ML20004B198

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Mgt Issues.Licensee Has Met Burden of Proof on Mgt Issues Except as Specified.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20004B198
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/15/1981
From:	Adler R PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
NUDOCS 8105270379
Download: ML20004B198 (46)

Text

PA 5/15/;

0 UI!IED STAES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ttGSSION p

EEFCRE 'IEE A'ICMIC SAFE'IY AND LICEBEING BOARD m;*.)

i MAy, 9log,

V:

{(A.

In de theter of

)

J

)

MEIROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,

)

p

)

Docket No. 50-289 fN

/

('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear

)

(Restart)

NQ, -

Station, Unit No. 1)

)

Q C

CCttDIEEALTH OF PESNSYLVANIA'S PROPOSED FINDDIGS OF FACI' ABD CONCLUSI0B3 OF IE ON MMAGDET ISSUES A.

INIRODUCTION AIO EULANATION OF TFE CGIGEEN.!IH'S APPPG.G TO FDODES A!O CONCLUSICIE IN 'IHIS PROCEEDI:n The Cuunur.cealth's general plan of participation in this proceeding was set forth in the "Ca.m.eealth of Pennsylvania's Report en Positicrs Formlated Based en Infer =atic;n Available as of July 25, 1980." In relevant part, de Cm.umealth stated that:

(4) Pennsylvania will adcpt a strong pcsition on all questions of burden of pmf. The general rule established by 10 C.F.R. 52.732 is that 'the applicant er the propenent of an order F2s the o

burden of proef.' Essentially, Petropolitan FZisen is seeking an crder pedtting it to c

bpr restart the Unit 1 reactor. The burden of proof V

thus is clearly en the licensee to decenstrate g)7 U. L,h.h that such an order muld be consistent with the 3,/,My g g M " y public health, safety and interest.

L 12 s

~.w

(.5) The unique status afforded to state agencies by 5274 of the Atccd.c Energy Act and 10 C.F.R. 52.715(c) enables Pennsylvania to reserve 4,/.6,s ; ird '

jMgmmt on any questien of fact er issue of law-on Wich it currently elects not. to adopt a position. Pennsylvania hereby reserves its right to file proposed findings of fact and exceptions and to participate actively in the Cctrissica teview regardless of the positicn it adepts en a particular issue at this stage of the proceeding.5 5.

See In re Gulf States Utilities Co., AIAB-317, Marca 4, 1976, reorinted in 2.TC. REG. REP.

(CG) 'I30, 053.02.

h 8105270 37q d

I

Pennsylvania adopts this position due to its 6

status as a representative of the public interest and its desire to reserve j@ ant regarding issues on which there currently exists insufficient evidence to render a raticral decision.

6.

See In.re E:CG Nuclear Co., Inc., AIAB-447, Dec. 13, 1977, recrinted in 2 WC. FE. REP.

(.CCH) 130, 255 (concurring opinion of Sal:: man, Ma:foer,ASIAB).

In its prcposed findings and ccnclusions en canage:ent issues set forth below, de Cc::ncm:ea:.th takes advantage of its right to adopt positions and "adrise the Ccmnsion" cn a neeber of discrete issues.

42 U.S.C. 52021(1): 10 C.F.R. $2.715(c). R e O m o valth dces not, however, propose findings and conclusions en all relevant canagement issues in the proceeding. We Cuuusealth assu=es that the Staff and de adversary parties will suhrit comprehensive proposed findings and conclusions on canagecent issues.

2e Board should not infer frm the Cu.uasealth's decision to propose findings and conclusions only en ciscrete issues that de Cumaealth has not reviewed de entire record en rar. age ent issues.

Rather, de Ca.uuaealth si= ply elects to exercise its right to a6/ise de Ca:nission en specific ranagement issues en which the Cctrenweald perceives deficiencies that need to be re::edied. Me Board ray infer l

frce this procedure that these are the only defic:.mcies in Licensee's ranagement capabilities that the Ceuwasealth finds need to be recedied.

l In general, the Cuunusealth does finc dat Licensee has =et its burden 1

of proof on canage::ent issues other than those cited belcw. However, l

l l

this does not cean that the Cuuuaealth adopts specific findings and l

l conclusions proposed by any other party. Wreover, the Ccunctuealth 1

l l

reserves its right to participate as a full party on all issues en.

appeal. Gulf State Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 ard 2)

AIAB-317, March 4, 1976, 2 NUC. REG. REP. (CGI) 130,053.1 l

i l

l 1.

'Ihe Cuausealth has participated actively in all phases of this proceeding, this meeting the requirerents stated in AIAB-317. ~

B.

PROPOSED FDDINGS OF FACT AND CDUCUJSIONS OF IR I.

Burden of Proof en Panageent Issues

26. He Board places a very heavy burden of persuasion upon Licensee to derenstrate its maragement capabilities with respect to all caragment issues raised by the carrrnhsion. A similar burden of persuasion is imposed on issues raised in contentions once the interveror has met a threshold burden of production necessary to recuire ceasonable minds to inquire further into the issue.

27. Be general standards for burden of proof en maragement issues was set forth in Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4) Suppleental Initial Decision, July 13, 1979, 2 NUC. REG. REP. (CCH) 130,406:

(F phasis added.)

194. It is, of ccurse, fundamental to Ccemissicn licensing law tbat an acclicant seelc.ng a construction cermit carries the burden of croving that it is entitled to one.

10 C.F.R. 52.732. This is true even stare the issue in controversv has not been raised 'oy tra acolicant. Tennessee Valley Authority (PartswJ.le Nuclear Plant) ALAB-463, 7 lac 341, 356, 360 (1978); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant) AIAB-348, 4 NRC 225, 227-231, 233. The burden on particular issues may be triggered by a shcwing sufficient to recuire reasonable minds to incuire ferther.

Vermont Yani<ee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 486, 55 L.Ed. 2d 460 (1978). With respect to specific issues where the burden is one of persuasion, the magnitude of the burden uoan a litigant to stexa the burden is assianed sFould i

be influenced by the gravity of tre matter in centroversy. Virzinia Electric & Power Cccoany (Dod Anna Pcwer Staticri) ALAB-256, L !aC 10,~

17 n. 18.

195. Ihe maragerial and tecM. ical cualifications to operate a nuclear power plant safely is an issue of the greatest graviev and we place a large 'curden of persuasion upcn the Anolicant to cctwince the Board by a preponderance of the evidence dat it has prevailed cn de issue.

t 9.

28. Re Shearon Harris case involved a construction permit application. Be Board does not believe, however, that Licensee bears ag less stringent burden of proof in this proceeding.

In fact, the Board feels for a nur.ber of reasons that Licensee bears a nure stringent burden of proof in this case.

29. First, the Nearon Harris decision itself stated that "we regard plant operation to require a greater showing of technical qmH #ication and =anagenent capability compared to plant construction."

Id. Be issues in the instant case, of course, involve the ability of Licensee to ocerate the plant safely. Moreover, the nature of the proceeding does not affect the fard-eni principle that the burden of proof is on the utilief to demonstrate that operation cf the plant is consistent with the public haalth and safety. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) AIAB-315, Februaq 27, 1976, 2 NUC. REG.. REP. (CCH) 130,050.

30. Second, and more fundn-entally, cne of the very focuses of this proceeding 2.s to revise potential deficiencies in Licensee's management capabilities raised as a result of the III-2 accident.

In the August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing, the Camission wrote:

"the unique t

circu= stances at til require that additional safety corrcerns identified by the NRC staff be resolved prior to restart. Rese concerns result l

frem...(2) questicas about the managenent capabilities and technical rescurces of Petropolitan Edison, including the i= pact of the Unit 2 accident on these..."

See also id., short-term item 6; March 6,1980 1

1 l

Order (CLI-80-5), slio oo. at 1.

Rese concens arose from the findings of a number of special investigations en the causes of <ie 'B!I-2 i

accident, many of tdtich were critical of Licensee's management capabilities. l - - -

~

See, e.g., Staff Ex. 4, at 2-4; app. A.

These findings i:: pose a parHe"larly heavy burden en Licensee to denonstrate that the deficiencies in Licensee's canagement capabilities have been recedied.

II. Add 4Hd TrafMm Recuireents

31. In additicn to short-term items 1(e) and 6 in the August 9, 1979 Order and !btice of Hearing and items 1 and 2 in the March 6,1980 Order, a tu ier of contentions were acmitted relating to de adequacy of Licensee's persemel training progra=s:

SHOLLY CONIENITON 14(b)

The Licensee's caragement capability, in ter=s of organizational, stafhng, and technical capabilities, is not sufficient. Specifically, the following deficiencies in Licensee's =aragenent capability are centended:

(b) Licensee's cperations and technical staffs are not sufficiently qualified to safely operate DE-1.

AA!ODT CIQ2iTICN BD. 2 It is contended that HE-1 should rce open until the pe-for=ance of licensee technicians ar.d manage:ent can be denonstrated to be upgraded as certified by an independent engineering firm. This upgrading should include 100'/. test perforrance of job description with prevision for retraining and l

retest, or discharge of those who cannot consistently and confidently = aster all necessary informaticn for safe conduct of their job descriptions under all anticipated critical situations as well as routine situaticrs.

I CEA CONIENIION 10.13 l

l CEA centends that there is a specific need for l

the establish:ent of training for operators that l

addresses the crobles of a '=indset' that denies information indicative of serious problees.

1 l

l I I

t

32. 24 Board finds a number of deficiencies in Licensee's training programs for both operational and management personnel.*

33. 2.e Comission has clear authority to i= pose additional traini requirenents for Licensee's operational personnel. 2a general requireents for operators and senior operators are set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 55. In addition to the specific requirecents set forth in Part 35, the Comission =ay " require further information in order to enable it to dettr=ine whether the application should be granted or denied...," 10 C.F.R. Sf5.10(b), and may "by rule, regulation, or order, ir: pose upon any licensee such requireents in addition to those established in the regulations in this part, as it des::s appropriate or necessary to protect health and to Mn4+e danger to life or property." 10 C.F.R. 555.8.

34. W.e Board rakes findings below related to the training of Licensee's senior maragecent personnel as tall as operatioral personnel.

While canage ent personnel are not covered by 10 C.F.R. Part 55, this Board nevertheless possesses $e authority to reach findings and conclusions on the adequacy of Licensee's ranagement personnel.

In particular, the Cocrission noted that "it has not established definitive standards for ranagement organization and operation for nuclear power plants... F.e Board snould apply its own Ndet ir leveloping the record and foW its conclusions on these questions." CLI-80-5, March 6,1980, slin oo.

at 4.

Licensed Ooerator Rees mir.ation

35. Short-term itea 1(e) of the Cocnission's August 9,1979 Order Training related to eargmcy planning will be dealt t#.th in the energency plaming section of this order...

and Nctice of Hearing requires mywited training and 100". reexamiration of all operators in the areas of natural cirealation, small break loss of coolant accidents, and the M-2 accident. Licensee atterpted to ceet this recuir eent through its Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (CARP). Staff Ex.1, at C6-5 to C6-7.

36. Licensee relies very heavily en cperator action to eraire the safe operation of the plant. As noted in the Board questien en UCS 8:

"It appears from the sean break IDCA analysis that there is a large a:: cunt of ral f ance upon operator action..." See, e.g., Clark, et ff. Tr. 6225, at 4-12 (see escecially M. at 4);.'ones & 3 roughton, ff.

Tr. 5038, at 5-11; Tables 2-8.

The Scard viess this ralinnce en operator perfor=ance as irrosing an extrecely heavy burden en Licensee to decastrate the adecuact of its cperator traidng program.*

37. Licensee has conducted an extensive retrcining program for its reacter operators, and has significantly upgraded its engoing training program. Ecwever, based en the results of Licensee's testing programs, the Board is not convinced that an adequate i=preveent in operator perfor=ance has been da:cnstrated, particularly in the M-2 accident subject matter. In additicn, NRC Staff rev:.ew of Licensee's testirg r

programs has been inadequate.

Consequeatly, the Board cannot conclude that the requireents of short-ters order item 1(e) Fave been met.

• As a licensee or applicant relies ::cre heavily on a hardware l

system or cccpenent to ensure plant safety, logically the need to focas on the reliability of that hardware increases.

See Virginia Electric and Power Co. ('iorth Anna Power Station, Units 1 Z, 3, and 4), ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10, 17 n.18 (1975).

The same principle should apply to reliarce en operator performance. This principle, in fact, was recogniced by Licensee's CARP Review Catuittee, which found that "the training program is another sub-syst e of the nuclear power plant system.

It is as i=portant that the requireents for the training sub-system be clearly defined as it is that the hardware requireents of the plant be so defined." Licensee Ex. 27, at 95..

4

38. 'Ihe reexamina.:..sa of Licensee's cperating personnel as iniHn11y conducted by PQS Corporation. Kelly, ff. W. 12, 409, at 6.

Be '_'QS exdation was specifically intended to " exercise the operators with an examinaticn of the tyce given by NRC to operator candidates in order to prepare de operators for such an exam..." Kelly, ff. E.12, 409, at 6 (a::phasis added).

In order to accomplish this objective, the exams were "develcped based en... knowledge and experience with 1RC cperator examirations, were formatted sidinr to IEC's techniques, and spanned all subject W.ch BEC examinations of operators would be expected to encocpass." Id. at 7.

'Ihe Board notes that Mr. Kelly spent 7 years as the Chief of tne IEC's Operator licensing Branch, where he was respcnsible for the for=ulaticn and evaluation of the BRC's operator and serior c.oerator exadrations.

_I_d_.at ac. o.. A.

'O A significant rerber of Licensee's operating persennel failed the

._ icacica exneratione Six cut of 33 indivicuals failed the overall written reacter operator exacdration. 'Ihree of these individuals were licensed reactor cperators, and cne was a licensed senior reactor operator at the ti=e of tre test. Neaten, ff. Tr. 20, 577. 'Ihis leaves some dcubt regarding the adequacy of Licensee's CARP in general subject =atters.

40. More significantly,15 cut of 33 individuals failed tra initial CARP exa=inaticn on special post 'IMI-2 subject =atter. Nine of these individuals were licensed reactor cperators, and five were licensed i

senicr reactor cperators at the dm of the exa=ination. Ibreover, to reactor cperators failed ce subsequent reexndrations in this area, and one senior reac ur cperator failed one subse ent reexa n tien. Neston, ff. 5. 20, 577. 'Ihis high failure is particularly disturbing since

_o_

i i

Licensee's CARP focused heavily on accident-related cateria'.. Licensee Ex. 27, at 36-41. The test data deconstrate deficiencies in Licensee's OARP for post-M-2 subjects, an itat. expressly covered by the Cocnission's August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing.

In fact, Licensee's witness attributed the repeated failures in the post-M-2 subjects to de training program rather than the individual cperators.

E. 20, 639 (Neaton).

41. A 90% passing grade on the IE-2 accident subject matter wss

=andatad by the NRC, due to the i=pertance of cperator Ic.cwledge in 6is area. Staff Ex.1, at Cl-16; 2.12, 699; 12, 701-02 (Kelly). Yet the validi y of Licensee's CARP exdation on the IE-2 accident and t

related sequences was not revie.ed by de IEC Staff.

E. 12, 702-03 (Kelly). Therefore, the Staff has no assurance that de exa=iration was a valid indicator of coerator Icraledge at de 90% level. Licensee's acational psychology expert acknowledged dat de meaning of the score on an exa=iration is rel-ed to the difficulty of the test. Gardner, ff. Tr. 12, 409, at 8.

42. Licensee's cwn training staff subsequently conducted reexdations of individuals who failed the PQS examiraticn, and of individuals sto did not participate in the OARP program. Neaten, ff.

W. 20, 577. E 20, 591; 20, 599-600 (Neaton). Apparently, de Staff did not revica this exa::nraticn process either. Therefore, there is no l

evidence that de reexamirations conducted by Licensee were of a eccparable level of difficulty to the POS examirations.

43. Firally, Licensee ec: ployed a second independent auditing firm, Associated Techical Waining Services, Inc. (ATI), which ad::rLGtered practice e:enminations to Licensee's operating perscenel prior to de MRC 1

i j 1

i

~

writtm license examirations. Tr. 20, 593-609 (Newton). Again, there is no evidence of the comparability of the ATI exams to either the PQS or Licensee exams. Nevertheless, the results of the ATI audit further call into cuestien Licensee's cperator training program. Thirty-six indiv,dtiah tock the audit, 29 of whom were ~cperatig personnel (16 Ros and 13 SRos). Tr. 20, 581-83; 20, 632 (Newton). Only 5 operating personnel passed the SRO exam, while 6 operating personnel passed the 30 exam. Tr. 20, 606 (Newton). Moreover, there was not a perfect corralation beteen the personnel sto passed the ATI audit and the personnel who passed the PQS exam. Tr. 20, 614 (Neaton).

M.

The ATI audit was corducted during the first tuo wwks of April, one to tw uraks prior to the IRC examiration. Tr. 20, 607; 20, 586 (Newton). Despite the high failure rate and the short time interval becmen the audit and the examinaticn, Licensee's witness expressed cc.tfidence that these same cperators would pass de BRC exaciration.

Tr. 20, 607 (Neaten).

45. The Board cannot reach the same eccclusicn. Based en the record cutlined abcve, the basis en which Licensee certified its operatcrs as cecpetent to take the EC exa=ination pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 555.10(a)(6) is not clear.

46. Even less clear is the basis for the Staff's determination that the operaccrs were cccpetent to take the MC licensing exa=ination.

For exa=ple, the Staff criginally conditiened eligibility for the BEC licensing examinations en successful completien of the CARP and nndit exa=s.

Staff Ex.1, at Cl-16. Yet a significant number of Licensee's perrxr.el sto failed various audit exacs tere obviously permitted to take the BEC exaciration.

I l l

47. 24 Staff explains this changed position as due to the delayed restart ard consequently &e delayed ad=inistration of tb4 licensing exams.

W. 20, 695 (Crocker). 2 e Board finds this argument to be disingenicus. Re delayed NRC exacs should have per=itted core time for Licensee's personnel to pass audits on all required subject areas.

48. 24 Board does not read short-te=n Order ite= 1(e) as imposing an express requirenent that Licensee reexamination preclude IEC exanmation, al6cugh dis muld see= to be the logical progression.

Nor will the Board rec

.d that the April dcensing exams be repeated-merely for the sake of this logical order.

49. however, the Board concurs with the Staff's position that passing the DE-2 subject matter exenaticn at de 907. level reins a prerequisite to licensing. Tr. 20, 690 (Crocier). Moreever, the Board is not satisfied with tha haphazard use of va -icus exa=inations dat are not necessarily cccparable and that have not been reviewed for adequacy by de IRC Staff in meeting this requirenent.

50. Neither the ATI audit ncr de 5RC examination satisfy the need for a caprehensive exa=ination en de DE-2 subject matter. thile both 7

exams contained sme questions in this area, neither separated the DE-2 questions into discrete sections that could be graded serarately.

2.

20, 594; 20, 635 (Neaten); 20, 705 (Crocker); 20, 752 (representation by Staff counsel). >breover, the IEC exa= ;ests only at the 707. level for discrete subject areas.

Boger, ff. W. 12, 770, at 3.

51. Rerefore, the Board directs that a complete reexamiratien of Licensee's operating perscnnel in de DE-2 subject matter ocer prior to restart. His examination shculd be evaluated by de Staff to ensure its validity at the 90". level. Ee Board is not eceptive to de argucent 12-

~

r-

~.

,,--,_a.-.~

~, _, ~. -,..,

,,-e,--.-

that many operators passed examinations in this subject matter over a year ago. First, these exacinations were not reviewed by the Staff.

Second, it is i=portant that the operators be judged by consistent and appuupulate standards. Finally, if Licensee's CARP and regnalification programs have been successful, all operators should be able to pass such an emnination again.

52. The Board's concerns regarding the inconsistent perfcrmance of Licensee's cperators en general subject matter audits. are addressed in the following section.

NRC Evaluation of Ocerator Perfor=ance

53. Short-term iten 1(e) of the Cermissicn's August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing requires the URC to "ad-dnister cocplete en inations to all licensed personnel in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 55.20-23."

54. Prior to taking an NRC licensing exam, applicants are required to prodde " evidence that the applicant has learned to operate the centrols in a competent and safe manner..." 10 C.F.R. 555.10(a)(6). The rule further prcvides that the "Ccerdssica ray accept as proof of dis a i

certification of an authorized representative of the facility licensee.."

Id. The Board has already expressed sme doubts as to the preparation of Licensee's operators to take the NRC examinations. See Findings 35 to 52, suora. Merecver, the specific provisions of the Cccmission's August 9, 1979 and March 6, 1980 Order dictate a special burden on l

Licensee in this case to deconstrate the proficiency of its operators.

The Board believes that this increased burden places a si=ilarly heavy t

I burden on the Staff to evaluate the ability of Licensee's operational 6

personnel to cperate the plant safely. Consequently, it is not appropite

1 y

w, er

--wi-

-y w

g w

q y

4

,s w-

in this case for the Staff cerely to accept the certification by Licensee that its operators are qualf#ied "to operate the controls in a' competent and safe ::mrar."

55. H e operating tests a M niatered to Licensee's candidates require de applicant "to denonstrate an understnnding of," inter a1f a, procedures, manipulations, instrunentation, the bnavior charactenstics of the facility, abnormal and emergecy plans t-i proced=es, plant cperations, radiaticn :enitoring systens and 6.e significance of radiation hazards.

10 C.F.R. 555.23. For the reasons stated below, the Board concludes dat the standard NRC oral examination is not sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance that the M-1 cperating staff can operate the plant safely.

In order to provide such assurance, the Staff is directed to expand its standard oral exa=ination of IMI-l cperators to include formal evaluations of en-shift drills and si-nlato.; exercises. His will provide a acre raald atic appraisal of the ability of Licensee's operating shifts to perform under nor=al cperating and e=ergency circe:: stances.

56. The NRC intends to ad=inister oral examinaticns to all licensed operators approximately 30 days prior to restart.

Boger, ff. Tr. 12, 770, at 2 (Aa=cdt 2).

BEC written examinations a re a M,4atered to 36 of Licensee's persennel, including 29 operaticnal perscnnel, between Anril 21-24, 1981. Tr. 20, 581-86 (Newton). W e results of these examinations will not be available for a n=ber of acnths.

Tr. 20, 536 (Newton).

57. The Board finds dat the c= rent 3RC review of Licensee's operator training and certification program is 4 adequate.

2 58.

Ihe Staff has not yet reviewed Licensee's program for certifying --

1 i

candidates as qualified to take the IRC exncinations. Bus, the Staff did not know the extent to which the certificaticn takes into account drill performance, walk-throughs, etc., although they stated a general intent to do so in the future.

E. 12, 066 C<ai" 5, et al.). He Staff has not produced evidence on the extent or timing of 61s review.

59. H e Staff conducted cnly a limited review of Licensee's training program, including training materials, lessen plans, etc. Tr. 12, 829 (Boger).

60. He Staff takes the position that no review of Licensee's -

Requalification Trairing Program is required prior to restart, since Licensee's cperating personnel will be required to pass NRC exacanatwns.

Staff Ex. 4, at 21. He Staff views a coc:prehensive evaluaticn of Licensee's t aining program as a long-term program, fcr which no i=plementation schedule has been established. Staff Ex. 1, at C6-7.

61. Expert witnesses for Licensee, the Staff, and the Aahodes agree that evaluaticn of operatcr performance during realistic exercises is preferable to written and oral examinations.

62. Le Staff's witness agreed that tac licensirg exacs carr.ot be used a a predictor of cperator performance after the exa=ination.

W. 12, 797 (Boger). Re Staff currently does not ad=irister simlator exa=inations, but is intending to do so in the future. 2. 12, 874 (Boger).

63. Licensee's expert witnesses agree that there are benefits to evaluation of cperator cocpetence based en simlator performance.

E.

12, 264-65 (Icng). In fact, cne of Licensee's witnesses tesHa d that e

performance on-shift is a better indicator of an operator's cccpetence than secres en an examination. Be witness rerm.ded that both the _

4 Licensee and the NRC provide a rcre stru:tured approach to evaluating operator cccpetence en-shift ard during shlator training.

2. 12, 732 (Gardner).

6A. bbreover, Licensee admits that its practice exams are often geared to prepare applicants for the NRC examinations. Mock SRC examinations are used in preparing Licensee's applicants.

h. 12, 174 (Iong). This further calls into question the adequacy of the Staff's i

examination approach, which relies heavily en the written examiraticn.

65. Ms. Aamode, testifying as an expert witness based en her qualifications as an Meator and based en her Mention and professicral career in expert: ental psychology, also agreed that the cost valid test of coerator perforance is accccplished by creating as close a shintion as possible to actual cpeational circ = stances. Ms. Aauodt w uld i

choose en-shift drills and shlater pufvwee ever written and oral examinations as indicators of cperator cocpetence.

Tr. 13, 173-74 (Aamodt).

l

66. The Staff's cral exacnnation dces not satisfy this need for an evaluaticn of cperator performance. 2e regn1 ahem governing the SRC i

operating tests only require applicants to "de:cnstrate an understandirr of" procedures and other identified information.

10 C.F.R. 555.23.

Actual perfcrmance of manipulations and procedures is not recuired.

67. 'Ihe NRC oral examination does include some actual operation and walk-through of precedures. Tr.12, 868 (Boger). Thi2 does not, hcwever, encccpass perforance during a eccprehensive drill or during an ec:ergency scerario. Although the Staff witness " believed" that the Office of Inspection and Enforce.ent observes cperator perforance on-shift, he was not certain hcw foral this program is. Tr. 12, 870 (Boger).

l !

l f

___,_.-,_-,._,--___.--.,___.._,..--,__.,__,,,m

_.-...m...,

..,. _. ~.

.,-~,m-,

68. Da Staff formally observes and evaluates caly the major am al emergency exercise. Tr.12, 872 (Boger). This is not, bm ever, a part of the licensed operator evaluation program. Licensee performs emergency drills routinely on-shift. Tr.12, 328 (Ross). Dese drills are observed and graded by Licensee's instructors. Tr.12, 329 (Ross).

The NRC Staff could schedule formal evaluations of these drills as well.

69. On-shif: evaluaticns alene, however, are not adequate to judge operator perfAace ddg transients cr other abnormal events. As stated by Licensee's witness, en-the-job trainbg is not e_c.enely useful in training for transients or abnormal operating procedures.

Sintlater training is necessary to walk thrcugh energency and abnc=al procedures. Tr.12, 226 (Neeten). Similarly, it is not clear how tra BRC's written and oral examinations a%tely test cperator performance during c: ansients and oder abnor=al events.

70. Licensee's witnesses testified that ene of the benefits of the BW sintlator program was to enable the instructors to " evaluate the ability cf candidate CRos to respcnd to stressful situaticns." Icng, et al., ff. Tr. 12, 140, at 31. Similator manipulations are also observed and evaluated by the B W training staff. M.at36. Em Staff is directed to make use of this technique to conduct an independent evaluation of the performance of Licensee's operators under transient conditiens.

Similator Training

71. Licensee's operating perscenel receive similator training at the BW Bbclear Training Center in Lyncbbrg, Virginia. Ra BW simulator is a close, but not exact, replica of de DE-1 control roca. Licensee Ex. 27, at 104, 109; Tr. 12, 250-51 @ css).

~

-1,/ -

i i

72. He Board finds that Licensee's cperator training program is sccewhat deficient in the accunt of erphasis on similator training.

Licensee asse that the r.u::ber of similator hours provided to Licensee's operators is approximately eaual to the industry average. Tr. 12, 155 (Icng). Me record, however, does not cocpletely support this finding.

73. Similator training is an invaluable cocpcnent of the overall training program for reactor cperators, providing skills that cannot be provided in the classrocm.

E.12, 201 (Knief). Licensee's expert witness testified that similatcr training is useful in re cing the stressfulness of transients and in prcooting effective responses.

Gardner, ff. 2. 12, 409, at 8.

According to Licensee, "simtintor training is an essential elec:ent of both initial ard requalification training progra=s." Inng, et al., ff. W. 12, 140, at 29.

74 One of Licensee's contractors reached a similar conclusion.

PQS Corporation was hired by Licensee in W H, 1979, to cenduct a review of the operator training and reqitalificatica program. One of PQS' reco - Attiens was that Licensee increase usage of the B&W si=ulator. A PQS representative testified that this reccarendation had been incorporated into the mI training program. Kelly, ff. Tr. 12, 409, at 3.

The Board does not find that this assertion was adequately supported en the record.

75. Experts vary cn the apprcpriate amount of similator training.

Dr. Johnson of IVA recccamds two full weeks of simtintor training per year. This translates to 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> of similator rim per crew per year.

E.12, 467 (Christensen). Scae experts recctnr.d as cuch as six weeks per year.

12, 507-08 (Christensen). A report issued by Oak I'd.dge National laboratory reports an average of acproxi=ately 30 to 60 simulator.

s,--.

hours per trainee per year across the count f.

Tr. 12, 156 (Lang).

Licensee's CARP report provides a lower bound IVA esti ate of approximately 37 to 50 bcurs per trainee per year, as interpreted by Licensee's witness. E.12,154 (long). As reported by the CAP 2 cm-itree, other experts sculd require 50 to 67 Fours per year per trairae, using the same calculaticn ec: ployed by Licensee's tdtness.*

76. Acccrding to Licensee's witnesses, no formal studies have been conducted en de nu::icer of similater hours needed for adequate operator training. Re n:.=icers cited above are merely cpinions.

E. 12, 677 (Chmtensen). Moreover, the Board notes t'at none of the scurces of these opinicns were available for cross-exar::ination. 2us, while dere is no finn evidence dat de upper-bound esti=ates are necessary to trsin operators adequately, neider has Licensee provided any evidence that craviding less similater training than suggested by the experts is adequate. E e burden of proof is clearly en Licensee to "deaanstrate his =anagerial capability and rescurces to cperate uneil..." Short-cena order itect 6.

77. Licensee c1a% an equivalent a: cunt of similater hours per trainee because each shift receives one week at de similator site per year. 2.12,156; 12, 263 (Irng). Ecwever, de Hre spent at the similator is split aWtely equally bermen classrcan ti=e and s % 1ater ti=e.

Berefore, cne week at the si 21ater site represents 20 t

l hours of si 11ator tire. E.12,156 (Irng); 12,157 (Ross). This is confiresi by de fact that Licensee's cperators have had 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of s%1atcr ti=e in the two years since the accident.

Tr. 12, 157 (Irng).

bbreover, apprcxi=ately 50 to 75". of this ti=e wa: spant st d ing the f

1 LII-2 accident, leaving enly 10 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of sinnlator H e for

• 2000 hrs./30 trainees = 67 hrs.; 2000 hrs /l.0 trainees = 50 hrs. _

general training in two years.

W. 12, 159 (Ross).

78. Licensee's control rocxn operators have been sent to the BSJ similator twice in the two years since the M-2 accident. One consisted of a short practice session on the M-2 incident. At the second sim'inte training session, cperators pufvwed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of similator operations. Icng, et al., ff. 2. 12, 140, at 29. A core precise description of the BSJ similator program contained in the CARP Report describes the similator training nodule as cocor oing 16 hcurs of classroom time and 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> of similator operations. Licensee Ex. 27, at 105.

79. There is also scoe evidence that the initial ti=e periods spent at the BEJ similacor are not highly productive due to differences between the simtintor and the m I-l control room. One cperator indicated that the first day and one-half at the similator were relatively unproductive. Licensee Ex. 27, at 109.

80. Licensee's expert witness testified that "while no cperator can conceivably be exposed to every possible emergency situation, it helps to expose each to a wide variety of s.:ch situations." Such training was cited as a c:eans of improving operator perfomance under stressful conditions.

Cristensen, ff. 2. 12, 409, at 9-10.

During a crew's week at the BSJ similator,10 of 28 prepared scenarios are perfomed.

Tr.12, 470 (Christensen). No evidence was produced which adequately i

explained why each crew is not required to perfom each scenario. Three weeks at the sim11ator uculd allcw a crew to be trained in each scenario.

l l

81. Licensee does not provide : ore hours of similator training due to a lack of available hours at the 384 similator.

Tr. 12, 265 (Newton).

i The BSJ similator is booked through 1982.

Id_.

Licensee's witnesses - - -

feel, however, that sufficient t:aining is acca:plished in one 'aek.

M. We Board does not feel dat scbaditling difficulties at BW shculd affect the jiidgrwit as to the epwyriate arount of cperater training.

In any case, Licensee's CARP report noted that additieral BG similator time uculd be needed to meet proposed irereased si tlator requirements of NL"EG-0660. Licensee Ex. 27, at 110.

82. Another ceans of increasing the ru:icer of sinulator hours available to Licensee's operators wculd be to purchase an exact replica simulaccr for IMI-1. Licensee 3-27, at 110. Licensee's CARP W tree concluded that such " full-cission" si ilation *muld improve Licensee's everall operator training. Ccnsequently, Licensee 'm uld use the siculator ore in its training progra=s. M. at 109,144; t.12, 257-58 (Irng).

Ecweier, the lead td=e for purchase of an exact replica si sinter is approximately fcur ye:ats.

E. 12, 145 (Icng).

83. Firally, Licensee can provide additicral plant condition similatcr training through the use of cccputer terminals (CRT's) installed cnsite. Licensee Scpes to have such a systen in place by the end of 1981.

2.12, 258-63 (Icrg).

l

84. Based en the record cutlined above, de Board finds that l

greater ecphasis should be placed on the aacunt of similator training provided to Licensee's cperators, both in the short-term and the lerg-term. Widcut the correcticns noted below, the Beard concludes that Licensee has not deconstrated cccoliance with shcrt-tern item 6 with respect to cperator trainidg. Such cccaliance is necessary to provide reasonable assurance dat IMI-l can be operated withca.t eri. angering i

the health and safety of the public.

(

l 85.

In the short-term, Licensee should suoplement its si=ulator l

l I

trainhg to all operating persomel prior to restart. An additional week of training at the B&W simlator will pemit operating shifts to perfom a larger percentage of the 28 evolutions described in the CARP Report. Licensee Ex. 27, at 105-06. Since the Board has already directed the Staff to cceduct an evaluation of simlatnr performance prior to restart, the additional training can be coordinated with tFa Staff evaluation.

86.

In the icng-term, Licensee should be required to increase its j

an=al requalificaticn simlator training to a minimn of tw weeks per year. In the absence of firm evidence en &is point, Licensee's program shculd fall at least in de middle of the requireer.ts suggested by the experts.

87. Finally, the Staff should acnitor Licensee's progress tcward providing casite simlator training as a icng-term requirecent.

Based on Licensee's cwn esti=ates, reascrable progress shculd be measured by er expected late-1981 i=pleantation date for CRT facilities and approximately 4 years for an exact replica simlater.

Training for Senior Panag eent Personnel

88. Five out of talve of GPU Nuclear's senior manageent perscnnel are nar to the organiz tien, including the Vice-Presidents of M-1 Ot.

Hukill) and M-2 (Mr. Hovey).

E.11, 451-52 (Arnold) (explainir4 supplanentary charts entitled "GPU Nuclear Groua/ Corporation Organication,"

p. 7). Licensee's witness testified that there are scm disadvantages to having senior managenent personnel who lack a broad range of experience.

Tr.11, 516 (Arnold). The Board is also concerned that seca of these personnel may not have an adequate familiarity with the specifics of M -1 design, cperation, and procedures. -.

i

89. The Board does rot believe that lack of fdlinmity with DE-1 shculd preclude Licensee from seeking unnageent perscnnel with diverse backgrounds. This practice, in fact, shculd result in significant

=aragment benefits. The Board also believes, bowever, that deficiencies in the backgrounds cf key new management personnel should be corrxted with specific, formal training programs, as would be required for lower-level employees.

90. This concern is partimla-ly i=portant for personnel with responsibilities under Licensee's ecergency plan. Since an m ergency cannot be controlled reotely, the capability to assess accident ccndi 4ers and to determine that actions are necessary to control and mitigate the accident nust exist onsite. Tr.11, 520-21 (Arnold). Therefore, Licensee managesent personnel the make on-the-spot safety decisions during e:ergency conditions need detailed pe senal h owledge of the design and operatica of 11E-1.

E.11, 520-21 (Arnold).

91. One example of a key managecent ec:aloyee with insufficient far-il4n-ity with DE-1 is W. Phillip Clark, who joined the GPU Nuclear Crcup in January, 1980, as Deputy Chief Operating E.xecutive.

Prior to joining GPU, &. Clark spent approxi=ately 25 years in the navy nuclear program. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11, 434, at 9; Figure 1.

Due to W. Clark's lack of experience with cacercial pressuriaA water reacters, W.

Clark will need to rely en the technical expertise of other -ders of Licensee's organization. Tr.11, 520 (Arnold). This reliance may not be highly inage wpuiate for Mr. Clark's normal functions. Under some circ = stances, however, W. Clark =ay be called to H11-1 during an l

eergency, particularly when Mr. Arnold is not available. Tr. 11, 448-90 (Arnold).

It may reascnably be inferred that m official of W... -.

Clark's rank muld be relied on heavily in the course of an amargency.

See, e.g., Keaten and Iong, ff. Tr.13, 242, at 10.*

In &. Arnold's absence, W. Clark apparently muld serve as Enrgency Supp Director.

In this role, W. Clark m uld be responsible for " directing the offsite erergency support organication, and for providing advice and guidance to the Frergency Director on accident =anagement responsibilities." Regan, et al., ff. Tr. 13, 756, at 33.

92. A =cre significant example is the Director of DE-1, Henry Hakill.

W. Hukill is responsible for the day-to-day cperation of IE-1, and coc:pliance with 21I-1 ~echnical Specifications and regulatory recuiremnts. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11, 434, at 10.

W. Hukill joined DE-1 in Septa 6er,1980, after over 22 years in the U.S. Navy.

&. Hukill's only experience with large land-based reactors was a 13-month tenure wrking en the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project. Eukill, et al.,

ff. Tr. 11, 617, at 6-7.

l

93. As Vice-President of DE-1, Mr. Hukill is responsible for all aspects of plant operation and =aintenance.

W. Hukill " oversees the plant's operation, and evaluates, institutes, and nodifies policies f

affecting activities at Unit 1," serves as l h hon for all engine.ering, i

design and analysis, nuclear assurance, =aintenarr.e and ccust=ction, radiological and envircr nental controls and n%herative services provided to DE-1 by GPU Nuclear, and has the authority to shut dcsm the plant "whenever it is appcvytiate to do so."

Hukill, et al., ff. Tr. 11, l

617, at 4-5.

In order to perform the:e duties and to =ake these decisions, Mr. HLkill shculd have an inti= ate knculedge of DE-1 plant design and operation.

Ihe decision to repressurize the plant during the DE-2 accident, which led to plant stabilhation en the evening of Lrch 28, 1979, was

=ade by W. Arnold.. -..

94. thile Mr. Hukill has extensive experience in the operation of neelear power reactors, essentially all of his experience is in the operation of naval reactors, which are significantly sdier than DII-1.

Tr. 11, 522-23 (Arnold). Althmgh general principle.s of navy nuclear experience are appliable to the operation of comercial nuclear power plants, the dernik of the practice differ. Tr. 11, 813 (Clark).

95. In addition to Mr. Hukill's day--to-day responsibilities, he also playe a critical role during emergencies. During an energency, the Vice-President of HII-1, the Manager of IMI-1, or a designated alternate serves as the Fmergency Director. The Fmergency Director "has the aut%.irf and the respensibilities to inmediately and unilaterally in.tiate any emerge =y action, including providing protective action r e W eions." Rogan, et al., ff. Tr. 13, 756, at 26-27. The F=ergency Director is responsible for caking decisions en protective action recoceendations to offsite response agencies and for centrollirg the ficw of infor=ation to the IEC and other agencies. Tr. 11, 693-94 (Toole).

96. Licensee has failed to danonstrate the qualifications of Mr.

l Hukill to perform these functions.

1 j

97. As of February,1981, Mr. Hukill had not yet beccte fM14ar with Licensee's ecurgency procedures and plans, and what he muld be 4

required to do during an energency. Tr.11, 621 (Hukill). Mr. Hukill testified that he was not qualified to judge the offsite censequences of an accident at a carercial power reactor. Tr.11, 622-23 (Hukill).

Mr. Hukill has no experience in judging the magnitude of releases frcm cctrercial nuclear plants, nor in synthesizing this information ;d.th meteorological conditions, demography, or other factors necessary to l ~

formtlate a public health decision. To date, Mr. Hukill has had only a 3-hour briefing in this area. Tr.11, 699 (Hukill). Although Mr.

Hukill acknowledges the need to acquire more extensive personal knowledge, Tr.11, 699, he intends to base his decisions en the jrArmnt of various plant experts. Tr. 11, 621; 11, 694: 11,.696-97. This expressly contradicts Mr. Arnold's jndemt that management officials

-to make en-the-spot decisicns dunng an emergency have perscnal o

knowledge of critical plant-specific infor:atien.

E.11, 520-21 (Arnold).

98. Licensee has cccnitted to conduct erargency planning training up drcugh the tcp levels of manage ent. Tr.12, 242 (Knief). Presumably, this will incit.de senior GPU manage ent personnel who may respcnd to an energency at the site.

It is intended d at emergency directors will receive training in mitigating accidents similar to that given to operators. Tr.12, 249 (Iong). It is not clear, however whether this

=aining cill include siculator training,. Furder, the emergency directors will receive only two weeks of training. Tr.11, 675 (Hukill).

Thus, while the emergency planning program undoubtedly will assist Licensee's top management perscnnel during an emergency, it is not an adequate substitute fer a thorough training program in the design and operati.cn of 7MI-1.

99. As another example, Mr. Hukill bas not taken the decision analysis training given to other perscnnel. Licensee's Decision Analysis training sessica was developed to train irdividuals in bandlirg cocplex, unanticipated situaticas, under circu= stances of uncertainty, stress, and conflicting infor=ation. This training was given to all SPCs and STAS, but not to higher level manage::ent. Irng, et aL, ff. Tr.12,140, l

at 40. This is contrary to the recer:cendatiens of Licensee's own._

experts.

E. 12, 734-35 (Gardner); Licensee Ex. 27, at 13. Licensee provided no explanation of why all operating persennel shmid not receive this training.

100. Licensee atta: pts to counter these arguments by asserting that all M-1 eployees meet the applicable requirments of Reg. Guide 1.8 (May 1977) and ANSI /ANS 3.1-1973. Hukill, et al., ff. Tr. 11, 617, at 3.

Le Sra ^# agrees with this assessment.

Crocker and Allenspach, ff. Tr. 12, 653, at 5.

Le record, however, does not cccoletely support the conclusion that ccepliance with these standards alone is adequate evidence of the gm14 #ications of Licensee's cacag ement personnel.

101. W. Hukill, as Vice-President for M -1, is the plant manager for purposes of ccepliance with ANSI standard 3.1-1978. Accordi:g, to 54.2.1 of msI 3.1-1978, the plant manager =ust have the experience and equivalent training of a senior reactor cperator. Tr. 12, 654-55.

W.

Hukill does not have an NRC Senior Reactor Operator license.

2. 12, 656 (Crocker/Allenspach).* NEI 3.1-1978 does allow credit for =ilitary experience.

2. 12, 667 (Crocker/Allenspach). Ecwever, while 5.

Hukill's naval experience provides him with de general background required to perform his duties at IE-1, it does not provide him with sdequate specific cperating knowledge necessary to perform as e&rger.cy l

director. Literal cccpliance with ANSI 3.1-1978, therefore, does nct provide adequate assurance dat W. Hukill is qmli#ied to perform his duties widcut fur der traini g.

102. 2e plant =anager is also included in de NRC's deffnd.tien of "cperating personnel." For exc:ple, the March 28, 1980 letter to all

• In fact, the highest Licensee official with a current SRO license is W. Ross, the Supervisor of Coerations of M -1.

Tr. 11, 673 (Toole).

l ibhill, e al., ff. 'IR.11, 617, at 12. 2erefore, none of de potential designacea emrgency directcrs have current SRO licenses. -

j l

.~

.,..-.m.

power reactor applicants and licenses, which identifies training requirements for operating persamel, includet the plant marager. Du March 28, 1980 letter includes six categories of training that n:st be given to operating persomel, including in-core instrumentation, ex-core nuclear instrumentation, vital instrt:nentatien, primary chenistration, radiation acritoring, and gas generati n.

Tr. 12, 699-70 (Crocker/

Allenspach). To meet these requireents,11catsee nist provide formal training in these areas to all operating persemel, including the plar.t manager. Falinnce on self-a^mation is not sufficient.

103. Despite de need to train raw senior management personral in the design and operation of E!I-1, Licensee has established no forral training or a^ maticn program in this area. For exanple, Mr. Hukill is relying exclusively on a self-aaration program. Tr.11, 620 (Hukill).

Absent a for=al training and testing pregam, there is no wr, to assure that Licensee's senior ramageent persemel who ' rave little or no experience in cccmercial nuclear pcwer reactors can perform their jabs adequately, particularly during an margeccy.

104. 2:e Board directs Licensee to remedy this deficiency in the site-specific training of its ranagement persemel prior to restart.

Licensee's training depart:nent should identify those canagement officials wtose backgcunds demonstrate insufficient knowledge of DII-l design and operaticn to perform their functions in a ranner censistent with the protection of public health and safety. This review should focus in particular on officials wto are new to Licensee's organization, ard on persemel with significant plant safety-related responsibilities.

Training propa=s should then be designed and implemented for these dedividuals. The Board further directs that the Staff to review this pro gam and to certify its inplementatien to the Cocrission prior to restart.

-=27-

A 4

P 105. Absent satisfactory iglementation of this program, th Board cannot conclude that Licensee has deonstrated the adequacy of training of its senior management personnel. The above-stated ramadies are necessary to provide ra=='rmble assurance the DfI-l can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.

Trainim in Anticipated Transients Coerator Gn4dalines 106. Licensee intends to meet the requirments of Recocmendation 2.1.9C of NCREG-0578 (tansient and Accident Analysis) through th implementation of the Anticipated Transients Operator Guidelines (ATOG) program. Broughton, ff. Tr. 10, 941, at 2.*

107. According to the Staff's witness, Licensee's proposed ATOG program will change the general method by dich an emergarf procedure is handled. The mergency respose will change from an acc4%t-oriented to a symptoc>-oriented approach. Tr.12, 874 (Boger). Yet the Staff does not intend to examine Licensee's operators in the ATOG puedures.

Moreover, Licensee will av*na operators in ATOG only during perdde requalification exams rather than prior to iglementation. Tr. 12, 875-78 (Boger).

108. Licensee acknculedges the extensive procedural changes caused by the i=plementation of ATOG, and consequmely the need for supplanental operator training in this area:

l Since the procedure is applicable during forced or natural circulation, with or without offsite power, and with normal or emergency feedwatar, several existing plant procedures.will require modification and scoe may be eHminated.

Furthe= ore, since the approach to event

• The Board's findings on cocoliance with Recoceendation 2.1.9.C, dich as the subject of Board Question 11, are included in another section of this decision. 'Ihis section relates only to operator training on the ATOG program. - -. - _ _.,.-,- - -_-

I diagnosis is altered by this procedure, a revised program to train operators in this approach, in the use of this specific procedure and in the use of other modified procedures is required.

Broi*gh mn, ff. 2. 10, 941, at 4.

109. At this point, Licensee has " contracted with B&W" for B6W's ATOG canual. Icng, et al.,, ff. t. 12, 140, at 33. Sane instruction has been initiated en the ATOG prcgram.

W. 12, 189 (Newton). No infor=ation has been prcvided, however, en the extent or adequacy of this trai t. q.

110. Although ATOG training will not affect plant safety until AIOG is i=planented, the Board wants to be assured that adequate ATOG training is coeducted in a satisfactory =anner prior to implementation.

"h Staff's appch to ATOG d::plecentaticn and training is not acceptable.

The Staff cerely states that retraining of operators in ATOG procedures will be completed by Septe:ber of 1981. Staff Ex. 14, at 46.

111. The Board finds that retraining in ATOG procedures is at least as i m w it as =any other aspects of Licensee's operator retraining program regt. ired prior to restart and for which direct IRC Staff review l

is required. The Board concludes that steps to ensure adequate ATOG training are necessary to provide reascnable assurance dat 24I-1 can be cperated without endange & g the health and safety of the public.

Consequently, the Staff is directed to (1) conduct a thorough reviea of Licensee's ATOG retraining program; (2) require Licensee to include ATOG i

in the reexa ution provision of short-term order itaa 1(e); and (3) include ATOG procedures in the cral examination scheduled for approxirately 30 days prior to restart. -.

Training in Class 9 Accidents 112. The NRC's regulations governing both operator and senior cperator tests include "the necessief for a cared 21 approach to the responsibilief associated with the safe operation of the facility." 10 C.F.R. 555. 23(1). 'Ihus, the regulations recognize the need to include in the operator training program ccncepts of pger attitude and responsibilief.

113. Licensee has no specific trair&g program or courses desigrad to instill in ecployees a sense of responsibilief to protect the public health and saferf. Rather, responsibilief is conveyed as a part of the general training and education program. Tr.12, 308-09 (Iong).

4 114. No specific training is given to general employees on the possible censequences of nuclear accidents. Tr.12, 310 (1crg).

Operaticr21 perscrrel, including control room operators, are trained in I

accident aralysis as scoped by Chapter 14 of the 'IMI-1 Final Saferf Analysis Report. Tr. 12, 321 (Iang). No trainir4 is given, Fawer, in Class 9 accident results or in WASH-1400-type esme hj'pothetical accidents. Tr.12, 326-27 (1cng). Rather, Licensee assumes that all personnel trained in the nuclear emergency field are f*142-with such consequences. Tr.12, 327 (leng).

115. The 'IMI-2 accident as officially classified by the Staff as a Class 9 accident. Posenthal atd Check, ff. Tr.11158, at 8 (citing NRC Staff response to Board Question No. 4 regarding the Occurrences of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island, in the Matter of Public Service F.lectric and Gas Cocpany, August 24, 1979).

116. While it =ay be true that trained nuclear engineers and i

physicists are generally fa=iliar with the consequences of Class 9 and I

2T maxi::m Irfpothetical accidents, the Board does not necessarily believe that the same is true for control room operators or other operational personnel.

117. The Board concludes that it is necessary for all operatioral and emergency personnel to have a full understanding of the public health and safety consequences of their actions, or, more ayywytiately, misactions, in order to provide reasonable assurance that 'IML-1 can be operated withcut endangering de health and safeef of the public.

W.erefore, Licensee is required, prior to restart, to tra'at all of its operational and emergency personnel in the potential consequatees of Class 9 accidents that =ight occur at 'IMI-1.

'ite training should stress that inadequate attention to duties, particularly by personnel with key safety-related tasks, might lead to these consequences. The Staff is directed to review the substance of this training program and to certify its ccepletion to the Ccmission prior to restart.

III. Ocerational Resources 118. In the August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing, the Ccx: mission I

l directed that Licensee's deconstration of its managerial capabilir/

include "the adequacy of...the managec:ent and technical capability and 1

training of operations staff..."

Slip co. at 7.

The Cocmission expanded on this ir @ f in its & rch 6, 1980 Order on management issues, asking:

l (1) stether Metropolitan Edison's e-nd and arbMstrative structure, at both the plant and corporate levels, is appropriately i

organ 4 ad to assure safe operaticn of Unit 1; i

(2) wtether the operations and technical staff of Unit 1 is gna W ied to operate Unit 1 safely.

CLI-80-5, March 6, 1980, at 2. !

,, ~.

~,

n9. The Board finds a number of deficiencies in the qmHfications and numbers of Licensee's cerent operational staff.

Shift Staffing Re@ements 120. The Board finds that a requirement for tw licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SRO's) per shift is necessary for the safe operation of the plant.

121. Ucensee's managment agrees with the technical j@t that d.ere should be a licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) in the control room at all d m a.

E.11, 665, 71 (Hukin). However, Licensee does not view this as a firm coccitment until July 1,1982.

2. H, 666-67 (Hukin).

Existing shift forecen will raintain their positions regardless of whether they pass the NRC's SR0 examination, t. H, 668 (Hukin),

despite the fact that it uould be possible to have a shift forman as the senior official present in the control room.

2. H, 633 (Ross).

Licensee dces not explain why it is appropriate in the interis not to require an SFO in the control room at all Hwa and not to require an shift forcen to pass the SRO examiration.

122. The Board has sace difficulty reconciling this position with car:d.trents stated elsewhere in Licensee's testimetrf. According to Licensee's written testimony, the "'IMI-1 Supervisor of Operations, shift supervisors, and shift forecen are recuired to hold a senior reactor (SRO) license...." Icng, et al., ff. Tr.12,140, at 37 (epbasis added). Lhen the reactor coolant emperature exceeds 200 F, Licensee "normally" has on shif an SRO-qualified shift supervisor and an SRO-l qualified shift forecan. Hukin, et al., ff. Tr. H, 617, at 13. The CARP Repcrt also indicates that both shift supervisors and shift foreran 32-

~

,,.n,..

,,, ~.,. -,,,,

=ust hold SRO licenses. Licensee's Ex. 27, at 10. D e inconsistency in Licensee's position is not explained in either the written or oral 1

testirorrf.

123. In Supplement 1 to the Restart Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

(EREG-0680, Supp. No.11, the Staff took the position that tw SRO's were required per shift. Staff Ex. 4, at 11.

In Supplement 2, dated March,1981, the Staff apparently had not changed this position. Staff Fx. 13, at 4-5.

In Supplecent 3, dated April, 1981, the Staff suddenly extended de dand1Me for prov2. ding two SRO's per shift to July,- 1982.

Staff Ex.'14, at 22.

124. He Staff's rationale for its changed position relates to the Coccission's Order of March 23, 1981 (CL1-81-3), which stated:

2e rmnission believes that thit One should be grouped with reactors which have received operating licenses, radar than with units with pending operating license applications.

It ephasizes though that it expects the Board to find to the contrary when de record so dictates.

Slip co. at 7.

2.e Staff found no reason to treat M-1 differently from other operating reactors for purposes of this requirecent.

Staff Ex. 14, at 23. he Board finds that the Staff did not adequately examine l

I the differences between t!I-l and other operating reactors.

l 125. Re Staff did not give adequate weight to the fact that DIC-1 has been in a cold shutdcun =ade for over em years. Tr. 20, 748 (Crocker).

I 126. Be Staff's witness cited the requirement for em licensed senior reactor operators on each shift as one of the reasons for not i

requiring 100. examination of all operating individuals. Boger, ff. Tr.

12, 770, at 4-5 (Aarodt 2). Yet de Staff argues the qmli#ications of operating personnel as de rationale for not requi-ing two licensed l _.

I

SRO's per shift, Staff Ex.14, at 23. The Staff cannot use the argument both ways. Moreover, the Staff personnel who decided to extend the shift mming requirement did not evaluate Licensee's retraining p1.0 rma 3

to determine whether Licensee's operators are in fact better qmWied than NIOL operators. Tr. 20, 714-16 (Crocker).

127. Most importantly, the Staff failed completely to evaluate the effect of the SRO requirement on Licensee's site-scecific energency response plan.

E. 20, 763-65 (Crocker). Under Licensee's ec:ergency plan, during de in#.tial phases of mergency response, the shift superdsor serves as Frergency Director. Under Licensee's emergency plan, "the Fmergecy Director has the authority and che responsibility to irtediately and unilaterally inidate any mergency action, including providing protective action reca:cendations to autharities responsible for i=plementing offsite mergency ceasures." Licensee Ex. 30, at 5-6.

If the shift supervisor is unavailable or incapacitated, the shift foreman becomes Emergency Director.

Id. Rogan, et al., ff. 2. 13, 756, at 26-27. Thus, according to Licensee's position, there are circunstances where c. ron-SRO licensed shift foreman could becoce Fmergency Director.

The Staff acknowledges that, with only one SRO per shift, dere are ti=es where the control room would be widout an SRO. Tr. 20, 757 (Crocker).

128. During the initial response to an emergency, the shift supervisor and the shift fore::an conduct all major functional responsibilities in the control roan, serving as Emergency Director, Operations Coordirator and Radiological Assessment Coordinator. Bis condition could persist for as long as one hour. Chestnut, ff. Tr. 15, 007, at 22-24. The Board notes that, under Licensee's energency plan:

The Operations Coordirator is responsible for coordirating operations ard :raintenance

( 4 e

i activities t W. the Shift Supervisor and the Emergency Maintenance Coordaintor.

h Ooerations Coordinator may not relieve the Shift Supervisor or specifically direct plant coerations taless he is a licensed Senior Reactor Ooerator. 24 Operations Coordirator will report to the Emergency Director.

Licen.see Ex. 30, at 5-8 (emplasis added). h Radiological Assessment Coordinator is directed to " coordinate initial radiological assessment L

activities, review results, and report findi:gs and make recWations to the F e gency Director." Id. at 5-10.

129. This allocation of mergency responsibilities is particularly, critical during the back shift. 24 back shift poses unique problems in terms of the responsibilities of shift personnel, since the shift supervisor I

is the senior official at the plant. Licensee provides no additieral or different training, however, on operator performance during da back shift. Tr.12, 728-29 (Irrg).

i 130. Da Staff dete:rdned that this arr=ngtoene is acceptable since it is " consistent with the NRC gnMmce conm4 rad in Table B-1 of NCREG-0654." Gastnut, ff. Tr. 15,.077, at 22-23. Table B-1 denotes both the Shift Superv:.sor and the Shift foreman as SRO's. Staff Ex. 7, at 37.

131. Even under Licensee's carage::ent se:acture under rem i

operations, the shift forecen should be licensed SFO's. The shift foremen are responsible for overseeing the activities of the control rocm and auxiliary operators. This includes " ensuring that all control room activities are executed in accordance with prescribed requirecents, guida14nes, and operating procedures." Hakill, et al., ff. Tr. 11, l

617, at 18.

132. Under the NRC's rules of practice, direc.on of control recm operating persornel is a function puhe by a senior operator. -10 i

/

C.F.R. Part 55, " Operator's Licenses," applies to all individuals who

'hanipulate the controls of" any licensed facility and who are

" responsible for directing the licensed activities of licensed operators."

10 C.F.R. 555.2. A " senior operator" is da & ad as "any individual designated by a fac414 y licensee... to direct the licensed activities t

of licensed coerators." 10 C.F.R. 555.4(e) (ecphasis added). By Licensee's own definition of the functions of its shift forenen, the shift foremen are senior operators.

133. The Staff, in addition to not considering these factors, justifies creating Licensee as an operating reactor for purposes of the shift staffing requiremnt by arguirg that "the previous experience, the special training, and the [mC] reexamination all should assure a well-qualified grous of operators that may be expected to be core capable than a grcup of operators assigned to a newly licensed plant." Staff Ex. 14, at 23. Neither the Staff nor the Licensee support this statement

-with any evidence deconstrating that Licensee's operators are better qualified dan NIOL operators.

134. The record dccs not support the asseth that Licensee's operating staff has a significant arount nore experience than the staffs of raw plants. First, 4 cut of 16 Liccasee's RO candidates are new.

Tr. 20, 581; 20, 591 (Newtcn). !bre irportantly, 3 of Licensee's 6 shift supervisors and 3 of 7 of Licensee's shift forecen have no experience serving in their respective positions while da plant was cperaticral.

The refning 4 shift fora::en each have less than ene year's experience serving as shift foremen while the plant was operaticral. Hukill, ff.

Tr. 11, 617, at 16-22. Therefore, while Licensee's operaticral staff has some additicnal operating experience over NIOL staffs, the Scard

does not feel dat'this experience is sufficient to offset the em-years of 'IMI-l shutdcwn.

135. 'Ihe "special training" referred to by the Staff does not place M-1 in a superic-,osition to NIOL plants. All operational perscnnel for NIOL plants can be expected to undergo intensive training.

E. 20, 768 (Crocker' cere is no evidence that this trainig is any less adequate than Licmsee's regnalification training program.

In fact, NIOL operating candidates are not hindered by the added burden of unlearning old procedures and centrol roce design.

136. De NRC reexac:ination of Licensee's personnel si=ilarly does not put M-1 in a positica superior to NICL plants. All reactor operators are required to pass IRC examinations prior to receiving a license.

10 C.F.R. Part 55.

137. 2.e Board concludes that dere is ac:ple evidence en de record to justify de treatment of 'IMI-l as an NIOL rather than as an operating reactor for the purposes of shift staffing requirements. 'Ihis treatment is necessary to provide reascnable assurance that 'IMI-l can be operated withcut endangering the heal d and safety of the public.

Oceraticnal' Personnel 138. Licenste intends to cperate 'IMI-l en a six shift rotation, staffed with "six shift supervisors, six shift fors:en,18 centrol room i

l l

operators (at least 12 of sich shall be licensed), and 36 au:ciliarf operatcrs. Hukill, et al., ff. E. 11, 617, at 13.

139. 2.e Staff at ene point was extre::ely concerned with de nu:::ber of qualified senior reactor cperators on Licensee's staff, particularly to support a six-shift rotation. Bis provides little t

allowance for attrition accng SR0s. The Staff witness found the total ru::ber of SRos on Ilcensee's staff to be " barely rargiral", even if all candidates pass the SRO examinatien.

2. 12, 060-61; 12, 063 (Crocker)

(response to &n%n's concerns).

In fact, the Staff witness eg ressed sme concern that licensee muld not have an adequate number of qmH#ied SR0s for restart. Id.

140. Licensee relies on six inc=: bent shift supervisors to staff its six-shift rotation. This leaves no leeway for attrition. Wreover, three of the six shift supervisors have no experience serving in this position while the plant was operational.* Hukill, et al., ff. 2.11, 617, at 16-17.

141. Ilcensee relies en seven incumbent shift formen to staff its six-shift rotation. This leaves little room for attrition. ?m of these shift forec:en cur:ently do not have a Senior Reactor Operator's i

11 cense (Incu= bents D and G).

Three shift forenen have, no' expedence serving in this position sile the plant was operaticral (Incu= bents D, E, and G). Of the r M n h g fcur, each has less than one year's experience servirs, as shift forean while the plant w.s operational. HuV

'.1, et al., ff. W. 11, 617, at 19-22.

142. Licensee relies on six shift technical advisors to staff its six-shift rotaticn. This leaves no room for attriticn. Eukill, et al.,

ff. 2. 11, 617, at 28-29. Although there are also two additional "STA Trainees," these individuals apparently are not sufficiently qualified to serve as an STA.

Id. at 28.

• Inctnbents A and 3 became Unit 1 shift supervisors in July,1979.

Incunbent F became a Unit 1 shift supe: risor in May,1980. -

k 143. Da intent of the CARP uns to prepare approximately 40 licensed R0s and SR0s for an NRC licensing examination. Licensee Ex.

27, at 31. But only 27 Ros and SR0s and 4 RO candidates took the PQS examinations in April of 1980. Id. at 67. Only 16 Ros and 13 SRos (in addition to 7 nonoperational personnel) took the NRC licensing exarinations in April of 1981. Tr. 20, 581 (Newton).

Ta Board's 1

I evaluation rust rest on the assuntion that Licensee will operate the i

plant with a maximum of these 29 operational personnel.

144. In Supplement 1 to the SER, the Staff found that Licensee had provided no plans for training add 4Hmal operators to account for attrition. Staff Ex. 4, at 11. The Staff expressed concerns regarding the numbers of qmlified R0s and SR0s on Licensee's staff. This was based on 20 projected 30 candidates and 13 projected SRO candidates.

Id.

In Supplement 2, the Staff found that Licensee has sufficient R0s l

and SRCs to rectart on a five-shift operation. This was based on 17 projected RO candidates and 13 projected SRO candidates. Staff Ex. 13, at 4-5.

The Staff did not explain why its review was based on a five-shift rotation, *. ten Licensee intends to implenent a six-shift rotation.

l Nor did it explain *ty it reversed its position despite the reduced i

projections of cnnd4 dates who would sit for the NRC examinations.

145. Moreover, the Staff concluded that Licensee has made adequate I

plans for training operators for the long term. This position is not sufficiently supported. Licensee merely stated that the " current authorized manning permits 12 individuals to be in training..."

Staff i

Ex.13, at 5 (emphasis addM). There is no evidence that tFa Licensee r

is training any Ros or SR0s beyond those cited for existing shift l

rotations.

l l

l _ _,-_ _.___

146. The Staff pointed out that Licensee could revert to a five-shift rotation if necessary for safe cperation. Mcwever, this would, in the Staff's opinion, adversely affect regulification training, and would not cogletely resolve the Staff's concerns about the number of g m14#ied SR0s.

E. 12, 064-65 (Crocker/Allenspach). FMv ing the nunber of shifts to five would also require a rearrangement of shift personnel, producing other undesirable results. Licensee deliberately accecpted to train shifts together, as they would operate in the control rocm. >breover, Licensee's expert testified that " stress can be induced in the members of a team who are not accustomed to working with one another. Questions arise regarding division of responsibilities, cmpetence, etc."

Christensen, ff. E. 12, 409, at 10-11. Thus, reduction of shifts or rearrangecent of shift personnel is not a desirable solution.

147. The Board concurs with the Staff's imediate conclusion that, assuming that all of Licensee's ened4 dates receive operators h.icenses, Licensee will have sufficient qualified personnel to restart in the short-term.

Staff Ex. 13, at 5.

Ecwever, the Board does not =. gree that Licensee has demonstrated sufficient arrangecents for training of additional R0s and SR0s.

148. Berefore, the Board directs that a license condition be i= posed requiring a min 4m n of 13 licensed SRos and 16 licensed Kos on Licensee's coerational staff whenever the plant is critical. This is based on Licensee's proposed six-shift rotation, since no eviderre bas been produced on the effect of a five-shift rotatien on Licensee's training program and operator performance. Finally, training cf 12 additenal cperaticnal persennel shall beccee a 1cng-term restart require:ent. Licensee cust demonstrate reascrable progress, prior to..

I restart, toward training 12 additional operational personnel. Reasorable progress shall be defined as the selection and hiring of 12 qualified candidates.

149. 'Ihese measures are necessary to provide reascrable assurance that III-l can be ope ated withcut endangering the health and safety of the public.

Radwaste Staff Recuirecents 150. Itm (5) in ComLssicn Order CLI-80-5 (March 6,1930) inquires

'% tether the Unit 1 Fadiation Waste syste is appropriately staffed with qmlified indiv' Amis to ensure the safe operatien of the facility."

151. The 2E-1 Radwaste organization consists of 25 indiviam1s:

the Supervisor of Radwaste, a radwaste engineer, three radwaste foreran and 20 radwaste werkers. These individuals are responsible for all decontaminaticn, strrage, and preparation for shipping of radwastes at 2E-1.

Hukill, et al., ff. Tr. 11, 617, at 26.

152. The pocition of radwaste engineer is currently vacant. The radwaste engineer is respcnsible for '%riting procedures ard trouble-shooting the systen when problems arise which need inrM4 ate evaluation."

Hukill, et al., ff. Tr.11, 617, at 26 (ec:phasis added). Licensee has not cocritted to filling this position prior to restart, and provides no l

explanation for their deter =ination that this position can be vacant at i

i the +a of restart. Tr.11, 673 (Eukill, et al.). Similarly, the Staff's review of Licensee's radwaste staffir4 failed to address 6.e vacancy in da position of radraste engineer. Staff Ex. 4, at 24-26.

(

153. In light of the lack of depth at the top of this organization, the i=portance of caintaimng an adequate radwtste organization, and i

l i

l 1

the need to separate Lhit i radwaste capabilities frcxn Lhit 2 decontaedration, this vacancy is not acceptable. 24 Staff is directed to certify to the unrission prior to restart dat Licensee has hired a quaHFied, degreed racheaste engineer. An engineer may not be transferred from de BE-2 radwasta program to fill this vacancy.

154. De Board cencludes that filling the position of radwaste engineer is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that SE-1 can be operated ccccurrently with DfI-2 decenre kation withcut endangering de health and safety of de public.

IV. Staff Review of Firmer 4a1 Oralificaticns 155. In the August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing, the Ccmnissien recuired as short-term ite:: 7 that " licensee shall de:cnstrate his firancial qualificaticns to the extent relevant to Fis abilief to cperate 24I-l safely." 24 Cocc:ission exparded en this directive in the March 6,1980 Order en =arage::ent issues, asking 'Vnether Metrcpolitan F41sen possesses the firancid rescurces necessary to safely cperate Wit 1 in additicn to cle&g up thit 2."

CLI-80-5, item 12.

156. D.e IRC Staff propcsed that financial issues be eliminated as i

an issue to be litizated in the proceeding. IRC Staff's Suggestions on Methods to F.xpedite Completion of Pastart Proceeding ard Issuance of a Fe-N Decision to the Cccc:issien (February 3,1981), at 3.

te l

Cccur:nealth agreed that firancial issues need not be censidered in the f

l hearing as a short-term restart issue, but noted that it is still 1

i=pertant for de Licensee to de,.cnstrate its firancial abilief to operate DE-1 si nicanecusly with ie clean-up of ?!I-2 in de icng run.

Tr. 11, 857-60; CLI-81-3, at 3.

I t I

157. 2.e rmrdssion ruled that litization of the firancial issue in the hearing tould not be productive.

Howver, the amissicn also r

directed the Staff to "centinue to conitor the licensee's financial rescurces as long as is necessary and to report any health and safety i=plications to the rmeission." CLI-81-3, March 23,1981, at 9.

Parefore, financial issues have not been eliminated frco Staff review; they have si= ply been eliminated as a li._d. gable issue in the proceeding.*

138. The Board notes with concern that, as of June of 1980 (DfI-l Restart SER), the Staff cencluded that "there are insufficient bases to support a finding en the financ4al qnn14?ications of the licensees to cperate M -1 safely... revised statements by the licensees are required to demonstrate their financial 7:alifications to safely operate and evenez. ally d e miasien ?!I-1."

Staff Ex. 1, at C7-18 to C7-19.

Morecver, the Staff review was based cn de assucocien dat DE-1 tould resume ccanercial cperation in 1981, and depended en futre regulatory actions by de Pennsylvania Public Utility Ccenissicn and the New Jersey Board of Public Jtilities.

Id. at C7-15 to C7-19.

i 159. As of Nove er,1980 (SER Supple:ent 1), and March,1981 (SER l

Supple:ent 2), the Staff still had not made &e recuisite findings rels,tive to Licensee's financial qualificatiens no cperate ?!I-l and decentamirate DE-2.

Staff Ex. 4, at 38; Staff Ex.13, at 10.

Ic0. Supple =ent 3 to the Staff's 21I-1 Restart SER centained no evaluation of finarr421 qualifications. Staff Ex. 14, at 1.

Ccaplete eli-iraticn of finarcial qualificaticns from Staff review is contrary to

• It may be argued dat CLI-81-3 renove all firer 4a1 questions from de jurisdicticn of the Board. ?a Board is not, however, raking any deter:rinaticns relating to the ceritt of financial issues, as prohibited by de Cocnissicn. Rather, the Board is sinply ruling en j

de secpe of de Cmmission's ruling in terrs of post-hearing staff review. The Cocnission will, of course, autxatically review this j

ruling of the Board.

l - - -

the Car:ission ruling that the issue not be litigated in the proceeding, but that continucus staff review be maintained. Berefore, the Staff is directed that fi-c4=1 censiderations rarain as an issue to be considered by de Staff as part of its certification to the Cocmission on the cecpletion of short-ters itens and reascoable progress toward de ca:olecion of long-term iters.

161. Notwithstanding the fact that financial issues may no longer be litigated in de proceeding, the Staff is still required to dete & e prior to restart "that the licensee satisfies the financial qualification criteria i= posed on an applicant for an operating license." August 9, 1979 Order and tbtice of Hearing, slio oo. at 14. He applicable criteria are set forth in 10 C.F.R. 550.33(f), and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. C.

Similarly, the Staff :nst also det ene prior to restart that Licensee " possesses de financial rescurces necessa::f to safely cperate L' nit 1 in addition to cleaning up L' nit 2."

CLI-80-5, item 12.

162. Rese findings cust be based on ran144 tic and up-to-date information. Irgically, the findings need to be based on Licensee's financial ability to caet the restart recuirements prescribed c chis Board and de Cocr:ission. Le " reasonable assurance" standard of 10 C.F.R. 550.33(f) requires a shcwing that the utility has a reasonable fire c43 plan in licht of the relevant circumstances _. Kansas Gas &

Elec. Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit !b.1) A1AB-462, March 9, 1978, 2 NUC. REG. REP. (CG) 130,277.

Respectfully subnitted, no. %

ROBERT W. ADLER Attorney for the Cuau.ealth.

UNIED CTKIES OF MERICA NUCLAR REGUIATORY COMSSION st2ute:, hie ATCMIC SKiETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

)

)

MEIROPOLITAN EDISON COPANY,

)

)

Docket No. 50-289

('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear

)

(Restart)

Station, Lhit No.1)

)

Lt.xtu1CAE OF SERVIG I hereby certify that ccpies of the attached " Cot:renwealth of Pennsylvania's Proposed Findings of Fact and Ccnclusions of law on Panag e ent Issues" were served on the parties on the attacFed service list, this 18th day of May,1981. Parties with an interest in canag ment issues were served by Express Mail.

/

FOBERT W. ADLER At,*g for the Comcmaalth l

l

l h e> S X:ES CT AM!aICA CCZAR N7_a-"RY C:2t'J.SSICt!

!ETCRE FI A:t2CC SAET.Jf MD LI_CDSEC 3CATO n de Pat:ar of

)

)

PI"3CPCLITMI I" ISGI C:2'?X T,

)

)

Docke: Ib. 50-239

(:hree Mlle Isir4 :bclear

)

(Pae: art)

Station, LYl: b.1)

)

SERVICZ t.:ST Cecrge 7. T: :wbridge, Esq&e Dr. Lir.da W. Li:.le Shaw, Pit ~an, Po::s & 2::stridge A:a:zic Safe:7 ard Licensing 3 card Panel 1300 M Screet, N.N.

5000 Her=itage Drive Washing::n, D.C. 200C6 Raleigh, l brth Carolina 27612 Ps. Farjorie M. Aacod:

lbcketir) and Sevice See:icn R.D. 95 Office c ce Secretary Coatesville, Feesf vania 19320 U.S. :Lclear Pag.tlacr: f C:cx::ission l

eshington, D.C. 20535 y potty 3, g,cg, g, %

Anti-tbelaar Gr.1.:p Fapresenting Illyn R. Weiss York (M CRY)

Sheldon, Far rin, Pcf =9mn & Weiss 245 'J. Philadelphia Stree:

1725 : Street, N.W., Sui:e 5C6 York, Pex s/lvarla 17t.04

'Jashingt n, D.C. OCCC6 Ms. Frieria 3cr,t.ill, Ch*-an

. Karin P. Scalden Este. ire (?RO C:ali:1:n f:: :helear ?:%1er Shelden. Har:nn, ?cis=an & Weiss Plan: ?csepencen:

1725 I S=eet, N.W.

Sui:e SC6 2610 Granden Orive Washing =n, D.C.

2CCC6 W4'-d g=n, Celsears 198C8 Jacias A. 2urtello:.e, Esqaire

'r. ?cber: Q. Pollard Office of 2e ?.xeca::ive '.agal Direc=r 6C9 itn:peli c S = eet U.S. :h-ba-Pagalac :f C:x=:issien 3al ".::cre, Ma:yland 21213 Washinge n, D.C.

20535 Wal.c W. C:hei, Escuire' John A. Isr.n. TA.uire C:nstz:ier Ai.ccate Assistan: C:ur.sel Oecar :isn: of Jes:1ce Per.sylva=ia Public U-d"* f ' -Ssien F

Strauter f Sq:are, lith ?*.ccr

?.0. 3cx 3265 Harrisburg, Per sfLvania 17127 Harris!:x..g, ?ex.sylvania 17120 2. Oau.cey Kapferd

?cber: L. Kn:...p, Esgaire Judi:h H. Jctr.srJ.d Assis::an: Solict=r, C:u:.cf of Da.=hin I:riirc: rental cali:icn en bclea

?.0. 3cx ?, 4C7 br-h ?=c: S=eet

?::ww Harrisbt. g, ?ex.sylvania 171C3 633 Criando Avere;e State College, Pe=.sylvarla 16801 Jct = E. Mi: rich, Cair:nn Cau=hin Counef 3 card ci F d *:teners Mr. Steien C. Shelly

• at=hin Counef Ca. truse iY.ial of Conce=ed Scian:is.s Tren: ard Marke: S=eets 1725 I S=eet, N.*4.

Sui:e 601 Harrisbt..g, Pe= sf vania 17101 l

Washing =n, D.C.

20CC6 Jcrdan D. Cu:rdnfj.ac:, Esquire Ms. Icuise Bradfori At=rney for ::e.te= f 7:wnship l

"M: Aler:

T.M.I. Steering C:cr:inee 315 Paffer Stree:

2320 br-h Secera Stree:

Harrist:urg, Ferr.sylvania 1 102 Harrisburg, Ferr.rftvania 17110 Ivan W. S=ith, Isqaire, Chai=an ya: fin ! !.sais A::c:ic Saferf ard Licensi.g 3 card ?anel 6504 3radford Terrace U.S. :hclear Rege.lat:ry F' - tsien

?hi b M -hia, Pe= s/ va.ia 19149 L

Washing =n, D.C. 20555 l

Jane Iae 2. Wal:er H. J rdan R.D. 3, 3cx 3521 l

A:::=ic Saferf and '.1:er. sing 3 card Fanel Inars. Ferrsf'.vania 17319 381 West Cuter Orive Cak ?ldge, Te = essee 37330

• hccas J. Ce=ine. Iscaire Depurf A: =ey Geeral, Civisicn of '.aw Pecri 316,1100 Pa:,tc=d Icule/ar:i

caark, :w Jersey 07102 1

\\

v

.