ML20003E133

Brief in Form of Pleading Re Propriety of Tx Pirg Counsel Testifying as Expert Witness.Aslb Should Disqualify Scott from Participating as Counsel If Giving Testimony. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20003E133
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	03/31/1981
From:	Black R NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8104020304
Download: ML20003E133 (15)

Text

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V March 31, 1981 y,:

I S UtlITED STATES OF A!1 ERICA p

flUCLEAR REGULATORY C0'4MISSIO!1 N

A BEFORE THE AT0l11C SAFETY A*10 LICENSING S0ARD --

/ IPR 0 O

9 h4 11981 u C.

\\A In the flatter of

)

HOUSTON LIG'-iTItsG AND POWER CO*4PA:4Y Docket No.50-46o Q /g,pu \\ @

(Allens Creek Huclear Generating

)

Station, Unit 1)

)

IIRC STAFF'S BRIEF REGARDIliG PROPRIETY OF TEXPIRG COUNSEL BEC0'11NG EXPERT WITNESS I.

INTRODUCTION On March 16, 1931, the Licensing _ Board ruled that TEXPIRG's counsel, Mr. Scott, should submit a brief by !! arch 23, 1981, discussing his intentions to' offer expert testioony on beha'.f of TEXPIRG and Intervenor Doherty. See Tr. 8834-8875. The Boa rd directed -that ifr.

Scott address the question of whether he'should withdraw as counsel to TEXPIRG if he becones a witness (Tr. 8870-72) in light of disciplinary rules'of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar ~.ssociation, DR 5-102 and DR 5-101(3)(4). Tr. 8348.

Fdrther, t', was directed that fir. Scott provide an affidavit fron an off aer or. director.of TEXPIRG establishing f1r. Scott's distinctive value to TEXPIRG in this NRC pro.ceeding and whether his withdrawal

- as counsel to TEXPIRG would work a substantial hardship to the client.

Tr. 8871.

f 01040s/oghy

_= _

i *

- TEXPIRG's affidavit was served on Applicant on March 23,1981,l/

4 without an accompanying brief in support of any position Mr. Scott nay take with respect to this natter.

In light of Mr. Scott's failure to follow the Board's direction to provide legal argunent on this serious natter,2/ the Staff will brief the Board on the ethical propriety and the effect of Mr. Scott giving testinony on benalf of his client.

In the final analysis,' we conclude that Mr. Scott should be disqualified fra, any.further participatibn in this proceeding as counsel if TEXPIRG detenlines that he ought to testify on its. behalf.

I

'II.

DISCUSSION A.

Ethical Consideration

-f

- The problea of. the competency and propriety of an attorney testify-ing on behalf of.' his. client ha;'been the subject of a long histcry.of case law. See in general 6 l! ignore'on Evidence 1 1911 (Chadbourn rev.

-1977). Although nost cases' have generally recognized that. a'n attorney nay.be a competent' witness _to.i?stify on behalf of his client in a case

- in which he.is representing'that client, the practice of an attorney so' testifying has been repeatedly disapproved as'being improper, and j

4 1/- ' Applicant forwardedithe affidavit to Staff on March 25, 1981.

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2/

- We view this failure on Mr. Scott's part as an act of disrespect-to :the Board -and the _ par ties, particularly _ Intervenor Doherty.

- who ~ wishes f.o ai ail hinself of Mr.' Scott's. alleged expertise.

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l against. principles of professional ethics.3_/ The Ethical Considerations (EC)' and Disciplinary Rules (DR) set forth in the Code of Professional f'

Responsibility (Code) of the American Be Association, effective on January '1,1970,~ disapprove of such conduct.

The Code governs the conduct of Texas attorneys. Art. XII 93, Vern. Ann. Tex. Stats. (1973); Suprene Beef Processors v. Auerican Consumer Industries, 441'F.Supp. 1064, 1065 (H.O. Tex. 1977)'. Although there exists no statutory obligation upon the federal courts to apply the Code as enacted by any state jurisdiction or as adopted by the American Bar Association, ' International Electronic Corp. v. Flan'zer, 527 F.2d 1288,1293 (2d Cir.1975), the Code does, however, set guidelines for the conduct of attorneys appearing before the federal bar.

In United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344,1354 (7th Cir.

_1972), the court obser.ed that the application of the Code is part of the

. court's general supervis ry authority to ensure fairness to all who bring their cause to the judic'.ory for resolution., See.also Greenebaun-ftountain 11tg. v. Pioneer National Title Insurance, 421 F. Supp.1348,1351_ (0. Colo.

1976).

An attorney practicing before the'NRC aust conform to the stand-ards of conduct required in the courts of-the United-States.

10 C.F.R. 92.713(b). Accordingly, the NRC and, in part;icular, this Board is

. 3_/. See e.g. French'v. Hall, 119.U.S. 152-(1886), wherein the Court.

}noted that in some cases _it acy be unseemly for.the attorney 'of a party prosecuting -or defending _in a civil action to testify for his

client, especially if counsel is in a position to comnent on his own testimony,-and that the practice, therefore, nay very properly be discouraged. See also 9 ALR Fed._ 500'(1971).

^

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. guided by _the Code of Professional Responsibility in determining those standards to ensure' fairness to all who practice before it. See Toledo

~ Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Staticn, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-332, 3 NRC 785 (1976).

The Code (ECS-9) declares that the " roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent" and should be avoided.O The ethical considerations embodied in the Code make clear that the principal

- ethical objections to a lawyer's testifying for his client on contested issues are that the client's case will, to that extent, be presented through testinony of an obviously interested witness who is subject to impeachaent and placed in the unseeming position of arguing his own credibility.

In some situatic,ns, the practice nay also handicap opposing 4f EC 5-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in

~a particular case whether he will be a witness or -

an advocate..If a lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes acre easily _ impeachable _for interest and_thus.nay be a less effective witness.. Conversely, the opposing counsel may be-

- handicapped in challenging the. credibility of the

..- lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case.

An advocate who becomes a witness is:in the unseemly and ineffective position cf arguing his own credibility. The roles of an advocate and of-a witness are

. inconsistent; the function of:an advocate is to-advance or argue the cause _of. another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.

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counsel in challenging the credibility of the lawyer-witness.

See EC 5-9, 5-10; 9 ALR Fed. 500, 34 (1971); Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489 (8th Cir.

1977), cert. den. 98 S. Ct. 1283 (1977); International Electronics Coro.

v. -Flanzer,.527 F.2d 1283 (2nd Cir. 1975).E Further, the rationale underlying.the Code's canons of ethics and disciplinary rules at issue here also has'the purpose of ensuring that the integrity of the legal profession is protected. The Code generally requires that a lawyer who ought to be a witness for the client should fulfill that function and not diminish the value of his prospective

' testinony by also being the client's trial advocate. The client's need 3

for the testimony fron a disinterested source, and the client's entitle-nent to an advocate whose effectiveness cannot be impaired are the foundation of DR 5-102(A) and DR 5-102(B).

See Connittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the Anerian Bar Association, Fornal Opinion No. 339 (January 31,-1975).

These ethical cons'iderations nust 5]

Were !1r. Scott to assume a dual role in the present proceeding, it is-fair to assume.that other parties in this proceeding will not hesitate to challenge _itr Scott's qualifications or credibility as a lawyer-witness. Thus, the principal historical ethical objections may not be totally relevant in a fact-finding adminis-trative' hearing setting. See also Greenebaum-!1ountain, supra at 1353-54, where the. court found a distinction between a trial.to the-court rather, than' to a jury.with respect to the distortion-of the truth. objection _but, nevertheless, disqualified the lawyer-witness but not the lawyer's entire _ law firn.

t

.. also be reat in conjunction with Canon 9, which entreats lawyers to avoid even 1.he appearance of impropriety. As stated in United States v.

Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 at 960 (N.D. Tex 1978):

The ethical discipline of.the Anerican lawyer, simply put, has concluded that an attorney who testifies to nateria., contested facts ought not act as an advocate in that saae natter.

(footnote onitted)

As the Code indicates, all doubts as to whether a

. should continue his employnent' with the client or be a witness on a contested issue, should be resolved in favor of the layyer testifying and against his becoming or continuing as an advocate. EC5-10.5/

Since one of the underpinnings-of the Code is to protect the integrity of the legal profession, it should be obvious that client consent to his advocate being a witness is irrelevant. As stated in the

. Anerican Bar Foundation's Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility (American Bar Foundation,1979), at 214:

-Finally, it is argued, because th'e two roles are inconsistent (the advocate is partisan; the

witness is detached), the attorney's perfornance of each will suffer... _One connentator has concluded that the essential underlying-rationale for the rule is less a concern for the client's 6/.

Of course, the ethical considerations and disciplinary. rules set forth in.the Code apply only _ to the conduct of lawyers. NRC regulations allow a party to appear pro se_ without restriction-upon the freedon to testify and advocate as well.

10 C.F.R.

.52.713(a). Cf. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1

'& 2), LBP-74!72, 7 AEC 659, 673-674 -(1974),' affirmed,. ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 408'(1976).

. interest than for the preservation of the attorney's unique role as an independent and objective proponent of rationale argument; the purpose of the rule is to preserve the distinction between advocacy, which is based on reason and is subject to objective evaluation, and testimony, which is based on the witness's moral qualities and is evaluated in terns of individual credibility.

Therefore, client consent is irrelevant and is properly omitted from the Code."

(Enphasis added).

Based on the foregoing ethical considerations, the-Code's disci-plinary ' rules nake it clear that an attorney should withdraw fron a case when he ought to be a witness in the cause.for his client unless the _ withdrawal vrould work a substantial hardship on the client because

.of the-distinctive alue of the lawyer as counsel in that particular

.DR'5102(A);5-101(3)(4).E Obviously, whether withdrawal case.

_7f DR15-101 Refusing Enployment When the Interests.of the Lawyer-Itay. Impair? His Independent Professional EJudgment

.(B)

A. lawyer shall lnot accept employment in contenplated or pending litiga. tion if he.

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.knows or ~it is.: obvious that he or a lawyer in his' firm ought to be called as a witness,

.except that:he may.u'ndertake the~ employment.

and he~or a' lawyer-in his'fira may testify

(C0iiTIf4UED) n44 w',mp+

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is necessary under these circunstances depends upon the attending facts. This brief will now focus on the alleged " substantial hardship" on TEXPIRG and whether withdrawal is necessary in this case.

B.

Substantial Hardship Exception TEXPIRG's ' affidavit indicates that it wishes ltr. Scott to be an expert witness in these proceedings because it is unable to find, retain and afford any other expert witnesses that have the education and

-training necessary to be an expert witness on safety issues.

Affidavit, Ss 5 and 7.

TEXPIRG then clains that Mr. Scott's withdrawal would

'inpose a " substantial and. unreasonable hardship" on TEXPIRG because ilr. Scott has the " scientific training and education necessary to effectively cross-examine" other expert witnesses on safety issues, and

. 'CONIIriUED)

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(4) As to anyl natter, if refusal.would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the laayear.[ sic] or his-fim as counsel in the particular case.

DR 5-102 Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a Witness

-(A)

If, after undertaking enployment in contemplated _or pending litigation, a' lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his fira ought to beicalled as~a witness on behalf of-his client, he shall withdraa.

-from the conduct.of-the trial'and his firn, if:any, shall not ' continue representation in the trial, except that he.nay continue the representation'and he ~or a lawyer in his fira' may testify in the1 circumstances enumerated in DR~5-101.(3) (1)-through (4).-

"no e.aer attorney would have time to become faniliar with the pro-ceeding such that they could be effective." Affidavit, 1 7(c) and

( d ) ~.

Under the Code, the critical question is whether the distinctive and particular value to TEXPIP.G of 'tr. Scott as counsel in this pro-ceeding is so great that withdrawal would work a substantial personal or financial hardship upon TEXPIRG.

As Staff understands TEXPIRG's Affidavit, it is claining that if-ltr. Scott is required to withdra i as counsel, it would work a substantial; hardship upon TEXPIRG because (1)

TEXPIRG.cannot financially afford to retain any other counsel or

. witnesses,.(2) it would be impractical and. ineffective to engage anothfr

-attorney to{ represent TEXPIRG at this stage of this lengthy proceeding, and (3) Mr. Scott's education and training provide a distinctive value as counsel and witness in these proceedings. We will address each of these contentions below.

1. - Financial Hardship Under the Code, it is clear that the_ personal or ~ financial

- sacrifice of the client that nay result fron an' attorney's withdrawal must be weighed in consideration of whether the attorney should withdraw if he is to become a witness. See EC5-10. Thus, in Staff's~ mind,-to the

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extent-that TEXPIRG claims that it could not afford to retain another -

. counsel, a financial hardship wouldcbe imposed -on TEXPIRG if !!r. Scott Ecould-no't-continue"as-counsel to then. Uhether this financial-hardship-

--is a substantial hardship-within the'aeaning of t_he exception in DR' 5-101(3)(4) is dif_ficult_:to answer 'without' benefit of briefing froa-

TEXPIRG to explain more fully the existing attorney-client relationship, its resources and the availability of other counsel.

2.

Hardship Imposed to Engage Other Counsel TEXPIRG also contends that withdradal would work a substantial hardship because of the time and resources needed by replacenent counsel to.become an effective advocate in this proceading.

In essence, TEXPIRG argues.that 11r. Scott has distinctive value as counsel because of his faciliarity with the case. This argument nust be rejected because not only has TEXPIRG failed to detail its support for this argunent, but also because this very argunent has been consistently rejected by the courts.

In their recognition of the inconsistent role of advocate and witness and their resolution of all doubts on hardship issues in favor of disqualification, courts have tine and time again rejected the argu-nent that familiarity with -the facts of a case can.forn a basis for allow-

-ing'one to perform the functions of both advocate and' witness in'the same proceeding. See Universal Sales, supra;' Hull v. Celanese Coro, S13 F.2d 568 (2d Cir.1975); Draganescu v. First National Bank,-502 F.2d $50, 552'(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929-(1975); Connell

v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F.Supp.17,19- (ND.D Ga.1977); United States ex rel.

Sheldon Electric Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing, 'Inc., 423 F.Supp. -486, 490 (S.D.H.Y'. 1976).

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_Accordingly, even though-TEXPIRG'would_ suffer hardship-if it had to retain another counsel if Mr. Scott was disqualified. :this is not the

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type lof. hardship recognized by the courts in their interpretation of the

" substantial hardship"' exception of the Code. ~The need for a fairly t-

adninistered judicial systen and the preservation of integrity of the legal profession outweigh any hardship clain in this regard.

3.

Distinctive Valu.e as Counsel and Witness TEXPIRG finally clains that Mr. Scott has a distinctive value to then by reason of his scientific education and training that would enable hin to testify on safety issues and effectively cross-examine other witnesses on these issues. Again, without benefit of briefing, we are at a loss to deternine the distinctive nature and extent of the

" scientific education and training," now such education and training will enable f1r. Scott to qualify as an expert witness on those issues

.that he has indicated that he vill testify on, the extent to which TEXPIRG has sought other expert witnesses ar counsel, and finally, why Mr. Scott has distinctive value as_ counsel to TEXPIRG in this proceeding.

In Supreme Beef Processors, supra at 1068-69, the court stated:

This exception [DR'5-101(3)(4)] generally contera-plates only an attorney who has some expertise in a s'pecialized area of the las such as' patents and the

. burden is on the fim seeking to centinua representation to prove-distinctiveness.

See Universal' Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gyn, 546-F.2d 530 (3rd Cir.1976).

In addition, the distinctive value must be apparent-before the decision to accept or refuse employment is made.

Accor'dingly, the rule is to be very narrowly ' construed.8/

8f DR 5-101(B)(4) is. quoted in footnote 7, above. See also J. D.

Pflauner-, Inc.'v.' U.S. Dept. c(^ Justice, 465_F.Supp. 7.46, 748-(E..D. Penn. 1979) where the coart' stated:

These exceptions, however, will be. construed narrowly,-in order to assure.that greater weight is

given to the policy behind DR 5-102(A). that the~

roles -of advocate and, witness are fundanentally incompatible ~ -~ than to the nere convenience of-the party faced with' disqualification of counsel.

Since l4RC practice is not a specialized area of law, requiring specialized training or education of the attorneys practicing before the Comnission,E/ TEXP/RG has not net its burden of demonstrating

'!1r. Scott's distinctit n value in this regard as counsel.

In addition, TEXPIRG alleges that 11r. Scott has distinctiveness because.of his value as a witness. However, outside of the indication L that Ilc.' Scott will testify on certain contentions, TEXPIR3 has failed to.denonstrate the-uniqu? factual nature of Mr.-Scott's testinony or how it is crucial to their position in this proceeding, or why there are no others wh3 can give such testinony. OR 5-102(A) prohibits a lawyer's continJal representation of his client after he. learns that he "ought to'be' called as~a witnession behalf of his client.".It is evident that the application of this rule depends on the meaning of the phrase "ought

-to be called as'a witness." The Third Circuit advises that this pro-r vision of the Code.will be involved only if the a'ttorney is an "indis-Lpensible witness" on a matter of fact. That'is, where he has " crucial information-inhispossessio6thatmustibedivulged." Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym,' Recreational & Athletic-Equipnent Corp., Inc.,

19]. In fact, the flRC will allow ~ parties to ~ appear pro se.

v

546 F.2d 530, 539 n. 21 (3rd Cir.1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977).

See also J. D. Pflauner, suora at 747.

At this point, there is certainly nothing in TEXPIRG's affidavit whica indicates that !1r. Scott is an " indispensible witness" as to any f act in TE(PIR3's case. The Staff doubts seriously that iir Scott has kna.41 edge of particular facts tc anable such a showing to be nade.

Sinilarly, itr. Scott's training and education of a : tasters of Science degree in physics and a Bachelor of Science degree in chenistry, ph sics

/

and cathenatics does not show he has ;uch knowledge as to be an "indi-spensible witness." Thus, there is no strong evidence that 'tr. Scott "ought to" be called on behalf of TEXPIRG and autonatically invoke tht withdrawal requirenent of DR 5-102(A). E Since :tr. Scott is not an " indispensible witness," his value as a witness is obviously at the discretion of TEXPIRG.

If TEXPIRG decides that Mr. Scott's testinony would be necessary and helpful to the Board in its deliberations, then Staff subnits that it is clear that 'tr. Scott nust withdraw as counsel to TEXPIRG.

In sumation, TEXPIRG's clain that Mr. Scott has distinctive value in these proceedings both as counsel and as expert witness has no nerit.

It is incurtent on TEXPIRG to decide which nat he is to wear, attorney or witness. He may not, consistent with the Code of Professional Responsi-bility, wear both hats.

10/ TEXPlRG's Affidavit indicates that it cerely " wishes" !!r. Scott to be an expert witness.

III. CONCLUSION Ethical considerations, fundamental fairness to parties, and the preservation of the integrity of the legal profession have resulted in a fairly explicit rule that requires a lawyer to. withdraw from a proceed-ing if he ought to testify on' behalf of his client in that proceeding.

An exception to this rule is allowed if withdrawal would work a substan-tial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer as. counsel in the particular case. As shown above, TEX?IRG has not demonstrated that Mr. Scott's witndrawal, if he should testify, would work a substantial hardship on it.

In addition, the courts have uni-formly decided that in disqualification situations, doubts should be resolved in favor of disqualification. Accordingly, it is clear t5at if' fir. - Scott should testify on behalf of TEXPIRG, the Licensing Board should require his withdrawal as counsel to TEXPIRG.

On the other hand, Staff.is certainly not convinced that !!r. Scott's testinony on certain. health and safety issues is ' indispensible:in the l sense that he;"cught to' testify" on behalf of TEXPIRG. No factual natter

'within the sole knowledge of f1r. Scott is alleged.

Even though TEXPIRG

. night desire !!r. Scott to. testify on certain issues, it has not been alleged nor demonstratedithat such testinony is crucial to TEXPIRG's case, must be; divulged, or that others do not have:similarfknowledge. This ibeing-the case, it is Staff's opinion'that the Licensing Board should defer to'TEXPIRG's judgment' on this question at' this stage in the pro-ceeding.- As stated in J. D. Pflaumer,-Inc., supra at 747:

Plaintiffs and their-counsel should be permitted to present-their case according to their own best-

=

judgnent, and if it is their best judgment that they can get by withoJt testinony fron counsel, then it is certainly not up to defendants to urge upon then a different plan of presentation that would necessitate disqualification.

See Kroungold v.

Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1975).

Sinply stated, at this juncture the Licensing Board should not interfare with TEXPIRG's right to counsel of their can choosing and wit'i their right to present their :ase as they see fit.

However, they should be advised by the 30ard that it will require the withdrasal of 'tr. Scott as counsel if he testifies on behalf of TEXPIRG. TEXPIRG is free to choose Mr. Scott's role as counsel or witness, but 'tr. Scott cannot function and appear in this proceeding in a dual role. The Board should so rule.

Respe,ctfully subnitted,

,l

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'fl4OffjI~.AJ

-J 1

Qf Ricnard L. Black Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 31st day of March,1981.

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UtlITED STATES OF A:1 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0'1:1ISSI0ri BEFORE THE AT0!!IC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the flatter of H005T0fl LIGHTIllG A:10 POWER C0f1PAilY )

Docket No. 50-466

)

(Allens Creek ' uclear Generating

)

Station, l'ait 1)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "!4RC STAFF'S BRIEF REGARDIllG PROPRIETY OF TEXPIR3 COUllSEL BECOMING EXPERT WITilESS" in the above-captioned pro-ceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States nail, first class or as indicated by an asterisk by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission internal mail system, this 31st day of ilarch,1981:

Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Thairman*

Susan Plettnan, Esq.

Atcaic Safety and Licensing David Preister, Esq.

Board Panel Texas Attorney General's Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Washington, DC 20555 Austin, TX 78711 Dr. E. Leonard Cheatum Hon. Jerry Sliva, flayor Routa 3, Box 350A City of Wallis, TX 77485 Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 Hon. John R. liikesla f1r. Gustave A. Linenberger*

Austin County Judge Atonic Safety and Licensing P.O. Box 310 Board Panel 3ellville, TX 77418 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, DC 20555

$1r. John F. Doherty 4327 Alconbury Street The Honorable Ron Waters Houston, TX 77021 State Representative, District 79 3620 Mashington Avenue, No. 362 Mr. Willian J. Schuessler Houston, TX 77007 5810 Darnell Houston, TX 77074 J. Gregory Copeland, Esq.

. Baker & Botts ilr. F. H. Potthoff III One Shell Plaza 1814 Pine Village Houston,.TX 77002 Houston, TX 77080

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. 4 Jack flec.an, E,q.

D. flarrsck Lowenstein, Reis, flewnan &

420 Mulberry Lane A2elrad Bellaire, TX 77401 1025 Connecticut Avenue, fi.W.

-Washington, DC 20037 Texas Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

S enda A. :tcCorkle c/o James Scott, Jr., Esq.

5140 Darnell 13935 Ivynount Houston, TX 77074 Sugarland, TX 77473 flr. Wayne Rentfro Rosemary li. Lemer P.O. Box 1335 11423 Dak Spring

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Rosenberg, TX 77471 Houston, TX 77043 Carro Hinderstein Lectis Johnston 3739 Link Terrace 1437 Scenic 'tidge Houston, TX 77025 Houston, TX 77343

!!argaret Bishop U.S. riuclear Regulatory Comission J.:itorgan Bishop Region IV, I&E 11418 Dak Spring.

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Houston, TX 77043-Arlington, TX 75011

Stephen _A.'Doggett, Esq.

Bryan L. Baker

'Pollan,iiicholson & Doggett' 1923 Ha.4thorne P.O. Box 592-Houston, TX 77098 Rosenberg, TX 77471 Robin Griffith Carolina-Conn

-1034-Sally Ann 1414_ Scenic Ridge Rosenberg, TX 77471 Houston, TX 77043 11r. Willian Perrenod

Atomic Safety and^ Licensing 4070 Merrick

-Board Panel

• Houston, TX

--77025 cU.S. fluclear Regulatory Co:nission Washington, DC

'20555'

. Docketing and Service Section*

- Office ~of the Secretary Atocic Safety and. Licensing U.S. Huclear Regulatory Commisstor.

Appeal Board Panel *. l Washington, DC-.20555 L U.S. fuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC: 20555

's:c h&

Ricdard L. Black

. Counsel for NRC Staff;

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