ML20004C665
| ML20004C665 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1981 |
| From: | Fouke R CITIZENS FOR FAIR UTILITY REGULATION |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106040437 | |
| Download: ML20004C665 (16) | |
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Docket Nos. 50-445 ; ' M 2 6198f , 7g TEX AS UTILITIES GENERATING S COMPANY, ET AL. S 50-446 or,g, S 0~g;p a s.r.
5 (Application for U (Comanche Peak Stream Electric N Station, Units 1 and 2) S Operating License) ,
CFUR'S RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF'S SECOND SET OF INTERROG ATORIES TO AND REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM INTERVENOR CFUR AND SUPPLEMENT TO ANSWERS TO NRC STAFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO AND REQUEST TO PRODUCE FROM CFUR COMES NOW CFUR, one of the Intervenors in this proceeding, and files this Response to NRC Staff's Second Set of Interrogatories to and Request for the Production of Documents from Intervenor CFUR and Supplement to Answers to NRC Staff's First Set of Interrogatories to and Request to Produce from CFUR.
gfyR requested an extension of time to answer until May 22,1981 and received such an extension from the Staff and the Hearing Examiner.
To a large extent, complete answers to many of Applicants' Interrogatories are dependent on CFUR receiving proper discovery from the Applicants. Since CFUR has not been able to propound all necessary discovery to the Applicants and since the Applicants have been largely evasive in the discovery completed, CFUR reserves the right to further supplement its answers as may be required by subsequent developments. Additionally, due to the changes in regulations, charges in the configuration of CPSES and the lack of proposed technical specifications from the Applicants, CFUR may require further modification of its answers.
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s ANSWERS , Cl-2 Ability to make sound technical judgments with respect to the activities authorized by the operating IIcense. These technical judgments would include the ability to make sound technical decisions with respect to: Q) selection of proper equipment; (2) every deviation, discrepancy, violation, infraction, noncompliance and un'esolved item which occurred during construction, procurement and design; (3) selection of proper architect-engineer; (4) choice of design alternatives; (5) choice of operating procedures; (6) choice of maintenance procedures;
.(7) all deviations, discrepancies, violations, infractions, noncompliances and unresolved items which occur during operation and maintenance; (8) degree of' construction and checkout completeness prior to first
. . attempted. operation; (9) operating alternatives concerning system conditions (normal and/or otherwise);
(10) choice of training requirements; (11) performance of analyses of conditions of equipment; (12) performance of analyses of possible and/or on-going accidents and transients;
- (13) evaluation of technics; accuracy of reports; Q4) -determination of appropriateness and completeness of reports in order to insure that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public.
l
O Cl-3 ,
"CFUR's First Set of Interrogatories to Applicant And Requests to Produce,"
dated February 26,1981. The answer to question 17 appears to supply the information sought by the Staff, but the answers are sworn to be true of Homer C. Schmidt's own knowledge except as to matters therein stated on information or belief. The answers do not identify those matters stated on information and belief. CFUR would also bring to Staff's attention that Contention I states: Applicants have not demonstrated technical qualifications to operate CPSES in accordance with 10 CFR S 50.57(a)(4) in that they have relied upon Westinghouse and other entitles to prepare a portion of the -Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The thrust of the contention is that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate technical qualifications. The fact (now admitted to by the Applicant) that Westinghouse and other entities have supplied portions of the FSAR serves as sufficient reason to recognize that thu thrust of the contention bears looking into. However, other factors enter into the contention that the Applicants have not demonstrated, technical qualifications. A review of the above-noted document dated February 26,1981 will serve as an explanation of this additionti consideration. Cl-5 A true and complete answer to each of the interrogatories in "CFUR's First Set of Interrogatories to Applicant and Requests to Produce" with following actions will identify specifically which ways the Applicants have failed to demonstrate technical qualifications in accordance with 10 CFR S 50.57(a)(4). CFUR will supplement its answers after the Applicants fully respond to CFUR's Interrogatories. Specificity is not possible until that time. Cl-10 (a) From 10 CFR S 50.34(b) The final safety analysis report shall include information that . . . presents a safety analysis . . . and shall include . . . : _ . _p
e (2) . . . description shall be sufficle'.it to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to safety evaluation; (4) a final analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of . . . with the objective . . . (10 CFR 50.34(a)(4)) of assessing the risk to oublic health and safety resulting from operation of the facility . . . temphasis added) Also, the name " Final Safety Analysis Report" implies that purpose concerns safety. (b) The FSAR does at identify principal contributors to its preparation. Applicants' answers to Staff questions do not identify principal contributors. The Staff is conducting oral interviews with Gibbs & Hill and/or Westinghouse concerning the FSAR. (c) To CFUR's knowledge, the NRC Staff is not mentioned in statutes, regulations or regulatory requirements. (d) Since the Staff is not mentioned, no. (e) If an operating license is issued based solely on information supplied in application: 10 CFR S 50.40(a), (b), (c) and 50.57(a)(2), (3), (4) and (6). (f) Source of information supplied is not identified. Assurance of
" App'lican'tsT ~gualificdion'is
~ indet'erminate.
(g) CFUR's proposal rectification has been supplied in answer to Cl-7. (h) In the event that NRC Commission accepts portions of the FSAR whose principal contributor is one of the companies mentioned as proef of compliance with 10 CFR 50 or any other statute or regulation, CFUR does contend that such company must be licensed for that purpose. Basis is to ensure technical and financial qualifications including the necessary insurance to cover possible losses. (i) The Appilcant is responsible M toto for operation and maintenance, not Westinghouse , Gibbs & Hill and/or Brown & Root. (i', Not determined at this time. (k) From 10 CFR S 50.57: W G
L (a) An operating license may be issued . . . upon finding that: (4) The applicant is technically . . . qualified to engage in the activities authorized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter. From 10 CFR S 50.40: (a) The processes to be performed, the operating procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications, or the proposals in regard to any of the foregoing collectively provide reasonable assurance, that the applicant, will comply with the regulations in this chapter, including the regulations in Part 20, and that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered. (b) The applicant is technically . . . qualified to engage in the proposal activities in accordance with the regulations in this chapter. Cl-11 (a) Appheant necessarily preparing all portions impinging upon operation and/or maintenance. In the event that Applicant has failed to, supply other portions not related to operation and maintenance, verify accuracy and content as well as the financial capability to ensure that the public will be compensated for any potential loss. .. .... . . (b) Applicants have failed to comply with mandates of 10 CFR SS 50.34, 50.40 and 50.57. (c) Plain meaning. (d) See Cl-11(b). Cl-12 (a) As explained in Cl-10(c), the Staff is not mentioned in statutes and regulations. CFUR would assume that the Commission would delegate duties to the Staff. CFUR contends that the Applicants have demonstrated technical l qualifications and that in order to be able to issue a license and comply with the regulations referred to, it is necessary to conduct an extensive investigation into every aspect of the Applicants' technical qualifications. (b) Plain meaning.
- l (c) The quaHfications referred to in 10 CFR SS 50.40 and 50.57.
(d) See Cl-11(b). (e) Common usage. (f) In the interest of fairness, a full and fair presentation of all aspects of the licensing process should be made to the Commission. Cl-13 (a) Yes. (1) No. There are no qualification requirements listed for headquarters staff personnel in TUGCO. Resumes of people currently in TUGCO have been suppikd, but these people may not be around for the profected 40-year life of CPSES--or next year for that matter. The only qualification listed for TUSl headquarters staff personnel is as follows: The Manager, Nuclear Services, shall have a minimum of a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering or the Physical Sciences, and have a minimum of ten years experience in powerplant design, operation or related activities, including five years in a responsible managerial position. The Manager of echnical Support shall have a minimum of a _ __ . __ __. . Bachelor's Degree in Engineering and six years experience in power plant operation and/or design. The TUSI technical staff are competenent in technical matters related to plant safety and other engineering and scientific support aspects. In the event that the staff specialists need assistance with specific problems, the services of qualified individuals shall be engaged as appropriate. (FSAR, pp.13.1-19) Once again, resumes of people currently in TUSI have been supplied, but there is no guaranty how long they will '>e around. No mention of a qualified Shift Technical Advisor could be found as specified in proposal 10 CFR S 50.34(f)(IXI). (ii) CFUR considers compliance with RG 1.70 inadequate and thinks that it is very unrealistic to plan to be able to obtain the services of qualified Individuals. Even in the event that total compliance with RG 1.70, 1
. - j
S 13.1, is obtained, CFUR does not consider that compliance io be a demonstration of technical qualifications. (iii) See answer to Cl-2 and 10 CFR S 50.40. C 2-7 The term " conclusions" refers to final decisions, reasoned deductions or reasoned inferences, both prospective and retrospective in nature. Taken in context with the statement "thus conclusions based upon these computer codes are invalid," the term " conclusions" refers in particular to prospective reasoned deductions or inferences reached from use of the computer ' codes which would lead to erroneous final decisions. The conclusions CFUR is most concerned with are those to be made by the Hearings Examiner in regard to compliance with 10 CFR S 50.57(a). - However, CFUR does not acknowledge the validity of any conclusions, retrospective or prospective, based on computer codes incorporating reports not suitably verified- and formally accepted--whether they are secret NRC Staff conclusions or otherwise.
~ C2-10 (a) " suitably or fittingly establish the truth, , accuracy, validity, or genuineness of." Basis is in dictionary.
(b) " meeting at least the minimum requirements for proof of the facts." Basis is in the dictionary. (c) (1) To ensure validity, controlled tests or experiments are conducted. These tests or experiments must be evaluated to determine their accuracy in comparison to actual occurrences (accidents, incidents, etc.) (2) It is often considered desirable to attempt to create those circumstances which reflect the most severe conditions when conducting the M 4 6 6
test or e:periment. It is necessary to determine the accuracy and level of confidence associated with this attempt. (3) A simulation (use of computer codes) of the test or experiment is often attempted (in part to simulate more varied conditions than that tested; in part to simulate different configuraticm) variations of whic;. are used in the regulatory process. It is necessary to deurmine the accuracy of these simulations in coraparison with actual occurrences which is a function of both accuracy of simulatfor. In comparisen to test or experiment and the accuracy of tes' or experiment in comparison to actual occurrences. In addition, accuracy of interpolation and/or extrapolation is an . Important contributor to overall absolute accuracy. (4) When one simulation is used to test a separate simulation, the absolute accuracy is a function o f all the above accuracies plus their variances.
" Approval made or done in accordance with procedures that ensure validity"
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entails explicit determination of 'al1 tile' fai: tors before indicating approval.
- -(d) - See C2-10(c).
C2-11 (a) " Proper conditions" means those conditions which represent the most severe conditions. (b) "All abnormal conditions" specifically means all those conditions l ! considered in the regulatory process which are other than normal. (c) "All physical results available" specifically means actual occurrences and tests or experiments as used in answer to C2-10(c). 1 (d) "High degree of confidence" would be 99E The number which CFUR contends has not yet been determined. S @
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(e) " Properly introduced" means mathematical manipulations of variable with distribution functions that may or may not be the same type in a correct manner. (f) " System" means that which is being simulated; typically, the nuclear station being operated and maintained. (g) CFUR contends that the ose of such reports is to obtain an operating license. (h) See answer to C2-10(c). (1) From 10 CFR SS 50.34(b)(4) and 50.34(aX4): A final analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components with the [ objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility and including determination of (i) the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the facility, cnd (ii) the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and mitigation of the consequences of accidents] and taking into account any pertinent information developed since the submittal of the preliminary safety analysis report. C2-12 . ,_ . . . , _ . , (a) 10 CFR S 50.57(a) states:
... . an operating license may be issued by the Commission . . . uoon finding that:
(1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity with . . . the rules and regulations of the Commission. (emphasis added) which includes 10 CFR S 50.34 as quoted in C2-11(f). "Uoon finding that" means that a fact finding based on the preponderance of the affirmative, clear and convincing evidence presented in support thereof. (b) See also responses made in this set of answers. C2-13 (a) CFUR contends that there are safety consequences as a result of the failure to suitably verify and formally accept the computer codes and reports used S S in construction of computer codes for the CPSES/FSAR. Basis.is 10 CFR S 50.57(a) in conjunction with 10 CFR S 50.34,10 CFR S 50.36 and 10 CFR S 50.40. (b) Not applicable. (c) In the absence of verification, unsubstantiated claims which may be in error are possible.
.(d) Those " safety conclusions" referred to in 10 CFR S 50.57(a).
CF2 , The requirements for barely sufficient evidence to enable a contention to be admitted is not as extensive as the requirements for barely sufficient evidence to support a hearing. But evidence submitted to enable a contention to be admitted may exceed the barely sufficient evidence necessary to sustain admittance. In such a case, the evidence could well be .itrong enough to additionaHy support a hearing. Enclosure 1, pages 9 through 12, of " Report of CFUR's Position on Each Contention," April 10,1950, documents CFUR's basis to the extent of the following: The TMI-2 small-break LOCA ' contained the following significant
- ' '~
~; iarametersi
- 1. Operator Errces
- 2. Maintenance Errors
- 3. Equipment Failure of Secondary Nature
- 4. Multiple Failures
- 5. Hydrogen Generation in Excess of Regulatory It is further established that insofar as human actions are concerned, it is necessary to model the actions that could be expected over the 40-year life of the plant in contrast to actions expected in the near term when the concerned individuals will have been just subjected to the intensive training.
m 8 The credibility of the possibility of transients with TMI-2 type parameters is also established which dictates that they be considered within the category of design basis accidents.
"CFUR's Partial Substantive Objections to Applicants' Statement 'of Objections," July 23, 1980, further documents that NUREG-05"8 mandates that "further analyses of transients and small LOCAs are needed," and that "more and a different kind of analysis (in contrast to FSAR Section 15) accident anstyses is needed..."
There are 39 separate representatives initiating events listed in the Standard Review Plan, Revision 3. Some, but not all, of these events have been analyzed in Section 15 of the FSAR--those that have been deemed to be the most severe, but the TMI-2 parameters were not considered in this choice. When human actions are considered, the possibility of human error during a small break LOCA becomes more significant, especially when majority logic interpretation of instruments is expected (Task I.A.2.1, NUREG-0"37). The modified computer codes mast be tested to obtain a measure of absolute accuracy of the calculated values with respect to some recognized standard such as the small-break LOCA sequences tested with Semiscale and/or LOFT. The margins of safety (e.g., if operator had waited an additional length of time, the allowable cladding temperature would be exceeded) are required to be determined. A final analysis . . .with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility and including determination of (i) the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated du-ing the life of the facility, and (ii) the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents . . . and taking into account any pertinent information developed since the submittal of the preliminary safety analysis report. (10CFR S 50.34(a)(4) and(b)(4)) The final safety analysis report shall include information that . . . presents a safety analysis . . . of the facility as a whole, and shall > M O include . . . evaluation . . . to show the safety functions win be accomplished. (10 CFR S 50.34(b) and (b)(2). C 3-4 Absolute accuracy is accuracy as measured from a reference that must be specified. "CFUR's Third Set of Interrogatories to Application and Requests to Produce" is CFUR's first attempt to obtain answers as to accuracy of specific codes in present form from the Applicant. Status of these codes will be applied to Staff. C3-5 IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic's Terms. C3-11 See response to C3-2. C3-33 (a) Those variables representing the characteristics of multiple failures, consequential failures, failures of a secondary nature, operator errors and/or maintenance errors. - (b) A set of simultaneous equations containing controllable exogenous variables. (c) Basis is restatement of previous bases. C3-34 (a) "PORV" means that valve variously referred to as power-operated relief valve, pilot-operated relief valve, pressure-operated relief valve, motor-operated relief valve and electromatie valve which open at a pressarizer pressure below system design pressure and allows steam to be piped to the pressurizer relief tank. (The Staff is well aware of this answer; this question is an example of pure harassment.) (b) Those events analyzed in Section 15 of the FSAR as well as all other accidents and transients analyzed as a result of TMI. W O (c) That condition where a!I thermal /hyd aulic/neutronic phenomena are stable. (d) Commonly understood definitions. C3-35 . Not able to accept the parameters which proved to be significant at TMI-2. C3-36 CFUR contends that these computer codes have been supplied for the purpose of obtainir.g an operating Ilcense. C4-33 througin C4-40. CFUR is unable to proceed at this time with responses to Staffs Interrogatories addressed to Contention 4. C7-3
" Safe Shutdown Earthquake" as defined in 10 CFR S 100 Appendix A.III.c and
" Operating Basis Earthquake" as defined in 10 CFR S 100 Appendix A.III.d. CFUR does not understand the Staff's contention that "10 CFR Fart 100 does not define the term 'scismif disturbasces," as that term is used in Contention 7.
. c 7-21_ _ . _ . __
See Applicants' answers to questions 2a and 2b of CFUR's Second Set of Interrogatories to Applicant dated April 28,1981. C7-22 Not yet determined. C 7-23 (a) George Clancy and C. A. Thetford, ex-employees of Brown and Root. (b) Richard Fouke and Betty Brink,1980. C 9-3 Some radioactive releases will result from normal operation, and it cannot be ruled out that some will result from transients, accidents or incidents.
@ 4 C 9-4 There is no reason that CFUR can think of for assuming that there will be ef fects of radioactive release on the general public only at the exclusion boundary.
CFUR does not know what the Staff is asking. C 9-6 These transport mechanisms detailed in "AIRDOS-EPA: A Computerized Methodology for Estimating Environmental Concentrations and Dose to Man from Airborne Release of Radionuclides," Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, TN, December, 1979. C9-15 (a) f rom 10 CFR S 50.40: In determining that a license will be issued to an applicant, the Commission will be guided by the following considerations: (a) . . . collectively provide reasonable assurance that the applicant will comply with the regulations in this chapter including the regulations in Part 20 and that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered. (b) Yes. C9-16 ,_ _. . _ . From 10 CFR S20.l(c):
. . . persons engaged in activities under licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission . . . should, in addition to complying with the requirements set forth in this part, make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures, and releases of radioactive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is reasonably achievable . . .
C9-17 (a) Implication that only Commission regulations governing release of radioactive materials during normal reactor operation is contained in 10 CFR 1 5 50.36a and Appendix I to 10 CFR Pa-t 50. (b) Part 50 is not directly related to the current scope of Contention 9. l (i) Yes. - (ii) Within limiting conditions, yes. (Ili) The regulation as stated in 10 CFR S 20.1. CERTIFICATE I declare (or certify, verify or state) under penalty or perjury that the preceding Answers to NRC Staff's First Set of Interrogatories To and Request To Produce From CFUR are true and correct. Executed on this 22nd day of May,1981. [y Richard L. Fouke Respectfully submitted,
. 0 Richard L. Fouke N
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,CERTIFIC ATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing CFUR's Response to NRC Staff's Second Set of Interrogatories to and Request for the Production of Documents from Intervenor CFUR and Supplement to Answers to NRC Staff's First Set of Interrogatories .to and Request to Produce from CFUR has been forwarded to all parties and counsel of record this 22th day of May,1981 by first class mail.
Valentine' B. Deale, Esq., Chairman Mrs. Juanita Ellis Atomic Safety and Licensing Board President, C ASE 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 1426 South Polk Street Washington, D. C. 20036 Dallas, Texas 75224 Dr. Forrest J. Remick, Member Mr. Dwight H. Moore, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board West Texas Legal Services 305 E. Hamilton Avenue 100 West Main Street State College, PA 16801 Lawyers Building Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Dr. Richard Cole, Member David J. Preister, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Environmental Protection Division Washington, D. C. 20555 P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 Marjofie Ulman Rothschild, Esq. Jeffrey I. Hart, Esq. Office of Executive Legal Director 4021 Presect: Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. . . Dallas, Texas 75219 Wash.ngton, D. C. 20555
- Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq. Arch C. McColl, III, Esq.
Debevoise & Liberman 701 Commerce Street 120017th Street, N.W. Suite 302 Washington, D. C. 20036 Dallas, Texas 75202 Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 [g/hJQ
,/v N W' d Y C Richard L. Fouke CFUR 1668B Carter Drive Arlington, TX 76010 (214) 265-8723 -!'
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