ML20003J464
| ML20003J464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1981 |
| From: | Daniels F, Gwynn T, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003J460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-81-06, 50-358-81-6, NUDOCS 8105110499 | |
| Download: ML20003J464 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000358/1981006
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0.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT-
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/81-06
Docket No. 50-358
License No. CPPR-88
Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH 45201
Facility Name:
W. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station
Inspection At:
W. H. Zimmer, Moscow, OH
Inspection Conducted: February 2-6, 9-13, 16-20, and 23-27, 1981
R Flo %
Inspectors:
F. T. Daniels
R Ft.d b e-
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T. P. Gwynn
Sr-I-r/
RF ids
Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief
e/-r-7/
Reactor Projects Section 2B
Inspection Summary
Inspection on February 2-6, 9-13, 16-20, and 23-27, 1981 (Report
No. 50-358/81-06)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of previously identified items,
IE Bulletin and Circular followup, plant procedures, preoperational test witness-
ing, and plant tours. This inspection involved a total of 110 inspector-hours
onsite by two hPC Inspectors, including 30 inspector-hours onsite during off-
shifts.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, five were found to be satisfactory, and
one noncompliance was identified in the area of preoperational test witness-
ing (Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased
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Material, Equipment, and Services).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- J. R. Schott, Station Superintendent
- P. E. King, Assistant Station Superintendent
- J. J. Wald, Station Quality Engineer
J. H. Woeste, I&C Engineer
A. L. Mosbaugh, Test Coordinator
A. L. Jenkins, GE Operations Project Manager
R. W. Link, Operations Supervisor
J. Steininger, NSSS Test Coordinator
A. D. Dycus, GE Test Engineer
- W. W. Schweirs, Manager, Quality Assurance
- S. C. Swain, Construction Project Manager
and others of the station staff.
- Denotes those attending monthly exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
(Closed) Noncompliance 80-26-01 - Failure to obtain and verify
corrective action for QA audit findings.
The inspector reviewed the latest revision to 18-QAS-01 to verify
that corrective action commitments were included in the procedural
requirements. The inspector further verified that the indoctrination
session held February 26, 1981, was attended by all auditors qualified
to closeout audit reports.
3.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the
written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin,
that the written response included the information required to be
reported, that the written response included adequate corrective
action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin
and the
'censee's response, that licensee management forwarded
copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management
representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written
respcase was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the
licensee was as described in the written response.
(Closed) IE Bulletin No. 80-17, Supplement 3, Failure of Control
Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR: The inspector verified that
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a Continuous Monitoring System will not be required for this plant.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
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4.
IE Circular Followup
For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for
applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applic-
able to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or
were scheduled to be taken.
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(Closed) IE Circular No. 80-21, Regulation of Refueling Crews
(Closed) IE Circular No. 80-22, Confirmation of Employee Qualification
(Closed) IE Circular No. 80-23, Potential Defect in Beloit Power Systems
Emergency Generators
No items of noncompliance or devations were noted.
5.
Plant Procedures
The inspector reviewed the W . H. Zimmer Procedures Indices for
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compliance with the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.33,
Appendix A.
a.
Procedures Review Findings
Review of controlled copy procedure indices revealed the follow-
ing discrepancies which are considered to be unresolved items:
(1) Station Administrative Directives
There were no administrative controls in place to provide for
visitor control, equipment control (Locking of valves only),
or communications system procedures.
(50-358/81-06-01)
(2) Statica Operating Procedures
There were no procedures for controlling the requirement
to inert /deinert the primary containment (50-358/81-06-02).
(3) Annunciator Response Procedares
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The inspector identified 43 annunciators in the main
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control room for which procedures are not available, and
eight annunciator response procedures whose annunciators
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could not be located. At the time of licensing, there shall
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be an annunciator response procedure for each annunciator.
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(50-358/81-06-03)
(4) Meteorological Monitoring Program
There were no plant procedures to implement the operational
meteorological monitoring program.
(50-358/81-06-04)
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(5) Reli, ability Program
The surveillance requirements of the technical specifica-
tions were not completely covered by the station reliability
program. This was due in part to the evolutionary process
involved in developing the station technical specifications.
At the time of licensing, there shall be surveillance
procedures to cover all technical specification surveillance
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requirements.
(50-358/81-06-05)
b.
Procedure Implementation Controls
(1) The inspector reviewed a cross-section of station administra-
tive, operating, emergency, maintenance, and annunciator
response procedures to determine that review, approval, and
updating had been in accordance with SA. SAD.06, Review,
Approval, Issue, and Revision of Implementing Procedures;
that control of new and superceded procedures had been
accomplished in accordance with DC. SAD.01, Document Control;
.and that working copies located in the control room were
the same as the current revision in the central files.
(2) The inspector reviewed the operations supervisor's night
orders and operating memoranda to verify that they were
issued in accordance with SA. SAD.07, Administrative Memo-
randums, and OS. SAD.01, Station Operations, and that such
orders were not being used in place of procedures requiring
review and approval. The inspector identified an operating
memorandem dealing with operations surveillance of Peabody
Magnaflux activities onsite. This operating memorandum will
be revised to reflect the current radiographic contractor.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
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6.
Preoperational Test Witnessing
The inspector witnessed the performance of preoperational testing in
an attempt to verify that the most current revision of the procedure
was available and in use; that minimum crew requirements were met;
that test prerequisites were met; that proper plant systems were in
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service; that special test equipment required by the procedure was
calibrated and in service; that the test performance was as required
by the procedure; that data was collected for final analysis by the
proper personnel; and that administrative requirements for testing
were observed by test personnel.
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a.
Standby Gas Treatment System PO-VG-01
The inspector witnessed limited portions of the logic testing
for VG train "B".
Further observations are required in this
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preoperational test. The following items were brought to the
attention of the cognizant System Engineer:
(1) SU.ACP.05, Section 6.3.5-requires that if special test
equipment is used to collect data, either on data sheets
or in the body of the procedure, the instrument identi-
fication shall be recorded with the date. This require-
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ment was not being followed by the System Engineer.
The inspector brought this adsinistrative requirement to
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the attention of the System Engineer who stated that this
requirement would be followed in the future. Subsequent
checking by the inspector verified that this requirement
was being implemented.
(2) Step 7.2.2.6 requires verification of a Reactor Building
Ventilation (VR) System trip by observation of specific
conditions on a data sheet. This included verification
that exhaust fan IC be " tripped". The actual condition
of the fan was noted by the System Engineer as being "0FF".
(The VR exhaust fan IC was tagged out of commission.)
When questioned by the inspector, the System Engineer
agreed to evaluate this condition with respect to test
objectives. Subsequently, the System Engineer committed
to a re-test of this portion of the logic system using
VR exhaust fan IC as part of the repair work request.
This item is considered to be unresolved and will be
followed up in a future inspeccion.
(50-358/81-06-06)
b.
Local Leak Rate Testing PO-PC-1B
The inspector witnessed several attempts to perform a local leak
rate (Type "C") test of the feedwater check valves for feedwater
loop "A".
To date, no satisfactory leak rate data has been re-
corded. Further observations are required in this preoperational
test. The following items were brought to the attention of the
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cognizant System Engineer:
(1) There are presently no specific instrutte s for the
use of the leak rate test rig. Prior to the latest
revision to the test procedure, the manual for the
Volumetrics Leak Rate Tester was appended to the
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procedure. When the decision was made to replace the
volueetrics tester with a locally fabricated test rig,
no provision was made to include instructions for its
use.
(2) The test procedure specifies the use of a Volumetrics
Tester or equivalent. A locally fabricated fis e-rate
test rig was in use and was deemed " equivalent" by the
System Enr,ineer, however, no documentation was available
to support this equivalency.
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(3) The inspector attempted to verify traceability of cal-
ibratior. records for measuring and test equipment being
used to the National Bureau of Standards.
In particular,
the inspector reviewed vendor calibration certificates
for the two rotameters being used to determine acceptance
criteria data for type "C" containment local leak rate
testing (rotameters No. 8005 H 08039 and No. 8005 H 50121,
Emerson Electric Company. Hatfield, PA). This vendor did
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not appear on the licensee's list of approved vendors and
Electric Production Department procedures did not require
knowledge of the vendors' QA/QC program prior to obtaining
calibration services. This is in noncompliance with
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII and the
W'. H. Zimmer
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FSAR, Section 17.2.7.1, which states in part that potential
supplier of nuclear quality-related items (material, equip-
ment, and services) are required to submit their ability to
meet purchase order and/or specific requirements, and that
an acceptable QA/QC program is a prerequisite to award of
work.
(50-358/81-06-07)
c.
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System PT-RD-02
The inspector participated in the witnessing of this preopera-
tional test. For specific details concerning this test
witnessing, refer to IE Inspection Report No. 50-358/80-08.
7.
Plant Tours
The inspectors conducted frequent plant tcurs throughout this
a.
inspection period. The below listed items were identified and
the licensee is taking or has taken appropriate corrective action:
(1) Birds were observed flying throush the area of the refueling
floor with the reactor vessel open and uncovered.
(2) General area cleanliness on the refueling floor was found to
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have deteriorated. Several items were observed on the refuel-
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ing floor which were not entered in the material accountability
log.
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(3) Cable trays throughout the reactor building were observed
to contain rags, cigarette packages, tools, a carpenters
level, a piping hanger, welding equipment, candy wrappers,
and cigarette butts.
(4) A hydraulic snubber was observed lying on the floor of
the LPES room over a long period of time.
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(5) The RHR B&C room was found to be cluttered with trash.
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(6) Scaffolding in the RCIC room was found to be supported
by conduit and a seismic restraint.
(7) A fire hose on the middle level of the suppression pool
was found to be pressurized.
(8) On several occassions, nitrogen, oxygen, argon and acetylene
bottles were found free-standing near safety-related equipment.
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(9) A permanent cable marker was found to be ripped off cable
RD 286.
(10) A lit cigarette was found burning on oil soaked, non-fire
retardant plywood flooring in the suppression pool.
(11) The hanger storage area fence was found ripped open.
(12) Full trash cans were stored at the bottom of the southeast
reactor building stairwell.
(13) A plug was found to be missing from the suppression pool
spray header directly above the south exit of the suppres-
sion pool.
(14) Instrument rack H22-P073 had blue color-coded labels
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(identifirs ESS Division II) although the rack was
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actually part of the yellow train (ESS Division I).
(15) Instrument rack H22-P027 had a broken cable conduit.
(16) A potential fire hazard was identified in an area where
a previous fire had taken place.
(17) The refueling bridge was located over the open reactor
cavity for adjustment with several items of uncontrolled
temporary equipment aboard. These items included the
following:
(a) an extension cord
(b) a Simpson VOM
(c) a yellow lifting strap
(d) a large metal clamp and associated hardware
(e) a small comealong
(f) thirty-two (32) engineering drawings
(g) several heavy metal parts of tie refueling
bridge itself.
8.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of
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noncompliance, or deviations. Six unresolved items disclosed during
this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5.a.(1), 5.a(2), 5.a(3),
5.a(4), 5.a(5) and 6.a(2).
9.
Management Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on Feoruary 27, 1981. The inspectors
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summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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