ML20004B865
| ML20004B865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/12/1981 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004B866 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-RINV, TASK-SE SECY-81-299, NUDOCS 8106010207 | |
| Download: ML20004B865 (7) | |
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May 12, 1981 3
SECY-81-299 POLICY ISSUE
- bh[gg (Notation Vote) 3 MY 201981 m. !$
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Tht. Commission 4
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From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
PROPOSED TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO HEAVY WATER FROM SWITZERLAND TO ARGENTINA PURSUANT TO 10 CFR PART 810
Purpose:
To obtain the Commission's concurrence in the attached proposed response to DOE.
Review Date:
Under interagency procedures the NRC consultation period does not expire until May ',;.
However, DOE has requested comments by May 11 since, unless the request is approved early, the contract for this equipment may be awarded to a West German firm.
DOE has been formally advised that Commission review may not be completed by May 11.
Discussion:
On May 1, DOE forwarded for review a request for Foxboro to provide a process control system involving U.S. technology to Sulzer. Brothers in Switzerland for ultimate use in a heavy water plant in Argentina (Appendix A). We understand that some other Executive Branch agencies have already provided coments on this request. We also understand that these relevant Executive Branch agencies were advised infonnally in February that Foxboro was considering the submission of this Part 810 request.
NRC, however, was not informed.
CONTACT:
Wm. Upshaw, IP (49-28155) 8106010807
The Commission
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Discussion:
As an argument in favor of approval, the staff notes that TContinued) tha Foxboro equipment is not specially designed for heavy water plant operation and is not essential for the opera-tion of the proposed plant (i.e. the plant could be operated manually, albeit with less efficiency).
Further-more, alternate foreign sounes for the equipment are available and the order will likely be given to a West German firm (Siemens) should Foxboro fail to receive export approval. Another factor in favor of approval is that the export of the heavy water plant from Switzerland will be under the conditions required by the suppliers' guidelines.
The major factors weiching against approval are as follows:
1.
Foxboro's request for an advisory opinion for a similar export proposal was given a negative response by the SNEC in July 1980 because " prospects were dim that Argentina would meet U.S. nonproliferation requirements".
The staff is unaware (1) that any progress has, in the interim, been made in resolving these non-proliferation l
concerns or (2) that U.S. policy toward Argentina has been change.d.
l 2.
The U.S. strongly opposed the Swiss decision to sell the heavy water plant to Argentina withut requiring full-scope safeguards. To now provide assistance to this sensitive facility could be viewed as a reversal of this policy and a sanctioning by the U.S. of such transactions t
without full-scope safeguards in the future.
Switzerland conditioned the sale of the heavy water production plant on the application of IAEA safeguards. Argentina and the IAEA are still negotiating the safeguards agreement which will apply-to this facility.
To the best of the staff's knowledge, the IAEA has not yet fully determined the nature of the l
safeguards regime which it will apply to heavy water production plants. That is, will safeguards on heavy water production plants be modeled after safeguards on UF6 conversion plants, where safeguards are applied only to,the output of the plant, or modeled more after safaguards on fuel fabrication plants, which would include monitorirg production and waste streams in and l
out of the plant? The Executhe Branch has been active in working
The Commission 3
with the IAEA on developing a general safeguards approach for heavy water production plants, and the trend of thinking appears to be that safeguards will follow, but perhaps be less rigorous than, the approach used for fuel fabrication plants. The Executive Branch has asserted that this computer production control system could assist in the application of effective international safeguards.
The staff agrees that the system could assist in safe-guards application; but, without any knowledge of how Argentina intends to use the system, we cannot make any Judgment on the degree to which this system will in fact assist in the application of effective international safeguards.
-Recommendation:
That the Comission authorize the dispatch of the attached response to DOE (Appendix B).
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations Appendices:
A - DOE request dtd 4/30/81 B - Draft response to DOE Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Tuesday, May 19, 1981.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT May 15, 1981, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Secretariat v
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APPENDIX A l
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4 APPENDIX B
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Dear Mr. Griffin:
This is in response to your April 30 letter to Mr. Marvin Peterson of this office co.1cerning the Foxboro request to provide a process control system to Suizer Brothers in Switzerland for end-use in a heavy water plant in Argentina.
The Commission notes the belief of the 00E staff that this export should be approved and has the following comments:
1.
Accepting the assertion in your April 30 letter at face value, namely, that "the Foxboro. application would not have been approved (by the previous Administration) unless Argentina accepted full-scope safeguards," and recalling that Foxboro's request for an advisory opinion for a similar export proposal was given a negative response by the SNEC in July 1980,the Commission is unclear as to what factors have caused this prooosal for a reversal of the Administration's policy in this area. The Commission is also unclear as to what the policy of the new Administration is with respect to approving exports, such as this, to sensitive facilities.
2.
The U.S. strongly opposed the Swiss decision to sell the heavy water plant l
to Argentina without requiring full-scope safeguards.
To now provide l
assistanc,9 to this sensitive facility could be viewed as a reversal of this i
policy and a sanctioning by the U.S. of such transactions without full-scope l
safeguards in the future.
As a general matter, the Commission believes that the precedential implications of a decision to approve the Foxboro application are sufficiently important to have warranted a systematic development of U.S. Lolicy options for classes of 1
Mr. John A. Griffin 2
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exports such as the one in question. To establish U.S. policy by an ajf hoc treatment of individual export applications does not appear to the Commission to be the most judicious way of advancing US non-proliferation objectives.
At the same time, the Commission recognizes the commercial factors that underlie the position of the DOE staff and, particularly, that the process control system is available from another foreign source. These are legitimate considera-tichs that bear on U.S. decisions in cases such as this one.
However, their weight and importance can best be gauged as part of an orderly policy review process in which all factors, including those that formed the basis of the previous Administration's policy, are taken into account.
With regard to the urgency that 00E attaches to this case, the Commi:sion observes that its review would have been facilitated had the Foxboro proposal been brougtJ to the attention of the NRC staff, however informally, at the time concerned Executive Branch agencies were apprised of it in February of this year.
In this connection, Section Sib of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, admonishes the Secretary of Energy to insure that such requests are handled expeditiously on an inter-agency basis and to identify potentially controversial requests as soon as possible.
Sincerely, James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs l
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