ML20002A284
| ML20002A284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/30/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002A285 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8011050586 | |
| Download: ML20002A284 (89) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS.JON PUBLIC MEETING j
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BRIEFING ON CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITIES
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October 30, 1980 PAGES: 1 thru 87 A"' :
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10/30/80 l 1
NRC ARC:0181 UNITED STATES OF AliERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
PUBLIC MEETING 4
5l BRIEFING ON CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITIES i
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7 A
lith Floor, j
8 Commissioners' Conference Room, 1717 H Street, 9l c.$
Washington, D.C.
o zo 10 Thursday, 30 October 1980.
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S The public meeting of the Commission was convened, g,
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pursuant to notice, at 3 :0 8 p.m.
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BEFORE:
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JOHN F.
AHEARNE, Chairman 2
15 l N
VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner j
16 l d
l PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner b'
17 i 5
l JOHN M.
HENDRIE, Commissioner
$i 18 5
ALSO PRESENT:
19 Samuel J. Chilk, Leonard Bickwit, Harold Denton, 20,
I Darel Eisenhut, B. Grimes, Mr. Malsch, Michael T. Jamgochian, 21 Mr. Fouchard, and Mr. Blond.
22 j
23 !
24l 25,
j ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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DISC 1 T This is an unofficial. ::anse:1pc of a. saeci=g-of the Uni:ad Scatas Nue'ame lagulatory Commission held on
,n_,n_on 12 cha conesission's officas ac 1717 H. Screac, 3. 'J., '4ashington, D. C.
The mencing was opear es public at:andanca and obsarracion.
This. cransc=1pc has not baem :sviewed, cor:sc:ad? or adicad, and 12 may contain inaccuracias.
The transcrpt is israndad solely for gs= ara.L d"#c:=acional purposes.
As provided by 10 C23. 9.103,1: is not par of cha formal or d darmal recari of decision of da =a::ars discussed.
Expressions of opinion is -dis ::anse:1pc dc sec necessarily raflac: fi=al dar=*-=:1ons or beliefs.
No pleading or acher paper may be. filed vi:h the Commission. i= a=7 procasding as -da resul: of or addrassed to any scaramanc or ary=mze contained harmin, except as the Commission =ay author':a.
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(3 :0 8 p.m.)
CIIAIRMAN AIIEARNE:
We meet this afternoon to 4
discuss one item that has hung over from a meeting a few days 5
ago in which we were addressing the Action Plan and foliow-on 3
6 clarifications of the Action Plan.
This particular issue has e
7 to do with the Emergency Offsite Facilities -- where it is n
located, what it is, who tells what to whom.
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9 z-Ilarold?
oH 10 MR. DENTON:
We have a planned presentation.
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functions of the EOF.
We have also surveyed all the sites to a"
5 13 see the status of the construction of EOFs.
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I I would like to start the meeting, though, by E
g 15 capsulizing some of my thoughts on EOF, recognizing that this
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I guess what is apparent to me is that, depending
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best done at differing distances.
Some functions are almost n
20 independent of distance, and others are dependent on distance.
21 For accidents where there is not a major release 22 l
from the facility and there is free access near the site, such 23 as at TMI, there are some very valuable reasons to be close in.
24 You are able to talk to people going into the plant, coming 25 from the plant, the guards, the maintenance mechanics --
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I there's an informal network of information-gathering that you.
2 can do if you're very close.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Can you put a range on what 4
you mean by "close in"?
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5 MR. DENTON:
Somewhere around the main road, but
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6 it could be several miles out, provided you were in the direct 7
pathway so that people going in and out of the plant could talk 8
to you.
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9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You're putting "close in" on
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10 transportation access, so there 's a time element --
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II MR. DENTON:
Yes.
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Il CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
- to what you mean by "close 5
y 13 in"?
mj 14 MR. DENTON:
So that you get to see people as
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15 they go in and out, and the informal network would work; and,
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d 16 if I wanted to, or the man in charge there, could go in the w
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plant very quickly.
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18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Okay, so E
I9 MR. DENTON:
So where there is free access, and g
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20 no release --
2I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE.
. don't want to put the time l
22 in your mouth, but what do you define -- obviously you have 23 a sense of a certain amount of time as a reasonable distance 24 to be away.
25l MR. DENTON:
I guess I don't see the -- with the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY INC.
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1 on-site technical support center, we would have NRC people in 2
the plant anyway, and I guess I was more focused on access to 3
the information network of people going.into and out of the 4
plant.
So it was a time between there and the plant --
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It's not the distance from 9
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6 the plant; it's that they stop by that --
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MR. DENTON:
That's right.
In the mainstream of Al 8
the traffic flow, so to speak.
So that in essence --
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9 CHAIRMAM AHEARNE:
So that there was a mechanism z
O 10 to make sure they stopped, then you wouldn't care where it was?
E 11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They might object to it, k
j 12 but he wouldn't.
Eag 13 (Laughter. )
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14 MR. DENTON:
But if you talk about Harrisburg 15 and TMI, they would have had many routes to go directly home, 16 d
and you would have missed a lot of information.
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17 Now there's another reason for being close in
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18 that I think is important.
That is, the emotional support to P
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g our own employees and to sort of standing there near the plant 5
20 when an accident is happening that you don't get if you are 21 far back.
I think it was important for people at Harrisburg 22 to know that NRC was as close as you could get to the plant l
23 during that time period.
It's kind or a moral support that 24 shows the government is there going to Amchutka, sort of 25 feeling, that you're really there.
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I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But, let's see.
The last 2
time you didn't really have the equivalent cf the on-site 3
center, did you?
4 MR. DENTON:
No, we didn't.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And so that would serve 9
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some of these functions.
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7 MR. GRIMES :
Well, in a way, because of the TMI-l '
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control room, so there was a little bit of that.
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9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But it seems to me that 2
h 10 the trailer camp really was a combination of what is now the E
II on-site center and the off-site center.
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I2 MR. DENTON:
It served many of the functions; 3
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u I4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And we are planning to ej 15 have people right there.
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Well, I'm not trying to say how w
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you come from die plant nearer, rather than to start out in C
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Harrisburg, has some perception about the relative safety of it.
n 20 I can see that I had been headquartered in 21 Harrisburg, one of the first questions would have been:
Why 22 aren't you closer?
That sort of attitude.
23 So for that class of accidents where you're not 24l having to evacuate people, it helps to be closer in.
Now 1
25.
let's assume that the situation either started or changed l
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i such that you can't reasonably stay in a normal sort of 2
building, one with minimum sort of protection there, you'd 3
have two choices.
You could go into a control room, which is 4
shielded for a bigger accident; or you could move out a a
5 distance far enough so that you would be reasonably sure you 5
6 could have continuous occupancy there.
7 Going in the control room would give you 'the 8
ability to influence the controls of the plant, and moving d
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out would enable continuity of planning and emergency response, i
h 10 but I don't see a lot of advantages to being close in in a 3
5 11 bunkered facility because you're going to lose your infra-
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12 structure.
No one is going to bring you environmental 3
13 samples; or you're going to lose the drivers.
j 14 CHAIRMAN AIIEARNE:
Everybody is not going to a
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15 stop in --
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16 MR. DENTON:
That's right; they 're not all 2
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17 dedicated NRC employees who are going to stay there in the 5
18 event that the order to evacuate is beyond the EOF has gone 19 out.
So it would be very difficult to have free access.
So R
20 in that case, then, it would be preferable to be out a 21 distance five or ten miles so that you could provide con-l t
22 l tinuity of emergency planning and environmental measurements, l
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and so forth.
24 l So I guess where I would come out on reflection i
25,
of this -- and forgetting about economics -- that it would i
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1 be desirable to have a close-in sort of facility -- and it 2
doesn' t have to be a bunkered one -- for the great majority of
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3 accidents where you don't have to evacuate and where the 4
releases aren't big; that that has a lot of advantages for 5
this being close in and having a good feel for the informal
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6 network.
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7 For the really bad ones, I'd rather be far out, al 8
because then I can provide continuity of operations; you're d::
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10 telephone man will come in and repair your phones, and all 3
5 11 that sort of thing.
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12 So I can see advantages in both being close in IE 13 and being far out, depending on what the size of the accident E
14 is and what the particul'ar function to be performed is.
And a
_R 15 we have some slides that maybe clarify these issues a bit s
j 16 more, and actual show the status of construction.
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And that is what then led you 5
18 i to this alternative-two. type concept?
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19 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
3, 20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Because that's really what 21,
you're describing.
I 22 i MR. DENTON:
That's right.
I guess I've never 23,
been a real fan for being close in, heavily bunkered, because 24 i I would lose access to the very things that I think are 1
25 desirable.
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I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 COMMISSIONER.GILINSKY:
Well, wait a minute.
2 Then why are we -- Are these alternatives for us?
Or alterna-3 tives for the utility?
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MR. GRIMES :
They are intended as alternatives e
5 for the utility.
This is the slide from the previous --
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6 MR. DENTON:
And what I have tried to say today Rg 7
is, backing off and relooking at 'tNe problem since we last 3l 8
met, that there are differing ways to look at it, and I didn't d
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want to try to prejudge where we would end up, but just to icg 10 start it that way and then let Brian describe it a bit more.
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11 CEAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let me ask you a few more
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12 questions, though, if I could, on that philosophy.
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13 In your description, it sounds like this is m
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Where 2
15 would you see county, state, other federal agency represen-g 16 tatives?
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17 i MR. DENTON:
I think, provided that you had free 5
5 18 access -- meaning, you had not ordered evacuation -- the 5
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19 l counties, and the state, and FEMA would send people to wher-n 20 ever the NRC was for information-gathering; but I understand 21 that most of them would not move their own base of operations; 22 they would still operate out of their typical government 23 buildings.
But if it were an accident that didn't require 24 !
evacuation, they would station a representative in wherever 25,
the EOF was because of access to the information.
And then i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I they.would relay it back to their own operations center.
2 Now they would not, as I understand it, many of 3
them would not entertain moving into this EOF, because they 4
just want to keep their own " sheriff's office" kind of thing.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess then the second n
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question is:
Given that philosophy, it would almost seem that i
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the first alternative you have here has all of the bad features 8'
that you described -- it's a single one, close in, heavily d*
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bunkered.
ze 10 MR. DENTON:
And it was trying -- That's right.
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II CHAIRMAN AHEAhNE:
I just wanted to see if I --
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MR. DENTON:
You're right.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What about --
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It was trying to recognize the W
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3 fact that there are some close in.
I don' t see a lot of
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the door.
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20 (Laughter.)
2Ili CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
I had some friends who I
'2 j were on an island in ce Pacific. in that situation, and it
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24j MR. DENTON:
So I would see the close-in one 25 i
as not having necessarily -- I wouldn't object to bunkering i
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1, a close-in one, and if the situation suddenly started 2
deteriorating, you would certainly want to pull out.
And in
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3 fact, if it was reasonably bad, you would have wa ited to have 4
already staffed further out.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What about -- it seemed 5
6 to me that originally the on-site center was reactor-R g
7 oriented -
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MR. DENTON:
Yes.
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9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- and the off-site 10 center was public-protection oriented.
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Yes.
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12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And the public protection-3=
13 oriented center I don't think really needs to be close.
It's l
14 the people who are concerned with the reactor - in other 5
2 15 words, you've talked about talking with mechanics, and so on, 1
Y 16 to draw some advantage from being close.
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17 MR. DENTON:
I think that's right.
If the s
18 accident isn't so severe as to require evacuation, you never i
19 put into place -- if you ordered an evacuation, then a g
n 20 different sort of network takes place.
FEMA gets in the 21 role, the state highway patrol, and emergency preparedness 22 lines in, and then you'd have to rely on the people in the i
23 tech support and the control room to cope the best they could 24 i with the reactor; but you would have already have made the i
25 decision to evacuate the people out to some distance by that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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time.
2 MR. GRIMES :
But you recall that at TMI it 3
wasn't just focused on what the consequences were in the 4
environment; but, rather, what was happening to the plant, 5
and really the corporate TMI management, and high-level j
6 NRC management, focusing on what are the implications of these R
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plant conditions, was the main activity of that.
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8 COI1MISSIONER GILIUSKY:
Well, I was addressing d
9 the business of moving from one center to another.
I wonder o
h 10 whether you ever really have to, if you had a public protec-
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12 the reactor; that one could be some distance away,. and may not 5;
13 suffer from that.
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COliMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But the key question 15 there is :
What is the condition of the reactor?
And what is if 16 '
it likely to be in a few hours, and so on.
- d I7 i COliMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But there it seems to me E
3 18 they can get that over the phone, even, from the other center.
c i-I9 l The other people are worried about all sorts of details, and 3n 20 what to do -
II COIG1ISSIONER HENDRIE:
With running --
22 ;
COIG1ISSIONER GILINSKY :
and what sort of I
23 '
maneuvers to permit.
24 CO!!MISSIONER HENDRIE:
With running the plant.
25 CO!GIISSIONER GILINSKY :
With running the plant, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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guys who are going to decide whether people ought to stay 3
indoors or not, or move if necessary.
4 MR. DENTON:
I guess where I ended up was that
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of reasons to be fairly close in -- the ones I mentioned.
If
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it is a severe enough accident to require protective action j
8 taken, then you might as well be out there far enough so you do 9
can provide continuity and have access to all the other Y
10 government officials.
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But given that background D
g 12 philosophy, now --
5 13 MR. DENTON:
All right.
Let me ask Brian to y
14 summarize the questions and calculations.
5 2
15 MR. GRIMES :
Okay, why don' t we s tart with the 5
f 16 first slide, which is just a refresher on the positions that A
g 17 j we had brought two days ago as a proposal to allow the M
18 licensee to choose either a close-in habitable, or an E
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19 ll alternative two, which is a primary reduced habitability n
20 system -- it wouldn't be completely nonhabitable, but it would 21 only have protection factors of about five, and then with a 22 designated secondary facility an..
some assured means for 23 l continuity.
24 l (Slide. )
25 j COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
I'm not sure what the l
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC,
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right word is, but "nonhabitable" doesn' t seem right.
2 MR. GRIMES :
" Reduced habitability," I think is 3
a better --
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
" Reduced protection."
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Why don't we refer to it 3a 6
as " lightly protected."
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Lightly protected.
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8 MR. GRIMES:
At the end of the discussion, we a
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9 may not have to characterize the alternative.
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El 11 MR. GRIMES:
You may just have one selection.
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12 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes, one selection are those E=
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tha't are all built, and the others of the future.
14 MR. GRIMES:
What I would like to do in the next du!
15 slides is just to refresh your memory, in some cases, and give i
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17 l accidents, and who does what in what facility, to give you a 5
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19 May I have the next slide?
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21 No, that's the wrong slide.
Try " Time Factors 22 Associated with the Release. "
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24 l Could we have a different slide?
" Time Factors 4
l 25l Associated with the Release" is what we want.
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(S lide. )
2 This just presents the same material that is in 3
NUREG-0 396, characterizing when significant releases might 4
start, and what kind of continuous releases you might have to 5
g ccpe with.
There's a fairly broad range, but it gives the 9
3 6
general range.
The travel times are also significant for R
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vary poor meteorological conditions that could be up to hours Al 8
to get to off-site points.
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I think we got z
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the slides out of order.
It's called " Table 1. "
You have a
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(S lide. )
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I 15 along the left-hand column various functions that go on, and
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18 manipulation of controls stays in the control room for all E
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emergencies.
n 20 l Management of plant operatiors shifts to the 21 Technical Support Center for more -- as soon as the event 22 gets significant.
23 i The technical support also shif ts to the Technical 24 Support center.
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The management of the corporate response, l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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depending on the seriousness of the emergency and the timing 2
of arrival of people on-site would, over a period of hours, 3
shif t to the Emergency Operations Facility.
4 The radiological effluent assessment again 5
initially must be done in the control room, and for lower e
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6 classes of accidents it would stay there in the Technical R
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as soon as 7
Support Center; but for the more severe accidents, Xl 8
the Emergency Operations Facility was staffed, daat would be d
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used.
io 10 (Slide.)
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11 The next slide is a continuation of C.is table 3
y 12 on communications with state and local organizations.
The 3
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Then as the Technical Support Center and 5
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17 l serious events, the normal communications flow would be from a
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18 that off-site or near-site facility.
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19 The event monitoring by the NRC would take place n
20 in all of these locations, probably only one individual on the I
21 control room.
22 The management of recovery operations again 23 would be in the E0F.
24 And I guess to summarize, both the two key 25 ;
things that I think occur in the -- or the three key things ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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are:
the management of the corporate emergency response 2
resources; the decisions based on plant parameters as to the 3
overall strategic course of action to take, whether tha't is 4
to take an action which might significantly change the status e
5 of the plant, like tripping the pumps, or going on natural b
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circulation perhaps, that kind of decision a few hours into e
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the event will have to be made by the senior people on-site E
8 because it will indeed have potential effects on the public.
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h 10 must make the decision on recommending evacuation, whether 3
5 11 it's based on actual effluents going out of the plant, or based i
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The other function is the actual E=d 13 assessment of the -- and dose projections which could S
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significance of those effluents are -- I think need to be in d
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17 the EOF, but there would be nothing to prevent dose calcula-w 1
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5 18 l tors with the computers someplace else, doing detailed 5
19 l calculations, those types of functions.
En 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKV :
I didn' t catch what you.
I 21 said earlier.
You said something had to be the same person?
22 i MR. GRIMES:
Yes.
I think the group of people 23 that deal with hydrogen bubbles and what you should do about 24 l that, or whether you should go on natural circulation, needs i
25 to be, with respect to what the plant should do which may ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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significantly change the plant status, and therefore the 2
hazard to the public, needs to be the same people that are 3
assessing the significance of what is actually going out of 4
the plant, and what is likely to go out of the plant, from 5
known conditions in the plant, to be recommending to off-site
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6l authorities what the actions are.
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7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I guess I'm not convinced M
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that that's right, simply because people who are concerned n
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10 It is all very well to say:
If something doesn't work out at 3
5 11 NRR, then we'll order an evacuation; but in an hour, another
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12 piece of information comes up, or you say, well, let's try z
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It seems to me there really ought to be 3
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15 i MR. GRIMES:
Hell, it could well indeed be j
16 somebody in --
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17 i COMMISSIONER GILIMSKY :
Who is not the same 5
18 i person who is deeply involved in the kinds of things that E
19 '
you were just talking about, and whether or not --
8n 20 MR. GRIMES:
I think there should be someone 21 designated with that function, but I don't think that that 22 individual would really be the person to make the off-site 23 recommendation.
Rather, the senior person from the licensee 24 i who must weigh all his information, both in-plant and --
25l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The senior licensee person you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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see as the one making that recommendation?
l 2
MR. GRIMES :
Making an off-site recommendation 3
under the normal emergency plan.
The NRC would be either --
4l has an oversight function in tne normal mode, and would be 5
g either endorsing that, or supplementing that recommendation.
9 6
I would not see the NRC taking the burden off the licensee g
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for making recommendations as to what the consequences of his 8
8 plant are going to be.
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9 us, and then we are an overlay and an oversight, and when zoy 10 we see something going astray, then we wcall interact.
5 11 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Are you talking about in a
p 12 the very early stages?
Or even after we have arrived in 5
a 13 force?
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Even after we have arrived.
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have no vision of the NRC playing the only off-site recom-
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Well, I would expect 18 l w
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that people would turn to us.
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Yes, but I would hope that it would n
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built up partly by the planning process that we are confident 23 that the system would work.
24 f COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I have a feeling that i
25 they would look to us to give the principal recommendation.
i l
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think that's right.
2 MR. DENTON:
I think that's a useful goal to 3
plan towards, but it's not likely to be there in practice.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Yes, I think ultimately 5
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Well, I think that if we don't work R
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Now I noticed, with some oy 10 interest, Brian, in your -+your table title covers my 5
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Transfer of functions a
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3 13 MR. GRIMES :
Yes.
The table was made up for a 5m r
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Cj 15 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
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It was to describe transfer between I
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So recognizing that you can C
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Well, that 's not covered by the table, I notice with n
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22 MR. GRIMES :
No.
This was specifically drawn up 23 !
as a background to looking at a couple of actual incidents 24l from the licensees.
25 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So I would ask you:
Where do i
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you see state, local, federal operations coordinated?
Where 2
would you see that on this, if there was a coordination of 3
state, local, federal operations?
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Where would these pecple e
5 be, also?
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The second one.
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7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Would Bill Fouchard --
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In the original concept, my thought d:!
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In other words,
zcy 10 the EOF ought to provide enough space for that to occur.
5 II CHAIRMAN:
Which?
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The EOF.
Ej 13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
No, no.
Which people?
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$j 15 MR. DENTON:
The news media should be there in
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Okay, so you would -- if you 18 had a state / local / federal operation coordination --
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-- and then in Vic 's case,
j 21 interested in the news media --
22 MR. DENTON:
No.
I 23 l (Laughter.)
i 24 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It didn' t quite come out 25 exactly the way I intended.
I i
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MR. GRIMES:
If you look at the top line, you 2
will see where we think the licensee part of that role happens.
3 In other words, it happens in the EOF.
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No, no, I understand.
That's 5
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I'm worried about the coordination, and part 9
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Well, the coordination issue --
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
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Fine.
I'm not criticizing
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That's just fine.
That's just fine.
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And that would be the coordination --
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That's just fine.
That's 21 just fine.
I thought that was -- and that tracks with what 22 l I thought.
23 l MR. GRIMES:
Let me briefly describe what I think 24 j is the same thing, what our current criteria would call for 25 i in 6.5.4.
That is, that the state and local people are l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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encouraged to send representatives to this point.
And then 2
the licensee must be prepared also to dispatch a single liaison 3
person to other points.
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes, but I asked the point:
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Wait a minute, Joe.
I was 3j 11 trying to be sure I got that clear.
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Let me distinguish between the
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on a general basis.
We try to perform a --
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The actual f acts,
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MR. GRIMES:
We try to form a communications chain 5"
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to the public on recommended protective actions through the 8n 20 state and local people, who should have the credibility to 21 make this.
This does not come from the licensee to the public; 22 but, rather, through the state and local organizations through 23 predesignated broadcast frequencies, et cetera.
24 j Then what we have decided, at least at the staff t
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level, is that we can' t really justify making the press happy I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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as a condition of an operating license.
2 (Laughter. )
3 MR. GRIMES:
In other words, it's difficult to O
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press, that that really affects the health and safety of the
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11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, Joe has been hopping up a
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Okay, so we'll ask Joe.
I'm i
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19 Planning Rule, how he sees this :
Where this coordination 3
20 role under our Emergency Planning Rule is supposed to fit.
21 Joe?
22 MR. FOUCHARD:
The concept is that at the 23 l emergency offsite facility there would be space for a pool of 24 i the press.
I don'.t know what that number would be.
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is in the neighborhood of about ten.
Whether that press pool l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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would ever get in there, or whether that f acility would ever 2
be used for that purpose, in my judgment depends entirely on 3
the circumstance :of the accident.
4 If you're moving people out of the ten-mile zone, e
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However, I think the capability should be there.
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7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
For a pool?
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8l MR. FOUCHARD:
For a pool; yes, sir.
A small n
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There were 400 of them there, sir.
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If you get much further away than 18 hhat, the press is not going to use the facility.
This 2
y 19 facility should be something that can be readily identified, M
20 where communications can be installed rapidly, where the owner 21 of the property knows that it will be used for that purpose.
22 I think many licensees are moving in this 23 '
direction.
They have -- I visited two sites within the last 24 i couple of months.
One is Dresden in Illinois, where the 25 off-site press center would be about four miles away.
The i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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first question I asked is :
What's your fallback?
Their 2
fallback is their Jolliet office, which is about 15 miles away.
3 At Oconee in South Carolina, the off-site press 4
center they would like to use is closer to the reactor than 5
y the offsite emergency center.
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6 (Laughter.)
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That's a real test center.
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5 Il They are thinking about it.
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Okay, Mike, could you at all
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5 clarify what your understanding is of the rule -- what, if s
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I4 anything, the rule ';culd end up requiring as far as a 15 coordination of federal-local government people with respect
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I7 l MR. JAMGOCHIAN:
Well, as Brian mentioned, as e
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We would have an oversight 22 review capability on that, but the licensee is responsible to i
23,
assess the course of the accident, and then to make an initial i
24l recommendation for the protective action to the state and 25 local government.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What would the role of this 2
off-site facility be as far as the rule is concerned?
3 MR. JAMGOCHIAN:
Well, the rule basically says 4
there shall be one.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Nothing more?
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6 MR. JAMGOCHIAN:
No; that's it. As far as who R
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It's silent?
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Right.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Fine.
Thank you.
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Let me ask Brian what -- my under-3 f
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2I CHAIRMAN AHEAKNE:
Sure.
22 MR. DENTON:
-- and this is just one more kind, 23 and they don' t propose to change their base, but they would 24 assign people to the information source.
25 i
MR. GRIMES :
The general plans are to provide a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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liaison person in the EOF.
In addition, we are strongly 2
encouraging that they send dose calculators there so that 3
there could be a joint number -, a single number, rather than 4
the state having one number -- later in the accident, rather n
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Are there any communications 8
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Oh, yes.
That is a required 2io 10 redundant communication link between the --
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How many people in all do you
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Or another way of asking it:
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On the other of, I believe it's 30
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16 '
CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Joe has already said 10 of them
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are press.
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18 MR. GRIMES :
-- with an additional capability to '
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bring a press pool in on the order of 10 to 20 ; that 30 to 4
20 40, and I think the number is 35, including about 10 NRC 21 people.
That is the general si::e.
Of course anything of the 22 duration of TMI, then a trailer city would probably build up 23 '
around the EOF, as additional industry support.
24 l (S lide. )
25 The next slide, I wanted to get into some of the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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28 1
accident consequences.
This simply illustrates that the dose 2
levels from ground deposition after a plume passage, even 3
from extremely low probability core melt accidents in the
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13 less than a rem per hour.
14 CHAIRfWT AHEARNE:
Excuse me for a dumb question, 5
2 15 but I'm having a little difficulty understanding the way the 5
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" 2 x 10-2 per core melt"?
" 2 x 10 - 2 " wh at zi g'
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The 1-in-500 core melts would give 5
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20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I see.
21 MR. GRIMES :
Or 2 x 10-3 means 1-in-500 core 22,
melts would give this result; 10-2 means 1-in-100.
I 23 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Given a core melt --
l 24 l MR. GRIMES:
Given a set or 100 core melts, the l
i 25 j 10-2 core melt is the wors t.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
2 MR. GRIMES:
And it gives, for specific 3
dis tances, what the decay with time is.
That is w.ithout any 4
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So it just says the doses for almost all core e
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
" Hours" or " days" on the d
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" Days."
I'm sorry, the slide 3l 11 doesn' t show that.
The handout ha; it.
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how long 22 !
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for the 1-chance-in-10 case you could stay there and not i
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exceed those assumed doses.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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be " indefinite."
It's not just " greater than 60 days," it's 2
a very long time.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now if I. read down your --
4 There's something I'm missing.
In the second and third a
5 columns, you have with a 50-rem dose you can stay three days,
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8 8
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That is for a particular probability
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You've got three 3
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Three separate accidents.
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You've got three separate s
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You should draw a line between that.
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straight protection factor of five, so it is going to matter l
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i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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to integrate up to a total dose of whatever the assumed dose 2
in the left-hand column is to the people inside.
What it 3
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that for most core melt accidents, the facility would be 5
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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So if people have moved -- if we are moving i
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13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
What was the value of your
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Were you using that as the maximum i
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dose that the people could stay inside?
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22 f CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But on your assumed dose --
23 '
MR. GRIMES:
It is not to indicate that those 24 I are acceptable doses; only that --
25 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But those are inside, aren't i
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they?
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Yes.
Only if you're caught in the 3
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Yes.
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For various accumulated doses, that gives some 2
relative times that one could say.
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5 COMMISSIONER GILI' SKY:
Can I ask you, do the m
14 reactor-oriented functions of the center -- or of such a E
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if you've already required an evacuation.
In other words,
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22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Because it's hard to get 23 in and out of the facility, or what?
l 24 f
'MR.
DENTON:
Yes, it could be.
And the limited 25,
capability of people that can actually be in the control room h
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 in the tech. support center.
So you'd have a lot of backup 2
capability.
3 But now if it's one of these worst-case accidents 4
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7' out there, and don't worry about not watching -- you may have j
8 lost control of the reactor.
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j 16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you talking about us y
17,
having two EOFs?
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Hell, that would be -- economics 5
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19 aside -- what I would suggest.
n 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Well, actually it might 21 be cheaper than hardening one.
22 MR. GRIMES:
I don' t believe so.
MR. HANRAHAN:
Isn' t it more important to be 23 l f
24 i concerned about what the function is going to be done, what i
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you want done there, what people are there?
Rather than i
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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exactly where it is, and whether there's one or two?
As long 2
as the facility can carry out the function that you want done 3
during the time you want it done?
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
I'm concerned that e
5 we are unclear about that.
A.
6 MR. GRIMES:
I think I would like to, focus your R{
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most of the core melt accidents, which will probably, once d:!
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17 l judging the plant conditions and making decisions on both how 5
18 to prevent the situation from geuting worse -- which often
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require ccmmend decisions on the part of senior management --
8n 20 and, at the same time, to me, the same individual taking the 21 advice he has from the people designated to make recommer.dations 22 on protective actions, and making final decisions on what the 23!
licensee recommends to off-site authorities on that.
24 l MR. DENTON:
We ll, I think there are many func-25,
tions, and it varies how important-they are.
Maybe in the t
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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interests of time,.we should pass out the muddled state of 2
construction of these facilities --
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes; I agree.
4 MR. DENTON:
-- and then we will have completed 5
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0 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
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Darrell, do you want to discuss the 3!
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MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
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You don't think that a backup i
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No, I don't.
There's obviously M
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We asked all of the Project Managers to call their n
20 sites.
We did that for the operating facilities, and we did j
2I that also for the f acilities -- that is, the OLs, thems elves.
j 22 I think we've got most of the sites on this lis ting.
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23 l will find some of the sites got taken care of twice.
24 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Darrell, when they call, t
i 25l do they call the resident inspector?
Or do they call the i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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licensee?
2 MR. EISENHUT:
No, they do not.
They call the 3
principal contact daat the Project Manager has at the site, 4
and it varies in the level of who they are talking to, but it
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manager in the utility that we've been dealing with on these zcy 10 matters, because they should be knowledgeable in a very short Z
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very subjective, of course, but I wanted a simple "yes" or n
20 "no" answer.
21 If there was a shielding factor, a protection 22 factor, I asked:
Can you give us what -- tell us whatever 23 ;
you have.
I'll settle for a thickness of concrete; I'll 24 settle for a protection factor, if you've calculated one, for 25 i
.7 MEV number.
That one column is particularly sketchy I
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
JWB 39 1
because our September 5th draf t letter that went out did not 9
2 have in it, under the EOF discussion, didn't have the 3
discussion about protection factors.
So this is really one of 4
the first times they'd heard about it.
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what it really looks like, also I asked sort of a redundant 3
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When is it going to be complete?
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Cook is preparing for an mj 14 attack by an armed mob.
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15 (Laughter.)
y 16 MR. EISENHUT:
Let me -- you brought it up, so
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Some of 19 i the utilities said that it's just as easy to pour two feet of 8n 20 concrete as it is six inches of concrete, and in fact once you 21 put up the form and start a continuous pour of concrete, you 22 can just about do it if you're starting from scratch.
23 So we do have facilities.
You notice Beaver 24 Valley said that the shielding protection factor of 50.
I 25 think, for example, that's one where Brian and I have met with ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I
JWB 40 l
I the utility, and indeed they have, based on our regional 2
meetings, went back and redesigned their facility, and came 3
back in with a new design which I believe had two feet of 4
concrete?
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MR. GRIMES :
About 20 inches of concrete in one 9
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portion of the --
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MR. EISENHUT:
Covering the actual piece that X
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needs to be habitable.
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This varies considerably for the operating reactor z
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You have to look in the back, and sprinkle through i5 II and pick them out.
About half of them came up with a zero-is j
12 percent-complete, and about 25 said they had pretty well along, 4
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" pretty well alongs" are 100 'rcent.
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15 sites.
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sites" is the..OL sites ' are a little farther down the line.
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18 If you look at it in terms of -- cross-cut another way in
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terms of distance, you find that I believe the number was M
i 20 about 40 sites have EOFs which are planned to be within one 2I mile.
22 Now of those, I think aoout 10 within one mile 23 '
have been said that they are complete, something like 10 to 24j 15 of them close in.
25 Now I have to add one more comment to that.
That i
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
M 41 I
is, that part of the approach under this muddled state of 2
affairs over the last few months.
Part of the way someone may 3
have 100 percent on this chart is that if they bought the 4
option, the first one I see showing up would be Cooper, that
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farther out.
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the one in close was not going to be " hardened" or have a d
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high protection factor, and therefore they may have been able 10 to use an existing facility.
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-h II building itself was built from day one.
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13 numbers.
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I4 CHAIRMAli AHEARNE: So you're suggesting, for 5
y 15 example, at Cooper the 100 percent may refer to that.25 mile z
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I7 l MR. EISENHUT:
The.25 mile limit it may refer I
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3 18 to, and it may refer to the fact that it is using an existing A
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19 l building to start with.
a 20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
2I MR. EISENHUT:
So I wanted to point out that 22 there's a little phoniness in the number.
The one thing I do 23 '
take some comfort in being reasonably accurate -- and I' ve 24 -
talked to a number of the people who actually did the survey, 1
25 '
at least all of the PMs, I talked to several of the PMs -- they I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
JWB 42 I
said, licensees really did say:
Yes, we might have been 2
starting our things, but right now we are really doing nothing.
3 We've stopped in our tracks.
We really haven't made any 4
meaningful progress in the building, and we've stopped pending a
5 the outcome of where we really want to go.
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in time.
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13 MR. DENTON:
I think you should almost look upon m
'A 14 this as writing on a clean slate.
In other words, we' re 3
2 15 moving toward beefing up the requirements and technical f
16 competence at the site, anyway, and I'm sure these buildings W
17 !
can be put to good use that they have there.
5 18 COMMISSIONER GILIUSKY :
Some of them presumably 5
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19 ;
are existing, but buildings that existed before --
n 20 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
Some of them that are 21!
existing were for other purposes.
It's only a few who have 22 actually undertaken to build a special bunkered system that 23 '
we may have incurred extra cost along the way for.
l l
24l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let me just take the first l
l 25 one that you have.
i I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
JWB 43 1
MR. EISENHUT:
That's a good -- That's one we 2
do have a few facts on.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You've got "5 inches," so it 4
sounds like --
5 MR. GRIMES:
That's in the nominal protection e
5 6
factor, 4 to 5, yes.
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7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And it's "85% complete."
So M
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it sounds like they are building a building.
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9 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, they are.
Ny 10 MR. GRIMES:
On that one, I talked to an E
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14 essentially stopped right_now; if they went to a completely 5
2 15 hardened facility now, it would cost them $2 million more.
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18 would cost them S4 million more.
So they are very concerned c
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n 20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
They would rather it would 21 cost them ::ero million dollars.
22 MR. GRIMES:
Yes, they would rather it cost them 23,
zero million dollars.
24 !
MR. EISENHUT:
This building in this case is in 25 i fact a building that is sort of a multi-use.
They have sort of I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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a mini-close-in tech support center right next to the control 2
room, but since it was not a very elaborate building this 3
building is the one, Brian, that's right at the special security 4
boundary, which goes right through the building.
The part a
5 on the 'inside is going to be a super tech support center.
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be the EOF.
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MR. EISENHUT:
It has --
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10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Th at 's to keep Joe Fouchard's E
5 11 friends in.
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No, there will be in fact in 5
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auditorium.
It's a several-thousand-square-foot building.
16 It's got its own emergency power sources, it's own diesels --
it
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Eb 19 months ago and laid out this program.
They have been trying 8n I
very diligently --
20 I
21 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Af ter they met with you, you 22 said?
l 23 MR. EISENHUT:
We said.it seemed reasonable to 24 go ahedd and build - the facility, several months ago, and this is an example actually of a utility who has been trying to 25 ;
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I JWB 45 1
make the January 1,
'81, date.
You notice they are still 2
saying 4/81 for the actual facility.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
4 MR. DENTON:
And so I think we accept the 5
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conception as to what the function will be.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now if I look at the chart U
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that you people started out with that you showed on Tuesday, z.oy 10 they shouldn't meet your chart.
Right, Brian?
II MR. GRIMES :
They would meet alternative' two, if D
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5m l
14 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Whereas -- yes.
$j 15 MR. DENTON:
And the key is --
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16 CHAIRMAN.AHEARNE:
But it wouldn' t meet number one.
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MR. GRIMES :
No, it would not meet number one.
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18 MR. EISENHUT:
And all they would have to do to c
19 meet alternative two is to have this backup EOF, which we 20 pointed out we're not looking for a separate new building.
2I It's a dedicated -- it's not a dedicated building, in that 22 It could be an area where they can move portable sense.
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equipment in, portable data equipment.
The thing you would 24 have to have ahead of time is you would have to have the 25 communications lines put in.
And you would have tu have a I
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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procedure for assuring that you can transfer from one to the 2
o ther.
3 It was really written that way, in fact, 4
partially to reflect the fact that there are plants like e
5 Arkansas.
An]
6 MR. DENTON:
I guess one other comment, a lot of R
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The sites do vary a lot, and that 5
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W 12 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, I guess I should point out
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14 those plants that even -- we had the discussions, and they I
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discussed the 5 to 7 or 5 to 10 miles.
So daey' ve been on I
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this program for quite some time.
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18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
I'm bothered about this F
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19 idea of shifting from one center to another just at the time I
20 when you're telling people to move out of their homes, and 21 tuning into this station, while we're running down the road 22 to our new cer ter.
73 (Laughte r. )
24 '
MR. DENTON:
But I think if that were the case,
25 i
.f you knew that when you were manning the EOF, you would go l,
i I
ALDERSON REPOR TING COMPANY. INC.
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to the further-cut one.
It seems to me, if you had two 2
centers -- if I were a utility, I would build a near-in center 3
because I'd figure there would be a lot of occasion on which 4
you'd use it, even if the NRC and the state and local didn't e
5 come in on the scene.
But from the NRC's perspective, that 3n 3
6 if you knew anything about the accident, that would influence e
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which center you might go to.
If you really think it is going 3l 8
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you might as well get as close as you can.
It makes a lot of i
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Ej 11 If you think it's going to be a serious one, then 3
d 12 I'd go to the further-out one and have continuity there.
E=d 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Some of it --
5 E
14 MR. GRIMES :
I agree that dhere -- but there are 5
l 15 I ways to assure continuity.
I have had some discussions with 16 Commonwealth Edison, and their proposal to assure continuity B=
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G 18 have their corporate office staffed, also.
They would argue e
19 that for the time period of transition, they would have 8n 20 enough additional staff in the corporate office who would 21 also be getting this information that they could cover the 22 I transition period with recommendations to the state and local 23 I government.
Or you could, if there was any uncertainty at all 24 in this situation, you could certainly staff both centers at 25 that time -- the alternate as well as the primary at that l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
48 JW3 I
time.
2 col @iISSIONER GILINSKY :
Well, I was tending in 3
the direction of -- from listening to this conversation -- of 4
having the public protection center always some distance away, a
5 and the more reactor-oriented, hardware-oriented center close H
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These are the people who' benefit from being close to the R
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m,achine.
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8 MR. DENTON:
It may be we're trying to put too d
9 many functions into this one building for optimum use, but I zO 10 think --
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I II CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
How many of the utilities are it j
12 using their visitor center as the EOF?
3 ag 13 fir. GRIMES:
Well, a lot.have designated a
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so there are a lot of visitor centers currently being used; f
16 but those visitors centers for the most part would not meet
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18 they're big glass structures, and they would not be suitable.
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22 l MR. DENTON:
Another useful example to think i
23l about is Sequoyah, perhaps.
That certainly for accidents 24 l where you can occupy the simulator training center, that's 25 an excellent physical facility with a lot of space, and i
I I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
6 JWB 49 I
auditoriums, and simulators and computers, and health physics '
2 labs.
So if you had free access there, that's a very good 3
spot.
4 Now if you had to f all back, they have in e
5 downtown Chatanooga the full panapoly of the TVA Emergency h
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Centers for all kinds of emergencies.
So -
R 7
MR. GRIMES:
And even with the primary center 8
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10 significance of the dose calculations, and assesses the 11 reliability of 'the information coming out of the effluent D
y 12 monitors and things I think is better off in the EOF.
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13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So where do you come out, m
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14 Harold?
What do you think is the best solution?
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15 MR. DENTON:
I guess I've -- I think for the x
f 16 great bulk of the accidents, we better serve the public health us i
- 7 f by being close in and trying to influence the reactor state --
18 I mean, if you could ascertain tihat it was not likely to turn
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into one requiring emergency evacuation.
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British line, 5, 7,
10 miles.
24 l Now the thing I keep -- So I guess my least 25l favorite is the bunkered alternative just for occupancy.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Wherever I think it is, I think you need reasonable access so 2
other members of the public, and the state and local govern-3 ments can come in and bring you data, and communicate.
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am more interested in access among the parties than I am 5
necessarily a hardened facility, and I wouldn't want to be
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I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Is that also, then, the Al 8
reason that you -- one way of meeting part of your requirements,
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12 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
s 5
13 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Of course that is not really a
l 14
" accessible to the public."
15 COMMISSIONER GILIUSKY:
Well, you don't mean the j
"public"; you mean the people bringing data, 16 d
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No, I don't mean -- I thought x
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COMMISSIONER GILNISKY:
I don't think he means a
1 20 the "public," either.
2I CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Because it would seem that the 22 technical support center is -- that a large part of the 23l rationale was to provide that location for much of that.
i 2#
MR. DENTON:
'"h a t ' s right.
Tha t 's true.
25 l CHAIRMAN AHFARNE:
So the other facility is much 1
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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of the second case anyway.
2 MR. DENTON:
I think when I first started 3
advocating it, it was an attempt to get away from "a' trailer 4
and have a preplanned place, and now we really do have two 5
g places, with the tech support center being much more totally a
6 oriented toward the reactor control, and the EOF being much R
7
.more oriented toward off-site monitoring and coordination.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
So does that argue d
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more for moving the EOF farther out?
zo 10 LR. DENTON:
Yes.
I think what that would say, 11' then, is:
Given the more minor accidents, that our regional is y
12 directors, when assigned to the site, unless they thought it
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support center; and that the EOF would be more in a standby 9
15 mode, unless conditions deteriorated.
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10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
What that d'oes, then, is as h
17 l to pull your state and local agency liaison people, the 5
18 3
press pool, and all of the other, whatever other paraphernalia i
19 '
7, were headed for the EOF, to pull that into the Tech Support n
20 Center, which is just not set up for it.
The Tech Support II Center, you member, is to relieve the crowding in the control 22 it's not contemplated that the vice president for room; 23 engineering of the utility will go to the Tech Support Center.
24 He's out.
You know, the Tech Support Center are the immediate 25 back -- the plant super, and the immediate backup to the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
JWB 52 I
control room crew, and our aim was to keep the control room 2
occupied only by the on-shift control room crew with maybe one 3
NRC guy sitting there.
4 The Tech Support Center, then, is all those other 5
plant people.
Now if you're going to bring in, you know, j
6 vice presidents for this and that, and the guy from the R
7 sheriff's office, and the people from the state office of a
8 8
radiological health, and the state police --
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9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Why would they be there
,zog 10 at all?
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I Il COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
What?
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Il cob 24ISSIONER GILINSKY :
Why wouldn' t they be back 5
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13 at the other center?
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What I'm saying is, if i
15 you move the EOF well out, then for the great majority of j
16 circumstances in which you will need an EOF, it will be too
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far away for people to find it very handy.
E 18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Where do you see that break A"
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point coming?
n 20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
In terms of what?
Acci-21 dents?
Or distance?
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
No, no.
Distance.
l 23 f COMMISSIONER IIENDRIE:
I think if it's much more 24 than, oh, ebviously with some give and take on peculiar 25 circumstances at a site, but several miles.
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
JWB 53 i
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
How about five?
2 CO!U4ISSIONER HENDRIE:
That's a long way out.
3 I just would not put a requirement out that requires the EOF 4
be outside five miles, because I think that you' re going to 5
want to be closer than that, and it's appropriate to be closer
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I gather what the recommenda-Ead 13 tion here is that there at least be some arrangements made for S
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Well, Rod said he'd like g
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And there are questions l
24 l of that kind.
25 ;
MR. GRIMES :
Generally, if there's a telephone l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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line there, you can take a portable terminal in and get a 2
readout' without any problem; so you could relocate and get 3
access to your data base.
4 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
So the preparation that you 5j need on the backup EOF is primarily to have several telephone a
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lines already in place?
7 MR. EISENHUT:
And having the portable equipment 8
to move in and hook up.
That's all we would contemplate.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE :
Portable equipment like?
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10 MR. EISENHUT:
Any kind of recorders --
3 MR. GRIMES :
Like a CRT or something.
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Whatever you want to get off --
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17 l MR. GRIMES :
And a. few-thousand-dollar terminal 5
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is probably around someplace there in their corporate structure.
I 19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Vic?
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20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don' t know.
I'm 21l bothered by the internal consistency of this proposal.
It i
22 l seems to me that for most of these cases we' re not going to need 23 :
all this support, and NRC support, eith er.
24 l We were originally, it seems to me, trying to 25 make sure that public protection decisions got made in a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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reasonable way, and people had the right facilities, and 1
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right people around to make them.
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Well, but the changes are 16 that they won' t have to.
Even in circumstances where you will A
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ask for protective action on behalf of the off-site public, l
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the chance that you would have to move your EOF is still small.
5 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
You're saying because it 9n 20 l would be precautionary?
Is that the idea?
21 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
It would be precautionary.
22 i You've got 360 degrees on the wind rose, and protective action 23 l of f-site of the public is not equivalent to very large releases 24 :
of the kind that we've talked about.
Next month we're going i
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to have a meeting in which we're going to talk to some people l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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who think that there are good reasons to believe that even in 2
severe core damage circumstances that what comes out may be 3
rather less than what we've been calculating.
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Well, if these new ideas
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It would be helpful, tho ugh.,
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We have a lot of people waiting there, as Darrell said.
21 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Well, I think it is one 22 of those pieces of background daat you just keep in mind.
If 23 ;
for instance that thrust was coming in saying the release is 24 going to be very much worse, and the ground deposition is likely 25 to be much greater than you have been calculating, then I think i
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we would be scratching our heads over:
Now what do we do about 2
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7 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
I think I'd like to make one 8
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COMMISSIONER IIENDRIE:
Or five miles away, if z
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You made the comment that right
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I think Brian's chart that he went through 5
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Immediately.
3e 20 MR. EISENIIUT:
It would give you times in terms 21 of probably up to a few days, depending on whether you're 22 talking 90 percent of the core melts or not.
So a large 23 -
spectrum of accidents --
24 MR. GRIMES:
We have some nominal habitability.
25,
The chart showed an hour to two hours --
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MR. EISENHUT:
For the worst case.
2 MR. GRIMES:
And depending on what dose you're 3
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And the worst 4
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Well, let's see.
These
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Right.
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an hour and not have to t'ake extraordinary doses on the part of
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That's 90 percent of the core melts, 5
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some period of time.
I 22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, I think the point that 23!
Vic was making -- and, Peter, I'll turn to you in a minute.
24 I just wanted to --
25,
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's all right; I can i
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wait.
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The point that Vic was making 3
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I don ' t think we had --
21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Pleas e, let me finish.
I'm 22 trying to tell you where I was coming from.
23 And although there are only a very small percentage k
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21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Except, Brian, you see, the 22 whole point I was trying to make is that the cases that you 1,
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question. about whether or not you have to relocate; and I 2
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3 MR. GRIMES :
But to me, the key ones are the 4
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5 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But in precisely that h
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I guess I could look at it the other aj 11 way.--
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-- in a small fraction of 5j 13 the cases.
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-- and say that the one that it's 5
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No, I wouldn' t say to " require"
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21 COI9tISSIONER GILINSKY :
I guess what I'm talking 22 ab6ut is,'you know, not matter how small that percentage is --
23,
and that percentage, it seems to me, argues to whether we really 24l ought to have this f acility or not -- but in j us t thos e cir-f l
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cumstances when the reactor is in the worst state, and the t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 number of people who might have to move is the largest and when 4
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least well.
That somehow doesn't sound right to me.
4 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I don' t see why it
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I think I will have to ask d
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No, I'm not eager, John.
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Roger Blond from the Office of El l
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There's one other point.
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So the timing of the accident 21 also enters into the decision -- not that there would probably 22 l be the time available to move from one to the other.
Most of 23 the accidents are rather short --
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Well, what does that I
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all together?
Because it sounds from what you're saying is --
2 MR. BLOND:
No, the far-away center would be --
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But you seem to be saying i
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It argues against having the R
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This is again for the largest D
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For the life-threatening cases.
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But it sounds like ---
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That they would happen before even
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Yes.
It sounds like i
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That's precisely why the control i
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decisien, and have to have the ability to talk to the state 23,
and local people, because the timings are such that there might I
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Is it really inevitable l
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or unavoidable that the state and local people will not group 2
together with us in one facility?
Because that does affect 3
things.
4 MR. GRIMES :
It's fairly rare that they're
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Well, given, as I look down e
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Even when it's far out, it's rare.
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Well, I mean, half a mile, Y
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One of the few cases that I know si g
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How about Big Rock, for 5
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You have 12 miles.
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I'm not familiar with Big Rock.
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18 MR. EISENHUT:
We haven' t approved that one yet.
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19 CIIAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It's 100 percent complete.
20 (Laughter.)
21 MR. GRIMES :
Knowing that utility -
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Oh, I see.
I 23 '
MR. GRIMES:
-- I believe it's an exis ting 24 i building.
25l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I see.
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Peter, I think we inevitably have --
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I just have a question or 3
two.
I don' t have any driving thoughts.
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I would probably look and see what i
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Do you knew what you said?
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Therefore, you didn' t mean --
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I was looking at what we had --
18 MR. DENTON:
What I would do, starting from E
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Maybe it could be 23!
used for multiple civic functions, or whatever it could be 24,
used for.
But that would seem to be a very good inves tment 25 !
for the s e accidents where you really have to be out.
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At the same time, recognizing that the plant is going to have numerous upsets that don' t ever require activation
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But as a regulator, would d
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Or would that just 10 be the utility's choice, if they wanted to build it?
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I guess I would have a hard time D
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So you need to r3 20 have a tech support center that could cope with a fair number 21 of regulatory officials.
22 !
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, the one you 23 i described first sounds like the EOF we talked about awhile 24.l back.
i 25 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes, I was thinking that, too.
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I remembered that.
2 (Laughter.)
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And if Joe is right, we 4
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So I guess I have kind of concluded j
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Well, as Vic said, the one m
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I think we ought to make d
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I think our plan would be to put
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21 CHA1:tMAN AHEARNE:
Joe, you don't agree?
22 COMMISSIONER ITENDRIE:
No, I think the staff 23 proposal has got enough flexibility in it to accommodate a fair 24 ;
part of what has already been committed out there in good j
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adequately.
I would buy off on the staff recommendation.
2 COMMISSIONER GILIUSKY:
Well, I have always been 3
for at least the first part of what Harold outlined, and the 4
second part is reasonable as a facility to deal with many
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Do you feel that the e
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8 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Would change this?
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
would affect this in 10 some way?
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11 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I don' t think we ought D
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Okay?
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the present time, as compared to trending in the other direction, 23 '
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But I wouldn' t propose that it be controlling.
24 i CO*DISSIONER GILIUSKY :
You also said something I
25,
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to me to argue for making exceptions, rather than necessarily 2
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Well, that is certainly 4
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I don't know.
j5 What basis, though, would you have for making an exception?
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Righ t.
But what my point is --
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whether it was Harold's or not -- I agree with it, if it's 2
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Well, but the staff Al 8
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It s ays --
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
That's number one, iog 10 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
-- if you don't want to E
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Yes, I know.
But what I would 5
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(Pause.)
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And that would also address 3
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
What sort of protection 2
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Well, to not --
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What you've got laid out e
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Yes, what we had laid out there --
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What is a protection 5
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Eh MR. GRIMES :
I think it approaches 9 or 10 inches 19 8
ce 20 of concrete.
21 MR. DENTON:
I guess I'm not really sure I agree 22 that it warrants a lot of hand-tailbring with distance.
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rent.
And as we require special factors of 6, 7,
8, 9, 10 miles, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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they would have to build them with special factors.
I guess 2,
I was tr(ing to see if you would accept the principle that 3
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21 MR. DENTON:
No.
I would think that you would 22 quickly find in this that there would only be a few NRC employees 23 left, if you were moving people -- if we ordered other people 24 l to leave further out.
1 25 '
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I see what you're saying.
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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JWB 74 MR. DENTON:
And that you wouldn' t get the y
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Well, you've got to get clear the D
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18 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
A smaller fraction than i:
19 that because of the wind rose.
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Yes, it doesn't vary -- it diffuses 20 21 with distance about the same as the probability of getting hit 22,
by it.
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I guess I am willing to live 23 i
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25 MR. GRIMES:
But then, it seems to me, since the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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worst-case accidents generally have a track in one particular 2
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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the two-center arrangement basically is that it does contemplate 2
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If you give me a percentage, I'll E
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miles, seems to me to be f airly compelling.
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just don't want these people stuck in a traffic jam somewhere.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
So I guess, if I understand 3
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a distance protection factor connection?
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Yes.
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Did you choose your protection 3
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MR. DENTON:
To be in a building, I would sure 1
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Ity only point, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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JWB 78 I
which is more philosophical, that if the center is at five miles 2
and you've ordered evacuation in that direction of everyone out 3
to 10 miles, I don't see what real purpose it serves to be 4
able to keep people at 5 miles.
Where are you going to get the e
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That's what I had in
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Exactly.
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So now we have gone far out, and 22 !
we have bunkered in.
23
( Laugh ter. )
24 f CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And of course in theory you 25 would have ordered the protective action prior to it actually i
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being absolutely needed.
2 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
3 CHAIIU4AN AHEARNE:
Well, I'm not sure we are going 4
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Well, there probably is no single 3
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Mr. Hendrie would accept the E
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Mr. Bradford would go for a M
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22 l 23l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes, whatever a reasonable 24 l period of time for that is.
I don't think it's 30 or 60 days, l
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but a couple of days.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I would have preferred the ones 2
already given in the Staff approval, and they're underway to 3
accept those, but to require them to make a more permanent 4
arrangement for a farther-cut facility similar to what Harold e
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Well, after I've followed b
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Harold could you summarize i
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yours?
l 25 (Laughter. )
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
JWB 81 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
With the new Harold.
2 MR. DENTON:
I certainly agree.
3
( Laught.ar. )
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Well, would one of the two of e
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I would prefer that you state it.
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Okay.
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I would guess, then, that 1
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That sounds like you two 22 23 '
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I think we are, and I think I
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we could probably pick up Peter, also.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. GRIMES :
Somewhat foreseeing this option, one l
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locations.
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Yes.
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Would that satisfy the intent?
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Well, with a slight difference.
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That's difficult to define.
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Yes.
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And I j ust didn ' t want --
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It's still difficult to define.
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JWB 83 i
under a dozen sites.
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Yes.
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And 15 is just a little bit bigger 5b 19 than that.
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Yes.
The difference I would U-15 have going -- for the backup, I really would have to have some 16 words on that, a
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I understand that.
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I wouldn't require or urge a
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I understand, i
2j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
And I still don't come out 22 where you come out on the protection factor.
I am more with 23 Harold's rationale.
I agree with that.
24 l MR. EISENHUT:
Sure.
The only reason I said that is, you get that inherently, anyway, I think.
So therefore --
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, that 's fine what you 2
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I don't think we ought to require 3
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Unless they 're required.
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No, but it sounds like 7
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24 f COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Which doesn' t cover the 25 worst of them.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Right.
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So the thing I was putting together 2
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I guess the one remaining geestion e
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Should we move on the letter, minus this?
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I think you'd better move on g
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And could I suggest you try 5
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Let's see, now.
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F 19 l COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I'm not even going to try.
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COM!!ISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- was that to make it 20 {
easier to simply go out and rent a building?
21 22 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
I think any time we start laying on protective measures, it carries this regulatory 23 framework with it, and I would prefer to keep it a simple 24l 25 '
building that we didn't try to regulate the structural design l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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of, the building heating and air conditionir.g of, and so forth.
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What sort of a protection z
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It depends on the windows --
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If you're in the basement of such y
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So a factor of 10 is
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It requires special
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You might get it in a large basement.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
All right.
22 (Whereupon, at 5 :0 5 p.m., the meeting was 25 I adjourned.)
24 i 1
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l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.44ISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
\\J in the matter of: PUBLIC HEETING - BRIEFING ON CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITIES Date of Proceedin5: nc*nhar,n loan Docket !!usber:
Place of Proceeding:
Washincton, D.
C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Cecmission.
Jane W.
Beach Official Reporter (Typed)
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