ML20004C586
| ML20004C586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1981 |
| From: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| To: | Smith I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106040300 | |
| Download: ML20004C586 (8) | |
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Dear Mr. Smith-It has recently come to my attention that you received testimony on February 18 with regard to the question of reporting of information during the accident at TMI-2.
The hearing transcript indicates some uncertainty as to whether the Interior Committee majority staff report, Reporting of Information Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island, is a draft or final report.
The report with page 247 dated Janaury 29, 1981 is final.
While some revisions may be.made as the report goes to press, the conclusions as stated on page 247 will remain unchanged.
I commend this report to your attention.
In order that my own position on this matter be clear I will reiterate a statement I made to the NRC Commissioners on the occasion of a hearing on February 24 before the House Interior Committee's Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment-Let me comment quickly on the matter of reporting failures that occurred during the episode at Three Mile Island.
These failures could have resulted in unnecessarily large radiation exposures to the public if a major radiological release had occurred on March 28, 1979. During the period l
when the NRC and State of Pennsylvania were given inaccurate L
and misleading information, the actual conditions at the plant were such that there was substantial risk that a major radiological release would occur.
Yet, the Commission was in the dark for more than two days a.s to the severity of the accident.
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5 This is something that we, along with other investi-t gations, looked.into with great depth, and I frankly do not like what has been revealed.
The reporting failures called.into question the fundamental premise on which we are told that the regulatory framework is founded, and-that premise is that licensees will voluntarily provide State and Federal officials with information affecting the public health and safety.
It seems to me that you would have considered that one of your primary responsibilities
[was to get to the
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bottom] of why the reporting failures occurred but the NRC and staff showed little inclination to do so.
After considerable prodding from our and the Commission eventually did conduct an investigation which led to action by the Commission majority which makes little Sense to me.
In my view, your statements and the report prepared by~
the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have had the effect of obscuring the issue.
The result is to cast odoubt on your ability to confront difficult issues and to be even-handed in your regulatory decisions.
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I am also enclosing herein statements with regard to this matter made at the February 24 hearing by members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
i Sincerely, MORRIS K. UDALL I
Chairman f
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NAME: HIIO55010 PAGE 1
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5 HEARINGS ON Tl!E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6
AUTHORIZATION FOR TISCAL YEARS 1982 AND-1983 7
TUESDAY, TEBRUARY 24, 1981 8
U.
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9 Subcommittee on Energy the Environment..v./ h-and
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15 Tha subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, in room 1324 16 Longuorth House office Building, commencing at 9:56 a.m.,
17 Honorable Morris K. Udall (Chairman of the Full Committee, 18 and of the subcommittee on Energy and the Environment) 19 Presiding.
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3199 PAGE 135 Island which had l
the responsibility l
there.
Our l-3200 investigations have shown that a lot of other compar 'es and
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320 1 operators have a much higher level of training and much 1
3202 highor level of sophistication and precautions against 3203 i
accident than other utilities.
i 3204 Is there a large variety or large difference or are 3305 relatively narrow things in terms of equi these j
3206 pment. the abilities of staff, and the people they need 3207 safe reactor?
to really run a f
Or, are they about all the sama 3208 I
in safety?
I guess that is what I am really asking i
3209.
the are same in safety?
they about all Dr. Plessat?
3210-l Dr. plasset.
I would be glad to make a comment and then, 3211 of course, defer to my colleagues.
3212 I think there is a big of different groups or utilitiesvariation in technical capabilities 3213 safoly.
to run nuclear pouer plants 3214 3215 I think that this must be--if I may 3216 be less diplomatic tha perhaps the Commissioners were--why f*
TMI-1 3217 Long.
That organization has has been hanging so shown itself to be 3213 effective, not very and in particular I road the 3219 record of committee your and it brings out i
very clearly 3220 that are a couple things very actonishing.
On the very firs-day of the 1221 accident they were aunte th r. t i
3222 things were not going right, as they could not deal with them because of the 3223 they interposed be tueen interference the safety systems in the plant.
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MAME: HIIO55010 3224 l
They knew the PAGE 136 they only had dry steam attemperatures in the hot leg 3225 were such that that point.
3226 measurements at.thermocouples They made 3227 very high temperatures, measurements in core which indicated i
3228 and once but several times.
they made
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these not 3229 It is kind of incredible 3230 it meant.
to me that It is further incredible to they did not knou what 3231 make a big me 3232; to do about it by that they did not about it.
talking to the I don't understand MRC immediately 3233 this.
at that point.
I sust have to leave it
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1234 The other thing that the hydrogen burn andalso happened on the f 3235 course.
was of
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3236 it seems of them, including though several as day as I mentioned. the station superintendent i 3237 n-the first they hydrogen burn and ye t it didwere aware there had been a 3238 3239 l
with responsible people in th not get discussed in any detail 3240 e NRC.
incredible.
I find that also quite 3241 Ihe chairman.
3242 It really of some troubled me, of the correspondence you r f yes, and we all knou 3243 commen ts ?
e er to.
Dr. Siess?
Any final 3244 Dr. Siess.
You know, 3245 I think there differences in the way pla are clearly nts some
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3246 it's are tun.
t a difference in the I don't knou whether
,I technical skills or differ 3247 the management attitude, but I am ence in 3248 inclined to it is in the latter.
think a lot of pagR BRlBlHA
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HIIO55010 3249 PAGE 137
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-I have soon it related to size i
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,it is the telling factor.
and I can not believe that 3251 We have had
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gotten a lot of publicity, 3 incidents that have i
for example.
3252 them; the TMI. to name one of other 2 occurred in the IVA k
3253 certainly one reactor and the TVA is i
of the biggest and best staffed and b 3254 managed technical organizations ar est 3255 ound.
So I don't think we have =erced in on the 3256 differences but I am sure cause of the there are dt.fferences.
3257 Dr. Mark.
I think I would like to k
3258 add a very cmall comment.
I am not sure
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charitable if'I am more :haritable or less 3259 than Milton.
i I am much afraid, j
3260 with the Three Mile in connection 1
Island peopla.
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3261 of what and what they did not say.
they understood that dumb and I guess I think
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3263 they really were that is maybe less charitabl i
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3263 way but in another i
e, you might say it j
3264 is more charitable.
j I worry about assuming that they understood obvious thi t
3265 clear to overybody else, ngs which were
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Certainly at least a couple days later.
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3166 the HRC people wern 3267 there position to see and they were in a
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things if they had 3268 in gear but their eyes open or minds 7
there is no 3269 there evidence that they did,
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was a hydrogen burn.
although I would have made my I
3270
-assumption that Mr. Miller did not kno own s
i 3271
- burn, u it was a hydrogen i
or that somobody in the back room
.3272 just said, Maybe it's hydrogen.
But I did not get 3273 the feeling that that was going to close a logical switch for him t
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4 NAME: MIIO55010 3274 PAGE 138
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That'is just an emotion, I
3275 a reaction.
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Dr. plasset.
It is clear our Chairma., is mo 3276 I
than the past-Chairman.
re charitable 3277 Dr. Mark.
I am not sure.
But there 3278 plast and you meet this face are differences in 3279 to face at the ACRS uhen come and bring theit they 3280 eun people permit or operating to discuss a construction permit or a problem 3281k just very much in touch with and some.of them are what is needed to 3282 with and in command of it; be in touch v-ndors and saying, and others are calling in their 3233
Well, hay, so and-so is here I don't really know, 3284 Mr.
but from Babcock C Wilcox, 1285 does.
perhaps he 3286 The chairman.
let me rally have touch on one other thing 3287 k
to close the hearing.
then I 3238 of whe ther there I raised a question tnis morning is a valid 3289 an operating reason uhy TMI-1 uhtch uns
- reactor, operating safely in any eventapparently had some history 3290 of
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l down after 2 why'it should still be closed 3291 years?
Is there something l
3292 relationship or would we always
-bout that specia.
close it doun, ti
- is, if 3293 you got a pair of them should i
3294 you always LOCA or severe event close doun one you have a
if 3295 in the other?
Dr. plasset?
9 3296 Dr. plesset.
I think this relates 3297 discussed.
to I think the point
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Just 3298 that both Three Mlle i
represent a management Island-1 and IMI-2 that was incredibly incompetent and i
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even dichonast.
different attitude I think that means that you hav I
3300 ea 3301 towards that license you would towards or re-license than I
continued operation of, 3302 Rancho Seco or Davis-Bessie for example, I.think it's quite different y
3303 1
3304 Dr. Mark.
I think the if in trusted hands, technical features 3305 of that plant.
and in a politically posrible 1
3306 are such that there is no climata.
reason why 3307 have been turned on in the that plant could not 3308 summer of 1979, very real reasons.
except for.these But they~a're'not mechanical 3309-The Chairman.
Gentleman, 3310 the country is you do good work, glad.
and I think as I am, that 3311' you are giving of your time on the job and 3312 at the ACRS and of your time here I thank you for giving today.
We will no doubt have you 3313 here again.
ack 3314 Thank you very much.
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i 3315 The subcommittee 3316 is adjourned.
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Whereupon. at 2:36 p.m.,
3317 the call of the Chair.
the subcommittee adjourned to r
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