ML20002D580

First Interim Deficiency Rept Re Pressure Drop in Essential Svc Water Piping,Initially Reported on 801210.Util Is Reanalyzing Essential Svc Water Piping & High Pressure Fire Protection Piping.Final Rept Will Be Submitted by 810320

ML20002D580
Person / Time
Site:	Hartsville, Phipps Bend
Issue date:	01/12/1981
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, HTRD-50-518-80, HTRD-50-519-80, HTRD-50-520-80, HTRD-50-521-80, PBRD-50-553-80, PBRD-50-554-80, NUDOCS 8101210390
Download: ML20002D580 (3)

Text

.-

A27 810113 006 e

400 Chestnut Street Tower II January 12, 1981 HTRD-50-518 -519, -520, -521/80-02 PBRD-50-553, -554/80-02

- N s Mr. James P.'O'Reilly, Directog ,

. 0ffice of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission \

Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street \ j ,

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

HARTSVILLE AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANTS - PRESSURE DROP IN ESSEt:TIAL SERVICE WATER PIPING - HTRD-50-518, -519, -520, -521/80 PBRD-50-553, -554/81-02 The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Region II :nspector R. W. Wright on December 10, 1980, as NCR's HTAMEB8001, HTBMEB8001 and PBNMEB8001. In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, se are enclosing the first interim report on the subject deficiency. TVA anticipates transmitting the final report on or before March 20, 1981. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l

j L. M. Mills, Manager i Nuclear Regulation and Safety JAD:SDL:KEH \

Enclosure \

cc:

Mr.VictorStello,Directo'q(orcement Office of Inspection and En U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm ssion Washinsrton, DC 20555 cc: ARMS, 640 CST 2-C A. W. Crevasse, 401 UBB-C H. N. Culver, 249A HEB-K H. J. Green, 1750 CST 2-C R. T. Hatcote, Hartsville W. T. Kelleghan, Phipps Bend J. A. Raulston, W10C126 C-K H. S. Sanger, Jr., E11B33 C-K W. B. Swann, Hartsville, - NRC F. A. Szczepanski, 417 UBB-C o

$ 8101210310

E ENCLOSURE I

.HARTSVILLE AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANTS .

I PRESSURE DROP IN ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATE RPIPING HTRD-50-518, -519, -520, -521/80-02  !

PBRD-50-553, -554/80-01 10 CFR 50 55(e) REPORT NO. 1 (INTERIM)

On December 10, 1980, TVA informed NRC-0IE Region II, Inspector R. W.

Wright, of a reportable condition regarding potential excessive pressure drop in Essential Service Water (ESW) System raw water piping at the Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants. This is the first interim report on the subject reportable condition. The. final report will be provided en or before March 20, 1981.

Descriotion of Deficiency -

Corrosien products have been found to be causing greater than predicted pressure drops in carbon steel raw (river) water piping in TVA power plants which were designed (sized) according to standard industry practice. Analysis of the ESW System (Division III) for Harts?ille and Phipps Bend using new criteria to account for the greater pressure drops showed unacceptacle water supply to some components and showed that

. system modifications would be necessary to ensure all components.will -

received minimum design flow rates over the full design life of the plant. Since some conpenents of the ESW System would not receive adequate water supply over the full design life of the plant, the ability of the ESW System to perform its safety function would be jeopardized.

Corrective Action While testing the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, certain heat exchangers were found to be receiving i

inadequate cooling water flow due to a buildup of corrosion products in.the interior of the carbon steel piping servicing the equipment.

A study was undertaken to determine the pervasiveness of this problem in the TVA system and to develop recommended practices to mitigate its effects in the design of future plants.

Phase I of the study included the removal and analysis of 13 piping samples from 8 steam plants. The condition discovered at Browns Ferry was found to be widespread, and further investigation was recommended.

Based on the results of the Phase I investigation, interim criteria for pressure drop calculations was adopted, and GE was advised to use this interim criteria in designing STRIDE piping. As a result, all STRIDE ESW piping and valves two inches and less in size were changed to stainless steel.

I l

. - ~ - . - . ..

, . ~ , . , -..a n + . - . , , , .w - -

r, '

-2 Phase II of the study included the removal and anlysis of approximately 40 additional samples and performing pressure drop tests on three sections of piping at different plants and of different sizes. An empirical correlation was found between the condition of the piping tested and the measured pressure drop. Based on this correlation and the sa=ple-data base available, final pressure drop criteria was adopted.

The results of both phases of the corrosion study was published in a TVA report dated September 1979 and in the August 1980 issue of Power Engineering magazine.

On November 20, 1979, the TVA corrosion report was transmitted to GE -

with instructions to evaluate the impact of applying the recommended criteria to the STRIDE ESW and high pressure fire protection (HPFP) piping. GE has provided the results of their ovaluation of HPFP and ESW to TVA. TVA plans to direct GE to make the necessary changes. The TVA reevaluation of the ESW Division III piping in the BOP showed that it is necessary to increase approximately 880 feet of 10-inch piping to 14-inch piping in each plant. TVA is reanalyzing Divisions I and II of the ESW piping and HPFP piping in the BOP, and if deficiencies are identified, the associated changes to be made will be discussed in the final report.

. - - .