ML20003H686
| ML20003H686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1981 |
| From: | Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-02-01.C, TASK-2-1.C, TASK-RR A01452, A1452, NUDOCS 8105070245 | |
| Download: ML20003H686 (7) | |
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NOR1MEAST UTHJTIES 3
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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g
j Attn:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co=ission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ref?rences:
(1)
D. G. Eisenhut letter to SEP Plant Licensees, dated January 14, 1981.
(2)
W. G. Counsil letter to D. G. Eisenhut, dated February 27, 1981.
Gentlemen:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 SEP Topic 11-1.C, Potential Hazards or Changes in Potential Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial, and Military Facilities As part of the redirection of the Syste=atic Evaluation Prograc, Reference (1),
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) coccitted to develop Safety Assesstent Reports (SAR's) for certain SEP topics which would be subitted for Staff review.
NNECO detailed this co=itment and provided a schedule for submittal of SAR's in Reference (2). In accordance with this comitment, UNECO hereby provides the Safety Assessment Report for SEP Topic 11-1.C, Potential Hazards or Changes in Potential Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial, and Military Facilities, which is included as Attachment 1.
We trust the Staff vill appropriately use this information to develop a Safety Evaluation Report for this SEP topic.
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY U O M4 W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President 810 5 070 QL $*
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Docket No. 50-245 AttacFaent 1 Safety Assess:nent Report SEP Topic 11-1.C, Potential Hazards or Changes in Potential Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial, and Military Facilities I
l April, 1981 L
.i Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 SEP Safety Assessment Report Topic ll-1.C - Potential Hazards or Changes in Potential Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial, and -
Military Facilities 1.0 Introduction The objective of this topic is to assure that Millstone Unit No.1 is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to potential accidents which may occur as the result of activities at nearby industrial, transportation, and military facilities.
2.0 Criteria Standard Review Plan Section 2.2.1-2.2.2 states:
All identified facilities and activities within eight kilometers (5 miles) of the plant should be reviewed. Facilities and activities at greater distances should be considered if they otherwise have the potential for affecting safety related features.
3.0 Discussion Three significant industrial complexes exist within 10 miles of the Millstone site. These are:
Approximate No.
Name Location of Enployees Distance Sector Dow Chemical Corp. _
Ledyard 300 10 miles NE (general chemicals)
Pfizer Corp.
Groton 2,700 5.5 miles ENE (general chemicals)
Electric Boat Groton 20,000 5.5 miles-ENE (Division of General Dynamics - submarines)
In addition to the submarine base and Coast Guard Academy there is a training headquarters at Camp O'Neil in East Lyme for Connecticut Army National Guard units.
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. y Camp O'Neil is owned and operated by the Military Department of the State of Connecticut.
It consists of 80 acres on which'there are located 70 buildings for various purposes. It is an administrative training center for troops of the Connecticut Army National Guard.
On a full-time basis, besides a small contingent of post operations personnel, it contains the headquarters for the Connecticut Military -
Academy, the T45th Signal Company, and an Organizational Maintenance Shop (regional maintenance of vehicles and equipment).
On a part-time basis, during various weekends from March through November,
it is occupied by troop units for administrative training, billeting, and supply functions. Because of the administrative nature of its occupancy, the camp's operation has no effect on station operation.
No other military operations such as firing ranges, mi1#tary airfields, ordinance depots, and missile sites exist near the site.
The area around the Millstone site was investigated and found to 'contain no explosives, chemicals, airborne pollutants, flammable or dangerous gases, nor tanks or pipelines near enough to the site to pose a danger if they were to explode or burn.
A railroad right-of-way of the Penn Central Company transverses the site from east to vest. The mainline tracks are about 0 5 miles from the Unit 1 Reactor Building. Traffic on the spur of the mainline track which extends onto the site is controlled to minimize the possibility of railroad traffic related accidents.
A spur of the Penn Central railroad serves the Millstone Nuclear Power Station exclusively.
The switch for that spur is normally set for through traffic. To reach any station facility, the loccuotive must pass through a second switch, which is normally set to direct craffic past the station to a dead end near the sound. Therefore, the possibility of unauthorized transport of hazardous materials does not exist on the spur.
Hazardous materials that are shipped on the track which crosses the site between New Haven and New Iondon include Chlorine, Anhydrous Ammonia, Carbon Dioxide, Propane, Ethyl Alcohol, Rosin, A=monium Nitrate, and Hydrochloric Acid. Among these materials, only the shipment of propane
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(about hh carloads per year) is in the " frequently shipped quantities of hazardous material" category as defined-in Regulatory Guide 1.78.
It should be noted that chlorine is stored on-site and that adequate pro-tection is provided in the event of a chlorine gas release.
In the evaluation of TMI Action Plan Item 111.D.3.4, Control Room Habitability, it was determined that propane did not pose a significant hazard to the l
control room, therefore, propane is not considered a hazard for this topic assessnent.
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Records of recent hazardous material incidents show no incidents occurring between East Ly=e and New London, including the trackage near the Millstone site.
Even if such an incident were to occur on the main line, the distance between the tracks and the unit is sufficient to preclude any effect on the safe operation or shutdown capability of the unit.
There are no grade grossings on or adjacent to the site at which hazardous
=aterials might be transported across the tracks.
There tre no =ajor gas transmission lines within 5 miles of the site. The nearest low pressure gas distribution line is more than 3 miles from the site and is located at the corner of Clark Lane and the Boston Post Road in Waterford.
The closest oil transmission line is approximately 5 miles frcm the site in Groton, Connecticut.
Because they are 5 miles or more away frcm the site, both the gas and oil transmission lines constitute no threat-to the safe operation of Millstone Unit No.1 or to the site in general.
Ships that pass by the site in the shipping channela of Long Island Sound are of two types: general cargo freighters which usually are partially unloaded with drafts of 20 to 25 feet and deep draft tankers with drafts of 35 to 38 feet.
Both of these ship classes must re=cin at least 2 miles offshore for fear of running aground on Eartlett Reef.
No oil barges pass to the shore side of Bartlett Reef; and, since there are no tank farms in Niantic Bay, no oil barges pass within 2 miles of the site.
The possible damage to the pu=p house by a drifting barge was investigated.
The barge can only approach the pump house through the intake channel which is perpendicular to the front of the pu=p house. The relatively shallow bay botto= surrounding the intake channel vill prevent the barge from hitting the pu=p house from its sides. Should a barge hit the pu=p house from the frcr', damage vill be limited to the front sall of the recir-culation distribution box which projects seavard from the pump house.
The service water pumps which are the only safety related equipment housed in the pump house are located approximately 40 feet frcm the front vall.
The operation of these pu=ps will not te Lapaired and the water intake source vill not be blocked as the water intake source lies between El (-) 28 ft - 0 in. and (-) 8 ft - 0 in.
For these reascas, NNECO has concluded that shipping accidents would not adversely affect any safety related facilities.
There are presently two small cctmercial airports within 7 miles of the site, New London (Waterford) Airport and Trumbull Airport. No plans are anticipated by the owners of the airports for expansion of airport facilities.
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h-Trwnbull Airport, approximately 7 miles east of the site, handles regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights, but is inadequate for handling large jets.
New London Airport, 4 miles north of the site, is relatively small and handles no regularly scheduled commercial air traffic. Maximum runway length is 2000 feet. Except for occasional sightseeing trips over the site, the landing patterns are such that most planes are at least 3-1/2 miles from the site.
Trumbull Airport has three runways: 5-23 which is 5000 feet long, 15-33 which is 4000 feet long, and 10-28 which is 3000 feet 1cng and unlighted.
Due to limited traffic at Trumbull, there is no control tower. However, Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) service is available on runway 5-23 and Very-High Frequency Omni Range (VOR) service is available on runway 5-23 from Quonset Approach Control.
The air lane nearest to the cite is V58 which is approximately 4 miles northeast of the site. Other adjacent air lanes include V16, which is approximately 6 miles northwest of the site, and V308, which is approximately 8 miles east of the site. The nearest high-altitude jet route, J121-581, passes apprcximately 9 miles southeast of the site.
A second jet route, J55, passes approximately 12 mili s to the northwest of the site.
Based upon the size of the airports and the location of flight paths, the inpact of an airplane on Millstone Unit No.1 is highly unlikely.
This will be further examined under Topic 111-4.D, Site Proximity Missiles.
The nearest major highway which would be used for frequent transportation of hazardous materials is U. S. Route 95, which is located at a distance of 4 niles from the Millstone site. NNECO has determined that this separation distance exceeds the minimum distance criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1; and, therefore, provides assurance that any transportation accidents resulting in explosions of truck size shipments of hazardous materials will not have an adverse effect on the safe operation of the plant. This separation distance also eliminates the possibility of a toxic gas release adversely affecting the safe operation of the plant.
h.0 Conclusions NNECO has concluded that Millstone Unit No.1 is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to in-dustrial, transportation, and military activities in the vicinity of the plant.
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5.0 References 1.
Standard Review Plan Section 2.2.1-2.2.2, Identification of Potential Hazards in Site Vicinity.
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1.
3.
D. L. Ziemann letter to D. Bixel, dated November 27, 1979 4.
Millstone Unit No. 3 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
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