ML19353B071
| ML19353B071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19353B070 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8912110140 | |
| Download: ML19353B071 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES I'
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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...s SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY i
i POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEM 2.2 PARY 1 1.0 INTkODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment.
Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983 at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during the plant startup.
In this case the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28 1983 the NRC Executive Director for Operations directed the NRC staff to Investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plarit.
The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, ' Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the NRC requested by Generic Letter (G.L.) 83-28 dated July 8,1983, that all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits respond to tha generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.
The Wisconsin Electric Power Company, licensee for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, responded to G.L. 83-28 by letters dated November 7,1983, May 10, 1985, and March 27 1987. The NRC staff and its contractor, EG&G of Idaho, havereviewedthelicensee'sresponses.
The purpose of this safety evaluation is to document the staff's review of Item 2.2, Part 1, of G.L. 83-28. The contractor's Technical Evaluation Report (TER) is attached.
G912110140 891206 PDR ADOCK 05000266 P
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,. l 2.0 EVALVATION l
G.L. 83-28 Item 2.2 required, in part, that licensees and applicants submit for staff review, a description of their programs for safety relatec* equipment classification as described below.
~ For equipnent classification, licensees and applicants were required to describe their programs for ensuring that all components of safety-related systems necessary < or accomplishing required safety functions are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems I
used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders and replacerent parts. This description was to include:
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The criteria for identifying components as safety-related within systems currently classified as safety-related. This was not interpreted to require changes in safety classification at the systems level.
2.
A description of the information handling system used to identify safety-related components (e.g. computerized equipment lists) and the methods used for its development and Validation.
3.
A description of the process by which station personnel use this information handling system to determine that an activity is safety-related and what procedures for maintenance, surveillance, parts replacenent and other activities defined in the introduction to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, apply to safety-related components.
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A description of the management control utilized to verify that the l
procedures of preparation, validation and routine utilization of the l
information handling systehi have been followed.
5.
A demonstration that appropriate design verification and qualification L
testing is specified for procurement of safety-related components.
The specifications were to include qualification testing for expected safety service conditions and provide support for the licensees' receipt of testing documentation to support the limits of life recommended by the supplier.
Licensees and applicants were also directed to include the broader class of structures, systems, and componer.ts important to safety required by GDC-1 (defined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria, Introduction") in their equipment classification program.
Sa ty-rel d structures, systems, and components are those that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure: (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant boundary (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and (3) the capability to prevent or t.iitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potentiel of fsite exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
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6 The licensee's response to item 2.2 provided details concerning its method for equipment classification at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The NRC staff's contractor. EG8G of Idaho, evaluated the licensee's submittal for i
conformance with each of the positions listed above. The details of the contractor's review are contained in the attached TER.
I 3.0 CONCLilSIO,N Based upon the staff's review of the licensee's submittal and the attached TER prepared by its contractor, EG&G of Idaho, the staff concludes that the licensee adequately meets the provisions of G.L. 83-28, Item 2.2 Part 1 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
Attachment:
EGG-NTA-7391 Principal Contributor:
W. Swenson Date: December 6, 1989 l
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