ML19353B101

Insp Rept 50-267/89-21 on 891001-1115.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Followup of Lers,Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance Observation & Monthly Maint Observation

ML19353B101
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	12/05/1989
From:	Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19353B100	List: ML19353B099 ML19353B101
References
50-267-89-21, NUDOCS 8912110198
Download: ML19353B101 (8)

See also: IR 05000267/1989021

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.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYLCOMMISSION

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NRC Inspection Reporti

50-267/89-211

' Operating ~ License: . - DPR-34_.

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Licensee:

Public.ServiceLCompany of Coloradot(PSC)l

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~P.0. Box 840-'

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Denver,. Colorado' 80201-0840-

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Fort St. - Vrain: Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)

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.-Inspection At: :FSV, Platteville, Colorado

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O Inspection; Conducted: , October 1 through November-15,.1989

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~ I'n spectors:

R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector

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P.'W,;Michaud, Resident Inspector.

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Approved:-

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T. F.tWesterman, Chief, Project Section B

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~ Division of. Reactor Projects-

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Inspection Summary;

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EInspection Conducted October 1 through November 15. 1989 (Report 50-267/89-21)

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1 Areas' Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection.of onsite followup of

licensee event reports operational safety verification, monthly surveillance

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cobservation, and-monthly maintenance observation.

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Results: :Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were

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JModifications and preparations for defueling were observed throughout this

.nspection perio . -Significant progress was made in support of the effort to

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begin defueling on November 27,'1989.

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8912110198 891206

,PDR. ADOCK 05000267

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DETAILS

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' Persons Contheted

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D. Alps, Supervisor, Security

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• F. Borst, Nuclear _ Training & Support Manager

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• L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing'and Resources-

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R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager

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-*C. Crawford, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• M. Deniston, Superintendent of Operations

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• D. Evans, Operations Manager

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-*M. Ferris, QA Operations Manager

• C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production

• D. Goss, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager.

-*J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations

• M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager

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• G. Lindsey,- QA Operations

• G. Matheney, NFSC

.M. Niehoff, Nuclear Design Manager

• F. Novachek, Nuclear _. Support _ Manager

• J. Reesy, Nuclear Support Engineering Manager

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• D

Rodgers, Nuc_ lear Computer' Services Manager

• L. Scott, QA Services Manager -

• L. Sutton, QA Operations

• P. Tomlinson, Manager, QA

'*D.:Warembourg, Manager,. Nuclear Engineering

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• N.

Zerr, QA '

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The NRC inspectors- also contacted other licensee and contractor pers'annel

during the inspection.

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• Cenotes those attending the exit interview conducted November 14, 1989.

2.

Plant Status

The plant was permanently shut down on August 29, 1989.

The licensee is

making preparations to commence defueling on November 27, 1989.

3.

Onsite Followup of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)- (92700)

The inspectors reviewed selected-LERs to determine whether corrective

actions, as stated in the LERs, are appropriate to correct the cause of

the event'and to verify-that these corrective actions have been

implemented.

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LER 88-01 reported a Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance

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test was not performed. A plant transient delayed the performance of the

daily linear power channels' heat balance calibration, and an oversight

resulted in failing to perform the surveillance later that day.

The

supervisor involved was counseled on the importance of ensuring completion

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Lof required surveillance procedures. This~ appears to have been an

isolated incident, as n'o recurrence of this type of event has been

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observed.

This LER is' closed.

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.LER.88-08alsoreportedTSre;quiredsurveillancesnotperformedwithinthe

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. required interva.1.

This was-due to a scheduling error. Two new

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, surveillance.procedurer were. approved by the plant operations review

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committee ' ( PORC) . . The procedures' they replaced were deleted from the

computerized database before the new procedures were fully implemented..

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This; occurred because the changes to the scheduling data were based on-the

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.PORC minutes;rather'than the official procedure index. Upon discovering.

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this, the licensee immediately performed the required surveillance tests.

.The. licensee subsequently revised-Procedure SMAP-5, " Scheduling Program

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for SurveillancesLGoverned by FSV Technical Specifications," to ensure the

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. computerized surveillance, scheduling database is not updated prematurely.

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Procedure NPAP-2, " Charter for-Plant. Operations Review Committee," was

also revised to require documentation in the PORC meeting' minutes of any-

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required followup actions for items under review by PORC.

These actions

are sufficient to correct the cause of this problem and to. prevent a

recurrence.

This LER is closed.

LER 88-11 described a core support floor vent system valve which was not

> fully open as-required.

This occurred due to a separation of the valve

stem from:its disc.

Valve V-111063 was replaced with a diaphragm-seal

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type valve.

The sensing point for core' support' floor pressure indication-

was repositioned to provide;a means of: identifying an inadvertent

isolation. Also, an alternative bypass flow path was' installed.

Finally,

Valve V-111063 and seven other valves in the core support floor vent

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system were added to the sealed and critical valve checklist. This-LER is

. closed.

LER 88-12 notified the NRC of an error which was discovered in the

computer' code used to develop the Environmental; Qualification (EQ)

temperature profiles. .The error was discovered during an_ independent

verification of the computer code.

The code was corrected and a new

reactor building temperature profile was developed and used as the basis

for revised EQ temperature profiles.

The licensee performed a complete

review of the FSV EQ binders and verified that all E0 equipment was

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qualified to the revised composite temperature profiles.

Additionally, a

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fixed high-temperature setpoint trip at 171 F was added to the steam line

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rupture detection and isolation system (SLRDIS).

This fixed

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highftemperature setpoint was added to the TS in Amendment 68 to the FSV

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operating. license on February 27, 1989. These actions are sufficient to

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close this LER.

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LER 88-13 reported that a Class IA snubber had not been included on the

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FSV list of Class IA snubbers and had, therefore, not been maintained in

accordance with TS requirements. The snubber was added to the appropriate

maintenance procedure and TS surveillance procedure and was subsequently

verified operable.

Change Notice (CN) 2819 updated the FSV controlled

hanger list to verify that all Class I and IA snubbers were included.

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-Additional actions were taken by the. licensee to resolve design-change

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problems.

Sufficient procedural steps were provided to prevent a

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recurrence of this type _of omission.

This LER is closed.

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LER 88-14 reported a loop shutdown (ESF actuation) caused by " loss of

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bearing water" trips on-the Loop 2 helium circulators.

No specific cause

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for this event was identified.- All- helium circulator water flow and

differential pressure instruments.were blown down during troubleshooting

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' efforts.c'A special test T-410,.was performed to demonstrate.the helium

circulator bearing water system' operates as designed.

Performance of-

Test T-410 was unable to repeat the problem. This LER is closed.

LER 89-01 reported loop shutdowns (ESF actuations) caused by high primary

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coolant moisture levels.

This occurred with~the' reactor shut down due to

a-leaking core support ficor cooling water tube.

Isolation and test

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valves were installed on the leaking core support floor tube. All systems

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operated as designed during this event,.and the corrective actions are

sufficient to= prevent a-recurrence. -This LER is; closed.

LER 89-02 reported.an inadvertent actuation _of the reserve shutdown (RSD)

system. This was caused by' operator error in sfailing to aanere to

procedural requirements. .This event andethe: subsequent recovery were

covered in' depth in?NRC Inspection Reports 50-267/89-02 and 50-267/89-03.

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Corrective actionslincluded disciplinary actionsxfor the personnel

. involved and,a revision t'o the. procedure being used.

Procedure SR 4.1.8.c.1/2/3-Q, " Reserve Shutdown Hopper, ACM Disconnect,

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Low Pressure Alarm, and Circuit' Continuity Test," was revised to require

that the key switches for'both the 7-region.and,30-region subsystems of

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the RSD system.be:placed in. test and independently verified prior to

performing continui_ty testing'on either subsystem. These actions provide.

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a sufficient basis ~ to close this LER.

LER.89-03 described standby diesel generator engine head coolant. flow

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directors which had become dislodged from their ports. This was

~apparently due to a' manufacturing defect and was reported under

10 CFR'Part 21. New cylinder heads, with properly installed coolant flow

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directors verified, were installed on each of the four diesel generator

engines.

Each emergency diesel generator set was then run for 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to

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demonstrate its operability. The inspectors observed portions of the

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corrective maintenance and testing.

No recurrence of this type of event

.has been noted. This LER is closed.

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~LER 89-09 reported a failure of the Region 3 control rod pair to scram

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during performance of a weekly partial scram surveillance test.

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Region' 3 control rod drive (CRD) was replaced with an operable CRD and

plant operation was resumed.

The failed CRD was disassembled and

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inspected.

It was found that an incorrect number of shims were installed

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in the CRD motor to first stage bearing assembly.

This occurred due to an

incorrect measurement and resulted in overloading of the first stage

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bearing, premature wear, and degraded performance.

Previous electro

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motive force,tes

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These actions ,a e sufficient:to close this LER.

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LER 89-11 described operation of the reactor in excess of the authorized

maximum power level of 82 percent. This event occurred due to inadequate-

procedure's'to control changes,to the-secondary. heat balance calculations

o'n the data logger computer and was examined in NRC Inspection;

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Report 50-267/89-15.

Corrective actions included administratively

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limiting reactor power to 80 percent as indicated by the highest of.either

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clinear power channel, primary heat balance, or secondary heat balance

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indications.

The secondary, heat balance program was changed to

. automatically account fo.r reheat attemperation flow, and-

Procedure OPOP-IV, " Plant Operation Between 30% and 100*4 Power," was

revised to require the. operators to confirm.the automatic insertion and

removal of the attemperation flow signal. The licensee also reviewed all

plant' operations since startup in January I M9 to verify that at no other

time-had power exceeded 82 percent. A comprehensive review of procedures

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lwas performed by the licensee to verify that all' referenced data logger

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screen numbers were correct,

Finally, Procedure CSP-17, " Control of

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Changes to Plant Computer Program or Display," was. issued to address data

-logger changes and. procedure revisions.

This procedure requires approval

by the reactor support and operations department managers prior to

implementation of any change.

These-actions ec utitute a sufficient-bas +s

to close this'LER.

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LER 89-16 reported a loop shutdown (engineered safety feature actuation)

due to.a~ low bearing water surge tank level. A combination of an

. equipment malfunction and operator error was the 'cause of this event. The

malfunctioning level controller was rebuilt and calibrated. The operator

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involved was counseled on the importance of monitoring bearing water surge

tank-levels.

These actions ere sufficient to close this LER.

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4.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)-

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General

The inspectors made daily tours of the control room during normal

working hours-and at least once per week during backshift hours.

Control room staffing was verified to -be at the proper level for the

plant conditions at all times.

Control room operators were observed

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to be attentive and aware of plant status and reasons why

annunciators were lit.

The inspectors observed the operators using

and adhering to approved procedures in the performance of their

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duties. A sampling of these procedures by the inspectors verified

current revisions and legible copies.

During control room tours, the

. inspectors verified that the required number of nuclear

instrumentation and plant protective system channels were operable.

The operability of emergency AC and DC electrical power,

meteorological, and fire protection systems was also verified by the

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inspectors.

The reactor operators and shift supervisor logs were

reviewed daily along with the TS compliance log, clearance log,

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. operations deviation report (ODR) log, temporary configuration-

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' report-(TCR) log, and operations order book.

Shift turnovers were-

-observed'at least once per week by'the inspectors.

Information flow-

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,was' consistently. good, with the shift supervisors soliciting comments

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or concerns:frem.the reactor operators, equipment operators, auxiliary

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. tenders, and health physics technicians.- The licensee's station

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manager, operations manager, and superintendent of operations were.

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observed,to make routine tours-of the control room.

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The. inspectors made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to

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assess the-overall conditions and verify the adequacy of plant

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equipment, radiological' controls,~and security.

During ~these tours,

particular attention was paid to the 1.icensee's fire protection--

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program,' including fire extinguishers,-firefighting equipment, fire

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barriers, control of flammable materials, and other fire hazards.

~The: inspectors attended one of the licensee's safety committee

meetings on October 26, 1989.

Licensee management presence.was

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observed, and discussions were'open and frank.' 'The consensus of'the-

safety committee members was that issues affecting plant or personnel

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safety are. receiving more attention than in the past, though

additional. resources need to be directed to clean up a backlog of

work items,

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Radiological Controls

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The inspectors observed health physics technicians performing surveys

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- and checking air samplWrWTnd area radiation monitors.

Contamination

controlled ,wnstfand Wolhe(rj appropriate' areas and were verified to

levels,and exposure ratesswe e posted ~at entrances-to radiologically-

be up to date by the inspectors. Health = physics technicians were

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~present to provide asd stsncd when workers were-required to enter

radiologicallycontroMidfagas.

<The inspectors observed workers fdllbwing the instructions'en

radiation' work permits concerning protective clothing'and dosimetry,

and observed workers using proper procedures for; contamination

control', including proper removal"of protective clothing and whole

body l frisking upon exiting'a radiologically controlled area.

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Security-

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Tne inspectors randomly verified that the number of armed security

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officers required by the security plan were present.

A lead security

officer was on duty to direct secur.ity activities on each shift. -The

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inspectors verified that search equipment, including an x-ray

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machine, explosive detector, and metal detector were operational or a

100 percent hands-on search was conducted.

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The protected area barrier was surveyed by the inspect' ors to ensure

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.that it was not compromised by erosion or other objects.

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inspectors. observed that vital area barriers were well maintained-and-

not compromised. .The inspectors also. observed that persons granted

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access to the site were badged and visitors were properly escortedev 9[

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_The. inspectors monitored work done to enlarge the reactor build bg ( -

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Jrefueling floor to turbine building en'ergency exit doer.

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which replaced a single door:with double doors, was performed _under

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CN-2888.

The purpose of this change is to facilitate movement of

reactor defueling block's>during defueling. The inspectors observed ha.h

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-security officers posted at all times _that the door was breached)and-'

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.that such times were minimized.

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- 5.

Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)-

a.

Circulator Water Tubine Test

The inspectors witnessed the. performance of Procedure SR Si2.7.a.2-A,

" Loop 1 and 2 Valves and Circulator Drive Test," on October 4,1989.

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This test verifies the operability of the helium-circulators water

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turbine drive system by functionally testing each valve in the

feedwater, condensate, and boosted condensate supply loops.

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inspectors observed the successful completion of this test and no

discrepancies were noted;

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b.

Personnel.-Accountability Test

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On.0ctober 11,1989, the licensee-ran a quarterly personnel

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accountability system test in accordance with Procedure SR-EP-10-Q.

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The inspectors observed the conduct of this unannounced test and-

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verified that the initial accountability of all onsite personnel

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. occurred,in 25 minutes, which was within the-allowable 30 minutes.

No discrepancies were noted.

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Fire Protection Surveillance

The inspectors observed portions of the licensee's semiannual

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inspection of fire extinguishers throughout the plant. This was

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performed in accordance with Procedure SR-FP-7B-SA, " Maintenance and

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Inspection of Portable Fire Extinguishers," and was completed on

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October'27, 1989.

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Control Room Chart Recorder Surveillance

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The inspectors also observed the performance of semiannual

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-surveillance on control room chart recorders in accordance with

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Procedure SR-RE-9-SA, " Control Room Recorders Check." This test

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checks-each recorder for proper chart speed and intervals and

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performs a cleaning, lubrication, and inspection of each recorder's

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drive mechanism. This procedure was completed on all control ~ room

recorders on November 8,1989, and no -discrepancies were noted.

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No violationCoE35jNons were identified'in the review of:this program

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MonthlyMaintYnande10$seivation' (62703)

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The licensee proceeded with modifications to the refueling floor equipment

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and to the~ fue'l handling machines (FHM) .in preparation for<defueling,

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Modifications to the. FHM were made to adapt new interfaces between

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.personnelc'omputergcontrolsand.theexistingphysicalequipment.

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inspectr'r monitored:this work being performed'under Change Notice (CN)

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CN-1264A. Other activities monitored by the inspectors were the

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replacement-of1the_ cask video system for-'the FHM performed under CN-1537

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and upgrade-of the'FHM mast video system under CN-2723.

Numerous related-

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activities were also observed by the inspectors,

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The. inspectors reviewed the licensee's Purchase Order N9555, which

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procured defueling. elements (dummy fuel blocks) and Purchase 9596, which

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. procured boronated graphite pellets to be loaded into the defueling

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elements.1The purchase specifications and certificates of conformance

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were examined-.to' verify.-that the furnished product met the specifications,

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Copies of analyses and worksheets supplied by the vendor were included.in

~this review. The' inspectors found ~ no discrepancies in this documentation.

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On: November. 9,1989, the inspectors attended a QA post-audit conference

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where the licensee's audit of their preventive mainter.ance. program was

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discussed.

The purpose of the audit-was to review the preventive'

maintenance program's adequacy to support defueling activities. A number

.of' deficiencies and. improvement items-were identified by the licensee's QA-

auditors, but'the overall program was rated satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified in the- review of this program

area.

7.

Exit Meeting (30703)

An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified

in' paragraph 1 on November 14, 1989.

During this interview, the

i7 nspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee

did not identify as proprietary any information-provided to. or reviewed

.by, the inspectors.

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