ML20004D094
| ML20004D094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1981 |
| From: | Rutberg J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Kaplan D JUSTICE, DEPT. OF |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-A, NUDOCS 8106080358 | |
| Download: ML20004D094 (19) | |
Text
o UNITED STATES g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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JUN 0519815 C June 5,1981 g
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Donald A. Kaplan, Esq.
Chief. Energy Section Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice P.O. Box 14141 Washington, DC
-20044 Attention: Robert Fabrikant, Esq.
Re:
In the Matter of Cincinnati Gas
& Electric Co., et al. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), Docket No. 50-358A
Dear Mr. Kaplan:
I am enclosing for your review and comment, pursuant to Section 105(c)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's rules thereunder, a draft evaluation, entitled "Zinmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1:
NRC Staff's Analysis of Whether CSOE's Acquisition by AEP Constitutes A 'Significant Change' Requiring A Further Antitrust Review." The NRC Staff previously (in 1977) reviewed the application for an operating license for this facility to determine whether any significant changes in the activities or proposed activities of the licensees (Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, Dayton Power & Light Company, and Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company) had occurred since the antitrust revims conducted at the construction permit s tage. At the time, the Staff concluded that no significant changes had occurred that warranted an antitrust review at the operating license stage.
In reaching that conclusion we consulted infonnally with the Antitrust Division and the vivision concurred in our finding. The further analysis which we have undertaken is limited to a consideration of whether American Electric Power Company's acquisition of Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company has or will result in a significant change in the activities of CSOE.
Since construction of this facility is presently estimated to be completed by late 1981 and since our present procedures require that we offer sixty days for requests for reevaluation of our proposed finding, we request that you provide any comments the Division may have on our prtoosed finding as soon as possible.
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If you should have any questions, please contact Steve Lewis on 492-8655.
Sincerely q
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.J$sephRutberg Assistant Chief Hearing.
Counsel / Antitrust Counsel
Enclosures:
As Stated i
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m ZIM ER NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 NRC STAFF'S ANALYSIS OF WHETHER CSOE'S ACQUISITION BY AEP CONSTITUTES A "SIGNIFICANT CHANGE" REQUIRING A FURTHER ANTITRUST REVIEW INTRODUCTION On May 10, 1975, the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CGE),
Colunbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company (CSOE), and The Dayton Power
& Light Company (DPL) tendered their joint application to obtain an operating license 'for the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (Zimer 1). The operating license for Zimmer 1 is presently expected to be issued in late 1981.
By statute the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is required to determine the need for an antitrust review of each operating license application on the basis of whether "significant changes in the licensee's activities or proposed activities have occurred subsequent to the previous [ construction permit] review by the Attorney General and the Commission."M Based upon procedures in effect at the time of the operating license application submittal, the NRC staff conducted an internal reivew of the antitrust information and concluded "that changes in the Applicants' activities occurring since the construction pernit antitrust review do not represent significant changes that would now warrant another antitrust review at the operating license stage."U y
Section 105c(2) of the Atonic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 6 2135(c)(2)).
2/
Hemorandum of November 28, 1977, from Argil Toalston, Antitrust and
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Indennity Group, NRR to I. Peltier, Licensing Project fianager (hereafter referred to as Memorandum), p. 8.
l L.
At the construction pennit stage of Zimmer 1, the Cities of St.
liarys and Piqua, Ohio siid the American Municipal Power-0hio, Inc. ( A!!P0),
a planning. entity then representing 30 Ohio municipal electric-systens, s
filed intervention petitions principally seeking the procurenent and use of power from Zimmer.
Negotiations were undertaken between Applicants and the petitioners regarding participation in Zimmer.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 105(c)(8) of the Atomic Energy ActU and consistent with the recommendation of the Department of Justice, a construction pemit was issued for Zimmer 1 prior to completioa of these negotiations and of the Department's and staff's antitrust review.
The construction pernit was conditioned to provide that a post-construction pennit antitrust hearing could be held (which would detemine reasonable tenas of onditions for participation of petitioners in Zimmer 1) if Applicants a
petitioners were unable to reach agreement and that the construction pennit could be continued as issued, rescinded, or conditioned on the basis of the findings made in such proceeding.
Subsequently, the petitioners withdrew their petitions to intervene stating that they had no further interest in the proceeding.
The Commission thereaf ter deleted the antitrust condition from the construction pemit.
y 42 UCS 6 2135(c)(8).
This section provides that for a construction permit application on file at the time of enactment of the provistor, (which includes Zimmer 1), the Commission may detemine, after consultation with the Attorney General, that issuance of the construction permit is necessary in the public interest to avoid unnecessary delay.
i The NRC staff's review of whether any "significant changts" had occurred since the construction permit antitrust review was conducted in 1977 and concluded, as' noted above, that there were no such changes warranting another antitrust review. The staff did, however, note the pendency before the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") of an application under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 USC 9 79, et. seq.) by Anerican Electric Power Company, Inc. ("AEP") to acquire CSOE.
In 1973, an initial decision had been rendered by the Administrative Law Judge presiding over that proceeding which had denim the application primarily upon the basis of competitive considerations and an inadequate showing that savings would result.O At the time of the staff's review the matter was under appeal to the SEC, but a decision had not yet been rendered. The staff was interested in the possible impact of the acquisition on the competitive situation in Ohio, should the application be approved by the SEC.
Subsequent to the Staff's "significant change" review, the SEC reversed the initial decision and approved the acquisition.
By its Opinion of July 21,1978,N the Commission found that the proposed y
In the Matter of Anerican Electric Power t,o.,
Inc., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1476, Initial Decision (July 20,1973),pp.
95-98, 147.
y In the Matter of American Electric Power Company, Inc., (HCAR No.
20633), a copy of which is Exhibit No. I to a letter of December 22.
1980 from W. S. White, Jr., Chainaan of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of AEP, and B. T. Ray, President of CSOE, to Jerome Saltzman, then Chief of the Utility Finance Branch, 'IRC.
This document will hereafter be referred to as " Opinion."
4-acquisition met all of the standards of the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
Among others things, the Commission concluded that the acquisition "will not burden or impair competition to an extent which will contravene the public interest standard stated in the Act."N A significant factor in reaching this conclusion was a proposed settlement which had been reached among the municipal systens which had been opposing the acquisition and AEP.
Among other features, that settlement would afford the municipals the possiblity of access to large-scale generation and supplementary coordination services.U In the SEC's view the proposal would (1) allow the municipal systems to attain econonies of scale and (2) lessen concentration of control of the utility industry in Ohio.E The SEC conditioned its ultimate approval of the acquisition, however, partly on the executing of a contract between AEP and the munir.ipals which would reflect the settlement pr0posal.E Subsequently, on May 1,1979, AEP, Ohio Power Company (an AEP af filiate), CSOE, and Af1PO entered into a coordination agreement. E By order of February 13, 1980, the SEC issued an order approving the acquisition of SCOE by AEP.b y
Id. at 392.
1 y
Id. at 378.
y Id. at 393.
y
.Id.
10f Exhibit No. 2 to the December 22, 1980 letter.
g In the Matter of American Electric Power Co., Inc. Supplemental Memorandun and Order, (HCAR No. 21433) (hereaf ter, " Supplemental Memorandum") a copy of which is supplied as Exhibit flo. 3 to the December 22, 1980 letter.
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. On the basis of the SEC's approval of AEP's acquisition of CSOE, the NRC Staff published a " Notice of Supplementary Antitrust Review cf Operating License Application."E That notice invited comment on whether the acquisition would result in a significant change in the activities or proposed activities of CSOE.E No coments were received in response to the notice.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE CRITERIA The Commission's criteria to be employed in making a "significant change" detemination are set forth in a decision issued in the operating license review for the Summer E acility.
A finding that a significant f
change nas occurred requires "that the change or changes (1) have occured since the previous antitrust review of the licensee (s); (2) are
-12/ 45 Fed. Reg. 75398 (November 14,1980).
The Commission's procedures now call for publication of such notice and for solicitation of coaments from the public. The Commission has delegated its authority with respect to "significant change" deteminations to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguads, as appropriate.
" Delegation of Authority to Make 'Significant Change' Determination for Operating License Antitrust Review" (September 12,1979). These procedures are reflected in a proposed rule which has been published by the Commission for comment.
" Implementation of Commission's Delegation of Authority to Detemine Whether There Have Been Significant Changes in Operating License Applicant's Activities or Proposed Activities Since the Construction Pennit Antitrust Determination,"
46 Fed. Heg.18747 (March 26,1981).
_1_3/ AEP has not become a co-helder of t;a construction pemit for Zimmer 1 and an applicant for the operating license by virtue of the acqui si tion.
14/ South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. and South Carolina Public Service Authority (Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), CLI-80-2811 NRC 817 (1980).
reasonably attributable to -the licensee (s); and (3) have antitrust implications that would likely warrant some Commission remedy."E The Commission further expl&ined criterion 3 as involving the following two inquiries:
"(a) whether an antitrust review would be likely to conclude that the situation as changed has negative antitrust inplications, and (b) whether the Commission has available renedies."N In applying the three criteria to the Zimmer OL application staff confines the present analysis to AEP's acquisition of CSOE and other events related thereto. Other changes subsequent to the CP antitrust review were the subject of the staff's earlier OL evaluation.
The changes wrought by the acquisition have clearly occurred after the ant.itrust review conducted at the construction permit stage,'thus satisfying the Commission's first criterion.
Looking at the acquisition and the coordination agrecaent with AMP 0 together, it is clear that these changes are, at least in part, inputable to CSOE and the second criterion is thus also satisfied. The analysis, therefore, turns on whether the acquisition, when considered in conjunction with the 1979 coordination agreenent, has antitrust implications that would likely warrant sone Commission remedy.
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS I
Market Characteristics of Potentially Affected Utilities AEP's acquisition of CSOE most direcity affects, of course, the behavior of the participants ther.selves.
In addition, however, the Id., 11 NRC at 824-25.
N Id., 11 NRC at 835.
. acquisition may also affect the competitive posture of other electric entities with 'whom CSOE does business or who may look upon CSOE as a potential supplier or purchaser.
As reported to FERC in 1979, CSOE sells at wholesale to two' electric utility companies (Ohio Edison Company
("0E") and Ohio Valley Electric Corporation) and foer municipalities and has " Interchange Power" transactions with Ohio Power Company, DPL, CGE, andOE.b Three of the four municipal customers of CSOE belong to Al1PO, the only exception being the Village of Glouster, which purchases approximately one megawatt from CSOE.30/ Since Ohio Power is an affiliate of AEP, the nature of its transactions with CSOE will, of course,' be altered by the acquisition.
A descrip! ion of the market characteristics of the participants and other potentially affected entities follows.E AEP, the acquiring firm and a holding company, serves parts of seven states with a total generation capacity of over 17,000 ftw.
Ohio Power Company, the AEP's largest affiliate, controls over 11,600 Mw of generation capacity and 6,300 circuit miles of transmission lines.
Although heavily coordinated with other AEP affiliates, Ohio Power maintains several major interconnections with large adjacent utilities,
,/
17/ Exhibit No. 9 to the December 22, 1980 letter.
/
J_8/ Id; infornation supplied to NRC Staff by Af1P0 in February 1981.
It 8
is our understanding that Glouster could join AMP 0 if it detenained to do so.
1_9/ Unless otherwise indicated, the sources for the following data are 9
1979 Forms 1 and 12 for each utility filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and Electrical World Directory of Electric Utilities, 1979-80.
including CSOE, CGE and DPL.
..; well as providing retail service to over 600,000 customers, Ohio Power also supplies wholesale power to nine municipal electric systems and one generation and transmission cooperative.
CSOE, the acquired firm, supplies retail power to over 450,000 customers in and about the city of Columbus, Ohio and provides wholesale power to four municipal electric systems, as noted above.
CSOE also -
controls approxinately 3,10011w of generation capacity and 1,600 circuit Miles of transmission lines and is interconnected with and virtually surrounded by facilities of AEP subsidiaries.
In addition, CSOE,'along with CGE and DPL, fonned the Columbus, Cincinnati and Dayton (CCD) power
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pool for the primary purpose of capturing the economies of scale of large uni ts.10/ Thus far, the CCD members have placed in operation six large generating units.b CGE and DPL are similarly fully integrated electric utilities f
priuarily serving urban areas.
CGE owns approximately 3,800 ftw of generation capacity and serves over 500,000 customers, including about six utilities at wholesale.
DPL accounts for nealry 2,700 of generation capacity and supplies power to over 400,000 retail customers and 14 wholesale customers.
In addition to co' ordination with CSOE in the CCD pool, CGE and DPL are also interconnected with Ohio Power and OE.
5 Rural electric cooperatives and municipal electric utilities comprise the remainder of the potentially affected electric entities.
All of i
20/
_0 pinion, at 377.
0 21/
Id.
i l '
Ohio's 28 cooperatives are members of Buckeye Power, Inc. (Buckeye), a generating ann of the distribution cooperatives.
Buckeye came into existence in 1968, at wh'ich time it purchased one of Ohio Power's 600 Mw generation units at the Cardinal Station.
Since then, the load of Buckeye members has grown to over 800 f1w, sufficient to support the installation of an additional 600 Mw unit at the Cardinal Statfor E CSOE does not, have any rural electric cooperative customers, although it does transmit power to nembers of Buckeye.
Many of the municipal electric systems in Ohio are members of N1P0, an organization fomed to own and operate generation and transmission facilities. _ Of the 51 municipal system members of Af1P0,14 own generation capacity, totaling 700 ftw.
Ohio Power and CSOE supply power at wholesale to 7 municipal members of Af1PO.
Some 30 other municipal systems in Ohio do not belong to Af1P0 and only one of these possesses any notable generation capacity (57 Mw).
Instead, nearly all purchase wholesale power from one or another of the state's private utilities.
Ohio Power and CSOE supply 6 non-members of N1P0.
Effects of the Acquisition The competitive effects of an acquisition are properly assessed in terms of a relevant market, with both geographic and product dimensiota, For the purpose of naking a significant change finding, staff believes it appropriate to concentrate the analysis on the market that usually has been the main focus of study in previous proceedings, the bulk power 22/
Id.
d.
supply market.
This market encompasses the full range of coordination services as well as wholesale power. The choice of bulk power supply as the' relevant product market has two bases:
(1) a general recognition exists that bulk power markets are much more potentially competitive than retail markets; and (2) retail power costs are a function of bulk power costs, so that it is more in order to study the role of competition at the bulk power level.
The geographic bounds of the market considered encompass the areas served by CSOE and by those electric entites with which it transacts business. We have also considered in our analysis the extent to which CSOE's wholesale customers may have regarded Ohio Power as a bulk power supply alternative, an option which the acquisition has necessarily foreclosed. We have grouped potentially affected utilities into three categories:
(1) rurcl electric cooperatives, (2) the other CCD systems (CGE and DPL) and (3) municipal electric systems.
1.
Rural electric cooperatives As mentioned previously, Ohio's electric cooperatives fonned Buckeye in 1968 and assumed ownership of a 600 ik unit at Ohio Power's Cardinal Station.
As part of the coordination arrangement worked out with Ohio Power, the co-operatives were assured access to back-up power and to Ohio Power's transnission system for transmitting the power to the cooperatives.13/ Subsequently, another 600 Mw unit has been placed in operation by Buckeye.
23/ Opinion, p. 5.
The apparen', ;uccess of this coordination arraagement is just one factor which prompts staff to conclude that the acquisition has not adversely affected the competitive position of the cooperatives.
A second factor is that even prior to the acquisition, CSOE, as well as Ohio Power, was offering transmission services to Buckeye for the purpose of transporting power to members of Buckeye. b 2.
CCD pool members By acquiring CSOE, AEP has potentially changed the nature of coordination relationships between CSOE and the other CCD members, CGE and DPL, and in so doing, may also have adversely affected competition between the CCD utilities and AEP.
AEP itself has stated that in order to achieve the objectives of the acquisition, "the planning and operation of bulk power supply fa.:ilities... must be done on an overall AEP system basir"E and that steps have already been taken "to permit the operation of CSOE's generation capacity and its ' ulk transmission as an integral o
part of the AEP system." E For its part, the SEC has found that the competitive position of the CCD utilities will not substantively change as a result of the acquisition.2_7/
In the SEC's view, even a CCD pool including CSOE would E/ Response of CSOE to Question 9 Information Requested from the Attorney General, April 15, 1971.
15/ December 22, 1980 letter, p. 6.
5
_2_6/
Id., p. 7.
6
_2_7/ Opinion, p. 19.
l.
not produce the economies available from the' AEP sysem and, as a result, the pool could not credibly expect to close the gap ~ in costs between it and.AEP.E The staff, in attempting to arrive at a judgment on this natter, directed a series of questions to AEPE.and conducted conversations with knowledgeable personnel from CSOE, CGE and DPL.
In its response AEP indicated that the acquisition of CSOE "is not expected to change, in any way the existing close working relationship among CGE, CSOE and DPL"E I
and has not given CSOE a larger proportional vote in the deliberations of the CCD comnittees.
For their part, CGE and DPL feel that together they can non build economically sized fossil units.
It was understood, by CGE at least, that CSOE would not havn built additional fossil units jointly with CGE and'DPL, even if it had not been acquired by AEP.
Yet, the sharing of futu.re nuclear units among AEP, CGE, and DPL has not been ruled out.
The acquisition also is not expected to affect operational coordination among the utilities since interchanges of power have always-occurred under bilateral contracts, not under the pool agreement.
Based primarily on these responses the staff concludes that the acquisition will not adversely affect the coordination opportunities of DPL and CGE, or their ability to achieve economies of scale and compete in bulk power markets.
28/
Id., pp. 15, 19.
g 'Letthe from Jerome Saltznan, Nuclear Regulatory Comm4sion, to E. A.
Bor!r.an1, The Cincinati Gas and Electric Company, November 19, 1980.
30/ December 22, 1980 letter, p. 5.
3.
Municipal electric systems Aside from the possible implications of the acquisition for the coordination relationship among the CCD utilities, the primary focus of the effects of the acquisition has been on the competitive position of municipal electric systems in Ohio.
As noted above, CSOE sells at wholesale to four municipalities.
Three of these municipaliites will benefit from the access to large-scale generation and to coordination services made possible by 1979 Coordination Agreement.
CSOE would also undertake obligations to municipal systens outside' its service territory by virtue of the terns of the Agrecment.
An understanding of the role played by the Coordination Agreement in improving the competitive posture -
of the Af1P0 members requires a review of aspects of the SEC proceeding.
In August 1972, prior to the initial decision, AMPO joined with AEP, the City of Orrville, Ohio, and the Ohio Municipal Electric Association (0 MEA) in a proposal to the SEC that the acquisition be approved subject to certain conditions.E Subsequently, in April 1974, AMP 0 and Ohio power Company entered into an interconnection agreenent ("1974 interconnection agreement") providing that Ohio Power would render transnission service, energency service, short-tern service, and limited term service to AfiP0 and that Ai1PO in turn would offer emergency service, 31/ Appendix No. 4 to the " Coordination Agreement among American tiunicipal Power-Ohio, Inc., Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company, Ohio Power Company, and American Electric Power Company, Inc.," p. 2.
(The Coordination Agreement is hereafter referred to as the "1979 Coordination Agreement").
4,
short-tem service, and limited tern service to Ohio Power.E Utilizing the 1974 interconnection agreement AMPO has acted as a broker in the sale of power to Orrville and arranged a seasonal power exchange between
. Buckeye and the Cities of Cleveland and Hamilton.E The cain coordination option lacking in the 1974 interconnection agreement was access to generation, but this void was filled with the execution of the 1979 Coordination Agreement.
Under the agreement, AMP 0
-could elect to either (;) purchase one or two previously planned units (Poston fics. 5 & 6) from CSOE or (2) arrange, with cooperation and support from CSOE and Ohio Power, to construct generation facilities with capacity between 600 ftw and 1,300 flw at another site.24/ AEP has recently advised AMP 0 that it is discontinuing construction of Poston flo.
5 and Poston flo. 6 and is extending the decision date for Af1P0 to exercise the first option to June 30,1981.E The most recent information available to the Staff is that Af!P0 does plan to acquire Poston flo. 5 and flo. 6.E 32/ Agreement between American Municipal Power-0hio, Inc., and Ohio Power Company, April 1, 1974, Appendix 1 to the 1979 Coordination Agreement.
33/ Appendix flo. 2 to the 1979 Coordination Agreement, Article 1, Section 0.05; and telephone discussions with George Crosby, AMP 0, February 9-10, 1981.
34/ 1979 Coordination Agreement, Article One, Section 1.3.
35/ Letter from W. S. White, Jr. AEP to George Crosby, A!!P0, December 5, 1980.
36/ Telephone discussions with George Crosby, Af1P0, February 9-10, 1981.
In addition to the generation alternative, the 1979 Coordination Agreement also assures AMP 0 of back-up power for Poston flo. 5 and No. 6 and power del 1very. E further, to cover the period between the purchases of the generating units and the date of commercial operation, the Agreement provides that A!!P0 may buy as much as 200 Mw from Ohio Power's Gavin Plant.E Thus, AMP 0 seems to have achieved a wide range of coordination options through the 1979 Coordination Agreement and the 1974 interconnection agreement.
The Staff has been made aware of certain difficulties encountered by AMP 0 in wailing itself of the generation option conferred by the 1979 Coordination Agreement. E These' difficulties arise from the vote of the Ohio electorate against a constitutional amendment which would have enabled the legislature to designate AltP0 a political subdivision with the power to issue bonds on a tax-exempt basis. b Despite the difficulties, NtP0 still feels the purchase of Poston flo. 5 and flo. 6 37/ 1979 Coordination Agreement, pp. 31-45.
38/ Supplemental Memorandun, p. 2.
3_9/ Telephore conversation with George Crosby, A!!PO, February 9-10, 1981.
M The proposed constitutional amendment appears as Appendix No. 7 to the 1979 Coordination Agreement.
The parties to the Agreement were obligated to use their best efforts to secure adoption of this amendment (Article Three) and Af1P0 has indicated that the companies did support adoption.
Telephone conversation with George Crosby, AMP 0, February 9-10, 1981.
y
-is economically and technically feasible.$. AMP 0 has indicated to Staff and AEP that it believes alternative financing and legal' arrangements are possible.42f ' In any event, the SEC in approving the acquisition noted that the 1979 Coordination Agreement was not dependent upon passage of the proposed constitutional amendment and that the agreement has apparently satisfied the rests of the Ohio municipal electric systems.E We conclude that the acquisition of CSOE by AEP, when viewed with AEP's offer of coordination services, does not adversely affect the competititve posture of municipal systems which are members of AMP 0.
CSOE and AEP have stated that they do not expect the acquisition to affect CSOE's policy with respect to its wholesale customers, nor its coordination activities.b The municipal customers of CSOE (including the Village of Glouster) should not, therefore, be adversely affected by -
the acquisition.
CONCLUSION Since the initial operating license antitrust review of the Zimner 1 application was completed in 1977, th'e SEC has approved the acquisition of CSOE by AEP.
The staff has exanined the effect of the 4_1/ Discussions with Geerge Crosby, AMP 0.
42/ Id. ; See letter from W. S. ' White, Jr., AEP, to George Crosby, AMP 0,
- p. 2.
g ' Supplemental Memorandum, p. 3.
44/ December 22, 1980 letter, responses to Questions 2 and 3.
acquisition upon the coordination and competitive relationships among CSOE and its n2ighboring electric entities and, in addition, has reviewed the recent coordination agreenent entered into by AtiP0, AEP, CSOE, and Ohio Power.
In the staff's view the acquisition does not adversely affect the competitive or coordination posture 'of rural electric cooperatives, CGE or DP.
The staff is further of the opinion that the acquisition has not detrimentally affected the coordination and competitive position of municipal electric systems and that the 1979 Coordination Agreement possesses the potential for improving the competitive stance of such utilities.
Therefore, the staff has concluded that the acquisition does not have any antitrust inplications that would likely warrant some Commission remedy and, as a result, does not represent a significant change in CS0E's activities that would warrant another antitrust review at the oeprating license stage.
I