ML20003G838
| ML20003G838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/08/1981 |
| From: | Catton I Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Major R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1333, NUDOCS 8105040013 | |
| Download: ML20003G838 (2) | |
Text
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8 MRMORANDUM FOR: Richard Major A
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I. Catton, Consultant
SUBJECT:
Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation A guide on control room evaluation is long overdue.
Its existence should result in significant improvements in new as well as old plant control rooms.
In some respects, however, it is incomplete.
Control room design should involve hardware design, infomation content and format, operation procedures (normal and emergency), operator selection and training, arid control room manning. The major factor, in my view, is the operator. A control room as a system must be compatible with the capabilities and limitations of personnel who operate them. One cannot avoid the inter-faces between the operator, systems hardware, software, information delivery method, operating procedures, environment, and other operators.
This brings me to the conclusion that, within limits, the best control room for one plant may be different from another because the plant owners may have different views on the role to be played by the operator.
The guide does not emphasize the operator enough. The heavy reliance on military human factors specifications seems to overlook the fact that the military has a uniform personnel training program. Most of the guide is just common sense.
It basically says that needed infomation should.be conveniently located, easily read, and unambiguous.
It is noted that one should attempt to minimize error probability. This can only be done with a great deal of effort. To avoid conflicting implications between infor-mation from instrumentation, training, and procedures will require repeti-tive performance of the various actions necessary to run a plant.
In that human error is the single most likely cause of an accident, a great deal more attention to determining ways to minimize it is needed.
It may be that use of simulators is the only way this can be accomplished.
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The Staff responses to comments are sometimes too weak.
In some cases, the Staff does not indicate that they will or will not do anything.
Rather than encouraging the monitoring of consequences of corrective actions, the Staff should demand them. Comments such as " incompatible with current practices in the nuclear industry" or " types of recorders not used in the nuclear industry" should be ignored as the nuclear in-dustry has not shown itself to be too wise in such matters.
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The.section on control room work space needs a little more attention.
Walkthrough of all emergency procedures should be required to ins'. ire that the flow of traffic during the emergency is optimal.
Access to the supervisor by non-operations personnel without going into the con-trol room should be provided. Small displays and readout devices should be discouraged even if they are common practice.
Narrow width, strip charts are difficult to read and trends tend to reveal them-selves too slowly. The checklist given by the Staff contains a number of judgment calls that will require very talented people to properly execute.
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