ML20004D817
| ML20004D817 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1981 |
| From: | Barth C NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106100113 | |
| Download: ML20004D817 (65) | |
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06/09/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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CINCINNATI GAS AND ELECTRIC
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Docket No. 50-358 g[C{/f{g COMPANY, el a1.
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CoEIE@kwrj NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER IN THE sh FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION The NRC Staff, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 92.754 and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Schedule for Filing Proposed Findings and Conclusions of March 20, 1981, hereby submits the attached proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in the form of an Initial Decision with respect to those issues upon which the administrative proceeding hearing has been completed as of this date.
Respectfully submitted, AY Charles A. Barth Counsel for NRC Staff l
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 9th day of June,1981.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATDMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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CINCINNATI GAS AND ELECTRIC Docket No. 50-358 COMPAriY,gtial.
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(Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1)
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NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AN'u ORDER IN THE FORM 0F AN INITIAL DECISION Charles A. Barth Counsel for NRC Staff June 9, 1981
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Zimmer Table of Contents Paragraph Page Introduction......................
1 2
Hearing Record.....................
18 9
Contention 6 Dr. Fankhauser............
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Contention 14 MVPP 19 9
Contention 15 MVPP 27 14 Contention 16 MVPP 42 21 Contention 17 MVPP 49 24 Contention 13 MVPP 63 29 Capital Costs 64 30 TMI Capital Costs 77 33 Costs of Operation..............
79 34 Decommissioning 81 35 Intervenors Testimony 86 38 Costs of an Accident.............
91 40 Board Raised Issues................
100 42 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, Cost Benefit 100 42 Pressure Testing of Doors 111 49 Nets and Bolts on Traveling Screen......
114 51
. Alleged Electrical Deficiencies 115 51 Grinding of Control Rod Velocity Limiter...
119 54 Fi nd i n gs o f Fac t....................
126 58 Conclusions of Law...................
128 59 129 60 Order.........................
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. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Dr. M. Stanley Livingston, Menber Dr. Frank F. Hooper, Member In the liatter of
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CINCINNATI GAS AND ELECTRIC
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Docket No. 50-358 COMPANY, g at.
(Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power
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Station, Unit No. 1)
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INITIAL DECISION (OPERATING LICENSE PROCEEDING)
I.
INTRODUCTION 1.
[ Reserved For Completion of Hearing].
2.
This Initial Decision concerns the application filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, for itself and as agent for Columbus & Southern Ohio Edison Company and The Dayton Power & Light Company, (hereinafter " Applicants") for a facility operating license which would authorize the operation of the l
Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter "Zimmer" or
" facility"). The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company is responsible for the construction and operation of the facility which utilizes a boiling l
water reactor designed to operate at a core power level up to 2436 l
thermal megawatts with a net electrical output of approximately 800 megawatts.
The facility is located on a 615 acre tract of land on the Ohio River in Washington Township, Clermont County, Ohio approximately one-half mile north of Moscow, Ohio and about 24 miles south-east of Cincirnati, Ohio.
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i 3.
On April 7,1970, the Applicants filed an application with tne Atomic' Energy Commission, now the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (hereinafter " Commission" or "NRC") for a permit to construct the Zimer facility. Following reviews by the Comission's Staff (" Staff") and the Advisory Comittee on 'leactor Safeguards, as well as public hearings before an Atomic Safety And Licensing Board, a permit to construct the Zimer facility was authorized (5 NRC 133).
Pursuant thereto, Construction Permit No. CPPR-88 was issued on October 27, 1972, and construction has proceeded since that date.
4.
On September 17, 1975 the NRC issued a Notice of Receipt of Application For Operating License...and Opportunity For Hearing (40 Fed.
Reg. 43959, September 24,1975).
In response to the Notice, petitions for leave to intervene were filed by the Miami Valley Power Project
("MVPP"), Dr. David B. Fankhauser, Mrs. Mari B. Leigh and the City of Cincinnati. On November 3, 1975, this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(" Licensing _ Board" or ' Board") was established to rule on the petitions.M After a special prehearing conference held on January 23, 1976, U ursuant to 10 C.F.R. 62.751, the Board issued a Notice of p
If Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to Rule on Petitions (November 5, 1975) (40 Fed. Reg. 52442, Nov. 10, 1975).
y Notice of Hearing and Order Concerning Special Prehearing Conference (December 24, 1975) (41 Fed. Reg. 828, January 5,1976).
Hearing and admitted all of the petitioners as parties to the proceeding E and specified the contentions at issue. E 5.
By letter from the Staff dated September 9,1977, the Board was informed that Mrs. Leigh had died, thus her contention is moot.
6.
This Board has been reconstituted on three occasions due to the illness of one member, the retirement of another, and a conflict in schedule. E 7.
Discovery in this proceeding took place over a period of approximately three years, with the Board permitting additional discovery in certain instances when new contentions were admitted or new matters arose.
8.
The prehearing conference required by 10 C.F.R. 92.752 was held on March 22-23, 1979.
During the course of the conference, the Board, accompanied by representatives of the parties, toured the Zimmer facility and the surrounding environs, including the Moscow Elementary School. During that prehearing conference as well as a number of times during the course of the evidentiary hearings, limited appearance statements were heard. Sessions for receipt of limited appearance 3/
Order Granting Petitions for Intervention and Providing for Hearing (March 19,1976). The Board's " Order Granting Petitions to Intervene" (November 28,1975) had been reversed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8 (1976).
4/
These contentions were modified in part by Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration of Four of Intervenor Contentions (April 3,
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1976) and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Applicants'
-Objections to Order Specifying Contentions (June 17,1976).
5/
See Notices of Reconstitution of Board dated November 10, 1977 (42 TeT. Reg. 58881), November 10, 1978 (43 Fed. Reg. 46911), and
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March 1981 (
Fed. Reg.
),
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. statements were held in Moscow, Ohio as well as in Cincinnati and occurred during the evening as well as during the daytime to acconnodate as many people as possible. The Board, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix A VIII(b), asked the Staff to respond to a number of issues which the Board felt to be important. The Board concludes that the Staff adequately addressed those identified concerns, O and that those concerns raise no unresolved matters of safety significance.
9.
During the course of the proceeding, resulting in part from the occurrence of the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 ("TMI"), the Board admitted a new party and three participants.
The Board admitted Zimmer Area Citizens /Zimmer Area Citizens of Kentucky (ZAC) as an intervenor pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 92.714 and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Clennont County, Ohio, and the City of Mentor, Kentucky, as participants pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 92.715(c). E Additional MVPP conten-i tions dealing with cable trays (Contention 14), control rods (Contentions 15 and 16), 8l fire protection of cable trays (Contention 17), monitoring 6/
See paragraphs 100-125 infra.
-7/
Memorandum and Order, LBP-80-14,11 NRC 570 (April 22,1980);
Memorandum and Order Admitting Kentucky as an "Interestes State,"
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( April 1,1980); Memorandum and Order Admitting Clennont County, Ohio Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 92.715(c), (June 11,1980); Memorandum and Order Admitting Mentor, Kentucky, Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 92.715(c), LBP-80-6, 11 NRC 148 (January 29,1980).
8f Order Establishing New Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule with Regard Thereto (April 9,1979).
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(Contentions 18 and 19, E and emergency planning (Contentions 20-32) were admitted and discovery upon these issues was permitted.
- 10. The Applicants prepared a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and an Environmental Report (ER). The FSAR and ER, with amendments to June 19, 1979, were both admitted into evidence (Applicants' Exhibit 1, Tr. p. 605. N Amendments to the FSAR, bringing it to to date as of were received into evidence on
, Tr. p.
- 11. The NRC Staff prepared a draft and a final environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy A:t and 10 C.F.R. Part 51. During the cou. <e of the proceeding, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 951.52(b)(1), the Staff introduced into evidence its F1ial Environmental Statement (FES) (Staff Exhibit 1 Tr. p. 245) and certain material which supplemented or amended the FES (Staff Exh. 2-6, Tr. p. 754). This material consisted of an NRC Staff Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement relating to the radiological impact of Radon-222 releases (Staff Exh. 3), a comparison of health effects attributable to coal and nuclear fuel cycle alternatives (Staff Exh. 4) with certain revised information pertinent thereto (Staff Exh. 5) and a staterant regarding risk assessment l
l methodology mandated by a January 19, 1979 Commission statement of policy concerning the Reactor Safety Study and Review Group report 9/
Memorandum and Order Admitting New Contentions (August 7,1979);
l Memorandum and Order Ruling on Contentions of ZAC-ZACK, LBP-80-19, 12 NRC 67 (July 2,1980).
1_0] See description of these exhibits following Tr. p. 605.
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7-(Staff Exh. 6) which also modifies Staff Exh. 4.
The staff also intro-duced its Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements 1 and 2 thereto, which evidence the staff's safety review.E
- 13. The decisional record in this proceeding consists of the following:
a.
The material pleadings filed herein, including the petitions and other pleadings filed by the parties, and the orders issued by the Board during the course of this proceeding; b.
The transcripts of the prehearing conferences on January 23,1975 (Tr.1-120) and May 21-23, 1975 (Tr. 121-532),
and the transcript of testimony of the evidgiary -
hearings with pagination from 522 to c.
All of the exhibits received into evidence which are identified in Appendix ( A) to this Initial Decision.
- 14. The Applicants filed three motions for summary dispositionE with regard to a number of the contentions. The Board granted the motions with respect to Contentions 1 and 5 of Dr. Fankhauser and Contentions 11 and 12 of MVPP. E The other admitted contentions were considered during lj/ Staff Exhibits _, _, and _, Tr. pp. _, _, and _.
12/ Interspersed in these transcripts are limited appearance statements which of course do not constitute a part cf the decisional record.
10 C.F.R. 92.715(a); Iowa Electric Light & Power Company (Duane Arnold Energy Center, ALAB-108, 6 AEC 195,196 n.4 (1973). Pages 3600-3900 were skipped by the reporter in preparing this transcript.
13/ Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition (April 6,1979);
- Applicants' Supplemental Motion for Summary Disposition (Aoril 23, l
1979); and Applicants' Motion for Surnary Disposition Relating to Contention 17 (September 21,1979).
-14/ Prehearing Conference Order (June 4,1979) at 13-18; Applicants' Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition or in the Alternative for r
Certification (July 25,1979); and Meniorandum and Order (granting motion for summary disposition of contention 5), LBP-81-2,13 NRC (January 23,1981).
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. evidentiary hearings held on June 19-22, 1979, June 26-29, 1979, August 7-10, 1979, November 14-15, 1979, March 2-4, 1981, and 198.
- 15. Subsequent to the issuance of a license to possess nuclear material issued pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70, and during the course of the proceeding, MVPP and Dr. Fankhauser moved to delay delivery of unirradiated fuel to the site of the facility. The Applicants opposed the motions, both on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits. The NRC Staff supported the Licensing Board's jurisdiction to consider the motions, but urged denial on the merits. (Tr. p. 2991). While the Board found it had jurisdiction to consider the matter, it der.ied the motion, finding that the intervenors provided no information which would warrant granting the requested relief. (Tr. p. 3041). The Board found that the Applicants' activities confonned with the requirements of the regulations and the outstanding materials license issued pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 and that the NRC Staff is exercising properly its authority in this area. E 16.
In making'this Initial Decision which follows, the Board con-l sidered the entire record of this proceeding and all of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the parties and participants. Each of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which is not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Initial Decision is rejected as being unsupported in law or fact or as being l
unnecessary to the rendering of this Decision.
Memorandum and Order Denying (Motion to Delay) Delivery of Fuel to the
-15/
Site, LBP-71-24, 10 NRC 226 August 15, 1979. While the Board deemed such order to be final and appealable, no review by the Atomic l
Safety and Licensing Appeal Board was sought.
. 17. The Board is guided in this operating license proceeding by Appendix A,Section VIII of 10 C.F.R. Part 2, which in subsection (b) provides that the Board will make findings on matters in controversy among the parties or upon those issues raised sua sponte by the Board i tself.
II. HEARING RECORD A.
Contested Issues Contention 6 Dr. Fankhauser The Applicants will not meet the design objectives of Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 because the dose levels to the children at the Moscow Elementary School will exceed those which are permissible.
- 18. The Moscow Elementary School has been closed and thus the contention is moot.
See Tr. p. 4246. The applicant and Staff introduced testimony of qualified experts that Appendix I dose levels would not be exceeded at the school. (Tr. pp. 607,767). Dr. Fankhauser introduced no evider.ce or calculations which would support his contention.
Therefore, even though the contention is moot, the Board finds that it is without merit.
Contention 14 MVPP Cable trays containing electrical wires have been inadequately welded by improperly qualified welders, contrary to NRC regulacions. More specifically, three pi:. verticals and two piece channels were welded by people not fully ASME certified. These welders were not consistently able to produce a quality weld with good fusion, a situation aggravated by Husky Product's incentive system which induced quick blasting techniques to be employed. Further disregarding standard procedures production welding techniques and test welding techn! ques
. were not identical. Any meantngful inspection of the crucial three piece vertical welds is impossible because the trays have been galvanized. Therefore, the existing system of cable trays must be dismantled and a new set welded by fully certified welders and installed.
19.
Cable trays used in the Zimmer facility were manufactured by Burndy-Husky Incorporated in Florence, Kentucky ar.d consist of three types of trays: (1) three piece straight tray used horizontally, nonnally 10 feat long having two side channels and a corrugated bottom plate (solid) welded together by resistance spot welds by an automatic resistance spot weld machine, (2) three piece vertical tray utilized in straight vertical runs also having two side channels but with a flat plate for the back of the tray. These trays are also welded with the same automatic resistance spot weld machine; and, (3) fittings that provide the transition trays from horizontal to vertical, ::hanges in direction horizontally or vertically or T-sections. These transition trays may have either single piece side channels or 3 piece side channels fabricated from three separate pieces by we'iding, this welding being done by a manual Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) process by a qualified welder. The filler welds are approximately one inch long and are spaced every two to three inches along the welded joint. These side channels are then spot welded to a corrugated solid bottom place. This welding l
is done by either a resistance spot weld machine or by semiautomatic l
metal inert gas (MIG) process as necessary (Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel and Harvey Wescott Regarding Contention 14, Cable Tray Welding Tr. following 1643 ((hereinafter " Staff Cable Tray Testimony) at 7-8)).
- 20. These trays, when installed in the Zimmer facility, are supported by seismically designed hangers with support spacing of l
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. straight runs not to exceed 9 feet in length, fittings are supported on both ends by seismically designed hangers. Tr. 205. The designer, Sargent and Lundy Engineers, ("S&L") specified that the cable raceway system for Zimmer (both conduits as well as cable trays) will be designed adequately to sustain a seismic event by reliance on the support hanger system, not the tra/s themselves. The basic purpose of the trays is to separate and direct the wires. The support for the wires comes from the seismically designed hangers anchored in the structures themselves. The electrical cables would therefore reaain in place on the supports even in the unlikely event that the cable trays disappeared.
(Staff Cable Tray Testimony at 8.)
- 21. The cable trays were manufactured in accordance with design specifications requiring steel having a minimun yield of 30 KSI. When this material is received at Husky, the receiver documentation is inspected to verify that the shipment meets these specifications (Applicants' Testimony Relating to Contention 14 Cable Trays, following Tr. 985 (hereinafter " Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony"' at 1). Design specifications further required the cable trays to sustain a working load of 40 lbs. per square foot plus a load equivalent ta 200 lbs. at the mid-point of a 10 foot span with a minimum load (safety factor of 2.0) when treated in accordance with NEMA Standard VII-1-3.01 (Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1; Tr.1807). The safety factor was determined by means of structural tests at Husky (Tr.1090).
- 22. Cable trays for the Zimmer Station were manufactured by the Burndy-Husky Corporation in accordance with a quality assurance program approved by the Applicants (Tr. 990,1104-05). However, cable trays at
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[ Zimmer are not ASME Class 1 (Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1; Tr.
1097). Accordingly, there is no requirement for " certification" of welders as is required by the ASME Code Section III for pressure vessels, for example. However, each Husky welder was required to have a t
qualification test to establish his competence for the type of welds made on Zimmer cable trays ( Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1; Tr.
987). Each welder underwent a qualification test required for each position and proct 3s (Tr. 988,1035). To the extent necessary, training was provided to enable welders to pass qualification tests (Tr.1027).
During an internal audit by Burndy-Husky, it was determined that due to an oversight, one procedure had not been quali'ied. This situation was rectified by the manufacturer (Tr. 658 aff testimony p.11, Tr.1643).
- 23. The matter of the adequacy of the cable tray welding originally arose when the NRC's Chicago, Illinois Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) received a letter on August 1,1978 from Mr. Edwin P. Hofstadter, a former employee of Burndy-Husky alleging deficiencies in cable trays some four years after occurrence.
I&E promptly investigated the allegations and concluded that the cable trays installed in Zimmer i
were properly fabricated and posed no safety problem. See attachment to the Staff's testimony (Tr.1643, especially Region III Report No.
50-358/78-21 which detail the investigation and document the IAE conclusion of no problem. The I&E investigation included visual inspection of welding examination of CG&E and Husky documentation, and l.
I destructive testing.
Mr. Hofstadter testified for the intervenors. His direct testimony (Tr. 1153) and cross exanination by the Board (Tr.
1443-1467) and the parties (Tr.1343 ff) discloses that he has no
. expertise in welding, welding procedures, or inspection of welding (Tr.
i 1193 ff) and, further, he could offer no probative evidence which would impeach the conclusion of the staff experts. Mr. Hofstadter testified under cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of any of the welds on any cable tray installed at the Zimmer facility (Tr. 1223) and that if he would examine a weld on a cable tray in Zimmer, he could not tell what kind of a weld it was (Tr.1238). This Board concludes that the cable trays and fittings installed at the Z'.mer facility are adequately fabricated and installed to provide assurance of the safe operation of the Zimmer facility (Staff testimony page 12, Tr.1643).
- 24. MVPP alleged that the Husky incentive syst2m aggravated the ability to produce good welds. Husky has an incentive program which rewards welders for increased prodection without sacrificing quality.
The program is designed so that welders are penalized for rejected pieces (Tr. 1081-84,1091-93,1107). After welding, the pieces were inspe:ted and trays failing to meet quality requirements were rejected (Tr. 1099, 1381). The Board finds that there is no basis for concluding that the ir.centive program had any adycese effect on the quality of the
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cable trays for Zimmer.
- 25. For corrosion protection, the trays were galvanized by hot dipping in accordance with ASME standards (Tr. 1100-01). tiVPP alleges that " meaningful" inspection of certain welds were made impossible because the trays were galvanized. Visuel inspection at Husky as to acceptability of welds was made prior to galvanizing (Tr.1102).
In addition, receipt inspection was done at Zimmer to assure that there was no enange during shipment (Tr. 1106). Tne Board finds that galvanization of the cable 5
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. trays did not detract from the ability to inspect and test the trays.
- 26. The Board finds that Mr. Hofstadter's testimony and the evidence adduced at hearing does not provide reliable and substantial evidence of inadequate welds upon cable trays used in the Zimmer facility and does not indicate the existence of any safety problem.
Contention 15 MVPP Control rods which must be easily inserted into and removed from the reactor core have been inadequately manufactured so that they do not meet the site specifications for such control rods.
27.
The control rods pc' form the dual function of power shaping and reactivity control. Power distribution in the core is controlled during operation of the reactor by manipulating selected patterns of
- ontrol rods. Control rod displacement tends to counterbalance steam void effects at the top of the core and results in significant power flattening. The control rod consists of a sheathed cruciform array of stainless steel tubes filled with boron-carbide powder. The control rods are 9.75 inches in total span and are separated uniformly throughout the core on a 12-inch pitch.
Each control rod is surrounded by four fuel assemblies. The main structural member of a control rod is 4
made of Type 304 ;tainless steel and consists of a top handle, a bottom casting with a velocity limiter and control rod drive coupling, a vertical crucifonn center post, and fo tr U-shaped absorber tube sheaths. The top handle, bottom casting, and center post are welded into a single skeletal structure. The U-shaped sheaths are resistance-welded to the center post, handle, afid castings to form a rigid housing to contain the boron-carbide-filled absorber rods.
Rollers at the top and bottom of the control guide the control rod as it
. is inserted and withdrawn from the core. The control rods are cooled by the core bypass flow. The U-shaped sheaths are perforated to allow the coolant to circulate freely about the absorber tubes (Appl. Exh. 1, Final Safety Analysis Report (hereinafter "FSAR") at 64.2.
See also Figures 4.2-11 and 12 for specific dimensions),
- 28. The control rod drive system controls gross changes in core reactivity by incrementally positioning the controi rods within the reactor core in response to manual control signals.
It is also required quickly to shut down the reactor (scran) in emergency situations by rapidly inserting withdrawn control rods into the core in response to a manual or automatic signal (FSAR 64.2.3.2.2 at 4.2-33 through 39).
- 29. The control rods were manufactured at General Electric Company's plant in Wilmington, North Carolina. All quality assurance procedures at the manufacturing facility were satisfied. Control rods were inspected pursuant to General Electric's quality assurance procedures to assure that design specification requirements are met l
before being released for shipment to the Zimmer site (Applicants' Testimeny Relating to Contention 15. Manufacture of Control Rods, following Tr. 2209 (hereinafter " Applicants' Control Rod Testimony") at 1). Such inspections included the measurement of the thickness of the l
l control rod to determine if there are spots that are out of tolerance (Tr. 2214-76). The control rods were also examined for straightness and freedom from twisting (Tr. 2733). Periodic audits of the procedures i
were conducted to assure that quality ecquirements were being met (Tr.
2210-12).
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, 30. Control rods were packed and shipped according to special requirements which were established to maintain the integrity and configuration of the rods and thus assure delivery to the site in the same condition as when they were packed at Wilmington (Applicants' Control Rod Testimony at 1; Tr. 2234-35).
- 31. After the control rods were uncrated at the reactor site, and before installation into the reactor, they were again inspected for possible shipping and handling damage prior to installation in the reactor vessel. This on-site inspection was performed during the period July through October 1978 by Reactor Controls, Incorporated ("RCI") and consisted of several visual observations as i as a number of measurements.
(Direct Tastimony of Federico A. Maura Regarding Contentions Nos.15 and 16, Control Rods Thickness and Seals, following Tr.1643 (hereinafter " Staff Control Rod Testimoriy") at 3 and Attachment 3 thereto; Tr. 2237). The actual inspections were done by quality assurance personnel from RCI. Millrights manipulated the control rods to assist these personnel in their inspections (Tr. 2257,2292-93).
prior to engaging in these inspections, the RCI personnel received training in the steps necessary to conduct the inspections (Tr. 2265).
- 32. The use of the two envelope gauges and the determination of l
whether to accept or reject a control rod was co2 rolled by General Electric Company procedures. A 0.280-inch envelope gauge was used to determine if the control rod blade thickness, at any one point in the l
length of one of tne four blades of any control rod exceeds 0.280-inches. The gauge looks like a tuning fork approximately 1-inch wide.
It is passed over the length of the cruciform shaped blades to
. detemine whether there are any. points of. interference (Tr. 2215-16).
A 0.320-inch envelope gauge is similar to the 0.280-inch gauge except it is approximately 1-foot long and is used to detemine if bowing exists over a wider area (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 3-4).
The 0.280 dimension did not represent any maximum design requirement for sheath thickness, but a check point at which the design engineer wished to be consulted (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 7; Tr. 2651-5.3).
- 33. During the initial site inspection, conducted by RCI for the Applicants, of the 137 control rods, 86 did not pass the 0.280-inch thickness envelope gauge (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4; Tr. 2247).
Of those 86 that did not pass, 4 also did not pass the 0.320-inch gauge used to locate undesirable bowing and the four control rods were rejected (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4; Tr. 2279).
In accordance with the GE inspection procedure a C --pound force clamp was placed against the blade sheath, adjacent to the high area of the remaining 82 control rods (Tr.
2409-10). The purpose of the clamp was to detemine if the local sheath bulge was flexible, and to ensure the absence of foreign matter between the sheath and the poison rods which fom the blade. The forty pound load removed waviness of the sheath without pemanently defoming the sheath (Tr. 2325,2381-82).
- 34. While certain dhage such as significant dents or bent rods l
could be a reason for rejection, nomal saviness which is overcome by l
the clamp, is acceptable (Tr. 2253-54;2416-17). This procedure is used l
unifomly at the place of manufacture of the rods as well as in the field (Tr. 2357).
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. 35. The control rod is designed to operate with rubbing friction between the control rod and the fuel bundles which is substantially in excess of forty pounds (Tr. 2324,2346-47,2386-89). Therefore, the forty pound inspection clamp load has no effect on safety or nomal operation (Tr. 2345-47; 2368-72). The design of the control rods has been confimed by qualification tests perfomed by General Electric Company during which control rods were cycled for the expected life of the blade and the wear of the blade and fuel channel were measured s (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 6; Tr. 2381, 2423-25). Because of elasticity of the control rod blade and fuel channels,_ the blade thickness acceptance criteria could be increased above the maximum thickness measured before the first operational difficulty would be experienced (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 7; Tr. 2385-87, 2436-37).
In any event, any abnomal friction would be found during the pre-operational and operational testing of the control rod and control-rod drive (FSAR 994.2.3.2.4.3, 4.2.3.2.4.4,- 4.2.3.2.4.5 at 4.2-59 through 61; Tr. 2349, 2390-94). Even in the hypothetical event that a control rod with the highest worth failed to function for any reason, there would be no effect on safety inasmuch as this is a design condition for the reactivity control system (Tr. 2351-52).
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- 36. Of the seven control rods which did not pass the 0.280-inch gauge with the 40-pound force clamp applied, one was rejected and not placed in the reactor. The remaining six control rods were accepted by the licensee after the General Electric Inspection Procedure was clarified to indicate that the clamp could be placed over the high point in question, and the surface area of interest on a control blade was 4
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redefined (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 4-5; Tr. 2414-18, Tr. 2281-82, 2286).
37, liRC inspectors witnessed a successful reinspection of those six control rods on April 10, 1979.
(Staff Control Rod Testimony at 5). During the course of handling of the control rod drives, flecks or particles of materials were discovered in the connection between the sheath and the center structural member of the control rod, the tie rod (Tr. 2308-09, 2312-13, 2419). A cleaning process was initiated utilizing compressed air, vacuum cleaners, probes and other methods to dislodge the flecks (Tr. 2309,2326). The rods were wiped down with a degreasing agent (Tr. 2309). The flecks which had a maximum size of 1/16 inch wide by 1/8 inch wide and which were extremely thin were determined to be the result of a spot welding process (Tr. 2309-12, 2438). A safety analysis was conducted which concluded that were some flecks left in the rods there would be no effect on safety (Tr. 2328).
Even if tne flecks were not removed prior to operation, filters on individual pieces of equipment and the cleanup system would remove them l
should they escape from the sheath (Tr. 2358-59,2420-21). The Board finds that.there is no safety problem associated with these small particles or with the inspection and utilizacion of control rods to be i
used in the minimum facility.
l l
38.
In January 1979, during initial fuel loading at tne Fukushima 6 reactor (Japan) it was noticed that several fuel channels hit the small ledge that exists in the corner of the control rod wings at the top of the velocity limiter just before the fuel bundle seated on the orficed fuel support. Under maximum material-tolerance conditions, this i
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. ledge could n.ick the corner of a fuel channel. While nicking does not affect fuel channel or control rod life or reactor safety, the ledge was chamfered to eliminate the possibilities of nicking (Tr. 2315-16, 2318). This chamfering was done with a handheld high speed air motor containing a small milling tool (burr). The ledge nicked the fuel I
channel only at maximum material tolerance conditions. Therefore, a gauge was utilized which duplicated the fuel channel corner.
If the gauge hit the ledge, the ledge was chamfered.
If the gauge did not hit the lege, no action was taken. The result was that all corners of all control rods had to pass the gauge before the control rod was accepted (Applicants' Control Rod Testimony at 2-3).
The control rods were wiped clean and put back in storage (T.. 2318).
It was not necessary to go through the detailed cleaning previously done because of the procedure used to assure that particles could not get into the control rod (Tr.
2318,2421). However, at that time the rods were visually inspected and no defects were found (Tr. 2658,2676). Moreover, random checks with a micrometer and gauges revealed no rejectable control rod blades (Tr.
2658-59). As the result of this inspection, all control rods which have been installed in the Zimmer reactor meet all requirements for operation.
- 39. Mr. Martin, a mi'i ight who was employed by RCI, the inspector of the control rods, testified for the intervenor, MVPP. Mr. Martin performed certain mechanical duties for RCI such as the manipulation of the testing fixture and a micrometer, subject to the supervision of qualified control personnel from RCI who were responsible for the inspection. His testimony regarding inspection of the blades did not w,,
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differ in any substantial way from that presented by the Applicants or Staff.
(Tr. 2467, 2474.)
- 40. A witness for the Applicants testified that whila an attempt was made to explain in some detail the operation of the control rods to the millrights, the process was too involved and complicated (Tr.
2405-06).
It is the conclusion of the Board, based upon Mr. Martin's testimony, his background and work experience, that he had an insufficient understanding of the design, manufacture and operation of the systems or components on which he was working to come to any valid conclusions concerning safety matters.
- 41. The Board has considered all the evidence of record, including the testimony of Mr. Martin.
The Board is satisfied that the control rods were designed, constructed, inspected, and will be tested in a manner which assures that they can, with sufficient margin, perform their intended function over their useful life. There has been no competent testimony to the contrary. The most that can be said is that Mr. Martin did not understand the nature of the design of these control rods, was unaw:are of the prototypical testing of this design and the pro dnd post-operatior,al testing to be conducted at the Zimmer facility.
Thus tbE Board finds that Contention 15 has no merit.
Contention 16 MVPP Airest all of the seals on the control rods, which when properly set prevent radioactive water from leaking out when the reactor is shut down for maintenance, do not meet minimum specifications for s.1oothness. Rough seals cannot set properly, making servicing more difficult and unnecessarily endangering workers and the general public by causing leakage of radioactive water.
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- 42. Under normal conditions, the primary seal which retains water in the reactor is that created by the nating surfaces of the control rod drive and cont;ol rod drive housing flanges. The seal noted in MVPP Contention 16 is the velocity limiter to guide tube backseat. (Staff Testimony Contention 16, at f, Tr.1643). These seals are shown in Applicant's Exhibit 1, FSAR, Section 4.2 in Figures 4.2-12, 13 and 14.
The only function that these control rod seals in question serve is to limit the leakage of water from the reactor vessel during the time when the drive aechanism is disassembled for maintenance (Applicants' Testimony Relating to Contention 16, Control Rod Seals, following Tr.
2209 (nereinafter " Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testfaony") at 1; Staff Control Rod Testinony at 8; Tr. 2745-46, 2766-67). Therefore, these seals would only see the pressure caused by the. head of water in the v:ssel and are not subject to operating pressure. They serve no other function (Applicant's Control Rod Seal Testimony at 1).
- 43. The specifications for the seals, which are AISI' Type 304 stainless steel, are a 63 RttS finisn and dimens%nal constraints in size and shape (Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 1; Staff Control Rod Testimony at 8).
- 44. Since these are not perfect metal-to-metal seals, a small l
amount of leakage must be expected until the drive is removed at which time c blind flange can be installed on the control rod drive housing, if needed. This small leakage may create an inconvenience to maintenance personnal during removal and subsequent reinstallation of control rod drives but, in no case, does it create a safety problem l
(Staff Controi Rod Testimony at 8-9; Tr. 2746, 2763-64, 2765-66).
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- 45. To detannine that the specifications were met, all control rod seals were subjected to visual inspection with a compar6 tor and a dimensional check in a special inspection fixture. These inspections are performed at Wilmington as a planned part of General Electric's Quality Assurance Program (Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 2).
- 46. After the control rods were shipped to the site, the seals were inspected for possible damage in shipment (Tr. 2742). The visual inspection was conducted with a comparator (Tr 2742). One control rod was returned to General Electric and replaced because of a scratch across the seal surface. All control rod seals installed at the Zimmer reactor meet design specifications for operation (Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 2; Staff Control Rod Testimony at 8). There wa.
no requirement imposed by the General Electric Company, the supplier of the seals, that they be inspected at all at the site, let alone with a comparator (Tr. 2923). The RCI inspection form did not require checking the seals with a comparator (Attachment B to Staff Control Rod Testimony). Thus, inspection of the seals was not specified as a safety requirement (Tr. 2923).
In any event, it would require a gross defonnity in the seals to create any sort of problec (Tr. 2925).
Even in that case, other elements of the control rods would prevent a maximum outflow of water (Id.).
- 47. Mr. Martin testified on behalf of the intervenors, MVPP that he thought the specified roughness of the seal was too great to permit it to meet its design function (Tr. 2798). Mr. Martin could not identify the seal when a drawing was presented to him at the hearing (Tr. 2827, 2829), nor did he know that the seal wcs designed to leak
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. until the evidentiary hearing on this issue (Tr. 2871).
- 48. Mr. Martin by education, training and experience has no qualifications which would. lend credibility to his judgments regarding design, manufacture, and. inspection of the seals in issue. The Board finds the Applicants and Staff testimony substantial and probative and gives no weight to Mr. Martin's testimony. The Board finds that the contention number 16 is without merit.
Contention 17 MVPP Fire insulation material which is being used to protect the cables in the cable trays from fire 1s inadequate to protect the cables in light of the cable tray installa-tion design and cable tray load. The tests of the fire insulation material were improperly performed in that conditions which will exist during operation were not adequately simulated.
- 49. The Applicants' presereted testimony of Mr. Melvin S. Abrams, an expert in the testing of fire resistant materials (Affidavit of l
Melvin S. Abrams, following Tr. 3414 at 1-2,) and Robert Cotta, a quali-fled expert (Statement of Professional Qualifications, Robert E. Cotta, following Tr. 3414). The Board also finds the Staff's panel consisting of Bert M. Cohn, and Robert D. Barnes to be well qualified experts.
Intervenors presented no evidence.
(Tr. 3238).
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- 50. With regard to arsuring that an adequate. level of fire protaction is provided, the principal concern is in areas where wiring and equipment serve safety functions and could be subject to dar,nage from a single fire incident.
In assuring that an adequate level of fire protection is achieved, the NRC uses the defense in depth concept which recognizes that no single echelon of fire safety in and of itself may be adequate to protect nuclear plants and therefore a number of different w
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. aeasures regarding fire prevention, fire detection, fire protection and fire supression are taken.
In the situation of cable trays, the location of each tray to the other, the location of trays within the space, the separation between redundant divisions, the presence of materials and equipment creating a fire exposure, the accessibility of the space for firefighting, the presence of fire detection and fiee suppression equipment, and other factors are all considered in establish-ing whether additional protective measures, such as fire barriers or insulation are required, and if so, what those additional protective measures should be. These determinations are made by the Staff experts and their consultants who review and inspect the facility in detail utilizing recognized standards and guidance (Staff Fire Protection Testimony at 1-5, 6-8; Tr. '3369-/1).
- 51. Based upon Staff review, the Applicants have agreed to the installation of fire barriers, protective insulation, automatic sprinklers, or combinations thereof in those places recommended by the f
Staff for additional protection. The Applicants proposed to use a ceramic fiber blanket therual insulation material manufactured by the Babcock and Wilcox Company under the trademark name "Kaowool" as a protective insulation material to be wrapped ir a specified manner around selected cable trays and conducted tests to show its adequacy for l
rne purpose (Staff Fire Protection Testimony at 8; Appl. Exh. 7A at 4 and Appendix A.2).
C2. Although time periods required by the Staff for fire protection of cable trays va y from 30 to 60 to 90 minutes based on location, nearby combustibles, ceiling heights, room dimensions, etc.,
. Applicants will cocoon ill cable trays requiring protection with three one-inch layers of Kaowool, giving each tray a 90 minute rating
( Affidavit of Robert E. Cotta, following Tr. 3414 at 2; Tr. 3245-46, 3377-78,3425). The 90 minute fire rating was. provided for extreme conservatism inasmuch as the Staff has conc?uded that it would not take more than 15 minutes to detect and extirguish a fire at Zimmer (Tr.
3278,3378).
- 53. To qualify Kaowool wrapped trays, the Applicants rely on a test conducted by the Portland Cement Association at Construction Technology Laboratories ("CTL") on June 6,1979.
Four cable tray specimens consisting of 16 foot long sections with 40% fill of EPR insulated, Hypalon jacketed IEEE 383 grade seven conductor control cables similar in type to those used at Zimmer were placed randomly in the trays (Applicants' Exh. 7A at 1; Tr. 3420-22; Affidavit of Robert E.
Cotta following Tr. 3414 at 2). The particular cable configuration was chosen as the most susceptible to an outside fire, with the result that other cables at Zimmer would be expected to achieve even better results (Tr. 3421).
- 54. Cable tray specimens were exposed to the standard time-temperature fire exposure of ASTM E119-(Applicants' Exh. 7A at 2).
Eight shielded thermocouples protected in accordance with the require-ments of ASTM were used to measure and control furnace atmosphere temperatures (Id. at 13). Average furnace atmosphere temperature was controlled with only a 1.5% variation from the standard time-temperature curve throughout the test (Id. at 14). The particular time temperature 1
standard of E-119 is more severe than conditions possible during a fire I
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. at Zimmer (Tr. 3280-81,3301). The severity is to bound any and all reasonable errors that could be implicit in the model (Tr. 3281).
- 55. The CTL' test was also more severe than a spot fire at Zimmer would be since it involved continued complete engulfment and possible impingement of the flame on the bottom of the lower two cable trays (Tr.
3316,3355-56). The test cable trays were wrapped in a manner identical to the installation procedure at the Zimmer station (App. Exh. 7A at 8, Appendix A and Figures 1-14; Tr. 3316, Affidavit of Robert E. Cotta at 2).
The position of the trays was to simulate to the extent possible in the limited space available in the furnace, the configuration of trays at Zimmer (Tr. 3451-57). A change in spacing of the trays would not have any significant changes in the results of the test (Tr. 3456).
If only two trays were tested, the test would still be valid but would be less severe because of the positioning of the trays in relation to the j
burners (Tr. 3449-51).
- 56. The testing of horizontal cable trays is sufficient also to qualify a vertical cable tray since a vertical tray would actually be less exposed than a horizontal tray suspended above the fire (Tr.
3314-16).
- 57. Electrical continuity of 15 cab'es at the bottom sides, top and middle of'each tray was monitored by observing lamps in a panel connected to 120 volts that were wired to conductors in each cable. The l
circuit was designed to indicate short circuits from the outer l
conductors to the center conductor within each cable (Appl. Exh. 7A at 1,8,12).
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- 58. Prior to the start of the fire test, all 60 circuits were tested and no short circuits were found. The light panel also indicaced a lack of short circuits at the start of the tests (Id. at 14). The ca' ales which were monitored were those in positions known to fail first (Tr. 3301-04).
- 59. The test proceeded without incident for 90 minutes. During that time no short circuits occurred (Id. at 15). After the test period had been completed, at 94 minutes, a short circuit was indicated for one cable (Id.). As a result of this test, Kaowool was qualified as a fire thermal barrier between the enclosed cable tray system and external area of exposure fire for the arrangement used during the testing program and the 90 minutes required by the Staff (Staff Fire Protection Testimony-at 8-9; SER Supp. No.1-Zimmer Facility; Letter to Greg Harrison, Division of Systems Safety, NRC, from Bert M. Cohn, Gage-Babccck & Associates, both following Tr. 3244; Tr. 3250-53, 3579).
- 60. The Applicants testified that if the cables were energized there would be no significant effect on the test results. The Appli-cants have imposed a heat generation limitation on cable trays wrapped in Kaowool of 13 watts per foot irrespective of whether there is power i
or control cable present (Tr. 3422,3424-25,3560-62,3599). Thus, i
l calculating the internal heat generation assuming this maximum value t
and comparing it to the heat conducted from the external fire through the Kaowool during the test, it was conservatively determined that the l
test period would be changed by approximately 1 minute 20 seconds (Tr.
3422-23). Since the first cable failure occurred at 94 minutes, the results of the tests would not be affected.
. 61. The fill of the cable tray would have a negligible effect upon the tests. (Tr. 3374-76,3424,3602-06).
It is possible that additional fill may be somewhat advantageous (Tr. 3424).
- 62. Based upon the evidence of record, the Board finds that Kaowool, the fire insulation material used to protect cables in cable trays in the configuration proposed is adequate, considering the cable and cable tray design and the other fire protection features of the facility. The Board finds the test which the Applicants rely upon to qualify Kaowool to nave been properly prefonned and the results to be acceptable. The Board therefore finds no merit in MVPP Contention 17.
Contention 13 MVPP "The equipment used in th? construction and operation of the plant will be excessively costly and, in effect, beyond the financial capability of the Applicant.
Applicants are financially unqualified to operate the plant because of escalating costs."
- 63. The question of the financial qualifications of an applicant to construct a nuclear power station is a matter for determination at the construction pennit stage,10 C.F.R. 950.33(f) and Public Service I
, Company of New Haupshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 8 (1978). Such finding has already been made in this docket (LBP-72-27, 5 AEC 133, 136 (1972)) and is dispositive of that issue.
This Board on September 17, 1980 pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 62.760a and 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix A paragraph VIII(b), raised the following issues which will be addressed:
l
. 1.
the ability of the Applicants to finance their respective shares of the cost of construction and operation of items mandated as a result of the TMI accident and not previously reviewed at the construction permit stage (including in particular the items required by NUREG-0694 ("TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses"), dated June 1980);
and 2,
the ability of the Applicants to fund estimated operating costs for the period of the license, plus the estimated costs of permanently shutting down the facility and maintaining it in a safe condition (see 10 CFR 950.33(f) and Part 50, Appendix C, I.B.); and 3.
the ability of the Applicants to withstand the costs of various contingencies, including extended shutdowns of the reactor caused either by problems arising at the Zimmer reactor (up to a maximum of a TMI-type accident) or by generic problems similar to those which have arisen at existing reactors and which have caused shutdowns at other reactors potentially subject to those problems.
The findings to be made by this Licensing Board at the operating license stage are set forth in 50.33(f), to wit:
If the application is for an operating license, such information shall show that the applicant possesses the funds necessary to cover estimated costs of operation... plus the estimated costs of pennanently shutting the facility down and maintaining it in a safe condition.
CAPITAL COSTS j
- 64..The total estimated, unexpended costs (including unexpended capital costs associated with NRC requirements arising from the TMI accident exclusive of allowance of funds during construction (AFUDC))
to complete the construction of the Zimmer Station is $204 million. Of these costs, $81.4 million represents CG&E's share. Additional AFUDC will amount to $32.1 million and the balance of $49.3 million represents i
additional money that will have to be raised ( Appl. Exh. 8, Tr. 3652).
l
. 65. C&SOE's share of these costs represents $57.1 million.
Additional AFUDC will amount to $22 million and the balance of $35.1 million represents additional money that will have to be raised (Id.).
- 66. DP&L's share of these costs is $65.5 million. Approximately
$46 million of the ~$65.5 million will have to be raised with the remainder being non-cash AFUDC (Id.).
- 67. Construction costs for Zimmer Station are included in the overall requirements for capital and have been or will be financed as a part of the Applicants' overall needs.
In 1980, CG&E issued 500,000 shares of 10.20% series' $100 par value preferred stock, an additional 3.4 million shares of common stock at a price of $16.125 per share, and
$100 million of 12% first mortgage bonds to finance part of its construction program including Zimmer Station. The issuance of additional common stock through the Employee Incentive Thrift' Plan, Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan raised approximately $14 million in 1980 and is expected to raise $16 million in 1981.
In January,1981, CG&E issued 300,000 shares of 12.52% series $100 par value preferred stock. Presently, CG&E is raising capital through the it;uance of short-term debt obligations at interest rates ranging from 17 7/8% to 201/2% (Id.)
68.
IN 1980, C&SOE issued $80 million of 13 5/8% first me-tgage bonds, $30 million of which was new capital, and received a $30 million capital contribution from itr parent company, American Electric Power Company, Inc. ("AEP") to finance part of its construction program including Zimmer Station (Id.).
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. 69. For DP&L, construction costs for Zimmer Station are included in the overall requirements for capital and have been financed as a part of that company's overall needs (Id.).
- 70. Detemination of future financings for the three companies are subject to several factors, including the amount and timing of rate increases, internal generation of funds, and the course of construction program of each company. Present estinates indicate that CG&E will sell approximately 2,500,000 shares of common _ stock in the first half of 1981 and will sell debt securities later in the yeur.
It is presently expected that any additional capital which may be required in 1981 by CG&E would be provided from short-tem bank loans or the issuance of commercial paper. Prices and tems of these securities would be determined by the financial market at the time of. the sale (Id.).
- 71. The record indicates that C&SOE will sell approximately 560 million of first mortgage bonds in the first half of 1931 and will receive a 540 million capital' contribution from AEP sometime during the l
year.
It presently is expected that any additional capital which may be required in 1981 wnuld be provided from short-tem bank loans. Prices and terms of these securities would be determined by the financial mar W at the time of the sale.
(Id.).
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- 72. DP&L's future needs will be fulfilled by the issuance of varying types and amounts of securities, including debt, common and preffered equity, leasing arrangements, and, in the interim, short-tem borrowings. The timing, amount, and type of specific financings has not been determined and is subject to several factors, including the amount ard timing of rate increases, the amount of internally generated funds, i
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. market conditions and the amount of the total construction program (Id.).
- 73. The unexpended costs to complete construction of Zimmer will be incurred during 1981 and 1932. CG&E's share of these costs, 581.4 million compares to the Company's total estimated construction costs of 5411 million for 1981 and 1982. For these years, costs to complete Zinaer Station will represent approximately 19.8% of total estimated construction costs (Id.).
- 74. C&S0E's share of remaining construction costs during 1981 and 1982 is 557.1 million which compares to the Company's total estimated construction costs of $302 million for 1981 and 1982. For these years, costs to complete Zimmer Station will represent approximately 18.9% of total estimated construction costs (Id.).
75.
Daring 1981 and 1982, OP&L's total estimated construction cost' are 5521 million. Therefore, the unexpended costs will represent about 12.6% of the overall construction budget for the period involved j
(Id.).
- 76. The Board has reviewed the Applicants financial statements f
(App Exh. 7 Tr. 3652) and testimony at the hearing and confirms the Commission's conclusion reached at the construction permit proceeding that the Applicants are financially qualified to design and construct the facility. 5 AEC 133 at 136 (1972).
Tfil Capital Costs
- 77. As a result of the THI accident, the NRC imposed requirements f
with regard to additional training, equipment, systems, structures and facilities, including those relating to emergency planning, for facilities such as Zimmer. This additional capital cost is estimated
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. to be $30,000,000. See Applicants' Exhibit 8; Staff testimony pages 11 and 22 (Tr. 4429) and Tr. 4124-4133, 4200-03, 4237-41, 4287-88.
Included in the $30 million total TMI capital costs is an approximate 5%
contingency fee. Since certain equipment has not been procured and total agreement has not been reached with all government agencies regarding emergency planning, certain of these figures represent best estimates. As an example, witnesses for the Applicants stated that costs associated with development of the emergency plan could increase as an upper limit by $2 million. On the other hand, construction of the Operations Support Center was proceeding on the basis of detailed estimates and drawings (Tr. 4249). Approximately half of the TMI required items are proceeding on a similar basis (Tr. 4132).
- 78. The Board finds tht estimates to be reasonable, considering the contingency added, and giving due allowance for possible added costs and viewing the TMI costs against the totcl capital costs of the facility and the construction budgets of the three companies, and their proven ability to finance the project, the Board concludes that there is reasonable assurance that from a financial viewpoint the TMI items can be constructed.
Costs of Operation
- 79. The Applicants have provided costs of operating the facility in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix C in Appl. Exh. 7, Tr.
3652. The figures include nuclear fuel expense, operating and maintenance expense, taxes and return on investment. A return on investment of 10.52% was used which represents a weighted average of the 1
present return of the three owners (Tr. 4270-71). The rate of return l
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. would be expected to rise in the future (Tr. 4271).
Included in the fuel expense is an allowance, based upon the latest Department of Energy estimates for disposal of the spent fuel (Tr. 4034-35). The depreciation expense category includes an allowance for decommissioning costs (Tr. 3679). The cost of servicing the debt associated with the financing of the construction of the Station is included in the return figures (Tr. 3679-81).
- 30. The costs of operation of the facility would be recovered from the ratepayers of the three companies (Tr. 4219-20). That portion of the costs of Zimmer not already included in the rate base would be n
included in the rate base of the three companies by ratemaking proceedings, probably in 1983 (Tr. 4220, 4233). With regard to these three utilities, the Public Utility Commission of Ohio ("PUC0") has acted #avorably in eacn of the ratemaking proceedings brought before them (Tr. 4231). When a request for emergency rate relief was requested, PUC0 has acted on an expedited basis (Tr. 4231). The three companies have in the past demonstrated an improved and improving financial picture, due in part to the actions of PUC0 (Tr. 4062; 406566; 4075-76; 4085; 4159-60; 4221-22; 4223; 4276). Based upon these factors and the evaluation of the Staff, the Board finds that the standard of reasonable assurance set forth in the Commission's rules and regulations has been met.
Decommissioning
- 81. The Applicants' plans for decommissioning are based upon the Atomic Industrial Forum ("AIF") report published in November,1976, entitled, "An Engineering Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor
. Decommissioning Alternatives." This study provided cost estimates in 1975 dollars for several decommissioning alternatives for BWR plants of both 1160 MWe and 550 MWe sizes. This study utilized previous decommissioning experience in developing the modes and costs of decommissioning (Appl. Exh. 7 at 1; Tr. 4009).
In planning for decommissioning of the Zimmer Station, the Applicants selected the
" entombment" mode which consists of temporarily entombing the facility for a cooling period of about 104 years, followed by dismantling and removal che structures which were radioactive at the end of life of the facility.
It was assumed that a security. force will be required to guard the entombed facility for the 104 year cooling period (Appl. Exh.
7, Tr. 4009 at 1). The methodology utilized in the AIF study was found oto be still valid today (Tr. 4003). Temporary entombment has already been utilized in decommissioning nuclear reactors (Tr. 4008). The selected mode minimizes occupational exposure and the environmental impact (Tr. 4026).
- 82. There are four components of total decommissioning cost: (1) cost of prompt dismantling and removing non-radioactive structures at the end of the 33 year life; and (2) initial entombment cost; (3) annual 7
surveillance and maintenance costs for the next 104 years; and (4) cost of dismantling and removing remaining structures at the end of the 104 year cooling period. This final step includes the final disposal of structures as well as tneir dismantling and removal (Tr. 4022-23).
No further expenses are incurred after this final dismantling / removal. The AIF estimates for these four components for an 1160 MWe BWR and for a 550 MWe BWR were extrapolated to obtain the estimates for the 800 ftWe Zimmer
i
. plant (Appl. Exh. 7 at 1; Tr. 3638). Credit for the value of the land after the decommissioning project is complete was also taken into account. The Applicant's estinate for decommissioning the Zimmer Station is $35.88 million in 1983 dollars (App. exh 7, Table I). A 6%
annual inflation rate was utilized from 1975 through 1979. A 6.5%
i annual inflation rate has been used after 1979 in calculating the cost in 1983 dollars.
83.
During the course of the hearing the Staff noted that Battelle Memorial Institute had prepared for the NRC a study regarding the decommissioning of a boiling water reactor (NUREG/CR-0672) (Testimony of Michael L. Karlowicz, Jr., Addressing the Financial Qualifications of The Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company and The Dayton Power & Light Company to Operate the Zimmer Facility, following Tr. 4428-4429 (hereinaf ter "Karlowicz i
Testimony" at 10).
- 84. The Staff utilized costs derived from the Battelle study in evaluating decommissioning costs (Karlowicz Testimony at 10-11,18-20).
l The study utilized a 100 year pericd between initial entombment and the starting of dismantlement.
For the initial entombment and deferred
. dismantlement decommissioning method, which approaches the Applicants' proposed methoa most closely, the cost used by Battelle and the Staff was $64.5 million (Id. at 11). According to the Staff, this would, utilizing its methodology, translate into an annual total sinking fund payment of $4.5 million to be split among the three owners (Id. at 19-20).
. 85. The Applicants have compared cost estimates and other aspects of the AIF and Battelle studies and have concluded that the AIF study is still the best basis for analysis (Tr. 4616,4632). For example, the Battelle study allowed six years for the initial entombment while the AIF study allows a 34 month period. The difference i; based upon more decontamination work, including cutting, packaging and shipment of radioactive material offsite associated with the.Battelle study, leading to additional adninistrative and rental costs as well as direct costs, as well as a number of other factors (Tr. 4617-18). The Applicants testified that the AIF Study methodology is also better environmentally because it reduces the occupational dose (Tr. 4626-29,4630-31). The AIF approach is based upon the physical fact that if left in place, the radiation in certain systems will decay down to a point, after 104 years, that conventional techniques may be used for demolition and the occupational exposures would be reduced (Tr. 4584). The Board finds that the estimates utivized by the Applicants in analyzing decocr.'asioning costs to be reasonable.
Intervenors Testimony 86.
Dr. Ralph Estes, a professor of Accounting presented direct testimony (Tr. 4314) to support the part of the conter.t. ion (operation of the facility) which goes to financial ability to decommission the facility.
0. Estes direct testimony and cross examination does not affirmatively challenge the ability of the applicants to decommission the facility. Some of Dr. Estes' figures and assumptions differed from the applicants', thereby resulting in a larger annual contribution to the decoar.ission sinking fund and thus also maxirig greater demands upon
. the applicants' customers.
- 87. Dr. Estes challenges (Estes Tes. p. 5) the AIF cost estimate of decommissioning. However, he testified he is not an expert in regard to nuclear power decommissioning (Tr. 6603,4350) or the design of the Zimmer Station (Tr. 4394) and we give no weight to his unsupported assertion of error by the AIF.
- 88. Dr. Estes assumed larger rater of inflation for long periods of time than did the applicants and staff, while he held the rate of return on investment to the applicants lowest forecast (Estas Tes. p. 4).
Upon cross examination, Dr. Estes testified that this assumption was in error. This Board finds Dr. Estes basic assumption - the inflation rate will vary but the return rata upon investment will not vary - to be u.isound.
On cross examination Dr. Estes testified that it was not possible to predict the rate of inflation for the future (Tr. 4021).
89.
Dr. Estes assumed applicants residential customers used 3,000 kwh annually, not based upon applicants' history, but upon Wichita, Kansas (Tr. 4419). This assumes an output of Zimmer many times its rated capacity.
Under cross examination Dr. Estes recognized nis error (Tr. 4332).
The Boa rd finds, due to erroneous assumptions and lack of competency in economics and nuclear power fs.ility construction that little probative weight can be given to Dr. Estes testimony.
90.
This Board finds that the applicant's estimation of the costs l
of decommissioning have been developed through methodology that today is reasonable and sound. Based upon the past earning capacity of the applicants and the rate actions of the Public Ohio Utility Commission this Board finds that there is reasonable assurance that the applicants,
. through a sinking fund with annual contribution, will be able to pay for the cost of decommissioning the facility, even should the cost of decommisisoning substantially exceed the best present estimates.
. Costs of an Accident
- 91. The Applicants stated that as a result of operating experience and the TMI accident there have been significant improvements to minimize extended outages and reduce the risk of accidents (Tr. 3654).
The fundamental point is that any accident or long term outage would l
have unique characteristics and would have to be dealt with as it developed. The companies would have to resolve financial considerations associated with an accident or outage to tiie satisfaction of PUC0 (Tr.
i 3553).
L 92.
It was emphasized that since the Zimmer Station is a BWR, a
(
THI type accident could not occur. Nevertheless, improvements are being incorporated into tne facility to aid the operators in general accident prevention and mitigation (Tr. 3655).
93.
If nonetbaless a TMI-type accident was postulated to occur, I
the Applicants calculated that it would cost approximately $835 million to decomtaminate and decommission the Zimmer Station reactor (Tr. 3655, 4042-43). Of that amount, $300 million would be paid for by insurance
~
proceeds (Tr. 3662).
Next the accumulated decommissioning fund would be used to offset the remainder. The remainer would be borne by the three owners in proportion to their ownership of the facility (Tr. 3656, 4042,4060). This nioney would have to be raised over a period of 4-5 years (Tr. 4080,4095). Such costs when distributed among the three l
companies would not have a substantial effect on rates or on the l
. /
companies' financial position (Tr. 4056,4072,4304).
- 94. With regard to replacement power costs, the Zimr.er Station is a single unit facility.
In contrast, the accideat at TMI-2 caused the sister unit to be shutdown and taken out of the rate base. Zimmer represents a smaller porti)n of the applients' system installed capacity (approximately 7.4%) than TMI Units 1 and -2 did of the GPU system (approximately 21.5%) (Tr. 4507-08). Thus the applicants should be in a better financial position to respond to a THI-type accident (Tr. 3656).
"S.
The Applicants testified that by law the PUC0 includes property con;idered "used and useful" in rendering electric service in the electric utilitu's rate base. There cre no laws or regulations in Ohio that specify the period of time that a plant may be taken out of service and still qualify for inclusion in the utility's rate base. The Applicants stated that they assumed that the PUC0 would act responsibly i
under the circumstances existing at the time of its decision (Tr. 3659).
96.
In similar situations where a unit has been out of service for j
a long time for maintenance or other repairs, the PUC0 has not removed the generating unit from plant in-service when it is anticipated that-the unit will be returned to service following maintenance or repairs (Tr. 3659, 4066-67). There is also precedent for PUC0 allowing costs to be amortized over a period of time (Tr. 4076). Thus if the Zimmer Station were pennanently shutdown, the Applicants would look toward amortizing the Jndepreciated value of the plant (Tr. 4076-77).
- 97. The Applicants testified that replacement power were Zimmer shutdown could come from their own units and their systems would still have reliable reserve capacity (Tr. 3683,4046,4223-24,4294-95).
. 98.
Considering all the testimony at the hearing, the Board believes the question of accident costs has been adequately addressed.
The Board recognizes that it is not possible to give a precise answer to such speculative questions. The Board recognizes that it must presume a rational regulatory environment in viewing the response to its questions. The Board has not identified any significant deficiency in the response which would demonstrate that the owners of the Zimmer Station could not respond following a hypothetical shutdown or accident.
99.
Based upon the evidence in the record, the Board finds that there is reasonable assurance that the Applicants are financially qualified to complete construction, operate and decommission the Zimmer Station. 'We therefore find that Contention 13 advanced by MVPP has no merit.
BOARD RAISED ISSUES 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, Cost Benefit 100. The Board, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.760a and 10 C.F.R. Part 2 Appendix A paragraph VIII(b), raised sua sponte as an issue whether the operation of Zimmer would comply with Section IID of Appendix I to 10 C.F.R, Part 50 (Tr p. 781). The applicants testified by competent experts that the proposed fac' ity would comply with Appendix I dose levels (Tr.5 2937) and the Staff's qualified expert also so testified (Tr. p. 2967). No other testimony was offered upon the Board's issue and cross examination by the parties and the Board of these two experts only further confirmed their testimony (Tr. pp. 2938, 2947, 2969 and 2971). The Board has concluded based upon its review of 10 C.F.R. Part
. 50, Appendix I and its underlying decision E and the testimony of the Staff expert that it was the Commission's intent that plants in the category of Zimmer be given more latitude than newer plants in meeting the as-low-as-reasonably-achievable-standard. Plants such as Zimer, i.e., those for which an application was filed prior to January 2,1971, are not' bound by the guides on de:ign objectives contained in Section II to Appendix D. E Rather than a limitation on use'of the Annex to Appendix I,-the January 2,1971 date is a recognition that the entire section has no direct application to such cases. However, if a plant can voluntarily meet the design objectives which are intended for newer plants, i.e., Section IIA-C and demonstrate compliance with the Annex to
~
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Appendix -I which is a more stringent demonstration than would otherwise be required, the Board sees no reason why such standards, being more stringent, should not be applicable to facilities such as Zimmer. The demonstration of compliance in the Environmental Report, 95.2, as shown in Appl. Exh.1 and FES 55.4 is an apprcpriate substitute for a demonstration of compliance with the cost-benefit provisions of $11.0.-
NUREG-0389, of which the Board has taken official notice (Tr. 839) and which the Staff witness used as a reference, demonstrates that Zimmer, as well as other facilities of its class, could not achieve a favorable cost-benefit ratio by the inclusion in the radwaste system of all items J_6/ Rule Making Hearing - Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Condi'. ions for Operation to Meet the Criterion "As Law As Practicable" for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled duclear Power Reactor Effluents, CLI-75-5,1 NRC 277 (1975).
1_7f Id. at 292, 328-32.
7
. of reasonably demonstrably technology when added to the system sequentially and in order of diminishing cost-benefit return and is itself a demonstration of compliance with the cost-benefit provisions of Section II.D.
101. The Board sua sponte further raised questions related to whether scheduling of certain operations could result in a favorable cost-benefit ratio. We inquired:
a.
Wita respect to the cost-benefit balance contemplated by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, Section II.D., the Board wishes to be advised whether scheduling of releases from non-continuous sources (i.e., the mechanical vacuum pump and the dry well purge) could effect reductions in man-rem and/or man-thyroid-rem dose to the population reasonably expected to be withia 50 miles of the reactor.
In this context population includes but is not limited to school children; transients should be included. By scheduling of releases, the Board has in nind:
1.
time: day / night for the dry well parge and variation of days (e.g., weekends / weekdays / seasons) for both the dry well purge and the operation of the mechanical vacuum pump.
In other words, in this analysis the parties should take into account the number of people at various directions and distances from the plant site at night versus the day and on waekends versus week days.
(Tr. p. 1428).
102. Applicant's expert testiff ed that accurate prediction of wind speed, wind direction and atmospheric stability which may persist during a given release and the prediction of changes in these factors which actually occur away from the plant over the course of time is virtually impossible (Applicants' Response to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Two Questions Relating to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, following Tr. 2937 (hereinafter " Applicants' App. I Response") at 1-2).
The Board finds that it is not possible to produce a decisional model in e-e, n
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. the real world which could reliably and effectively tell an operator whether to operate the mechanical vacuum pe.ap or drywell purge at a particular time or to wait for some other unspecified given time. Thus, even were it theoretically possible that a positive cost-benefit ratio could be acnieved, it is extremely unlikely or impossibl'e that it would have any application to the real-life operation of Zimmer.
Both the Applicants and the Staff approached our question in a similar manner by bounding the problen and demonstrating that, with respect to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, it is clearly not cost beneficial to attempt to schedule releases from non-continuous sources under any reasonable set of assumptions. The Staff calculated that there could be a cost beneficial hold up of the dry well purge for 20 seconds, an insignificant hold up time, and probably not possible of being implemented in the real world.
(Staff testimony page 4, following Tr
- p. 2967).
Inasmuch as the Board requested that the cost-benefit balance as established by the Commission in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, Section II.D be a frauework for evaluating the ef ficecy of scheduling non-continuous releases of gaseous radioactive materials, the values of
$1,00) per total body man rem and $1,000 per man thyroid rem were utilized as required by the Commission's rule, and the methodology described in Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1 and population estimates for the year 2010 were used in a conservative manner to cciculate the population dose resulting from the non-continuous release of gaseous materials (Applicants App. I Response at 3-5; Tr. 2938-42, Staff response at 4, Tr. 2967).
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. 103. The population wheel within 50 miles of the Zimmer Station is highly skewed, with the total population and the calculated population dose duninated by the Cincinnati area (see FES, Fig. 2.1 and page 2-3; Applicants' App. I Response at 3; Tr. 2939-40). This area lies between twenty and thirty miles from the ' Station in the NW and the NNW sectors.
Of a total estimated population cf the ares for the year 2010 of 2.4 million people, approximately 1.6 million people are estimated to reside in these sectors (Applicants' App. I Response at 3).
If a significant reduction in population dose could be potentially realized from the scheduling of non-continuous releases, it would be when the wind blows in the NW or NUW sectors immediately before these releases were otherwise scheduled. The maximum potential reduction in population dose would result if one waited for extreme shifts in direction and atmospheric stability Class A so the total calculated man rem dose would be minimized (Applicants App. I Response at-3-4; Tr. 2943-44, 2948 and Staff Response at 4, Tr. 2967).
104. Han rem and man thyroid rem doses resulting from mechanical vacuum pump and drywell purge releases have been calcul? tad by both the 4
- Applicant and Staff.
Under the most unfavorable meteorological conditions, a calculated population dose of 6 man rem by immersion and an inhalation dose of 3.0 man thyroid rem would be experienced. This condition could occur 0.46% of the time. Similarly, under most favorable meteorological cu..ditions, the calculated population dose is 0.008 man rem by imaersion and 0.00' man thyroid rem by inhalation (Applicants App. at I Response 5-6).
Using the guidance of the cost-benefit balance of 31000 per man rem or man thyroid rem, and as the
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benefits from scheduled releases are additive, a conceivable (but extremely unlikely) benefit would then be $8,988 (Id.). Similarly, the benefit in dollars for the drywell purge dose is 5462 (Id. at 6).
In order for these benefits to be realized, an extreme shift in both wind direction and meteorological stability must take place; the wind direction cust shift froa a SE wind to a NW wind, and the stability must go from a stability Class G to a stability Class A.
Shifts less than these will produce correspondingly smaller benefits (Id. at 6). As the Staff expert pointed out, the optinua reduction in population dose is when the wind blows over the now closed itoscow Elementary School, but this would increase individual doses in the Moscow area although re6:cing the total population dose.
2.
If a reduction in population dose may be achieved by one or more of the scheduling methods referenced above, either alone or in co.nbination, the Board wishes to be further apprised of the cost thereof; in doing an esticate with respect to dry well purge, the parties may wish to segregate purges which may be rescheduled with little or not difficulty or expense from those where greater difficulty or xpense is entailed.
(Tr. 1423-29).
105. The mechanical vacuun pump is used during startup to remove noncondensible gases from the main condenser. A delay in mechanical vacuun pump operation to allow for shifts in meteorological conditions would therefore cause a delay in plant operation (Tr. 2972-73). The cost of such a delay would depend priaa-ily on whether the power required to replace the Zinner output could be supplied by units on the Applicants' generating systems or whether the replacement power would have to be purchased froa other utility systems (Applicants' App. I Response at 7).
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. 106. The Applicants calculated that if replacement power could be supplied by other units on the Applicants' generating systems, the estimated fuel cost penalty (i.e., the cost of generating replacement electricity utilizing more costly fuel) associated with a one day delay in plant operation would be $169,138. The estimated cost of a one day delay in plant operation if all replacement power is purchased from other utility systems is $960,000 (Id. at 7).
107.
If the one day delay cost of $169,138 associated with utilizing other units on the Applicants' system is used together with the methodology of Section II.D. of Appendix I, the cost of each minute of delay in startup would be $118.
If the 9 man rem reduction was converted to dollar:: by multiplying by $1,000/ man rem, it can be seen that even in the extreme case presented, the Applicants could possibly delay only 76 minutes if it could be assured that the extreme change discussed above would occur.
(The Staff calculated an 85 ninute or less delay. Staff response page 5).
If the power was purchased, a wait of only 14 minutes would be cost beneficial in the extreme case discussed (Applicants App. I Response 7-8).
l 108. The Staff testified, utilizing sbilar methodology, that the most favorable conditions to lower the population man thyroid rem dose would be to wait until the wind blew in the direction of the Moscow Ele-mentary School (Staff Response at 4, Tr. 2967). However, the cumulative l
l frequency of occurrence of wind blowing in such general direction is 2.2". or 8 days per year for Stability Class A.
In addition, the Appli-cants' study revealed that it would take 152 hours0.00176 days <br />0.0422 hours <br />2.513228e-4 weeks <br />5.7836e-5 months <br /> for the wind to go from the northeast to the southeast and from G stability to A (Tr. 296).
I
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. 109. The Board finds that scheduling releases from the dry well and mechanical vacuum pump, if possible, would make an insignificant contribution to reduction of radiation expected to be received by the population in the area of the Zimmer facility.
110. The Board finds that schedul:ag of releases according to time and wind direction is not practical because of the small cost-benefit time frame, because of the small frequency during which very favorable wind conditions occur to benefit from the scheduling and because of the small magnitude of the reduction of the population dose to be achieved by such scheduling and the comparative small magnitude of the reduction to natural background (see Staff Response at 5; Tr. 2964). Considering these facts and recognizing that there does not appear to be any benefit of scheduling releases either on a day or night basis (Tr. 2970-71),and recognizing the flexibility of operation contemplated by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, the Board finds that no limitation in operation beyond that presently contemplated by Appendix I for inclusion in the Technical Specifications is appropriate.
Pressure Testing of Doors 111. During the prehearing conference, an affidavit executed by Robert Anderson, an ironworker who was employed to install and pressure check watertight doors at the Zimmer site, was submitted to the Board.
The affidavit stated that 10 watertight doors leaked between the concrete and t.
' eel angle which was imbedded into the concrete so that the door frame could be hung during the course of a pressure test conducted by the contractor (Affidavit of Robert Anderson attached to the Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding the Pressure Testing of
50 -
t Doors, following Tr.1643 (hereinafter "Vcndel Pressure Testing Testimony")).
112. Pursuant to our authority as set forth in 10 C.F.R. 92.760a this Board raised as a serious safety matter the allegations contained in Mr. Anderson's affidavit and requested the Staff to present evidence upon this matter.
113. Tne NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E"),
investigated the Anderson allegations. Based upon this investigation, it was determined that the pressure test witnessed by ifr. Anderson was only a contractor proof test and not a license quality acceptance test.
Subsequently the door frames were successfully repaired utilizing an epoxy plastic material. At the time of the initial inspection, some but not all of the quality acceptance tests had bean successfully performed (Vandel Pressure Testing Testimony at 1-2; Tr. 2198-2200). Subsequently, I&E conducted a followup inspection, whereby it witnessed the final testing of the doors. Three of four doors tested passed the leak rate test. Necessary repairs will be made to the fourth door to correct two pinhold hold leaks and the necessary followup leak testing to verify adequate repairs undertaken (Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding Pressure Testing of Doors and the Use of Improper Bolts for the Traveling Screen following Tr. 3140 (hereinafter "Vandel Door and Bolt Testimony")
at 1 and Inspection Report 50-358/79-23 appended thereto at 5-6).
The Board has concluded that no safety problem exists or ever existed. The Board considers this matter to have been adequately resolved.
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. Nuts and Bolts for the Traveling Screen 114. During the hearings held in June 1979, an affidavit was submitted to the Licensing Board alleging that stainless steel nuts and bolts were not ' sed in the installation of the " drag line" as was required. Again the Board raised this as an issue pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 92.760 and this item was reviewed by the I&E during a site visit on July 17-20, 1979.
It was establisned that " drag line" is the terminology used by the affiant for the set of traveling screens installed in the water intake structure at the site, a non-safety related piece of equipment. This class of equipment is usually not inspected by the NRC. lionetheless, the stainless nuts and bolt concern was reviewed by the f4RC inspector who determined that stainless steel cap screws and lock washers were used in the installation as specified by the manufacturer and that no installation errors regarding substitution of material occurred (Vandel Door and Bolt Testimony at 2 and Inspection Report 50-358/79-23 appended thereto at 4-5).
The Board considers that this matter has been adequately resolved.
Alleged Electrical Deficiencies 115. MVPP submitted to the hearing board on June 29, 1979 an l
affidavit of an electrician who alleged that during the course of his employment at the Zimmer site he had observed problems and/or possible problems in seven areas. We again exercised our authority pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.760a and raised this matter as a Board issue. Thereafter the worker was interviewed by I&E and a site visit arranged. As a resul?
of its investigation I&E determined that while some of the worker's alle-l gations related to safety components, they had been previously identified
l 52 -
and analyzed by the i4RC or by the Applicants or by both. The flRC con-cluded that the identified concerns were being adequately resolved by the Applicants (Direct Testimony of Jack Hughes and Thomas E. Vandel Regarding Electrical Deficiencies, following Tr. 3116 (hereinafter " Staff Testimony Regarding Electrical Deficiencies") at 1-6 and Inspection Report flo.
50-358/79-19 (hereinafter " Report 79-19")) appended thereto.
116. The Board admitted the Staff Testimony Regarding Electrical Deficie.cies only as it related to Contention 14. While the Board admitted the remainder of the document for the purpose of showing that the Staff performed the investigation as requested by the Licensing Board, it has reviewed the document and concludes that the Staff has satisfactorily resolved the allegation.
(Tr. 3117).
117. With regard to those portions of the affidavit relevant to Contention 14, it was established that contrary to the affidavit's allegations, the National Electrical Code does not apply to the Zimer facility. The applicable limitations are (1) FSAR commitment (Section
- 8) that tray fill will not exceed 60% of cross sectional area, (2)
Sargent & Lundy specified limitations of volume fill, forty pounds of cable per square foot (FSAR, Section 3) of cable tray maximum and allowable thermal heat (ampacity) of eighty watts per linear foot of tray maximun. S&L selected 33 computer s ile rou.ing points known to be the worst loading cases for designer review.
Ir addition the NRC inspector observed and randomly selected 20 other points for review, i.e., cable trays which appeared to be heavily loaded trays (Tr. 3118).
The ilRC inspector reviewed the results of the designers calculations g
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. regarding the above stated limitations and verified the designer's j
determination that in only one instance the percent cross sectional area fill for a non-safety reltted tray exceeded 60%; however, no other instance of the limitations being eneeded (Tr. 3127-30). The single instance of overfill in a non-safety related tray was being corrected.
It was determined that the worst condition for volume fill (identified by the S&L review) is one tray that is loaded to 36 lbs/sq ft, the worst condition found of the NRC inspector's random sample was 29 !bs/sq ft, with the overall average in the neighborhood of h the 40 lbs/sq ft. The ampacity worst case was found to be 48 watts /ft, well below the allowable limitation. The results of the Staff's seismic hunger loading review was essentially the same as for the cable trays and no problems were found (Staff Testimony Regarding Electrical Def!ciencies at 5-6 and Report 79-19 at 6-8).
118. The question of the addition of side rails on cable trays was raised during the cross examination of the Staff witnesses as well as the practice of laying the cabler on a random basis rather than laying the cables down in neat rows (Tr. 3125).
E.en if side rails are added to cable i
trays, the 60% fill limitation fr r cross sectional area is still based upon the original cross sectiora! area (Tr. 3124-25). By randomly laying the cables there is additional void space which permits a better dissipation of heat buildup (Tr. 3133-34). The random placement has no adverse effects on safety (Tr. 3136-37). Moreover, this type of fill does not affect the use of Kellum grips discussed previously (Tr.
3129-31,3135). The Board finds that the additional evidence raised nothing to affect its conclusions regarding Contention 14.
-. - -. ~ ~.
. Grinding of Control Rod Velocity Limiter 119. As a result of an affidavit given to the Licensing Board the Board requested that the staff review the control rod velocity limiters.
An inspection was conducted by the Staff regarding the grinding of a chamfer in the upper corner of the control rod velocity liuiter at 1e Zimmer Station, the alleged problem. The modification was rec ~ ~ red to eliminate potential interference between the control rod and the fuel channel during the end of its insert travel. The workman executing the affidavit was interviewed by I&E to assure that his concerns were fully understood. The workman's concern related to metal chips allegedly left ins.1? the control rods. These chips had been generated during grinding done in late February 1979 to remove an oversized weld in the control rods.
The affiant informed the I&E investigator that he was satisfied with the pregrinding cleaning job done to remove metal shavings left by the manu-facturer (Direct Testimony of Federico A. Maura Regarding Metal Chips in Control Rods Following Tr. 3497 (hereinafter " Maura Testimony") at 1-2).
120. The records of the modification, which was performed during the period of February 21-23, 1979, were reviewed by the NRC inspector who also interviewed Reactor Controls, Inc., General Electric Co. and licensee personnel involved in the performance of the modification.
Based upon the records and interviews, the Str.ff inspector determined that 80 control rods required grinding of a chamfer in one or more corners of the velocity limiter; all such modification work was done with the control rods in the vertical position; durirg the work, the corner holes and lower holes in the sheath were covered with tape or i
shim stock; polyethylene was used to cover approximately the lower
.~
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. 3 to 4 feet of the blades (Id. at 2-3).
121.
The NRC inspector reported that Reactor Controls, Inc. and licensee personnel at the job claim no one inforced then that netal chips had entered the sheath holes during the codification. They also stated the chips treveled away from the blade due to the position of the blade and grinder, and they personally did not see any chips in the blades after the codification was completed and prior to reinstalling t'~ blades in the reactor (I',at 3).
122. At the request of the ilRC inspector, a acckup of the grinding was made using a stainless steel 3 x 3 inch channel, half inch thick.
Using the saae grinder, burring tools and techniques used during the
' "'ification the inspector determined the direction of travel of um.,.a i particles.
In addition, the metal being removed was collected to determine the size of the particles (ftaura Testinony at 2; Tr.
3501-02). Based upon such test the inspector concluded that most particles traveled at an angle away from the blade with a few particles traveling in the near vertical direction and no particles traveled in the dire". ion of the blade (Tr. 3518-20); and the largest particle found was a, proximately 4 inch long x 3/64 inch wide. The thickness was a few mil i. 11ost particles were the size of sugar grain particles (Id. at 3-4).
123. Based upon analysis of this matter, it was determined that there is no heat transfer problea even if enough metal chips succeed in blocking the flow path between the absorber rods and sheath (Tr.
3502-05). However, relatively large chips trapped between absorber rods and the sheath, in the area where the control rod experiences the highest
-rm
~,
1 l neutron flux exposure, could possibly generate small cracks after the absorber rod becomes less ductile (Maura Testimony at 4-5, Tr. 3508-09, 3513-14, 3521-22, 3524-25). ' No safety problem exists because leaching 10 of B C through wall cracks does not occur until after 50% local B 4
burnup exists (Maura Testimony at 4-5 and attachments B and C thereto, Tr.3510-12,3526).
124. The design life of a control blade is defined as the time when its calculated reactivity worth has decreased by 10% of its 10 original value. This value is equivalent to an average B depletion over the upper one fourth of the blade, of 34%. This considers boron leaching. The safety significance of the boron loss shutdown capability and scram reactivity was evaluated and has been detennined to be negligible (Maura Testimony, Id. at 5; Tr. 3528).
125. Based on review of the modification records, interviews with personnel who performed the modification, the results of the mockup of the grinding done on the blades, the results of up-to-date studies regarding B C leaching through cracks in the stainless steel tubing of 4
l the control blades, the conservative specification of the design life of l
the control rods (Tr. 3530-31), and the steps being taken by the NRC to l
continue monitoring this situation (Tr. 3531-33)., it was the NRC Staff
(
conclusion that any chips which may be left in the control rod blades at Zimmer Station do not represent a safety concern. The Board concurs.
III.
FINDINGS OF FACT i
l 126.
In an operating license proceeding, the Board is authorized only to decide the issues in controversy among the parties (10 C.F.R. 12.760a and Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Section VIII) and those l
l
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. matters specially raised by the Board itself.
In this u ser, the contentions have placed in issue the general subjects of cable tray manufacture, control rod design and manufacture, fire protection of cable trays, financial qualifications, emergency planning and
~
environmental monitoring. The Board itself raised issues of compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix C, Scheduling releases from dry well purge and mechancial vacuum pump, certain matters of financial responsibility, nuts and bolts on the traveling services, pressure testing of doors, grinding of control rods and certain alleged electrical deficiencies.
127. Based upon the entire record of this proceeding, including but not limited to all documents received into evidence and all testimony given during the hearings, this Board makes the following findings of fact.
1.
Radiation emanating from the spent fuel pool at the Zimmer facility will meet the design objectives of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix I (Board Order, June 4,1979 page 13).
2.
[ Reserved for disposition of Contention 2].
3.
[ Reserved for disposition of Contention 3].
4.
[ Reserved for disposit'on of Contention 4].
5.
The Moscow Elementary School has been closed and therefore Dr. Fankhauser's contention number 6, that 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix I dose levels will be exceeded at that school is moot l
(See paragraph supra).
6-9.
[ Reserved for contentions 7-10 which will go to hearing later].
10.
There is a need for the power to be produced by the Zimmer facility within the time frame of its proposed operation after completion of construction and thus will be an adequate supply of nuclear fuel for its aperation (Summary Disposition of l
' contentions 11 and 13 with consent of the parties.
(Board ruling, Tran. script page 445).
- 11. There is reasonable assurance that the applicants will be financially able to construct, operate, and decommission the Zimmer Facility (paragraph supra).
- 12. Cable trays as manufactured and installed are capable of perfonning their intended function (paragraph supra)..
- 13. Control rods for the reactor core have been properly manufactured and inspected and met the applicants size specification (paragraph supra).
- 14. The velocity limiter seals upon the control rods which are used when the reactor is shut down have been properly designed, mai.ufactured and inspected so that there is reasonable assurance that they will adequately perfonn their intended function (paragraph supra). There is no~ damage to the public health and safety due to occlusion of the seals.
- 15. Fire insulation material (Kaowool) has been properly designed and successfully testet so that it will protect electrical cables as required by the NRC Staff. We further find that the material will not oxidize (paragraph supra).
16-34. [ Reserved for contentions 18-32].
- 35. The proposed facility will be able to operate in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I (mragraph supra).
- 36. Scheduling releases from the mechanical vacuum pump and purge of the dry well are impractical and would not be cost-beneficial in terms of reducing population dose levels (paragraph supra).
- 37. The water-tight doors described in the affidavit of Robert Anderson were properly installed by CG&E and inspected by the NRC and those doors should perfonn their intended function (paragraph supra).
- 38. Nuts and bolts installed upon the traveling screen, non-safety equipment, are made of stainless steel and are adequate for their intended function (paragraph supra).
- 39. The deficiencies in loading of cable trays with power cable alleged to exist by Donald P. Blanch have been investigated by NRC's office of I&E. We find these allegations of Mr. Blanch I
te be without basis (paragraph supra).
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Conclusions of Law 128. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact which are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's Rules of Practice, and upon consideration of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding,-
the Board makes the following Conclusions of Law:
1.
The Zimmer facility will meet the design objections of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I insofar as radiation is emitted from the spent fuel pool (Board Order, July 1,1970).
2.
There are no present requirements to provide training to local populations through which spent fuel will be transported (Board Order July 18,1980).
3.
There is no evidence to support i1VPP's allegation that the facility will not be needed to provide a source of power to the Applicant's grid or that these will be an inadequate source of fuel for the facility.
4.
The requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 51 have been met.
5.
The requirements of Section 102(2)(A), (C) and (E) of the National Policy Act have been met.
6.
The Board has thoroughly considered the basis of the analysis and evaluation set forth in the Final Environmental Statement, which weighed the environmental, economic, technical, and other benefits against environmental costs and considered available alternatives [ pursuant to the direction 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix A, Sections VIII(b)(7) and VIII(c),
respectively], and concludes that the foregoing Findings of i
Fact concerning the issues in controversy in this operating license proceeding and changes in circumstances since issuance of the construction permit which have been addressed in this Initial Decision do not tip the cost-benefit balance against issuance of the operating license for the Zimmer Station.
The evaluation includes our assessment of the FES, of the applicants' compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, of the evaluation of the health effects of coal generation facilities versus nuclear generation facilities, and of the Commission's final interin uranium fuel cycle rule,10 C.F.R. Part 51.20(e) (Table S-3) as it applies to the Zimmer Station.
In reaching its conclusion, the Board considered and decided all matters in controversy among the parties, and independently considered the final balance among conflicting factors contained in the record of this proceeding.
c
>. 7.
Having considered and decided all matters in controversy among the parties related to operation -the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized t' make such additional findings on uncontested issues as n y be necessary to determine whether or not to issue a full-term operating license for the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Stat. ion and if so upon what conditions.
8.
This decision shall not become effective until the l
requirements of Appendix B,10 C.F.R. Part 2 have been fulfilled.
ORDER 129. WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Jirector, Office of Nuclear Regulation, is authorized upon making requisite findings with respect to matters not enbraced in this Initial Decision in accordance sith the Commission's regulations, to issue to Applicants an operating license for a term of not more than forty (40) years, authorizing operation of the Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station at steady state power levels not to exceed 2436 megawatts thermal; such license may be in such form and centent as is appropriate in light of such findings, provided that such license is consistent with the conclusions of the Board herein.
l 130.
In view of the Commission's Rules of Practice limiting the loard's jurisdiction in a contested operating license proceeding, the Board has made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on matters actually put into controversy by the parties to the proceeding as specially raised by this Board. As required by the Commission's Regulations, the NRC Staff will inspect the Zimmer facility prior to 4 suance of any operating license to determine whether it has been constructed in accordance with the application, as amended, and the provisions of the construction permit.
In addition, the license will not be issued until the NRC Staff has made the findings reflecting its
,. review of the application under the Atanic Energy Act, which will be set forth in the proposed license, and has concluded that the issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security and to the health and safety of the public. Upon issuance of the license, the Applicants will be required to execute an indemnitj agreement as required by Section 170 of the Act and 10 C.F.R.140 of the Cannission's Regulations.
13.1.
Exceptions to this Initial Decision may be filed within ten (10) days after service of this Initial Decision. A brief in support of the exceptions sh611 be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter [ forty (40) days in the case of the NRC Staff]. Within thirty (30) days of. the filing and service of the brief of the Appellant [ forty (40) days in the case of the Staff] any other party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the exceptions.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman 1
Dr. M. Stanley Livingston, Member Dr. Frank F. Hooper, Member Dated at Bethesda, Maryland i
this day of 1981.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
CINCINNATI GAS AND ELECTRIC Docket No. 50-358 COMPANY,etal.
(Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power
)
Station, Unit No. 1
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED EINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER.IN THE FORM 0F AN INITIAL DECISION in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, 4
through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 9th day of June, 1981.
Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Timothy S. Hogan, Jr., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Board of Commissioners U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 50 Market Street, Clermont County Batavia, Ohio 45103 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Frank F. Hooper John D. Woliver, Esq.
School of Natural Resources Legal Aid Society University of Michigan P.O. Box #47 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 550 Kilgore Street Batavia, Ohio 45103 M. Stanley Livingston Administrative Judge William J. Moran, Esq.
1005 Calle Largo General Counsel Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company P.O. Box 960 Troy B. Conner, Esq.
Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 Conner & Moore 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Soard Washington, D.C.
20006 Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission James H. Feldman, Jr., Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555
- 216 East 3ch Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 David Martin, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General W. Peter Heile, Esq.
209 St. Clair Street Assistant City Solicitor First Floor Room 214, City Hall Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 l
Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 George E. Pattison, Esq.
Mas. Mary Reder Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney Cox 270, Rt. 2 462 Main Street l
California, Kentucky 41007 Batavia, Ghio 45103
, Lawrence R. Fisse, Esq.
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 462 Main Street Batavia, Ohio 45103 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Goard U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- Andrew B. Dennison, Esq.
200 Main Street Batavia, Ohio 45103 i
l d
d r
Charles A. Barth Counsel for NRC Staff
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