ML20002B157

Deposition of B&W by LC Rogers on 790612.Statements of post-trip Involvement in TMI 790328 Transient

ML20002B157
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	06/12/1979
From:	Rogers L BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8012100048
Download: ML20002B157 (34)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:__ .w,. ~.. 0 .,~. ~ b /{f ~, THE' BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY POWER GENERATION GROUP ~. ;- ~ To l Distribution A j ~., 3 From L.C. Rogers. Site Ooerations Manager ses aes_.s-Cust. File No. 2d or Ref. T Met-Ed/Jersev Central Power and Licht Subj. Date ~ Statement Of 3/28/79 Unit II Transient June 12. 1979 '2".. j n..,.................,........i,. .?'. _.7.. Attached is a description of my persoani statement '.I relating to my contribation towards re-establishment of stable plant conditions-following the trip and subsequent transient experienced at TMI Nuclear Station Unic II, beginning with the turbine / reactor trip at 0400 hours 3/28/79. The majority of the information and conclusions expressed in this package are a result of my personal recollection, post trip review of collected plant cata information, and the result of tapes of interviews and transcripts of interviews of other personnel involved with contributions towards plant stability on that date. Because of use of the above listed resources, I consider the times and events to be most accurate of any other ~ time and event information I may have personally either written or verbally described. If you have any questions regarding this subj ect, please do not hesitate to contact me. LCR/djr cc: John MacMillan Byron Nelson Andy Olds Jim Phit.aey Bill Spangler e b 80121000 % T p .u

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~w r. 7/5 3 STATEMENT OF THE POST TRIP INVOLVEMENT: IN THE TMI 3/28/79 PLANT TRANSIENT by Leland Curtis Rogers Site Operations Manager Babcock & Wilcox Company - h g e 4 = h 4 ,.n.- .- +.. ,~,

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,... p_._m.~ e, r ~.? My name is Leland Curtis Rogers; and at the time of the Tf1I-2 plant transient, I was assigned at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station as the 2 Site Operations Manager for the Babcock and Wilcox Company. My primary functicnwas completion of the Unit Startup Testing Program, as described 1^,. by the Nuclear Steam System Contract. I also held a collateral rest asibility as Manager supervising five Field Service Enginers that performed various

' s service tasks requested by the Management of Metropolitan Edison and l?..

General Public Utilities Service Corporatic 1, under separate Service

.1-contract agreements.

I report to W. H. Spangler, Manager Startup Services, Nuclear Services Department, in Lynchburg Virginia, NPGD office for all of the N.S.S.S. Startup responsibilities at Thme Mile Island. I also report to Mr. J. D. Phinney, Manager Operating Plant Services, Nuclear Service Department, in Lynchburg Virginia, for the various service task assistance to Unit I during the refueling operations. The Unit I plant startup to begin Cycle 5 operations would also have had B&W Engineers providing ~ assistance to Metropolitan Edison, thus, reporting to me. NUCLEAR BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE I am a Registered Professional Engineer in the state of California. My nuclear experience is as follows: l I. Naval Nuclear Power Prooram

a.. July 1955 - June 1957 f

Nuclear Operations SIW prototype, Idaho Falls, Idaho. Operations. testing and overhaul. Instructor - Shift Senior Chief Reactor Operator. l ~ - - ~ (

i m~- ,. ~ y,______. ~~ ~ ~.. - b. August 1957 - March 1959 " ~ ~ U.S.S. Swordfish SS (N) 579 Precomissioning, testing, operations, and overhaul. -i- -.-. i c. August 1959 - October 1962 U.S.S. Sculpin SS (N) 590 ",f Precomissioning, testing, operations and overhaul

pg.

d. December 1962 - February 1966 ,i. USNTS Bainbridge, Maryland, Naval Nuclear Power School Instructor, Basic Training Courses e. February 1966 - June 1969 U.S.S. Tinosa SS (N) 606 Operations and overhaul - Training Coordinator f. July 1969 - February 1970 Engineering Repair Department, U.S. Naval Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut Repair assistance to the operating submarine fleet. g. During the 15 years,1955 through 1970, I also attended Special Training courses relating to design, theory, operations, and performance of Naval Nuclear Power Plants. II. Comercial Nuclear Program a. February 1970 - September 1972 Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Field Service Engineer. Performed tasks such as Test Program ~, '.-1 Procedures Preparation, Refueling Restart Physics Test Engineer, ~ Constri.:ction Functional Test Service, Hot Functional Test Engineer, Critical and Power Escalation Service Engineer f.. _ _

,w.,..- ~ ? ~ ~.;- for the Westinghouse System Plants Yankee Rowe E- " j. - Connecticut Yankee Rochester G&E (Ginna) .,[.6 CP&L (Robinson) i- ' ~ FP&L (Turkey Point) VEPC0 (Surrey) -; ;~. - Can Edison (Indian Point II) i. WMP (Point Beach) NSP (Prairie Island) WEP(Kewanee) b. October 1972 - Present Three Mile Island Nuclear Station October 1972, Site Operations Engineer, Startup Support Unit I. s June 1974, Manager Site Services, Service Tasks for Metropolitan Edison Company Unit I and GPUSC Unit II. January 1977, Site Operations Manager Unit II Startup, and Manager, Site Services for both units. My statement is a deliberate effort on my part to identify, as best I can recall for the record, if required; my personal contrisution towards the post trip Unit II operations on March 28, 1979, at Three ~~~ ~ Mile Island Station and the following two days. Also, I shall attempt j to identify any supporting contribution, during the stated operations, I w 4

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of any other B&W personnel that I was aware of at the time or have ~ learned about since that were sources of information that was directed 1. to me as a support function. Because of the period of time since the [.!~ ~ ~ ' ' _p plant transient, my observations may be affected by the loss of time / y,,-N fact relationship or conversely because of knowledge developed about the transient and their effects since that time may be influenced and indicate contrast to statements or data 'from other sources. March 28, 1979' '.} Approximately 0600 on March 28, 1979, I was awakened by the telephone and was asked to please stand-by for a conference call with Mr. Miller. (This is not an unusual occurrence since my role as B&W !!anager of Services at TMI Site, by agreement with Metropolitan Edison, usually results in a notification of abnormal or unusual operations of either Unit; so I may be better prepared to provide I whatever B&W support may be identified on an individual basis at a later time.) Within a few minutes, the conference call connections were made and the persons on the line identified themselves as Jack Herbein (Metropolitan Edison, Vice-President of Generation), Gary Miller (Metropolitan Edison, Station Manager), George Kunder (Technical Superintendent Unit II), and myself. George had been notified : bout the plant trip earlier and had gone into the plant. (He lives about one mile from the site and arrived at approximately 0450 hours.) George identified that Unit II had experienced some (not clearly identified at that time) upset condition in the feedwater system that caused a protective interlock system to initiate both feedwater pump S -m

c ~... y.,_. ~ r \\ .J ~ trip. This condition causes a generator / turbine sequential trip action which did occur, about 0400 hours. George continued with a ." 5. ~~ scenario which described the following events (may not be in the - ~ /- same order as George presented them): , %.,]_ a. approximately 8 seconds after turbine tripped, the reactor ~M-tripped on high pressure. .'/.

• b.

the electromatic relief valve, RC-RV-2, opened prior to the, 2.~. .. 7 - reactor trip, as expected.

c.. shortly (no time estimate) the rupture diaphragm on the reactor coolant drain tank failed (high pressure in the tank).

d. pressurizer level recovered quickly at start of transient, and the operators have had trouble keeping within indication range at top since. Approximately 300" at time of call. e. believe George told us of suspected lass of many of pressurizer heaters bacause of high moisture from drain tank; insulation on heater cables known to be vulnerable to high reactor building humidity in past. f. samples had revealed possible primary to secondary leak on "B" OTSG therefore it was " bottled up" at that time. g. reactor coolant system pressure was 800 to 1,000 psi and temperatures in the reactor coolant system still high. h. suspected to have violated the fuel pin compression curve limits. 1. "B" loop reactor coolant pumps were secured 0512 hours because of pressure temperature limits. - s._ j. "A" loop reactor coolant pumps were secured about 25 minutes later.

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,;..,~..,,. ~ r , *? k. "A" loop reactor s colant pumps were secured about 25 minutes later because reactor coolant flow indicators were erratic and reactor coolant pump motor current readings were erratic. .. /- .a

i A general discussion followed among all the people on the call.

I was attempting to become more clear on what had occurred to lead to '. ' 3-the complicated reactor coolant system conditions. I asked George ';~~~._ if the electromatic relief valve isolation block valve, RC-V2 was shut. h.." ~ George did not know, but dispatched an operator from the Shift Supervisors office to find out. I heard a reply come back to George that RC-V2 was shut. It is here that I believed that RC-V2 mcst have been shut since right after the drain tank rupture disc had failed (which of course the valve had not been shut and according to the data was closed at 0622 hours). This informa;. ion may have misled all of the conference call people away from making a key decision at that time. My thoughts were to insure that the cause of the reactor coolant drain tank diaphragn failure was absolutely shut off. I suspected that the electromatic relief valve may not have closed as it should have after nomal operation, which obviously led to drain tank failure. I ~ believe that George also said the operators had reported increase above normal reactor building pressure and temperature. (These indications would be considered correct because of the reactor coolant drain tank condition. ) The group discussion concluded that imediate action would be to .,.~5 - ~ restore system pressure and attempt to regain reactor coolant system flow by starting a reactor coolant pump. Herbein suggested that Miller .. _ ~

1 , w.. 2.,. I ~ r start in to the site, and Gary agreed. Miller asked me if I was al o ' ~ on my way in to the site, and I acknowledged that I would be there 2'- as soon as I could. (Note, George did not mention any proble.1 with ~ ~ '.,. - ~ radionuclide activity problems during the call; and in fact, they did nf-not exist at the start of the call.) The call ended somewhere around 0625. I quickly got read and left for the site. I arrived at th.. 34rth f Gate of the site at approximately 0705 hours and noted that the gates T were closed, and the security forces were directing traffic to go to the Met-Ed Visitors Center down Route 441. I pulled up to a guard and asked why the gate was closed,and he informed me that a " Site Emergency" had been declared. I told him that I would be needed in the Unit II area, and about that time another guard that knew me came out of the guard house with my 002 red badge and instructed the other guard to open the gate for me. (I do not know if someone had previously instructed I the guard to clear me when I showed up or not.) I went to my normal work office location (in the temporary green steel building directly opposite the Unit II Reactor Building). I took my briefcase into my office, picked up my hardhat, left a note for my secretary, and went across the street to the turbine building entrance - inner security gate entrance. Guard Drabick was enforcing the " Site Emergency" turning back towards the South " Brass" Gate a lot of walking craft workers and a bus load of workers. He informed me that I could not go in, and I asked him to use his radio and call the control room for permission. - ~~ Pe got a message to send me in. I noted that an atmospheric duma valve was blowing steam. I entered the turbine building and pressed the

..-. u u_ i elevator call button. I noted that a good share of the turbine building lighting was out; and when the elevator did not arrive in ~ what I considered a reasonable time, I concluded that the loss of ...:[. power may have affected the elevator. I went up the stairwell by t7 - -=- the elevator. I walked across the operating floor of the turbine building and ,-[ passed through the fire doors to the Control Tower Building and entered the Control Room by the left-hand door. I noticed Gary fliller 7,. - and several tiet-Ed shift and Engineering Staff Supervision personnel. ~ I let Miller know that I was available to help in whatever way I could. I attempted to detemine the status of Plant Parameters as best I could without interfering with the designated operators. Most e significant piece of information was the Plant Radiation Monitors. I was not able to get close, not wanting to interfere with the operators' duties, and obtain actual readings. I could see many channels in " alarm" and almost all of the rest in " alert." Conversation revealed that some were reading in the " Hundreds of R" levels. I inquired of Bill 7 ewe (shift supervisor) if the reactor coolant pump runs had been attempted. Bill said that all four pumps were tried, three would not start, one pump had run fairly normal for a couple of minutes then showed minimum current and no flow indications, therefore, was secured again. Bill also said that because of " lost" j pressurizer heaters, the operators were unable to get a bubble in z the pressurizer and keep it; occasionally they got level indication, but it was not controllable most of the time because it was stayin;; at a very high level. I checked that all of the control rods were inserted in the core, reactor coolant system Th's were pegged at 620 cegrees 2, TC's were bot cred out en narrow range, TC wide ranges were vr.,,,.. ~ r between 200 F and 300 F, the reactor coolant pump seals were staged but the trace of several previous hours had shown significant pressure excursions, apparently following the reactor coolant system pressure. ,-{ . 'k;N Quick glance appeared that the seals had perfomed well during the system pressure cycles and on and off pump operations. 2 The time was 0730 hours and I decided to attempt to call Lynchburg ..; ~ ' ~ ~ ~ - (Spangler). I had to use the I&C shop phones outside the Control y Room due to the Control Room phones being tied up at the time because -.I Miller had initiated a " General Emergency" condition bas _ed on the high and increasing radiation levels in the Reactor Building. My 2 attempt to reach anyone at Old Forest Road B&W Office was not fruitful in that I got the Security Guard et the building front entrance,and he informed me that the switchboard was not yet in operation and probably could not locate anyone in the Nuclear Service Section at that time. I went back to the Control Room and stayed out of the way. Met-Ed personnel were peforming operating tasks as directed by the shift supervisor and also performing tasks as directed by Miller relating to the procedure requirement for the " General Emergency" condition. All phones were occupied in notifying all of the organizations and agencies required. Met-Ed Rad Survey Teams were reporting levels from the specific locations as directed by Dick Dubiel. I talked to chemistry supervisors regarding the secondary samples on "A&B" OT5G's and agreed with their conclusions that the "A" generator was not currently contam-inated and that the "B" generator was [contam'inat'ed and should be kept ~~ ~ isolated from the steam. system. I believe the first reporis of highly -s contaminated water being present in the (seenextpage) l

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Auxiliary Building were received in the control area around this time ~~ frame. I returned to the I&C office at 0745 hours and again placed a call

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to Bill Spanglerin Lynchburg. Bill answered the phone, and I briefed . '15 him on what I knew at that time relating a re-cap of events from 0400 53 hours to 0745 hours of the information that I possessed at that point. I informed him that the site was closed and a " General Emergency" had k?.. been declared because of the very high radiation alanns in the Reactor 7-h Building. I am not sure but I may have informed him of the activity iri ~ the Auxiliary Building also during that call. As I recall, Bill asked me some questions about how events may have occurred, such as, what started the Feed System Transient. At that time, it was suspected that the condensate polisher valve control air supply system was full of water, which could have started a cascade securing of the condensate polishers leading to a loss of feedwater event. I believe I related N this information to Bill. (Post trip review reveals a loss of condensate pomp as the initiating event and this can give the same results.) Bill may well have asked additional questions, but I do not have recall as to what they were at this time. I know that I said, "Someone will be getting back to you later to keep you updated." During this time the operators under the shift supervisor and with assistance from liike Ross, the Unit I Operations Supervisor, were attempting to regain full knowledae and control by using their nonnal indications of the reactor systems and Balance of Plant. I was not directly advising anyone and because of physically being in the rear area of the Control Room, I was not fully knowledgeable of their actions. l 4,-__

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~ Gary Miller, Bill Zewe, Mike Ross, George Kunder and I held a short ~~ caucus about immediate action to attempt with the plant. An agreemert ^ was reached to attempt to run a reactor coolant pump in the "A" loop, since the last pump run was in the "B" loop, to see if the same effects 1-would be apparent in the "A" loop. System pressure was approximately. f'- f. 1500 psi. The 1A pump was started and showed no flow indication and ~- minimum current on the motor.' I was then convinced that by some method the plant had converted both Th legs volumes to steam and it was as large a void as to extend essentially to the pump suctions. I cuggested that further pump ruas at that time would do nothing for the i system and possibly destroy a shaft seal assembly. Miller asked all of the supervisory and assistance people to retire to the Shift Supervisors Office in the rear of the Control Room. I NOTE: The Control Room area was a calm operating station with reports l of plant systems and component informa' ion being comunicated in an ~ efficient fashion. Chemistry, Rad Monitoring, Maintenance, and Staff Engineering were all being dispatched on tasks supporting the operators. ~ There is no questien in my mind that all individuals in and around Unit II that day understood the seriousness of the plant condition and there was a genuine concentrated effort to do whatever was necessary to bring all plant situations under control. In the face of adversity, all participants responded much finer that one may expect from such a large, diversified, individual interest, collection of personnel. e.,

. g...,. ~ ~.. - In the meeting, Gary started with a statement that all persons involved needed to regard that our collective first responsibility ".- :~ was to protect the public from harm by insuring all actions could not

26 aggravate the release of radiation. At that time, it was known that we had high radiation levels in the reactor containment (it was agreed.

that the reactor building was isolated and we should not have any 2i additional movement of radioactive water or gasses from that source). 2. ~ 7-It was also identified that the Auxiliary Building had serious contaminated water and gas and was " buttoned up" as best as known at the time. Gary went on to say that protection of the pers'onnel required to be on site was the second priority objective and would be considered as an overrriding factor in support of the third objective and that was tu recover the plant by making it stable and attempting to prevent further damage to the plant components. ~ The meeting progressed c.long the line of identifying what we (collectively) knew about plant conditions. Everyone agreed that we had some damage to the cladding of fuel in the core which led to the fission ~ product released to containment and elsewhere. There was a strong feeling at that time, because of radioactiw sample analysis results that fuel assembly damage was probably not very extensive, beyond cladding failure. Several Ge Li analyses were perfonned on the Auxiliary Building water, and the majority of the spectrum of activity was fission product gasses and the decay daughter products of those gasses. The flow path of activity frem the reactor coolant system was through the pressurizer and electromatic relief valve to the reactor coolant drain tank and to containment. It was also agreed that the loops were in a steam phase and that the off-scale panel Th readings were possibly an uncalibrated te= erature. Ivan Porter had connected a

.; ~ .J minivolt bridge to one of the RPS TH RTD's, and this instrument indicated that the detector was showing a resistance slightly beyond .. l '. the vendor supplied calibration curves, which as I remember, is f. approximately 720 F. Also, a multi-point recorder which showed both "[ the Th temperatures from thermocouples was approxiamtely 720 - 740 F. . ~ - 3-No one was sure if the loop RTD would respond correctly in a steam 7. phase, and also no one was sure if the multi-point recorder TC's were 2.~.. 1-calibrated for temperatures in the indicated range. (The Th indicated ~ temperatures were such that confidence of the indication was questioned.) It is significant to point out that with no reactor coolant pump flow and no natural convection flow in the loops, one must assume the loop RTD's could not be representative of the temperature of water in the core area. The TC's on both loops had been going down steadily in temperature f indicating positively that HP injection flow was going into the system. (Miller emphasized that HPI should always be on and not be secured without his agreement.) Reactor coolant system pressure was approximately 1300 - 1400 p i and the pressurizer was nearly solid with heater controls, essentially ineffectual. Also discussed was the fact that RC-RV-2 was most likely failed in the full open position and the only venting of the reactor coolant system could be controlled -7 by RC-V-2 operation. Even though no one felt that it was a good idea to start a reactor coolant pump, a concern was expressed whether we really were removing enough heat from the reactor coolant by steaming through the atmospheric dump valve. Steaming to the co denser was stopped because no auxiliary steam was available: for gland seal ~ _13_

,,...... : ^ - e ~ I systems and the Unit II vacuum was broken (Note: Since Unit I was in hot standby in preparation for a plant startup, Unit II was supplying [,~ ~ the Unit I auxiliary steam requirements and the station auxiliary 2.[.. boilers were not and had not been operating recently). The station 18 =- auxiliary boilers were prepared for startup to eventually supply . ' -g' Unit II auxiliary steam needs. Also the "B" OTSG was isolated. T. Consensus in the meeting at that time was that the TC temceratures showed 2.~ that HPI was being injected and the core must be receiving a.. _ .. 7 - flow of water by keeping it covered and cool. (I believe about this time the information was being delivered that the core T/C' ~were ~~ [ reading a random indication from relatively low temperatures to 700 to 2400 or not reading at all. Consensus here was that confidence in these detectors was very questionable without some additional answers. Obviously, the core had overheated, but I do not think anyone in the room had appreciation of just h)w high that may have been nor ~ that the core water level had ever been low enough to have steam voids and dry out the fuel cladding. Note: With no flow in the reactor coolant loops either pumos or natural flow (this'conilusioii based'on RTD indications)~,' the group" impresssion was that HPI flow must be keeping the core cool; we cannot operate any of the reactor coolant nonr.a1 systems until we collapse the steam voids in the hot legs and restore forced flow or natural circulation that can be monitored on the installed instrumentation. A suggestion was made to raise the "A" steam generator level to approximately 99". on the operate range in order to remove some of the primary steam s I s l -la-

+ u _ sc- ~. l-energy and possibly promote better natural circulation when the "A" ,,-[} loop was restored to_ water phase. Somewhere in this time frame (shortly after 0900 hours)

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s Mr. John Flint, B&W Field Service Engineer, arrived in the Unit II Control Room. I suggested to John that he get up to speed with the fi - current plant conditions; and after I briefed him on previous events, ,4_ help in evaluating the information that could be obtained from the 2*.. _,T. plant computer. Also that I would be needing to stay in close touch with him until the unit was again stable. A group decision was made to increase primary system pressure by keeping the RC-V-2 block valve shut and increasing HPI flow. It was decided to use RC-V-2 as a maximum pressure control device and have the operator control primary pressure at or about 2100 psi. The general feeling was that we might be able to drive the loops into a water phase; once again, having the system at fairly high pressure and removing some of the steam energy by utilizing the "A" secondary atmospheric steam relief to lower the primary temperatures in the "A" loop (again accepting that the "B" steam generator was bottled up-notsteaming). Since the heat transfer across the steam generator tubes was known to be inefficient (backed up by the fact of low steam generator pressure indication), concern was raised that maybe we were not steaming to atmosphere at a high rate. I went out to the roof of the turbine building to visually verify that the relief valve was blowing at a high rate, and it was doing so. Met-Ed personnel i e

. = ;,.,... .u.t_ ..__-..__.._.__a.m were also stationed near the discharge with radiation monitoring detectors to insure that the unit was not releasing activity to the 5_. atmosphere through this flow path. All indications were negative and the plant personnel were confident that no hazard to the public

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existed through this path. Approximately 0915 hours the controlled pressure increase was ... ~ 'Y. started and the reactor coolant system pressure reached the nominal 1.~.. 2l00 psi at approximately 1140 hours. Pressurizer water temperature ~: remained around 350 F with all of the heaters turned on that could be utilized. During this time frame the reactor coolant system TH's remained pegged high on the control panel, the digi 41 voltmeter did not show any significant variations, and loop TC's were steadily indicating lower temperatures. This latter fact again reinforced the point that we were delivering cold water to the ccre area with the i HpI system. The panel operators were also using the 1" vent line (remote operated valve RC-V-137) as a vent path, along with RC-V-2 assisting in the control of system pressure. (This allowed the operator to cycle open/ shut RC-V-2 less often. Continued operating capability of this valve was a major control room concern. The pressurizer level was pegged at the top all during this period. All of the instrumentation in the plant was thoroughly monitored during this period. Somewhere arc;nd 1000 hours, NRC personnel arrived in the Unit ~~ II Control Room area. From this time on, no planning discussions were held without at least one (1) NRC representative sitting in on the G

~;- ^^ ~ I ~ ~. ~ - conference and offering coments as he may have felt appropriate at that time. In the 0900 - 1030 time frame, I was informed that Mr. Greg Schaedel - . 21 N-- (B&W Site Operations Engineer) was standing by at Met-Ed's Visitor ' - -7 Center. Through intermediaries (phone lines were in a maximum ~ i! - utilization stage) we passed several messages to each other. I asked ~ Greg to muster the B&W people and have everyone go home but stand by for _u - a call to come in and assist on the station as may be required. I also briefed Greg on the plant status on what we were trying to accomplish. We also discussed the fact that I had already notified B&W Lynchburg c on the transient and the subsequent events up to the 0745 time frauri. Greg later passed on to me that he was going home and that he would call back to the Control Room after he got to this home. Greg and I also decided to use Greg as the communication link, from his home,. with Lynchburg since long distance calls from the Control Room and the site were extremely difficult to complete; and he would probably find it easier to accomplish this from his home. Shortly after Greg arrived home he received a call from Lynchburg informing him that a charter plane with three (3) engineers was on its way to the Harrisburg Airport. 'Mr. Kelly, Mr. Winks, and Mr. Twilley were the engineers; and they were directed to go to Mr. Schaedel's home h and stand by until they could come on the site. They were expected to reduce plant instrumentation data and evaluate that data to identify what had actually occurred during the plant transient. They also could ~ " l ~ ' l . l E ~

3..... ~. ;- be utilized by me to assist in initial activities towards bringing the plant to a stable condition. Greg and I talked to each other several ' times and I updated him on plant conditions. On one of our conversations, I asked Greg to have a highly trained Radio-Chemist and also a Water I'll-k 5 Chemist dispatched to the site to assist Met-Ed Chemistry Department, a,s, ~ 'l - I saw a ~need to establish the composition of the reactor coolant system -Y. water, reactor building sump water, and secondary plant water condition 12.. 71-very quickly in order to be able to quantify our actual plant conditions. ,-'i It was my intention at that time to be able to analyze any water . samples and be able to identify the extent of cladding damage to the fuel and possibly aid in the cleanup operations that would be required (as I felt then within a reasonably short time period). I was aware of having injected sodium hydroxide into the reactor coolant system during the first few hours of the transient and was concerned about the overall effect of chemistry in the reactor coolant system possibly aggravating the fuel cladding condition. Also of significant concern was the quality of the secondary system water since several modes of feedwater injection had been utilized and therefore the chemistry specifications had most likely been exceeded. Greg notified me in a later call that Mr. Dale Uh1 (Radio-Chemist) j and Mr. Eric Yochheim (Water Specialist Chemist) were being chartered j to our area to assist as necessary. Lynchburg also notified us, through Greg, that any type of assistance that we thought that we ~ may need could be dispatched as soon as requested. G - --

~ t Shortly after, approximately 1115 hours, Mr. Miller again held a conference in the Shift Supervisors Office. The intent here was ,[)~ ~ ' ' te discuss what all of us thoughh about our existing plan for operation and to introduce any new suggestions towards getting the if- ~[ unit stable once more. Through out the day, the tone in any and all conferences was to review what the plant status was, as we knew it, y -T - to present new ideas potentially to be carried out, what may go wrong g3, if a specific action was taken, what should the operators see (on the ,-l' instrumentation) if the action was successful or unsuccessful, and also what would be the follow-up action, if the discussed action proved successful, or conversely, if the action accomplished nothing. The general agreement was that staying at nomal full pressure had not indicated any change in the loop instrumentation, during the approximately 13s hours and that continuing in this fashion was using BWST inventory which was merely ending up on the reactor building floor. Someone raised the question whether or not we might be injecting HPI water into the system, and by some unidentified flow path, actually bypassing the core and therefore allowing the cort to be uncovered causing additional physical damage to the cladding. After a detailed discussion and planning session, the plan was to continue HPI flow but open the pressurizer vent line valve, and RC-V-2 relief valve block valve to deliberately lower system pressure to approximately

• 600 psi, where the core flood tanks would provide a volume of water
• -i directly to the core and the both tanks would act as a pressurizer l

e on the core volume in the reactor vessel insuring that the core was covered. HPI would continue to be used throughout the entire evolution. l t l

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p . ~. ;- Lowering pressure to approximately 550 - 600 psi was considered a a -. prudent move since the loop TC RTD's had continued to show that cool water was in the~ system and should be cooling in the core. If the n :.i operators observed a large core flood tank level decrease, then ',N .c that would indicate that the core was partially uncovered and the CFT's were reflooding the core area. All participants in this .}. discussion were agreeable that going to lower pressure was a step _22... in the proper sequence since, at a later time, when the loops were ~ ~. '. again filled with water we would be lining up to use the Decay Heat System. We all were agreeable and well aware that in the present plant condition we could not use the Decay Heat System. Another thought was that if we found the core flood tanks to discharge a large volume of water, then a follow-up step would be to line up and use the " piggy-back system." (Low pressure injection pumps, decay heat pumps, in-line with the HpI pumps, recirculating the water from the reactor building sump after the BWST was emptied.) I further suggested to Miller, at this point, that he should make preparations for getting the BWST inventory from Unit I lined up to supply that water to the Unit II BWST, as a contingency in case the LPI-HPI system would not function properly. This action (temporary line up from #1 BWST to #2 BWST) - I was fully planned, but never carried out, merely kept open as an option. Approximately 1130 hours, the reactor coolant system pressure decrease was begun (controlled carefully), and about 1230 hours, system pressure equalizedwith CF tank pressure, and it was noted with much relief that a very small volume of water actually injected. In most people's minds (people in the control room area) this action ~. -. -

~ . ~ *. ' ~.. - verified that the core was flooded and most likely we had not been ~- in a' voided condition prior to this time. It was thought that core ..A. cladding damage must have occurred early in the day when the system ... -- f, was at low pressures and residual high temperatures existed. Somewhere ? [k in this time period,I asked Greg Schaedel to requestthat Lynchburg ~ '1 - provide us with a calculated Decay Heat Generation rate for the core (approximately 100 days of operations and 9 to 10 hours after the 1?.. 7_.7 reactor trip). I was looking forward to the sequence where we would I be going to the decay heat system and needing to know what heat removal load capacity we would be required to have for continued plant cooldown. Throughout most of the morning since breaking vacuum in Unit II, the station auxiliary boilers were being " fired up" and brought on line. Several difficulties were encountered by the boiler operators and the steam to draw a Unit II vacuum was not available, therefore, throughout most of the morning, the only heat sink available was steaming through the "A" atmospheritdump system. Approximately 1230 hours an order was received in the Control Room from a Pennsylvania State Agency (reported then to be the Governor), to terminate steaming radioactive gasses to the atmosphere. As I pointed out earlier, this steam was non-radioactive secondary system inventory and at that time our only heat sink. The stop steaming order allowed no options and the atmospheric dump system was shut down. To me this was a serious ~ roadblock to our recovering (refilling) the reactor coolant loops to a water phase condition because we were loosing our only heat l l sink available at that time. t l

-~ 1-Plant conditions were: pressure approximately 500#; core flood tanks " floating" on the core; HPI flow (as I remember 300 gpm to "A" loop and 150 gpm to "B" loop); TH RTD's still off scale high and ..:.f.~ special bridge readouts in excess of 720 F; TC RTD's "A" loop beginning %f . -= 5 to show an increase with "B" loop pretty steady at a low temperature ~ fi - (this probably caused by having to stop steaming to atmosphere on the "A" generator); pressurizer level still pegged at the top; and pressurizer temperature approximately 350 F. 7,.... ~ In anticipation of eventual need, the decay heat pumps were run ~ in a recirculation mode for approximately 1 hours. Somewhere i around 1350 hours, a deep thump noise was heard by the majority of people in the Control Room area. At first, in response to questions about the noise, it was suspected that some ventilation dampers had been repositioned which caused the noise. After fully checking the entire plant conditions, it was noted that both reactor building spray pumps had started, two of the reactor coolant pumps indicated high temperature air cooling systems, and source range instrumentation showed a noise spike. The transient conditions were a result of a rapid reaction between the H2 and 02 in the containment and occurred coincident with a continued long period of system venting to the containment. The operator shut off the building spray pumps after approximately six minutes of operation. Monitoring teams reported no new high level activities, therefore, it was concluded that the containment had not been breached by the pressure transient-(=28 psig). Shortly - ~~ after 1400 hours, the RTD special bridge connection on Loop "A" showed a decreasing temperature trend, and at approximately 1420 hours, the control canel indications showed Th to be decreasing. "A" loop Th indication came as low as 560 F before swinging back up to a ; egged ~~ ~- : :..

~ ~ ~. ;- condition. It was felt at that time that the reason we lost water phase again was due to operators readjusting HpI flow to each loop. .. L. Also at this time, the pressurizer temperature started to increase at a rapid rate. All individuals in the Control Room believed that I' ~! the indications we had seen were that the "A" loop had gone to essentially a water phase and back to a steam phase. By readjusting the HPI flow .7 'T. back to put a heavier flow rate into the "A" loop legs, the Th indications 1?. J_. :.. soon (approximately 10 minutes) came back into the indication range. ~: It was agreed that if water were back in the "A" loop then we should indeed see the pressurizer temperature increase because we would be forcing "A" loop water through the surge line into the pressurizer instead of bypassing the loop as we had been prior to returning to water phase. By 1500 hours, pressurizer level was indicating the fonnation of a bubble in the pressurizer and loop "A" Th was down to approximately 530 F with the "A" loop TC's increasing to nearly 400 F. "A" loop temperatures continued to indicate e scale the remainder of the day. (flote: There was no steam removal from the steam generator in progress during this period, as pointed out above.) If the plant were allowed to dump steam at this time, I feel sure that natural circulation would have stabilized plant parameters. Shortly after the "A" loop indication returned, Mr. Miller was required to leave the site to provide a briefing with Mr. Herbein and Mr. Kunder to the Lt. Governor, in the Capitol Building, Harrisburg. Gary left Explicit instructions to, if possible, contain any radiation - ~~ for public protection, keep HpI flow operation, do not steam to atmosphere, attempt to get the station auxiliary boilers operable,

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.. =.. trouble-shoot the lost electrical buses, and do not make any plant' ~ lineup or operation changes until he returned, unless required to do ..5- '"~ ~~ ~~ so because of emergency requirements. Gary and group did not return to the site until approximately 1700 hours. _,-j During the latter part of the morning and throughout the afternoon ,}~ ~ and evening, I had stayed in touch with Greg Schaedel; and he in turn ..1 - was talking to the Lynchburg office. Lynchburg, by the middle of the '.".7$. - 1-afternoon, had set up a comand center, where the managers a.id key '. ~ personnel, from B&W systems, could be kept informed of plant conditions ^ and thereby develop suggestions and recommendations to be passed on to the site. One of the recommendations that I recall receiving that afternoon was that the operators must insure at least 400 gpm total HPI flow to the core. I believe that this recommendation was the result of one of my earlier questions, pertaining to the decay heat generation rate, although I did not recognize this statement as an I answer to my question. I also recall talking to Mr. Bob Arnold during the time Gary was gone from the plant. I answered some of Bob's -questions and filled him in on.the plant condition. As I recall, ~ Bob strongly recommended restart of the reactor coolant pumps. I believe I answered that with "We will run a pump after we are convinced that we have water in the loops and Miller returns to the site." Bob also may have inquired why we did not return to a high system pressure. and collapse the steam voids. I believe that I adequately answered Bob's questions with respect to the plant condition. .. 1 ~

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\\ When Miller returned, somewhere around 1700 hours, another short 1 " ~ - conference was held to plan full plant stability. Plant conditions, were "A" loop Th was approximately 530 F, "A" TC was near 490 F, "B" look _ :. ~_ i i Th was still full scale and th digital indicated near 720 F, "B" TC . - - = - 150 F, system pressure near 650 osi and the pressurizer level had ,. fa - gone as low as 180" indicating a good bubble, but had increased again to the full indication for about k hour. Approximately 1700

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T 7.. we again showed indication of a small pressurizer bubble, but level ~ was near the top. Approximately 1700 hours, Unit II condenser vacuum ~ was able to be drawn since the station auxiliary boilers were stable and furnishing gland sealing steam. Shortly after the condenser began to show a vacuum, the control room operator began steaming the "A" steam generator by use of turbine bypass control valve. About 1700 hours when Miller and Herbein returned from the Capitol (Herbein in Visitors Center and Hiller in the Control Room) a lengthly phone conversation between Gary and Jack, and occasionally myself resulted in a management directive that the Control Room operators must raise system pressure to normal pressures. Most. of the personnel in the Control Room did not agree with again raising pressure, since we h:.d not been successful in collapsing any steam voids when we tried to do this action earlier in the day. (The major goal of our collective actions at that time, as I remember, was to achieve water phase condition in the "B" loop.) Approximately 1720 hours, system pressure started being raised, control by HpI flow and pressurizer venting (when necessary). I began a campaign about that time to run a reactor coolant pump in the "A" loop since l we were all very confident that the "A" loop was water phase. l

~ Miller and I agreed that I should attempt to get Jack's concurrence with starting a pump. I talked with Jack again and approximately i

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1830 hours, Jack agreed with a pump start, as long as I got Lynchburg's m concurrence. Miller coninenced an effort to check out the needed power supplies, systems, and interlocks to start a reactor coolant ~3 - pump in the "A" loop. Our preference, of course, was the 2A pump since that would give the maximum pressurizing spray system flow. ~. I made direct phone connections with Lynchburg, B&W Control Center, and explained plant conditions, requesting agreement to start ~ the 2A reactor coolant pump. By that time the operators were aware that the A-C electrical buses that supply power to the nonnal reactor coolant pump motor oil lift system and the backstop oil system (anti-rotation device) were deenergized and troubleshooting was impractical since the switchboards were located in a high radiation 1 zone. The D-C backup lube oil system was checked out and found to be operable. B&W agreed that we could make a pump start effort with ~ only the D-C lube oil system operating for the motor assembly. After 4 all of the other concerns of the B&W people were answered, a general agreement was made that we would just run a 10 second bump on the reactor coolant pump and see what effects could be monitored. By the time all parties were satisfied to allow an attempted pump start, the reactor coolant system pressure was a nominal 2200 psi. The operators tried the 2A pump but it did not respond to the control operations. The operator then attempted to start the 1A pump unit, the time was approximately 1930 hours. The pump assembly did run and was allowed to run for the agreed 10 second bump. Dramatic T

~.. t e, indications on the instrumentation was noted, reactor coolant pressure- - went as low as 1600 psi and recovered to normal after the pump bump, "B" loop Th came on scale after pump bump. "B" loop Tc went down from --

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a 220 F and slowly came back up to approximately 260 F, pressurizer .,J.4 level indicated " full" throughout the cycle. The control room operator had increased HpI flow prior to pump start and this action ~ ~ ~ S-lessened the pressure transient. s I reported system perfomance to Lynchburg and immediately (also reouested by Miller) requested concurrence on making another start, as soon as 15 minutes (recomended time between motor starts) wait time was up. As it developed, Lynchburg was still discussing the first bump results with me when the 15 minute wait time was up, and Miller directed that the 1A pump be started. The pressure transient this time was to 1450 psi, again the operators had increased HPI flow and the loop temperatures all came together at approximately 380 F. The forced flow of the pump did sweep the steam voids from the "B" loop and the extra HPI flow made up for the volumetric change. All plant instrumentation could now be utilized by the operators as correct indications of plant parameters in their respective sections of the plant. Miller and I had another planning discussion and it was generally agreed that the reactor coolant system should continue to be cooled down to the pressure and temperature that would allow the operators to bring the decay heat system into operation. I also pointed out to Gary that Unit II was significantly low in BWST level, and that he should I insure that the line-up to get Unit I's BWST inventory over to Unit II could be used rapidly in the unlikely event that the reactor . '~ ^ ~~

.';7, ; -~ coolant pumping ability may again be lost and he would require a ~~ significant volume of BWST water as alternate cooling.

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Throughout the day, the eventual line-up of reactor building s sump to decay heat pumps to HPI pumps to reactor coolant loops ?S;[ 5 recirculation was an option available for cooling in the plant design,,, 3 but I personally was not anxious to go to that option unless it was r. the only one left available. 31.?. 71. Gary..other Met-Ed supervisory people, and I continued a rehash discussion of our actions throughout the day and the effects of certain operations attempted. We also discussed what could be done through the night to further stabilize the Unit towards a cold shutdown condition. The general agreement was to cool down and depressurize the reactor coolant system and go on to the decay heat system. I asked what the approximate time would be that the operators expected to shift over to decay heating cooling, and the best estimate was approximately 0400 hours on March 29, 1979. ~~ I again called Greg Schaedel and brought him up to speed with the changes in plant conditions since I had last talked to him (this report was a significant change of plant). I told him that I had been in direct communication with B&W during and shortly after the pump runs. I suggested that Greg notify Jon Putnam to come to the site at 0400 hours on March 29, 1979, to remove the mag-tape record from the B&W reactimeter (data acquisition system) that had recorded the day's events and to begin a delogging process of the transient and subsequent ~ information that was recorded. Greg was also instructed to send in l t l i r

7, .4.,..- ~ I ~., - two of the Lynchburg Engineers at 0800 hours on March 29, 1979, ~ ~ ~ to begin a data reduction phase of the infonnation Putnam would .'. 5_. be obtaining. I remember telling Greg that our normal office was still .. [. 7 classified as a radiation zone and therefore they should set up- , p-operations in one of the Met-Ed offices in the Unit I area. I ~ fi - suggested that Greg also go in around 0800 hours and coordinate the whole operation and assist the Control Room operators providing 2.- advice and consultation as they may require. I told Greg that I 7-[ probably would be a little later than 0800 hours, but that I would see him during the morning. I then left the Unit I processing building. My car was down the middle of the site by my office and I walked 'down there, went into my office locked it up and left the site. The time was approximately 2300 hours. March 29, 1979 I came back to the site, needing to go through a security processing at the visitor center, somewhere around 0945 hours. Greg had contacted me at home-and informed that he had set up a temporary B&W office in the security processing center conference room for our B&W effort of data delogging and transient evaluation. I went to our normal office and picked up a telecopy machine and supplies that I felt we would need in our temporary office and move the equipment to our new quarters. I established a line to Lynchburg and told them to keep ~ the line open for continuous usage. .[.1 I also told them that I had a manual telecopy machine and they ~ should make a similar set-up in their comand center in l l - ~. - -

',:g f. Lynchburg so we could send data, procedures, coments, etc., back and forth with relative ease. The remainder of the day as I remember it .. 3.. was talking to Lynchburg about the data we were reducing and making ._ :[. contingency plans for other operations the plant may need to exercise. 17 w. '5 This contingency planning request had come from a meeting held with Miller and his task group in the Control Room during that morning where .. ~ 'Y. all potential contingencies had been brought up. l?.. 7 :.. I remember questioning why the plant was not on a decay heat ~ as anticipated and infomed that there were some serious difficulties with pressure control ind that some hesitation was now being expressed as to further contamination of the auxiliary building if decay heat system was brought into operation. B&W Lynchburg and one of my B&W Engineers (sometimes it was me) also opened a phone tie between the control room and the Lynchburg Command Center. I worked out a schedule with Greg and utilized all of the B&W Enginaers in the area to provide around ~ the clock coverage in data reduction, newer data collection, and relaying to Lynchburg, and provide advice and consultation to the plant operators. All of the Engineers were working 12 hours shifts, but I had staggered the turnovers so that we changed some at 0400/1600; some at 0800/2000; and the others 1200/2400 hours. I felt this way we would never have I a brand new full group in a changeover status at any time and the continuity.of B&W coverage would be much smoother. B&W continued with this type of coverage for approximately 8 days bringing more people in from Lynchburg as our need grew for data and assistance. Around 8 days into the operation we attempted to get enough personnel on site to allow the majority of the Engineers to be on 8 hour S -3C-

g,, ~ shifts and also attempted to rotate personnel to get a day? '. ' ~ ' off occassionally. The remainder of the day and into the night was devoted to providing as much assistance to the >i- .. ; c'. Met-Ed Staff on site, providing advice and consultation with ~ many communications between Lynchburg and the Site Support 'I [- Team being utilized to insure plant and enviroment safaty. ~ ~ -;1 '. ~ ~ 3/30/79 ~~ h~. 1 I came to the site approximately 1030 hours, again needing to clear admittance through the processing center, set up at the main visitors center. We B&W personnel were again performing data processing and evaluation of the transient data collected. Additionally, since there had been some airborne radioac'tivity released early that morning, the control room Met-Ed Staff were seeking and receiving our direct assistance for any changes in plant condition, using Lynchburg again, as our backup engineering information source. The ability to sample reactor coolant and secondary water ~ quality became identified as a maj or problem. I asked B&W through Dale Uh1 to send to the site a complete Water Chemistry Laboratory temporary setup, complete with analytical personnel to man the facility. I felt we needed an ability to perforn ~ l l analyses away from the normal plant designed capabilities e.n d to provide the personnel to r un t.h e an. lysis, since the Met-Ed Staff were all tied up in radioactive survey requirements and were totally conwitted. I also requested a " Hot Lab Counting Facilities with analytical personnel also to be 31. - 'T

r ~. ;- supplied to the site..Both of the labs and personnel were dispatched and available for use at the site by late 3/31/79. This support was a j'[ [ ' major accomplishment in the time requested and delivered. [_, By Friday evening, B&W was operating a significant support effort to ~0 j. Met-Ed and this support continued to expand for the rest of the critical..

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l l period until the Unit was on natural circulation, later in April., l =,,- CONCLUSION .~ Beginning at approximately 0600 hours, 3/28/79 with the conference call identifying problems at TMI-2, until approximately 4/13/79, B&W ~ personnel were pressed into a service function that was far beyond nomal expectations. My personal contribution has been an effort that affected my home and family far beyond that expected from usual work /home relationships. My l personal contribution, I believe, significantly assisted Met-Ed and TMI with the very best support I could provide. My B&W Engineers assigned i to the site team have given a large personal and I am also sure, family effort towards full support of Met-Ed and the TMI Station. Those Engineers and Technicians brought in from other B&W Units and sections to support the site work during extreme working conditions have all been the very finest group of ceople performing a wide variety of special and new tasks working successfully towards a common goal. I extend my apareciation to any and all B&W contributors for the .,'.i initial emergency support and the continuing long-term effort. - s._ a

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