
The control room operators were subsequently given indications of an
increased steam generator leak rate and activity levels, increased condenser
off-gas uonitor readings, and increasing priinary letdown monitor (RM-LI)
readings.
These indicators were designed to trigger the declaration of a Site
Emergency.
During a site accountability operation, two persons were simulated
to be missing, requiring search and rescue operations.
During a subsequent
evacuation of non-essential personnel, five individuals were simulated to be
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contaminated, and required nonitoring and decontamination at Crawford Station.
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To evaluate the License?'s ability to handle an individual who became
contaminated and injured, an auxiliary operator who was dispatched to investi-
gate an increasing bearing temperature was simulated to slip after breaking
a pressure sensing line, breaking his leg and becoming unconscious. This
required a response by offsite medical and transportation support.
There was a sinulated fire in the circulating water pump house. This fire
was fought by the onsite fire brigade as well as offsite fire companies. The
fire caused the loss of circulating water flow, loss of condenser vacuum,'and
the need to stean to the atmosphere to continue plant cooldown.
During this
process, major fuel damage was simulated to occur with offsite dose rates which
would trigger declaration of a General Emergency and protective action recoamend-
ations.
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In summary, this was a comprehensive and detailed scenario, escalating
from an Unusual Event to the General Energancy category.
The scenario called
for very little simulation - information on plant paraneters and conditions
was provided to participants only after those actions which would be required
under actual accident conditions to obtain or produce such information had
bean taken by the exercise participants. This satisfied the NRC scenario objectives
for the emergency exercise.
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Q.6.
What functional areas of the Licensee's emergency response organi-
zation were tested by the execise?
A.
During the June 2,1981 exercise, the following functional areas
were tested and were observed and critiqued by the NRC Exercise Evaluation
Tean:
(1) Operation staff _ actions in detection, classification,
and operational assessment of the accident;
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(2) Hotification of offsite agencies, notification and
call-up of licensee personnel and connunications;
(3) Radiological dose assessoent and projection and pro-
tective action decision-making;
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(4) Licensee personnel assembly and accountability;
(5) Security;
(6)
In-plant, onsite and offsite radiological surveys;
(7) First Aid and rescue;
(d)
Interface with tne HRC response organization;
(9)
In-plant radiation protection;
(10) Tecnnical support;
(11) Public information;
(12) Repair / corrective actions; and
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(13) Direction and coordination of the response.
For tne HRC's part, the HRC regional emergency response, con:isting of
Region I inspectors and the NRC THI site organization, was activated and
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participated in the exercise.
Q.7.
From the standpoint of onsite emergency response and Licensee's
emergency preparedness, what were the results of the exercise?
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A.
Tne Licensee demonstrated an ability to carry out its own approved
procedures, to coordinate its response with that of offsite agencies, and to
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respond to the energency simulated by the exercise scenario.
No shortcomings
or deficiencies which would degrade the sufficiency or effectiveness of the
Licensee's emergency response in any of the functional areas were observed.
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A nunber of minor or insignificant problems were observed, however,
none of those resulted in a degradation of the emergen;y response.
These
items were identified by tne exercise monitors of the NRC's Exercise Evalu-
ation Team and by the Licensee's own exercise monitors during post-exercise
critiques. Those minor deficiencies for which a corrective action is appro-
priate will be entered into the Licensee's action tracking system until
action is coupleted.
Q.8.
Explain the mechanism wereby deficiencies noted during exercises
or drills will be corrected.
A.
Deficiencies noted or action required as a result of drills and
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exercises are assigned to an action itea tracking system by the Licensee's
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Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness.
Under this system, responsibility for
modifications to plans, procedures, equipment, or training is assigned and
tracked weekly until tne corrective action or resolution is completed.
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49 How will the Uffice of Inspection and Enforcement assure that
problem areas identified during the exercise are corrected?
A.
As part of the emergency preparedness appraisal program as well as
the routine inspection program, items identified from the exercise are followed
until the are resolved. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement verifies
through this process that, regardless of the significance of an item, Licensee's
management has reviewed the matter and has initiated and completed improvements
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where necessary or desiredble to improve emergency response capabilities.
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Q.10. What can you conclude on the Licensee's emergency preparedness
program from this exercise.
A.
The Licensee demonstrated the ability to implement its emergency
plan during the joint exercise on June 2, 1981.
Although there were areas
where improvements to procedures or future training should be considered,
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these areas did not significantly degrade any of the key functional areas
of the Licensee's energency response.
The Exercise Evaluation Team observed
no shortcomings or deficiencies in Licensee's emergency response that would
degrade the sufficiency and effectiveness of that response.
Based on the exer-
cise, the NRC Staff position is that the provision for the Licensee's partici-
pation in an energency exercise as required by the August 9,1979 Comaission
Order and as provided for in the new energency planning regulations has been
met. FEMA will report on performance of the offsite response organizations
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during the June 2, 1931 exercise.
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