ML20003E392
| ML20003E392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1981 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Galef S WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104030309 | |
| Download: ML20003E392 (3) | |
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'IA 247 Ms. Sandra R. Galef Westchester County Board of
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White Plains, New York 10601
Dear Ms. Galef:
We received your letter of February 3,1981 in which you express your concern regarding the evacuation plans presently under development for the environs around Indian Mat.
As a point of clarification, you. hould be aware that NRC does not evaluate s
the State and local emergency plans. The respcnsibility for upgrading off-site emergency planning was assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by a Presidential Directive issued on December 7, 1979.
Consequently, it is now FEMA's responsibility to review the offsite planning and preparedness, and present its findings to the NRC. We then review FEMA's findings which are included as part of our determination as to the overall state of emergency preparedness at and around the nuclear facility.
Returning to your concern as to the feasibility of evacuation around Indian Point, it should be remembered that evacuation is only one of the various protective action strategies that could be taken in the event of a serious accident.
In fact, for most of the serious low probability events, we en-vision that sheltering would be the more desirable action from a risk-benefit viewpoint.
Even for the most serious type release, sheltering followed by a more leisurely relocation may be the optimum choice of pro-tective measures. Here again, as in most disaster situations, the actual measures to be taken at the time of the event will be influenced by the many variables that bear on the decision-making process.
In the case of a nuclear power plant such factors would include the release characteristics, e-teorological conditions, operational ti;.ie constraints, and the physical protection factors of available shelter facilities.
As a matter of information, evacuations are a relatively com.on event in In fact, the records show, at least since 1960, that an this country.
evacuation takes place somewhere in the U. S. on almost a weekly basis.
The number of people evacuated in these events has ranged from a few to hundreds of thousands and some have occurred in high density urban and sub-Two such events occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1965 urban areas.
,a where 150,000 persons were evacuated in two hours and in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania in 1972 where 75,000 persons were evacuated in five hours.
Also, the metropolitan business district of downtown Portland, Oregon with a population of 101,000 persons and a population density approaching that 1 h\\
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i Ms. Sandra R. Galef of New York City, was evacuated in less than one hour during a Civil Defense test exercise in 1955.
One of the largest evacuations in our history took place in 1961 as a result of hurricane Carla where over 500,000 people were evacuated from the States of Texas and Louisiana.
Even though these are just a few examples, we consider that large scale evacuations are indeed feasible, and are a viable option.
You also expressed concern regarding the assurance that various emergency workers and civil officials would continue to do their part in providing the necessary support services during an emergency.
I believe that your concern can best be addressed by relating some of the findings resulting from a study conducted by the Disaster Research Center of the Ohio State University which is devoted solely to research on disasters and associated problems:
o The idea that people will panic in the face of great threat or danger is very widespread. However, it is not borne out in reality.
Insofar as wild flight is concerned, the opposite behavioral pattern in most disasters is far more likely.
People will often stay in a potentially threatening situation rather than move out of it. This really should be expected. Human beings have very strong tendencies to continue on-going lines of behavior in preference to initiating new courses of action.
o Just as the panic image of disaster behavior is generally incorrect, so is the view that disasters leave victims dazed and disoriented
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both at time of impact and in the recovery period. Those who experienced disasters are not imobilized by even the most catas-a
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trophic of events. They are neither devoid of initiative nor passively dependent or expectant that others, especially relief i.
and welfare workers, will take care of them and their disaster created needs.
In fact, disaster victims sometimes insist on acting on their own even contrary to the expressed advice of the public authorities and formal agencies.
o The assumption that local organizations are unable to cope with disasters is based both on the notion that these organizations and the comunities in which they are located are overwhelmed by disaster impact, and also by the fear that the employees of these organizations are so affected by disaster impact that their efficiency L
is reduced. Neither of these notions stand up well under close observation.
You also expressed concern regarding those individuals whose mobility may be impaired due to " homebound" confinement. This same concern was surfaced by a Ms. Sandy Parrino representing the Office of Disabled, City of Ossining
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at a meeting which we conducted on December 18, 1979 at the Westchester Inn in Ossining, New York. The meeting involved the NRC, the utilities, New York State and local officials, and the public. One purpose of that meet-ing was to solicit such public concerns for consideration and inclusion i
in the appropriate offsite emergency plans. We were assured by the State j
officials at that meeting that such matters would be studied and appro-priately incorporated into the offsite emergency response plans. Since the responsibility for the review of these plans has been transferred to FEMA as : discussed earlier, I would suggest that you contact FEMA Region II I
in New York City for the provisions which have been made for " homebound" persons in the Indian point environs.
In regard to your suggestion of placing emphasis on extended provisions for food and medical supplies within the home, places of business and schools, we do not-consider that any special storage provisions for such items is required as part of the formal planning process.
a If we can be of service to you in the future, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr., Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement O
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WESTCHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF LEGISLATORS 813 COUNI'Y OFFIG BUILDING WHITE PLAINS, NET YORK 10601 W
(9 4) 632 7.651 Mec6er SANDRA R. GALEF Commi: et on Legislation Ugiskior, 2nd Dusrict Committee on Co::ununity Affairs, 44 orchard Drive Hea:Ih & Hospitals Ossir.ing-on Hudson. N.Y.10562 914-762 5050 mm February 3, 1981 Mr. John F. Ahearne, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Co: mission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Ahearne:
I did not want to presume that an emergency evacuation plan from the 10 mile radius of Indian Point, Buchanan, New York could not be drafted.
Therefore, I eagerly awaited the evacuation pro-posal that was compiled by the consultants for con Edison and PASNY.
At this point, after reviewing the plan and attending the briefing by the consultants in Westchester on January 28, 1981, 7
a realistic I now support the theory that evacuation is not alternative.
There are people suggesting that the plan can be modified to incorporate suggestions from the public, or that additional.
information can be collated.
It has also been proposed that an extension of the April 1st deadline would give time to make the plan acceptable and workable.
I would like to go on record stating,that the plan only represents a theory of words and not words of practicality.
A plan has been developed which cannot be implemented and serves It deflects pro-only to attempt to pacify a concerned public.
per consideration of more meaningful alternatives in an area as densely populated as_ours.
Basic questions about this plan and about any plan based upon evacuation reveal the problems.
For example:
Who has the authority to insure that necessary personnel, a) and beyond the 10 mile radius, to execute the plan will in.
within fact do their job rather than flee the, area with their own. families?
The plan relies on bus drivers, policemen, medical personnel, radio station operators, directors of institutions, the Red Cross, prison guards, etc.
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i Mr. John F.
Ahearne, Chairman February 3, 1981 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 b)
According to the plan, the Ossining Correctional Facility will not be evacuated.
What presumption is there that the guards and e=ployees of the prison would remain within the 10 mile radius at this facility?
c)
How will active lists be kept of the hemebcarl?
Who will be instructed to pick up the designated hemebound and is sufficient equipment readily available to facilitate such transport?
These issues only touch the surface.
Present thinking concen-
- l trates on a Three Mile Island type event where fortunately, there was apparently no major escape of dangerous caterial.
Suppose this is'different and a hazardous cloud heads towards New York City.
What does this do to the proposed plan?
As the NRC evaluates the submitted evacuation plan, I would suggest thatia unique approach be contemplated, particularly justi-fied, in light of the heavy concentration of the population in the s
area.
The evacuation aspect of the plan should, I believe, be re-jected and that, instead an emphasis be placed on provisions for security-within'the home, business and school such as food and medical supplies to last for a period of days as well as related safety measures.
If you determine that self protection is not adequate to pre-vent a disaster, then I believe that conrinuation of the life of the plants at Indian Point are questionable.
I look forward to hearing your reaction tc the Plan.
Sincerely,
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- h!p d, &'g-dl Sandra R. Galef g' County Legislator of the Second' District SRG/esn 6
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