ML20003D813
| ML20003D813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/19/1981 |
| From: | Costello J, Hale C, Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003D810 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900403 NUDOCS 8104010049 | |
| Download: ML20003D813 (16) | |
Text
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C U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900403/80-04 Program No. 51100 Company:
General Electric Company Nuclear Energy Business Group 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Inspection Conducted:
November 3-7, 1980
/ _
k Inspectors:
~
J. R. p'er)ei10, ProgrW_ valuation Sect'io/ Inspector
~ Principyl Date n
Vendor Inspection Branch f
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A.Kfonnson,Reacto{ranchReact$r Construction pspector Date
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Approved by:
/
(
s C. J.
Chief Date Progr luation Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summarv Inspection November 3-7, 1980 (99900403/80-04)
Areas Inscected:
Implementatica of topical report NEDO-11209-04A in followup of regional requests.
The inspection involved sixty-two (62) hours on site by two (2) USNRC inspectors.
Resul ts:
In the creas inspected, no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
904010
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/
2 OETAILS (Prepared by J. R. Costello and A. R. Johnson)
A.
Persons Contacted P. M. Briggs, Principal Quality Assurance Engineer F. R. Busch, Senior Applications Engineer J. R. Cintas, Senior Engineer R. A. Crocker, Engineer
- W. H. 0'Ardenne, Manager Safety Evaluation Programs R. Fischer, Senior Engir.eer B. P. Grimm, Manager Reactor Instrumentation S. Hassan, Senior Engineer W. H. Hendrix, Systems Engineer K. D. Jakabcin, Principal Quality Control Engineer R. T. Kern, Se.iior Engineer C. J. Kjaer - Olsen, Design Engineer
- 0. E. Lee, Manager Quality Control N. Lauria, Manager Qualification Standards Engineering J. W. Millard, Project Manager Susquehanna C. E. Morris, Senior Project Engineer R. A. Parker, Manager, Control Room Design Engineering W. R. Perrault Manager Quality Control Engineering, Valves & Piping Components
- R. E. Pingleton, Audit Coordinator J. K. Powledge, Manager Quality Assurance, Engineared Equipment and Installation T. R. Regenie, Principal Engineer A. R. Smith, Project Manager G. B. Stramback, Senior Engineer, Technical Licensing J. Swezea, Senior Project Engineer K. Utsumi, Senior Engineer
- R. J. Valencia, Audit Coordinator
- R. K. Waldman, Audit Coordinator J. D. Wilson, Manager Production Planning
- Denotes those present at exit aeeting.
B.
Followuo on Regional Recuests In this area of inspection eight (8) regio,,al requests relating to deficiencies or potential deficiencies were reviewed and evaluated by the two (2) inspec-tors.
Each regional request is broken down into three (3) sections entitled
" Objectives", " Method of Accomplishment," a.id " Findings." The regional requests are as follows:
4 i
3 1.
Porosity Identified On Feedwater Nozzle Mississippi Power & ;.ight reported to Region II that during a preservice liquid penetrant inspection in accordance with NUREG-0312 that two clus-ters of porosity were identified on the inner nozzle radius of one FW nozzle on Grand Gulf 1.
a.
Ob; actives l
(1) Determine present status of problem.
(2) Determine why these items were not detected during regular inspection.
(3) Determine the reason for GE release for shipment with these defects.
(4) Determine if the QA program requirements have been violated.
(5) Evaluate the generic implications of this problem.
b.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were acccmolished by dicussions with General Electric personnel and an examination of:
(1) Potentially Reportable Deficiency PRD 80-14 initiated 4/7/80.
(2) FDDR No. JB1-216 R-1.
(3) PT Report PT-001, Liquid Penetrant Examination Report.
(4) Drawing N4 Nozzle Forging.
(5) Correspondence between MP&L and GE.
c.
Findings (1) As a result of a liquid penetrant examination performed on the inner bore region of the N4-A Feedwater Nozzle by an independent contractor for MP&L, two separate areas snowed numerous rounded indications and two possible linear indica-tions.
This examination was performed as an augumented inservice inspection per the requirements of NUREG-0312.
4 (2) The MP&L contractor performed a Liquid Penetrant (PT) examin-ation under the direction of MP&L.
The contractor used a solvent-removable liquid penetrant which was the only approved PT procedure they had at that time.
This was a different method of inspection than was used originally to accept the forgings.
The forgings were accepted using a magnetic particle (MT) procedure.
The MT procedure accepted the forgings whereas the PT procedure rejected the forgings.
(3) The specifications for the vessel nozzle forgings required a MT examination which is the normal method for examining forging surfaces.
No PT examinations were performed during fabrication.
(4) The nozzle forgings received 100% MT examination (Yoke method) on ID and 90 with no indications reported by the supplier.
There is no record of any repair welding to this nozzle at the forging vandor or at CBIN (Chicago Bridge & Iron Nuclear).
The forgings also received an Ultrasonic (UT) examination with no indications reported.
(5) The PT examination performed by the MP&L contractor revealed eleven (11) relevant indications in an area of less than six (6) square inches, whereas the code allows (10).
(6) Once it was discovered that the code allowable was exceeded, a field deviation disposition request (FDDR) was issued to grind down the surface of the base metal in the areas of the indications.
This was permissable since there was sufficient wall thickness to stay within the code.
(7) This problem can be attributed to a difference in test metnods and does not appear to be serious or to have generic impli-cations.
(9) No QA program requirements were violated and no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
2.
In3decuate Sensitivity of Radiograph Film This item was inspected and reported during the 99900403/80-03 inspection.
During that inspection, the inspector indicated he would followup during the next inspection GE's procurement practices and would verify that other utilities subject to this problem had been advised, and corrective action taken.
a.
Objectives (1) Review GE procurement practices including source inspector responsibilities, training and qualifications.
5 (2) Verify that other utilities subject to this problem have been advised and any necessary corrective action has been taken.
b.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by discussions with General Electric personnel and an examination of:
(1) FDDR JB1-212 dated 5/19/80.
(2) FDDR JB2-004 dated 5/19/80.
(3) 1980 QC Engineer and Represent e Seminar - 10/11-14/80.
(4) QARI, Revision 2, Par 6.3.2 (Qua
.y Centrol approval of radiographs).
(5) Letter frem John Millman, Assistant acretary, ASME, to L. J. Chockie, GE, dated November 6, 980.
c.
Findi g
(:.) Approximately 4000 radiographic films wt ' reinspected.
Of the 4000 films reinspected, 320 did not n.at the density require-ments.
(2) All of the 4000 radiographic fii.ns had been inspected by GE inspectors.
GE inspects all radiographs before they are shipped; this is part of GE's final inspection prior to shipment.
The radiographs are also inspected by the N stamp holder and his Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI).
(3) Densitometer measurements were not always used, as the alternate method of a strip comparator is also a:ceptable.
The difference in inspection methodology could account for the failure to detect inadequate density.
(4) All of the GE inspectors that review radiographs are qualified as Level II inspectors and their qualification records are on file at GE San Jose.
(5) Since the 80-03 inspection, GE brought in all of their QC engineers and representatives for a special training session on October 11-14, 1980.
This training session put particular emphasis on radiographic inspection including the acceptance of radiographs and the methods to be used to measure film density.
6 (6) Of the 320 rejected radiographs about 50% can be radio-graphed again.
To demonstrate the acceptability of the questionable radiographs, a sample of 20 valves out of 50 were radiographed again and all 20 valves were found acceptable.
(7) To date, no repairs have been required as a result of the deficient radiographs.
(8) Because Anis were involved, GE asked for a ruling from the ASME and has received a letter datea November 1968, from John Milliman, Assistant Secretary, ASME, which states in part, "The N-Certificate Holder taking over all responsibility for a component including a piping system, with the concur-rence of his Authorized Nuclear Inspector, has the authority to determine whether the records are complete, correct and adequate to demonstrate that the component meets the require-ments of the Code as indicated by the signatures on the appli-cable Code Data Report Form.
However, NCA-8430 requires that the Owner, by signing the Data Report Form N-3, certifies that components and installation conply with the applicable require-ments of the Code and to satisfy this requirement the Owner may choose to terify that t'te records and construction are complete, correct and adequate and if any question is raised regarding the records, it is a matter to be settled between the contracting parties and to the satisfaction of the Authorized Nuclear Inspectors involved."
(9) A meeting was held in Bethesda, MD on April 8, 1980, in wnich representatives frem Clinton, Perry, Grand Gulf and Nine Mile Point 2 (the other affected utilities) were appraised of the radiograph problem.
No further action has been taken by these utilities.
(10) A meeting is planned in early December 1980 with represer.t-ative of MP&L and NRC to determine if any additional racio-graphy will be done.
( 11) No deviations or unresolved items were identified.
3.
r'ailure of GE Switch Tyce CR2940-US203E This item was inspected and reported on during the 99900403/80-03 inspection.
The inspector indicated that the Nuclear Control and Instrumentation Department had not supplied the switch but were awaiting information of the failure analysis to determine the impact on the safety-related version of the switch.
7 The switch has been returned to GE Columbia, Maryland,.ard no information was available at San Jose as to cause of the failure.
Fu ther, GE -
San Jose does not believe that a single failure of a non-safety related handswitch, purchased on an "off-the-shelf" basis, indicates a generic problem for the Class IE handswitches which are purchased on the Class IE (Nuclear Safety Related) criteria of PPD *145C 3040.
GE - San Jose has been informed that MP&L has notified NRC by letter (No. AECM 80222 dated 9/16/80) that the failure is not a reportable deficiency.
4.
Defective Crimos In Inserts Of Control Room Instrumentation Panels Corrective and preventive measures for defective crimps of pins of cable connectors and retention of pins in cable connectors were described in IE inspection report 99900403/80-03.
However, the cable assembly line was not working at that time and the inspector could not close the item as he was unable to evaluate the imple-mentation of the corrective and preventive measures.
During this inspection the cable assembly line was working.
The inspector reviewed the cable assembly line operation and verified that all corrective and preventive measures had been instituted and the quality of the crimping operation and assembly of pins in the cable correctors were satisfactory.
No deviations or unresolved items were identified.
5.
Failed Silicon Contro? lad Rectifiers GE San Jose notified Region V of their intentim to submit a Part 21 report on September 6,1979, concerning a pssible defective silicon recti fier, a.
Objectives (1) Determine the cause or reason for the failure and what corrective action was necessary.
(2) Determine if the QA program requirements have been violated.
(3) Evaluate the generic implications of the problem.
b.
Method of Accomoli.chment The precedino objectives were acccmplished by an examination of:
(1) Memo to A. P. Bray from G. G. Sherwood GE dated 9/7/79, Subje.ct:
Reportable Condition, Tocaz Inverters.
(2) Memo frem G. G. Sherwood to H. H. Hendon/D. H. Ferguson, datad '.0/20/50,
Subject:
PRC Evaluation 50-38 Tcpaz
~ Inverters.
i
8 (3) FDI No. WBJF Grand Gulf 2 - Topaz Inverters.
(4) FDI No. WAMX Grand Gulf 1 - Topaz Inverters.
(5) Drawing No. 164C5243 Inverter.
c.
Findings (1) GE notified Region V of a reportable condition per 10 CFR Part 21.
Inverters supplied by Topaz Electronics used to supply essential divisional power from station batteries to the ECCS transmitter / trip unit analog sensors have failed.
These inverters had been shipped to Grand Gulf and Limerick plants.
(2) GE informed both Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick) and Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf) and advised them to return the inverters to GE for replacement or repair.
No defective inverters had been shipped to the other utilities involvec; they will be shipped the corrected inverters.
(3) Failure of inverters was caused by high frequency voltage spikes generated in the 125 Volt DC bus from switching of DC relays.
This is a condition which was not anticipated in design or testing of these inverters.
(4) Inverters were qu011fied in accordance with GE's safety related qualification specification 225A6634 and IEEE 323-19.'1. The inverters were also fabricated under GE's quality plan, QP 30.123, Quality Assurance Requirements, and therefore 10 CFR 50 Appendix B requirements were imposed for fabrication.
(5) The problem was corrected by adding capacitors to the inverters to dampen the high frequency voltage spikes.
(6) There was no eviden;e that the QA program requirements were violated.
(7) No deviations or unresolved items were identified.
6.
Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Rosemount Pressure Transmitters (Model ll52A O, & E, and 1151).
Rosemount Pressure Transmitters Model 1152A, 0, and E, per GE drawings 169C8391, 392, and 393, Revision 1, called for GE qualification test specification 22A4477, Revision 0, which requires environmental cuali-fication to IEEE 323-1974 and seismic qualification to IEEE 311-1975.
f 9
Rosemount notified GE they cannot meet IEEE 323-1974.
Rosemount Model 1151 is a commercial off-the-shelf pressure trans-mitter not normally qualified to IEEE standards.
It was not established how the above models were qualified.
a.
Objectives (1) Determine the environmental and seismic qualification test requirements to IEEE stendards accredited for each applica-tion of Models 1152A, 0, & E and 1151 transmitters.
(2) Resolve any conflicts between the manufacturer's cuali-fication and the requirements of the procurement documents of GE.
(3) Determine the reason for the TWX sent to Rosemount by GE en 5/24/77 stating that transmitters are cualified per GE's Quality Assurance Program.
(4) Determine if the QA program requirements have been violated.
(5) Evaluate generic imolications of the problem.
b.
Method of Acccmolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an examination of:
(1) GE Orawing 169C8391, Revision 4, Sheets 1 & 2, dated 4/9/80, Transmitter, Differential Pressure.
(2) GE Orawing 169C8392, Revision 5, Sheets 1 & 2, dated 4/9/80, Transmitter, Differential Pressure.
(3) GE Orawing 160C8393, Revision 4, Sheets 1 & 2, dated 4/9/80, Transmitter, Gage Pressure.
(4) GE Drawing 169C8968, Revision 3, iets 1 & 2, cated 4/9/80, Transmitter, Absolute Pressure.
(5) GE Orawing 169C8969, Revision 3, Sheets 1 & 2, dated 4/9/80, Transmitter, Absolute Pressure.
(6) GE Test Specification 22A477, Revision 1, dated 5/1/80, Class IE Control and Instrumentation Equipment.
(7) GE Qualification Specification for Essential Components -
General Use 225A6634, Revision 6, dated 3/1/79.
J
10 (8) GE Purchase Specification for Electronic Pressure Transmitters, General Use, 249A1945, Revision 1, dated 8/74.
(9) Rosemount "E" Output Option Model 1151, 1152, Environmental Qualification Report No. 67710A dated 6/13/77.
(10) GE Engineering Information System File Computerized Printout, EIS File dated 10/31/80, " Sort of All Applicable GE BWR Plants Using GE Test Specification 22A4477" (11)
Grand Gulf Nuclear Stat on, Final Safety Analysis Report, i
Mississippi Power and Light Company c.
Findings (1) Procurement of Rosemount Transmitter Models 1152A, 0 and E by GE to procurement drawings 169C9391 Revision 4, 169CS392 Revi-sian 5, and 169C3393 Revision 4, indicated changes to the drawings in the qualification test specification requirements from 22A4477 to 225A6634, during the above latest revisions.
The GE Qualification Specification for Essential Components, 225A6634, Revision 6, requires environmental qualification using IEEE 323-1971.
Seismic qualification has continued unchanged as indicated on the above GE drawings directing use of GE perfccmance qualification per 249A1945 requiring use of IEEE 344-1971.
(2) Additior. ally, other GE procurement drawings were reviewed (Dwg. No.'s 169CS963, Revision 3 and 169CS969, Revision 3 Absolute Pressure Transmitters) resulting in the same con-clusion as c.(1). above (3) Procurement of Rosemount Transmitter's Model 1151, a commercial off-the shelf pressure transmitter, now qualify to the commitments of IEEE 323-1971/344-1971, as evidenced by Rosemount "E" Output Option Model 1151, 1152, Environmental Qualification Repor, No. 67710A, dated 6/13/77.
Basically, it is qualification by reason of similarity with supportive data provided by engineering evaluation testing.
The "E" electronics have been subjected to environmental conditions of paragraph 4.1 of GE Purchase Specification for Electronic Pressure Trar uitters, General Use, 249A1945, Revision 1, dated 8/74, and have cemonstrated performance capability equivalent to that of "A" output option electronics circuit.
(4) GE Qualification Test Specification 22A4477, Revision 1, addresses use of IEEE 323-1974/344-1975.
The GE Engineering Information System File Comouterized Printout was employed to sort all applications of GE B%R plants using this test specification.
Rosemount's ans-er to meet these recuirements are tneir Mocel 11538 anc T0280-1152E wnica are presently undergoing qualification tests.
The Mocel T0230-1152E
11 transmitters, designed for PWR applicatio.s, are now being used in BWR's. The following nuclear projects will use the upgraded seismic and environmental qualification requirements for pressure transmitters (i.e. IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 344-1975):
Skagit 1 Allens Creek 1 TVA X17 thru X22 Clinton Station 1 & 2 Black Fox 1 & 2 River Bend 1 & 2 218, BWR-6, M3 251, BWR-6, M3 Nuclear Projects other than those above will continue to procure under GE Qualification Test Specification 225A6634 requiring environment qualificatian using IEEE 323-1971, and GE Performance Qualification per 249A1945 requiring seismic qualification using IEEE 314-1971.
(5) The Grand Guif Nuclear Station Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 3.11.2, 7.1.2, 7.1.2, 7.2.2, 7.3.2, etc. were reviewed.
NSSS components Class 1E equipment are to be in accordance with IEEE Std 323-1971 either by test or analysis.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was one project typically cited as procuring Rosemount Model 1151/1152 pressure transmitters under GE Qualification Test Specification 225A6634.
(6) The GE quality assurance program procedures appear adequate for the control at GE design / documents and interfaces with procurement manufacturers.
(7) No deviations or unresolved items were identified in this area of inspection.
Note:
A number of inconsistencies were noted concernina information obtained during this inspection when compared to'information obtained during our previous inspection at Rosemount (99900271/80-01).
We will resolve these during future inspections at each facility.
7.
Potential Deficiencies In GE Comconent Seismic And Environmental Qualification A potential reportable deficiency was reported by the licensee, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. on 5/12/80 regarding a lack of environmental and 5eismic qualification documentation for instruments supplied by the NSSS, (General Electric, San Jose, California).
The recorting of this potential deficiency coincided with the initiation of two (2)
12 Corrective Action Requests (CAR 0041 and CAR 0042) by the Licensee during an audit of the NSSS.
The interim report submitted by the Licensee on 5/12/80, indicated that the level and conductivity instrument qualification documentation problem would be fully disclosed and forthcoming in the Licensee's Final Report.
The interim report also indicated that the differential pressure transmitter (Rosemount Model 1151) instrument qualification docu-mentation was misfiled and found in another record file at the NSSS.
To prevent the recurrence of not being able to retrieve qualification documentation in a timely manner, the NSSS Quality Assurance Program is to be modified to cross-reference qualification records.
a.
Objectives (1) Determine whether the assigned classification by the NSSS, agrees with the required functions of the conductivity and level instruments, during or after an accident, as indicated by the Licensee's Final Report.
(2) Verify that GE Record Center has implemented a equipment /
qualification documentation cross-reference system that obtains quick access to vendor seismic and environmental qualification documentation for safety-related instruments.
(3) Determine if the QA program requirements are in force, and the effectiveness of the documentation system.
b.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an examination of:
(1) Final Report - Potential Reportable 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Deficiency involving Qualification of Instruments at Nine Mile Point, Unit 2, dated 8/5/80.
(2) GE Engineering Operating Procedure E0P 42-10.00, dated 6/23/80, " Design Record Files" (3) Design Record File Index Log.
(4) Cross Reference Sheets to related or supporting Design Record Files.
(5) GE memo to W. M. Barrentine from C. G. Lewis, dated 6/13/80, " Niagara Mohawk Quality Assurance Audit" (6) GE memo to C. G. Lewis from W. M. Barrentine, dated 6/25/80, " Niagara Mohawk Quality Assurance Audit" l
13 c.
Findings (1) Regarding conductivity element E12-N001 and level transmitter E12-N008, it has been determined that no corrective action (resulting from the audit which initiated Corrective Action Request 0041) is required.
The Final Report submitted by the Licensee on 8/5/80 in accordance with paragraph 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3), clearly indicates these instruments to be passive and are not required to function either during of after a design basis accident, and therefore no environmental and seismic qualification is required.
These instruments have been shcwn to be adequately qualified to satisfy their intended design function.
(2) To prevent recurrence and retrieve documentation in a timely manner, the NSSS (GE, San Jose) has modified their Quality Assurance Program to cross-reference qualification records and vendor supplied documentation.
GE has strengthened their implementing operating procedures (EOP 42-10.00, issued 6/23/80, paragraph (d)) to develop Design Record File contents by indexing to provide traceable and retrievable evicence in support of technical activities undertaken.
(3) GE C&ID Engineering reorganized to provide management attention (permanent people) to production needs dedicated to the ucgrading of qualification documentation of GE supplied C&ID equipment.
GE C&ID Engineering has imple-mented a program to review the C&ID equipment classification with respect to safety requirements, and review its document-ation for equipment designs in detail.
(4) Strengthening the control of the Design Record Files through centralization, and by review and organization of these Design Record Files has been implemented.
Self audits by GE C&ID of instrument qualification records are now being performed.
The Design Record Files are now in an orderly condition.
A Design Record File Index Log has been developed to identify all instrument and equipment qualification records.
4 (5) The Design Record Files now carry a complete supporting design history (cross reference indexes) to other appropriate and applicable Design Record Files.
(6) An audit performed by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporat. ion on 10/21 - 24/80 closed Corrective Action Requests (CAR) 0041 and 00A2.
The audit report is still forthcoming from Niagars Mohawk.
I w
e
14 8.
CD Report - General Electric, Reactor Protection System Panel Design Deficiency General Electric notified TVA that the NSPS (C-71-P011) 125VAC Power Distribution Panels (one for each unit) did not meet the isolation criteria of R.G.1.75 in that a short could prevent the initiation of a scram.
Four (4) panels were shipped to TVA for Hartsville, A1, A2, B1, and 82, in violation of a " Hold" placed on the panels by GE. The other (2) panels, for Hartsville and Phipps Bend, had not been shipped.
GE had reported this item to Region V as a 10 CFR Part 21 report in a letter - Sherwood to Engelken, August 6, 1980.
a.
Objectives (1) Determine to what extent GE does not meet R.G. 1.75 with respect to the physical indecendence of electrical systems as cited in the 10 CFR 21 deficiency report of 8/6/80.
(2) Determine the cause or reason for the violation of the GE hold order.
(3) Determine if the GE QA program requirements have been violated.
(4) Evaluate generic implications of the problem.
b.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were acccmplished by an examination of:
(1) GE Design Review Report No. 79-6 "NSPS Power Distribution" dated 8/16/79.
(2) Nuclear System Protection System (NSPS) Power Distribution System Evaluation and Plan, W. H. Hendrix,10/8/80.
(3) Conditional (Design Application) Release Shipment Control System Evaluation and Plan, J. D. Wilson, 9/3/80.
(4) GE Control and Instrumentation Department - Memo to D. E. Lee from R. A. Parker, " Conditional Release Engineering Instruction, dated 7/25/80.
(5) GE Engineering Support Operation - Memo to Messrs L. S.
Bohl, D. E. Lee, W. R. Marklein, J. L. Murray from C. D.
Magrath " Minutes at " Meeting on Communication at Deferred Design Verification", dated 9/8/80.
(
4 15 (6) Quality Assurance News Letter No. 49, author 0. E. Lee,
" Deferred Design Verification," 8/5/80.
(7) GE Control and Instrumentation Department - Memo to Production Engineering Unit Managers from R. A. Pirker,
" Conditional Release Engineering Instructions," ' *ed 7/25/80.
(8) GE Control and Instrumentation Department - Memo to G. G. Sherwood from D. H. Ferguson, D. E. Lee, W. M.
Barrentine, D. R.Monfils, "Potentially Reportable Condition, RPS System," dated 6/4/80.
(9) GE Control and Instrumentation Department - Memo to D. Ferguson from K. Cederguist "NSPS Panels C71-P011-TVA", dated 6/9/80.
(10) GE Control and Instrumentation Department - Memo to W. H. Barrentine, "Potentially Reportable Condition (PRC) 80-31, dated 6/23/80.
(11) GE Engineering Operation Procedure E0P 42-5.00, issued revision 6/14/79, " Engineering Requirements Document Release."
(12) GE Engineering Instruction No. SN-C71-P011, dated 10/23/80.
(13) GE Engineering Instruction No. SN-C71-P011, dated 11/8/78.
(14) GE Engineering Instruction No. SN-C71-P011, dated 12/22/78.
c.
Findings (1) GE C&IO has not yet resolved the design implementation of these power distribution panels in providing independent power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) A & B sole-noids, and maintaining electrical separation in accordance with US Reg. Guide 1.75. (Ref. Design Review Report No. 79-6, August 16, 1979).
The design commitments to upgrade (modify) these panels will solidify during a scheduled GE C&ID Design Review Meeting on the week of December 1, 1980.
l (2) Four (4) Panels TVA X17, 18, 19, & 20 were inadvertantly shipped to the jobsite under the original design which violated Reg. Guide 1.75.
Four divisions of power plus non essential power were employed within the panel without i
l
16 isolation.
The original design, which called for isolation transformers on each division of power, was not constructed during the panel fabrication.
The isolation transformers were negated during a GE design review which conceded they were not proven technologically.
The panels were built excluding the power isolator devices.
All tour panels have been returned to GE, San Jose, and no others were found to have been shipped with this problem.
(3) The four (4) panels TVA X17, 18, 19, & 20 were placed on
" Hold", then conditionally released by GE Engineering.
GE C&ID did not violate established procedures, and prac-tices, in place at the time.
Corrective action has been instituted since that time to strenghen the implementing procedures and practices both by Mr. D. E. Lee for Engine ring, and Mr. D. R. Monfils for Materials.
This now tightens the conditional design application release shipment control system at GE.
C.
Exit Meeting A meeting was conducted with management representatives at the conclusion of the inscection on November 7, 1950.
In addition to the individuals indicated by an asterisk in the Details Section, those in attendance were:
J. Barnard, Manager Product and Quality Assurance Operation (P&QAO)
A. Breed, Manager Quality Assurance, P&QA0
- 0. H. Ferguson, Manager Quality Assurance, C&ID
- 0. H. Krueger, Manager Engineering Support Operation, NED R. A. Pocberesky, Manager Nuclear Engineering Procurement Operation, NED The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection for those present at the meeting.
Management representatives acknowledged the statements of the inspector.