ML20003J224
| ML20003J224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/30/1981 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003J225 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8105110069 | |
| Download: ML20003J224 (76) | |
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10 Thursday, April 30, 1981 z
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<3 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.
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JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman, presiding.
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BEFORE:
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JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman of the Commission y
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15 l VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner
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y JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 5
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l ALSO PRESENT:
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i MARK MILLS, Director, Washington Office a
20 l Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy i
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MIRO TODORIVOCH, Executive Director 1
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l 22 l THE HON. DIXY LEE RAY, Membe" I
23 DR. ALFRED SCHNEIDER, American Association of l
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j DR. MELVIN CARTER, Health Physics Scciety 25 l (Cont'd) l l
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DR. CORWIN RICKARD, American Nuclear Society
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DR. FREDERICK SEITZ, Chairman, SE2
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4 DR. JOHN SUNUNU, Member, SE2
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LESLIE DUGAN, Western Coordinator, SE2 5
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2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's come to order.
The 3
Commission meets this afternoon to hear from representatives of 4
scientists and engineers for secure energy.
This meeting is one
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5 of a series over which the Office of Public Affairs of the 3e i
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lities, and I think what we will ask Mr. Fouchard to do is 8
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carry on the introduction from there.
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9 MR. FOUCHARD:
Thank you, sir.
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10 As the Commission knows, and I suspect many others in E
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Our last one was in February, and this organization a
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contacted us before that meeting.
Unfortunately, our table was 5
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with us here today, and I think Mark Mills is going to introduce w
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the representatives at the table, and so I suggest we proceed.
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19,i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We welcome you all here.
Please xn 20 ;
so ahead, Mark.
21 l MR. MILLS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate 7
I 22 the opportunity.
23 To start off, I am, as you can see, the Director of the newly opened Washington Office of SE2, and on my right is 24j the Executive Director from New York City, Miro Tcdcrovich, who li 25 I
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1 will be presenting Dr. Frederick Seitz' statement, who
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I will relinquish my seat to 3
Dr. Seitz, who is the Chairman of SE2, when he arrives.
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5 Governor, Dixy Lee Ray, who will be representing today SE2, a 4
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b rief statement.
And on her right is Dr. Alfred Schneider, who R
7 is representing Dr. Lynn Weaver, who sits as the Chairman of j
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On his right is Dr. Melvin Carter, who comes as a Y
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together some kind of representation of the, if you like, bi-3=
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
All right.
Where would you like to l
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start?
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DR. TODOROVICH:
Mr. Chairman, before I go into the l
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midwife.
We are happy that our letter did elicit response, that l
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at the table are people who are of longer standing in these
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for the next two hours.
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2 Now, as far as SE2 is concerned, we greatly appreciate 3
the opportunity afforded us.
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4 We are approaching the Commission because the e
5 American society faces some very serious problems, in our b
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AlthoMgh there is clear evidence at every corner of R
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our industrialized world that we have inherited the legacy of M
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the most successful four centuries of human existence, our dd 9
productive ship-of-state is, nevertheless, sailing into the z
10 doldrums and drifting almost to a halt.
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5 11 Many voices in our nation speak out loud and clear
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12 I but we build less and less.
We appear to be becoming a huge 2
3 13 debating society which lacks the mechanism to decide the winners.
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14 l The difficulty hinges not so much on what is s
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desirable or what the goals should be.
The great tradition of 5
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humanitarian philosophy which demands equal opportunity for all, w
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19 l What has brought us to the brink of paralysis in most X
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manage our daily affairs.
To build or create anything, one i
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We are clearly not short o f ideas -- in fact, some 25 b elieve that we may actually be approaching a state of a
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intellectual indigestion Srought on by our appetite for 2
information and an unpredecented pursuit of scientific and
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3 technical research.
4 The means are also there.
Currently, at least, they 1
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are much more abundant than during our earlier human history b
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of nations from relatively untrained manpower and raw materials.
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Today, however, the processes for making decisions seem to d
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entwine itself into a giant Gordian Knot at almost every level.
10 l I will dispense from giving you all the examples that l
I 3j 11 we found of such difficulty to come to decisions, and I hope E
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Recently, for example, a press report listed the w
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of the licensing of a nuclear power plant.
According to an 18 l
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article in the April 11, 1981 edition of Newsday, the NRC has x
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20 i identified a total of 61 open items that must be resolved before 21l the Long Island Lighting Company can get a license to cperate l
l 22 its Shoreham Muclear Power Plant.
The items cover a broad range l
23 o f variab le s, including the viability of cooling, fire l
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orotection, mechanical systems, and so on.
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Some 35 such open items in need of resolution were i
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1 identified by the NRC at Commonwealth Edison's LaSalle Reactor.
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2 Another 103 were identified at Pennsylvania Powerjand Light's 3
Susquehanna Plant.
4 Official spokesmen de emphasize that these unresolved
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6 power plants.
Yet the financial world is still alarmed enough R
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for the San Francisco Chronicle to announce last Sunday the X
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Another press report des'cribed malformations in young i
h 10 crickets hatched from eggs exposed to synthetic fuels.
Ej 11 Combining precedent with a little bit of imagination, cne can U
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14 licensing of a completed synthetic fuel plant.
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15 The list of cases can be enlarged further, but what 5
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has been noted suffices to reveal the pattern.
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18 which has given us such a great riches and opportunities, as if
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it were full of unacceptable dangers.
They seem willing, 5
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therefore, to support an implicit premise that we should expend 21!
a good part of our available energies in an attempt to put the l
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scientific and technological genie back into its bottle.
23 If Voltaire were to write his famous nove, Candide, 24{
today, he would probably concoct a stcry of the worst possible f
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indefatigable dedication of legally trained regulators who are I,
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aided by cherubic intervenors.
3 The facts about our civilization are, however, quite
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continues to increase, unabated.
Americans live a healthier and e
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7 fuller life than ever before, with education and the benefit of M
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the arts accessible to everyone.
We offer more hope and dc 9
opportunities to women and our minority populations than any i
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Ej 11 Nuclear technologies for the peaceful use of the atom 3
6 12 have established a safety record second to none.
Most cancer 3md 13 deaths are on the decline, and the U. S.
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cancer casualties, behind Finland, Ireland and Scotland, for d
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greater use of the atomic nucleus rather than curtail its 5;
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application.
How is it, then, that to a large extent the NRC 5
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seems guided by a distinctly contrary perception?
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In SE2's assessment, the Commission's operational t
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impasse is a result of some very fundamental philosophical 23 misconceptions which have led to the current, unwieldly, 24,
regulatory framework.
25 it is true that the present state of affairs has been i
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reached gradually and that the recent Sholly case lies onlyt.at r'
2 the end of a long road.
3 However, it is also true that the current ma:e-like 4
regulatory setup is not the cause of the NRC's attitude, but is e
5 the direct consequence of certain unscrutinized conceptual 3nj 6
assumptions which, over the years, have crept into the R
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Commission's way of performing its work.
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High on the list of such original sins, if I may call d=
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Logicians have long z
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The emphasis is on "never."
One is ma E
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Every Ccmmission staff member
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must know that statements such as " event A can never happen" w=
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or "this machine or procedure is completely safe" cannot be I
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dealth with in a report.
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Still, when confronted by the question, "is this 21 i power plant absolutely safe," the Commission has been willing to 22 devote time to generating regulatory prescriptions which should 23 make it safer.
This approach caused many delays and made 24 plants more expensive, although it did not make them, could not j
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After this round, the inquisitors would again approach
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the Commissicn with the same question, "is it absolutely safe,"
3 and the Commission would again oblige by adding further 4
regulatory orders to attempt to achieve even greater safety, 5
thereby adding further costs and commensurate construction
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7 At present, the number of such iterations has brought 8
construction costs and delays to the point where the U. S.
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9 nuclear industry and some of the more technologically advanced io i
10 l utilities are on the verge of financial collapse.
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l 11 l Even though it seems inclined to continue on this D
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12 l road towards achieving even greater unqualified safety, the NRC 5
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or profession asked to provide absolute performance.
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the counter-question, " safe compared to what," e st ab lish 5
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reasonable camparative standards, and proceed expeditiously to 21!
license plants which satisfy such clearly delineated criteria I
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of sufficiency.
23 This approach would not rule out either. justifiable 24 reviews or the incorpcration in an orderly fashicn of meaningful 4
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p ro grams.
At would, however, have to be based on a conscicus,
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well-articulitted decision by the Commission to abandon its past 2
quest for absolute safety or other logically impossible utopias.
3 A second fundamental error in the Commission's 4
procedures seemed to be to allow variants of the adversarial 5
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Indeed, in cases where the witnesses cannct even agree X
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on the color of the getaway car, there is a legitimate need for d
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the process of discovery, cross-examination, vigorous zo 10 presentation by prosecution and defense, and the final 5
11 assessment of reasonable doubt by an impartial jury.
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Regulgtory Commission are technical in nature and can be 5
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Further confirmations, if s
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necessary, can be reached by a consortium of experts.
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16 l The law, of course, requires URC to use the basic s
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Nevertheless, it seems Ew 3
18 that the Commission has not only permitted wholesale intrusion P
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19 l of the procedural preferences of the legal procession -- an M
20 i apparent surrender to the habits of the :.;ostly legally trained l
21l intervenors -- into the conduct of its affairs, but has 1
22 acquiesced in the proliferation of legalistic maneuvers beyond 23 any reasonable bounds.
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It suffi :ies here to quote the remarks by Senater 25 Alan Simosen T.ade during the last month's Senate Subcommittee on b
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Nuclear Regulations' hearings.
The subcommittee met in an
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2 attempt, among other things, to graps the full extent of the 3
legalistic stranglehold restricting the. Commission's decision-(
4 making capabilities.
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rprised, myself, in reviewing the rules, the procedural rules e
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of the Commission, to find that in many cases they are more 3
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complex than the federal rules of civil procedure; theyeare more d
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That is really zo 10 extraordinary in their complexity, layering upon layering, E
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what often chokes off the process in this burg, and that is z
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14 l and that is even rather sometimes embarrasssing, I must admit 9
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15 j to you, because that -- as I see it -- is exactly where much of E
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17 l Senator Simpson also suggested:
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19 b ut I perceive other subcommittee members of both sides of the x
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aisle will and want to look into a retooling of the procedures,
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the legal procedures of this Commission.
It seems to me that i
22 h after practicing law for 13 years...the rules of procedure were i
23 set up to simplify an issue, and yet I look at these rules and j
24 see things about discovery and summary proceedings and hearings 25 and appeals that are flights of fancy, in my mind, and I don't l
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1 know what they do to make the process work.
But, I think a 1
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2 retooling of procedures, surely that can be done administratively, 3
but we ought to inject perhaps a few layment into the next NRC
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5 pick some poor soul who doesn't know a sua sponte from a b
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SE2 strongly concurs with the senator's remarks.
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wonder who in this Commission, which deals with some of the d
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most scientific and technical subject matters encountered by i
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12 Senator Simpson may inadvertently have provided an
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14 l considering the lawyers, experts and the rest, as laymen.
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2 15 A third departure from time tested and time honored w*
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16 l governmental practices lies in the decision of the Commission to r
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18 i democracy in its dealings with the public.
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19 ll According to the practitioners of this political 5
20 approach, traditional forms of governance should, at most, be l
I 21l tolerated only an anavoidable relics of the past and, whenever 1
22 possible, be used for the advancement of the views of a j
i 23 particular group wnich believes it possesses some deeper, or i
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Thus, social groups, which are predcminantly l
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anti-nuclear in their political disposition, will go along with (m
2 the procedures of the Congress, administrative agencies, and the 3
courts as long as such procedures support the goals of delaying, 4
and eventually halting various nuclear proj ects.
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of the rational technological argument, manage to bring the R
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decision-making process close to a constructive resolution, such Al 8
doctrinaire groups promptly resort to extra-legal means, or take d-9 to the streets, in order to reach over the head of the regular zOy 10 and legitimate political process.
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of the last two decades.
Democratic thinkers of all times have 5
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wrestled with the difficult question of how to safeguard the u
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certifiable majority.
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On this question, various nations have often taken w
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There are differences between the French n
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19 i and American administrative procedures and also between Sweden i
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and Germany.
Yet each such procedure has been designed to 21l secure a satisfactory degree of governmental efficiency within 22 the d3mocratic context.
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Over the years, the 'mC has apparently yielded to i
24 pressure on this important point and termitted the trans forma-l 25 tion of its rules of crder and practice to permit a series of i
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open-ended, participatory discussions with no securely 2
acertainable time scale for termination.
3 We have tried in the rest of this presentation to give f '-
4 examples of each of these kinds of being wrong in matters of 5l principle.
One of those that we approached this Commissica e
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6 already is the question os siting criteria, where in one of the
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proposed amendments the Commission was proposing to move away 8
from the radiation conce:.'n being the dominant and metamorphosing I
d 9l' it in one focusing on population density.
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10 Again, the Commission will be asked whether the new z
i 11 approach is producing more safety, and again the NRC, if it
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implements such an approach, will try to make plants safer by z
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13 relocating them in less populace areas.
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14 l We predict, however, that after a few iterations o,f d
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While SE2 thus considers the new approach of the NRC i
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to be demonstrably wrong, we sincerely hope that in its revamped 5
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state the Commission's decision-making apparatus will finally f
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rely on an evaluation of comparative risks, and certain, l
22 l reasonable and satisfactory safety criteria which reflect to a 23 considerable degree the favorable perforrance record of nuclear 24 technologies.
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predominantly legalistic functioning was underscored during the 2
Senate hearings on March 25th of 1981 on;the case of the
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so-called sister power plants.
Here is just a little narration
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4 by William Lee, President and Chief Operating Officer of the e
5 Duke Power:
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6 "It seems ironic to me that duplicate plants can be 2
7 built, maybe in the same state, or an adjoining state, where the 2
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In the one case, there is d
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sufficient public concern about the plant so that someone i
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In another case, they don't intervene.
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11 of the plant where there is no intervention, there is no hearing la p
12 by a hearing board and no consideration by the appeals board,
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14 elect ~icity."
2 15 In the case of the sister plant, as often happens, u
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much more than the costs of the others which have not been w=
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18 contested, and the answer is that at the end, when Senator 5
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19 l Simpson inquired whether this added hearing time added anything a
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to public health and safety, the answer was:
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" Senator, I am not aware of anything substantive.
22 There may have been one or two instances where additional 23 '
surveillance frequency was required as part of a license 24 ;
requirement of scme variable but nothing fundamental with respect
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Well, if one reviews ---
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2 COMMISSIONEL GILINSKY:
Whose answer was that?
3 DR. TODOR0VICH:
Of Mr. Lee from Duke Power.
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4 We are asking here the Commission to really review its
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past thinking and see whether its methodology can survive 5j 6
serious scrutiny from many angles mentioned.
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We only wish, in conclusion, to emphasize that in our
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opinion the commissioners do not need to commence a new dd 9
biblical retreat into the desert in order to organize their i
h 10 thoughts regarding the appropriate steps to be taken by the NRC.
El 11 Any such procrastination would be equivalent to U
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13 i b rought the Commission's liernsing processes to a virtual g
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2 15 The NRC's work has been scrutinized sufficiently by a w
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16 multitude of onlookers to make it possible to design blueprints w
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=H; 19 l Let us move out of the current regulatory stagnation a
20 l by underscoring the NRC's primary statutory respcnsibilities and i
i 21 facilitate the nation's safe use of nuclear technologies for the i
22 i benefit of all citizens.
23 Cn behalf of SE2, I once again want to express our 24 l appreciation to the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission for allowing 25,
us to present our views at this time, i
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Very good.
Vic.
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2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It sounds like we ought to take 3
time out to slit our wrists.
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Vic, if that is the message 5
that you got ---
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Dr. Ray.
7 DR. RAY:
Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I want to say
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I 10 visit the H Street Building and see so many old friends.
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13 l different room, and on the opposite side of the table.
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taking to listen to concerns that I am sure are felt by a w
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throughout the country.
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there are others prepared to speak, 00o.
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So, I want only to say a ftw words in further suppor:
1 22 I of wha: Professor Todorovich has already presented.
23 '
He used the term, cuoting the Los Angeles Times, 24 :
that we are seeing the " sunset of nuclear pcwer."
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Los Angeles Times, if there is some way to reach tnem, that if
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value a human life?
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l 20 good old fashioned common sense, to acknowledge and recognize 21 that there are risks in everything, and that human beings are 22 fallab le, and anything human beings do is fallable, and there l
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But that is true for all enerev l
24 sources, even the oldest ones and ones with which we hm <e the l
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Even when it comes to re.diation, there are many people
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say, in the control of levels of exposure in nuclear power
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where the levels of radiation are so high that one would not be I
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It would not be permitted 7
in a nuclear power plant.
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El 11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It would be interesting, O
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and in some instances is talking about making mandatory 22 conservation measures that without any question increase the 23 '
hazard and exposure to radiation beyond levels that would be 24 l, permitted by NEC, and quite appropriately so.
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measurable and documented. increase of radon gas by antrapment I
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charges.
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little -- some would say really no substantial increase in 23 safety through the operating license procedures, to hold up for 24 such a long period of time at such high ccsts the generation of I
25 electricity has raised serious questiens and sericus doubts in l
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the minds of most people who are familiar with the problem.
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restructuring of its procedures, perhaps, and at the st. a time' e
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13 l CRAIRMAN RENDRIE:
Very good.
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mg 14 DR. SCHNEIDER:
Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, the z
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Engineering Societie1 appreciates this opportunity to present its
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Dr. Weaver, the chairman of the coordinating ccamittee, i
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24q his regrets.
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1980, the coordinating committee concluded that "The United 2
States cannot possioly refrain from pursuing the nuclear option 3
vigorous ly. "
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utilization of nuclear fission for electric power generation 5
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plants cannot operate because of a maze of legalistic 23 complications, seldom related to real safecy aspeccc.
24 Our prevsious and, especially, present administrations l 8
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been voiced unequivocally by Members of the United States
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We hope that the actions 3
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expediting the issuance of nuclear power plant licenses are 5
indicative of a genuine effort to remedy a highly unsatisfactory e
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racilities.
1 25l With time, the conviction developed within the :iRC, as,
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well as industry, that full compliance with these regulations 2
will inevitably assure safe operations.
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erroneous approach.
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Island is that the most effective function of the regulator is
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of what constitutes an acceptable degree of risk or a sufficient I
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licensing system will continue to levitate between the pressing 21,
demands of responding to numerous problems requiring prompt l
actions and the idealized concept of absolute safety.
22 23 A ranking of safety related matters is imperative if 24 our limited financial, technical and manpower resources are to 25 b.e used in an effective manner.
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We strongly support the suggestions by the Advisory
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operations of the nuclear industry.
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Public hearings, public comments, public speeches, 21 press releases and other manifestations of our democratic 22 !
system cannot substitute for a reliable, dedicated and 23 technically competent enforcement organi::at ion.
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l obligation in seeing to it that those of our fellow engineers l
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properly trained for their mission and continue to uphold the
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licensing and regulatory systems for other activities of the
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3 The enforced deferment of reprocessing 31nce 1977 has 4
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reactivate the reprocessing of spent fuel should go a long way l
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construction, operation and regulation of the nuclear industry.
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Whether nuclear energy will eventually live up to the x
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expectations of its developers in being a clean, reliable, safe, 21 l economical and lasting source of energy nay be decided during 22 '
the next decade by the success or failure of our regulatory 23 system.
I 24l Thank you.
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.I 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you.
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MR. CARTER:
A couple of things.
I have just what
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statement, which I will leave with you and you can read at your
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Commission is concerned, and some that are fairly critical, and a"
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American public's advocate and safeguarder in its mandated p.
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5 many others, the participation by public groups, professional E
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submit that as far as the NRC is concerned that you indeed could i
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particular process having been involved on a personal basis in h
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processing of high level waste, again a public participation
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regulatione.
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could be asked based on the last few years of accumulation of
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people problems.
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this condition, I think overshadows, influences and permeates
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singly or in groups, I would submit that there is probably no i
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one thing in the nuclear business that has either riveted their 23 '
attention, focused their attention, if you will, confused and 24 )
bewildered them as much as this particular thing.
l 25 1 I don't know if you could find a good analogy.
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probably would liken it to some extent to the kid that has gotten m
2 dirty, you know, and he needs to be bathed.
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usually go ahead and bathe him, and, you knew, instead of doing
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friends and relatives, we could call in the members off the
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17 'l thank each of you for spending your afternoon in this for= and a
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business a considerable period of time.
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'de come 00 this roca, I am sure, frc= differen:
21 backgrounds and different perspectives, but we come here, I 3
22 i would hcpe, in the spirit of cooperation as far as our nuclear i
23 situation, our nuclear industry, the perceptien cf this, if ycu t
i 24 will, by the public, by professional groups, and so fcrth.
And 25l I thank you again for allcwing me to be par: Of that process.
3 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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MR. MILLS:
Dr. Rickard.
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I also appreciate very much this 3
opportunity to just sit with you here, and I also have a state-("'
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health and safety of the public while providing the benefits of w
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of all of us that are participating in the scientific and w
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respcnsibility.
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supportive of the official responsibility that you all have in i
i 22 l the Commission, and so we don't feel at all that we are l
23 adversaries with you, but we are allies in trying to acccmplish i
24 -
the s ame thinz.
l 25 I needn't remind you at all, I know, on the ANS, but Il I
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will do it anyway.
It is a non-profit, scientific and I
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members.
All of these members are scientists, engineers and t
4 educators from the university, from the government, many from a
5 the NRC staff itself, from private laboratories, and industry.
b 6l This group of scientists and engineers have gotten R
7 together and we have provided a way to produce public policy
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8 statements which are the considered opinions and judgments of dn 9
the society in matters related to nuclear science and zo 10 technology.
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statements bear upon this discussions that we are having here
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15 f AMS members are fully aware of their professional 5
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fields.
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the ANS to do j ust this.
The NRC can and should look upcn 22 technical societies as a source of technical data and technical 23 jud6ments on generic problems and issues.
24 In the ANS, the nuclear reactor safety divisicn, a 25 whole division of the society, the reacecr operaticns divisioc, t
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another full division, and the very substantial nuclear 2
standcrds activity, which our standards committees carry on, 3
bear directly upcn the future of good nuclear regulation, and
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4 much that you have to do with, a
5 Effective nuclear safety rests upon a matrix of 5
6, scientific and engineering judgments.
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7 judgments but judgments nevertheless.
We urge that the decisions 8
continue to be based on technical facts and opinions, and that i
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Y 10 The judgments need to be made on a timely basis and Ej 11 on technical facts and scientific and engineering data after an U
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have many excellent technical people to draw upon to continue I
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the excellent nuclear safety record that we have, l
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so that the expert technical judgments in nuclear safety can E
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The fundamental safety philosophy established in the t
21l earliest days of nuclear energy of redundancy, diversity and l
22 i cefense in depth has served the practice of nuclear safety very 23 '
well.
24 With respect to protecting the public, and despits t
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All of us know there is no absolute safety in any
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construction, operation and management of nuclear energy can
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even while at the present nuclear energy risks are small Xl 8
compared with other forms of energy production.
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h II a statement entitled "The Comparative Risk of Different Methods U
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of Generating Electricity. "
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production or the societal risks to which we are exposed in our a
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21l "The consecuence of poor decisions in the development i
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i 25i "This positien statement censiders studies of the I
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comparative risks of several electrical energy sources, as well k
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5 than the available alternatives. "
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nuclear safety.
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focuses on these areas.
24 The future of nuclear regulation must achieve a mucn 23 grenter degree of stability and predictability if it is to be ln 3
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effective.
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technical sense can be greatly furthered by successful I
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nuclear steam supplies and balance of plant designs.
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It must serve as a vehicle 22 for removing excessive and costly requirements that don't i
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contribute their share to safety while directing safety research 24 L
and design activities to those areas with the creates OayOff.
1 25j PRA requirenents and studies should not be needlessly I
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added to existing deterministic safety requirements to that l
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3 The ANS has issued several other public policy (3
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Adequacy of Light Water Reactor Emergency Core Cooling Systems."
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"A Statement on Fuel dd 9
Cycle Centers," a third one on "High Level Radioactive Waste i
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the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on the licensing of aa E
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time, and these will be forthecming.
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energy to society witn stability in the licensing precess, i
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24 I brought along with me, j ust in case there were any i
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that you had here before, Mr. Angie Giambusso.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you.
Other comments, Mark?
3 MR. MILLS:
Open to questions.
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4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let me ask my colleagues.
Victor?
5 COMMISSION R GILINSKY:
You go ahead.
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No, but Vic, you were here Al 8,
longer.
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somewhat better at the development of program plans than at f].
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with how it ought to be used.
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your own people, the ?egovin group pointed out Oc you that we 4
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Now, I don't know quite how to get out of that for the 2
long run.
The proposition of a power worthiness certificate is 3
in my view a highly -- a good possibility and one we ought to 4
look at more closely than we are.
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to the political process.
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25 j a creature of the underlying statutes that establish us and of a
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the direction that we get from the Congress, to the extent that 2'
there is a net direction certainly.
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extent.
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t o s ome o f t hem.
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would like to make a comment.or raise some questions.
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2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY.
I don't have a lot to add.
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instructions you can give to those who are building the plant 25 and more efficient the process is cuite apart of any effect on i
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Is there any reason that you know of, 5
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here a couple of years ago, why, we would be working now on
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g talking with GE but hadn't come to terms when the effort sicwed n
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balance of clant.
22 l What you really need is the complete plant, because 23 the auxiliaries are very important, and what happens in a 24 1 review, we could see it occurring when we were doing those 25 t
p raliminary design approvals, is that if the only thing that you J
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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have got in-house ahead of time that you have reviewed is the
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the balance of plant that you get the balance of plant as a i '
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DR. RAY:
These things are a real step forward.
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Of course.
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When you can't even achieve standard design z
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Inc redib le.
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Occasionally, a railroad would make 5
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the s ame set of plans, and maybe even once three.
But by and 22 f large each of those steam locomotives was a unique design, and 23 Hamilton and the other manufacturers loved it, and the railroad j
l 24 engineers loved it because each of them had his professional f
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Then the General Motors Company came along and said, 2 l hey, we are going to provide diesel engines for you as
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Could I j ust offer you an additional
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same, but we do have very good standards so that the structural 5
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those standards into the design of a school can ensure the l
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not necessary to have the construction drawings that go to the
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against a safe standard, for that system.
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I agree with you as an engineer.
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May I interj ect something that is 23 '
relevant to this and a little bit c1cser to the question of 1
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in Belgrade who seemed to be a very wise man, but didn't really
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uncle s aid, b ut, you know, he knows so much that he really 4
doesn't know how to decide.
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industry with essentiall'1 a better record than anything before, l
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I see Dr. Seitz has been able to b
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Welcome.
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Thank you.
I am sorry I couldn't be with aj 8
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We have had a good discussion going E.
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Perhaps you would like to make some comments.
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No.
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It could well be.
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present time any more regulation in the transportation of w
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radioactive materials.
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So, I would see this time element, the passage of time, 2
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that, you know, rightly or wrongly, hearings were offered on l
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So, in a certain technical sense, while we have other 2
concerns where it is much more difficult to pinpoint when safe 3
is safe, the question of the Three Mile Island cleanup is,'in a 4
certain sense, a very, very straightforward question, and yet e
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Let me give you a couple ---
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Thank you, sir.
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Metropolitan Edison to accelerate the cleanup of Three Mile 22 '
Island.
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money.
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cleanup of the water in the containment building.
t 25 DR. TODOROVICH:
May I say, as a T. ember o f the public, !
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that what comes to me on the pages of the New York Times is l
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counter example, 4
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The representative on your G
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i 25l DR. RAY:
The whole cuestion of public arception and l
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how it is influenced by press reports is something that could c.
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license side, could have a very beneficial effect.
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There is a disagreement about i
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It would be nice if it would shcw.
25 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Nell, I think it will show, and i
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we have, among other things, submitted a proposal to the f])
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Does that really require congressional i
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I thought that could be done.
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I don't think that we have done much in the way of a
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We appreciate that remark.
We will do 25 that.
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One other thought that I had, Con =issioners, was,
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taken away from those places.
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Let me comment on that, if I might.
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6 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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yellow or blue, but essentially to color them some kind of shade
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DR. RAY:
All of those people for their livelihoods 21 depend upon a job here which, in turn, depends upon having 22,
nuclear power plants.
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working oneself out of a job.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION This-is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPEISSION in the matter of: Meeting With Representatives of Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy Date of ?roceeding:
Thursday, April 30, 1981 Docket li u m b e z :
? lace of ?roceeding: Rnnm 1130. 1717 u st. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the eriginal transcrip therect fer the file of the Commission.,
Marilynn M. Nations Official Reporter (Typed)
Official Reperter (Signature) e
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March h 1981 CHAIRMAN Dr. Frederick Seitz Chairman e
Scientists and Enginu /s for Secure Energy, Inc.
1225 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036
Dear Dr. Seitz:
This responds to your letter of February 9,1981 concerning the recent meetings the Comission has held with representatives of the Atomic Industrial Forum, the League of Women Voters, the Sierra Club, Critical Mass Energy Project, the National Consumers League, and the Equal Justice Foundation.
These meetings are part of an NRC effort to broaden the agency's outreach and to understand better the views of a number of organizations with a variety of perspectives on the future of nuclear regulation. As our Director of Public Affairs, Mr. Fouchard, indicated at the outset of the February 4,1981 meet-ing, we have received indications of interest in meeting with the Commissioners from other organizations, including SE -
2 We would be pleased to meet with SE2 and the other groups from the scientific comunity mentioned in your letter to hear more views on the general subject of the~ future of nuclear regulation.
It would be helpful if you could contact the other organizations you believe would be interested in joining you and suggest some dates when we could schedule such a session.
Mr. Fouchard's office will be in touch with your Washington representative to assist in the arrangements for such a meeting.
\\ ncerely, Si 4
R ph M. Hendrie h+
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Robert K. Ad.It, We Chairman Miro M. IpdorovICh. Ene<unve D. rector Mark P. Mills February 9, 1981 5<~<'-~~~-
o.co,. w.,s.yo., cme N ATIONAL OF7tCE Miro M. Todorovich 370 Scienth Aver:ue Suite 1007 P=ew iork, N.Y.10018 WESTE R*= Of flCE R. Led.e Dugan l'o,"N, 5""'
John F. Ahearne 5
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Re:
Pt.blic Meeting with NRC Commissicners, February 4,1981 o.*n'da ;';r,,
on "The Future of Nuclear Regulation" n orvis 1 Br.dbury h; a
Dear Chairman Ahearne:
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Upon learning of the above mentioned public meeting, the Washincton, D.C. office of Scientists and Enaineers for Secure v e *
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Energy incuired cf Mr. Fouchard's office at tne NRC as to L": "P c"~"r the possibility of SE2 providing testimony to the Commission.
pl;o;,c y;7 SE2 was informed that apparently the Commission wanted views r
whicn it considered different from that of the Atomic Industrial o-w H. o.
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Forum (in reference to testimony given by that organization Z,'L,.
on January 21,1981); and, in particular, that the Co=nission wished to hear a varieh of vins from FMic interest grogs
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opposing the use of nuclear power.
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It is of great concern to the scientists, engineers and scholars
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carried out in the fashion of tacitly labeling one presentation l
from the industry as " pro-nuclear" and a subsequent presentation 5
from the public interest as " anti-nuclear," contributes to
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anti-nuclear has been repeatedly illustrat':d by numerous opinion l
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surveys.
Unfortunately, the fact is '. hat the representatives
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historical actions, consistent anti-nuclear sentiments and 8 ~p *~
delaying tactics, rather than providing constructive input.
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If it is, in fact, the Commission's task to see to the safe l
licensing of nuclear paer plants (and clearly, by virtue of Conaressional mandate, not to debate the need for nuclear power) a~~
EUP" in order to best protect the public, it is essential that the Comission also hears from public interest groups that represent the majority opinion of the public.
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John F. Ahearne February 9,1981 According to a public opinion poll taken by Pat Caddell, for exa@le, at the end of last year, the public supported building more nuclear pwer plants by 49 to 35 percent.
Indeed, with respect to licensing and regu-lation, a poll conducted by the Council on Environmental Quality, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency found that, at the very least, the public would support by 69 percent those nuclear plants that now exist or have been built.
Clearly, this constitutes a mandate to get on with the job of licensing.
There is a plethora of genuine public interest groups whose strong state-ments and testimonies closely parallel that of the public interest to name only a few:
Americans for Energy Independence, Citizens for Total Energy, Americans for Nuclear Energy, Concemed Citizens for Energy and Environment, Electrical Wemen's Roundtable, The Energy Advocates, tiational Council for Environmental Balance, Coordinating Committee on Energy, MVoE, fiational Legal Center for the Public Interest, Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and some 20 other labor organizations, and some 73 state-wide organizations supporting nuclear energy, for example grouas like Arizonans for Jobs and Energy and Oklahomans for Jobs and Energy.
it is clearly appropriate and essential to the democratic process that these types of public interest groups have their opinions appear on the public record.
Of greatest concern to SE2 though, is the fact that much of the so-called pubif e interest testimony is not only at best misinfomed, but often times patently ludicrous.
Assertions that are publicly aired and unchallenged are afforded unjustified credibility by virtue of an audience with the Cormtission.
These assertions, held up as ' facts', often blatently ignore scientific reality, reasoned arguments and exhaustive studies.
In order to educate the public and help to allay unnecessary fears, it is well worth considering the highly esteemed value of reascned scientific l
tes timony.
A 1980 Institute for Energy Analysis report entitled "Public Attitudes and Information on the fluclear Option" pointed out that in response to the question, "How much confidence do you have in what various people or groups say on matters concerning nuclear energy development?,"
"58 percent of the public responded a great deal to scientists...followed by the tiRC (39 percent), the DOE (36 percent) and leading environmentalists (34 percent)."
l Indeed, the Sierra Club in its February 4th presentation decried its in-ability to muster the weight and credibility of scientific opinion. Accord-ing to the transcripts from the meeting, Ruth Caplan of the Sierra Club said that :
"Another problem is in getting expert wi tnesses.... Independent r
witnesses who have the technical expertise are very difficult to find....
Often the few people who are willing to testify in the public interest are absolutely inundated with requests."
It is worth considering that one reason for the paucity of expert witnesses in that arena is that there are in a fact very few experts, knowleogeable in ene gy and health mattens, who could legitimately testify on behalf of such single-interest groups and manipulate available data in the manner needed to put across the points so cherished by those intervenors.
John F. Aheame February 9,1981 While it is not germane to the NRC's stated randate of licensing and monitoring the operation of nuclear power plants, it appears that the Comission has submitted itself nonetheless to uninformed, selective ar:o insubstantial pronouncements about the energy needs of the United States vis-a-vis the need for nuclear power.
It is in this arena, particularly with respect to the unconscionable and continual delays in licensing existing nuclear power plants, that SE2 along with many other ncn-profit public interest groups, wishes to address the Comission.
As a case in point, the DOE report " Electric Power Supply and Demand for the Contiguous United States 1980-1989" stated that "to assure reliable energy supply and provide for significant reduction of fuel oil consumption, every effort should be made to maintain the current schedules for construc-tion and licensing of the following (ten) nuclear units.
All of these units are scheduled for comerciC operation by the end of 1981.
Diablo Canyon ~
and 2, San Onofre 2, LaSalle County 1 and 2, Farley 2, McGuire 2, Summer 1, Watts Bar and Sequoyah 2."
Yet, according to the NRC monthly report submitted on January 30,1981 to The Honorable Tom Bevill, Chairman of the Subcomittee on Energv and Water Development, Comittee en Appmpriations, there will be additional delays preventing the licensing of six nuclear plants this year with, for exarple, Diablo Canyon facing further delays of up to 12 months!
Diablo Canyon, in fact, is a lurid exacple of continual and unnecessary del'ays that burden the ratepayen of northem Californic with extensive costs.
In fact, in California at large -- an area in which SE., is strongly represented -- it is estimated that delays in nuclear licensing costs ratepayers mom than one billion dollars a year, delays which do not add significantly to the ultimate safety of those pwer stations.
It is our understanding that the NRC is considering the pcssibility of holding further meetings of a nature similar to that of the corning of February 4,1981.
Inasmuch as all of the foregoing points are relevant to the reasonable and expeditious regulation of nuclear power plants and, inasmuch as SE is both a non-pmfit, public interest, educational group and an associ$ tion of respected scientists and engineers, we would request that the Comission provide an opportunity for public testimc y to be heard from SE2 in concert Arerican Physical Society, American with scientific comunities, such as the:
Chemical Society, American Institute of CW.ical Engineers, American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers, American Institute of Physics, American Nuclear Society, American Society of "ivil Engineers, American Society of Mechanical Engineen, Health Physics Society, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineen, and National Society of Professicnal Engineers.
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John F. Ahearne February 9,1981 We would hope that such testimony could provide an opportunity to mitigate the unneccessary polarization engendered by the proceedings so far this year.
Sincerely, Dr. Frederic ^ tz Chairman d
FS:mst cc:
Commissioner Peter A. Bradford Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Commissioner Joseph M. Hendrie Senator Robert Stafford Senator Alan K. Simpson Senator Gary Hart Senator James McClure wtor J. Bennett Johnston
'r Henry M. Jackson e te Domenici e
Con, e Dor. Fuqua Congre:.o.an Larry Winn Congresswoman Marilyn L. Bouquard Congressman Manuel Lujan Congressman John D. Dingell Congressman James T. Broyhill Congressman Jamie L. Whitten Congressman Silvio 0. Conte Congressman Tom Bevill Congressri. John T. Myers Congressman Morris X. Ucall Congre:sman Carlos J. Moorhead l
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.