ML20002B505
| ML20002B505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Collier A OFFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS (SUBS. OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRI |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012110721 | |
| Download: ML20002B505 (1) | |
Text
.
9
'o UNITED STATES 4
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
o
{
E
,i REGION 11
~f o
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W,. SUITE 3100 g
M>
<<+q*****
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 303o3
<. 3 y
NOV 6 1580 52 o
r, c _ _
-c.
In Reply Refer To:
ptb o
?ge RII:JPO gEg; ga (50-437s'-
=go y
gg
- i.,
?
t>8
~S Offshore Power Systems E
5 ro ATTN:
A. R. Collier, President P. O. Box 8000 Jacksonville, FL 32211 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21 requires your action with regard to your power reactor facility (ies) holding an operating license or a construction permit.
Should you have questions concerning this bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~.
-[) r-4g-,
.y-James P. O'Reilly Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins l
1 i
8012110 M Q
SSINS No.:
6820 Accession No.:
8008220246 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D
03
_3 e,
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
,, J J
,a WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 November 6, 1980 IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21: VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPAhT, INC.
Description of Circumstances:
On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company notified IE Region I that cracks had been discovered in the yokes of a pumber of valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) system at their Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. The potential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant, safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby all RHR functions could be simultaneously lost. Specifically, the cracks were located in the radii at the yoke mounting. flange-to-yoke vertical section interface.
An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performed by the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They concluded that the cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yoke material not having the proper mechanical properties.
Purchased as ASTM A-216, Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yield strengths below the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.
The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcelm Foundry Company, Inc., of Newark, New Jersey. The foundry is no longer in business.
Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of the other valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves at Susquehanna. To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been tested.
Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly below the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.
Specification A-370.
These additional valve yokes are on a wide range of valve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed with Malcolm over a period of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, it appears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to one short time period. Anchor Darling intends to replace the defective valve yokes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear power plants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm have been provided.
Since Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staff cannot determine directly if Malcolm has provided valve parts to other valve manufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.
Actions To Be Taken by Addressees:
For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the following actions are required:
(
IEB 80-21 November 6, 1980 Page 2 of 2 1.
Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
If no valves are identified as having potentially faulty material, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
1 2.
Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall immediately visually inspect for cracks all normally accessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactor operation).
3.
Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves with potentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer (s) of these valves and either:
Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanical a.
properties in accordance with the ASTM material specification; if such is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below also.
b.
Replace the defective materials and/or valves.
Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and the c.
basis for such actions.
For plants with en operating license, the results of your initial determination (item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, your planned action (item 3), and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
For plants with a construction permit, the results of your initial determination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer (s), your planned action (item
- 3) and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall be reported within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, Washington, DC 20555.
Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve the affected valve manufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
November 6, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To 80-21 Valve Yokes Supplies by 11/6/80 All LWR pr reactors Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
with an C.
c CP Supplement 3 Environmental Qualification 10/24/80 All power teactor to 73-10B of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL Supplement 2 Environmental Qualification 9/30/80 All power reactor to 79-01B of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/11/80 All radiography Model 200-520-008 Sealed-licensees source Connectors 79-26 Boron Loss from BWR 8/29/80 All BWR power Revision 1 Control Blades facilities with an OL 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR