ML19353A862
| ML19353A862 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1989 |
| From: | Glenn J SENATE |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19353A861 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 8912060311 | |
| Download: ML19353A862 (7) | |
Text
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3Cnifeb States Amate W A&MINGTON. D.C. 20$10 l'
October 20, 1989 t
l Office of Congressional Affairs Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C.
20555 Dear Sir Enclosed you will find correspondence from Thomas F. Vetra regarding the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant.
I I hope that you can provide me with information that will be helpful in addressing the concerns expressed in the letter.
I would appreciate receiving your response and the return of the original correspondence as soon as possible.
Please direct,- our reply to the attention of Chris Kline.
Thank you for your time and effort.
Best regards.
Sincerely, ud=
John Glenn United States Senator JG/ckm Enclosure I
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c Thomas F. Vetra
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53 h'oodridge Road Duxbury, MA 02332 September 25, 1989 Boston Edison Company Attnt Mr. Ralph Bird i
Senior Vice President-Nuclear Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station RFD #1, Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360
Dear Mr. Bird:
It has become very noticeable that the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) has had a problem with the loss of secondary containment (5 times) since they went on line December 30, 1988.
The loss of secondary containment on 4/13/89 on the 74' level was due to an " interlock" failure whereby both doors remained open for a matter of seconds.
The other four (5) losses of secondary containment took place on 2/16/89, 4/1/89, 4/4/89 and as recent as 9/7/89.
As I understand, all because of " interlock" system failure.
The cause of these failures, which I understand are being investigated, is nothing new as both you and I know.
Mr. Tarantino said "These double doors will be replaced during an upcoming outage."
And " Essentially, we have to put a security guard there now, as a compensatory measure, to make sure both doors aren' t opened at the same time." To be clear about the location, let me say these are.both the inner and outer reactor (RX) building access doors.
Problems with these doors have existed for many years but for some reason have never been properly addressed by management nor has the work been completed as it should have l
been.
At this time I would like to discuss some previous history of this door.
Back in June 1985 a maintenance re-quest (M. R. ) was established because this fire door was cracked and had a bolt missing from the hinge.
A Purchase Order (PO) was also issued.
A later M.R. was issued in September 1985 for door replacement.
The 'new set of doors i
were actually installed in August 1987, but incorrectly and I
were never accepted by the various departments.
It took 23 months before the new doors were installed.
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4 Boston Edison Company
. September 25, 1989 Page 2 In just the last two (2) years therb has been a minimum of 70 continuing problems with these doors, such as latch, door lock, interlock system and card reader failures.
A broken interlock warning light on one or both sides of the fire door and a broken hinge also caused problems, some of which are still not corrected to this date.
It is my understanding the problems of this door have been reviewed by almost all departments at PNPS such as Safety, Security, H.P.,
Engineering, Alara, QA and yourself.
As a forr.or contract security safety officer, you may recall that I met with you in your office on 10/30/87 to discuss the status of these problems and the safety implications involved.
You indicated that you would take some action immediately but I can't for the life of me think what it was, t
I discussed these problems at the weekly BECO contractor safety meetings and requested that they be brought up to Mr. L.
Schrall's attention so that action would be initiated, it seldom was.
On 8/31/87 these problems were discussed with Mr. J. Lyash (NRC Resident Inspector) who was to discuss the subject with Mr.
L.
Schrall (BECO Safety Chief) that day.
No response was ever received from NRC or BECO.
This same i
date W/E K. Taylor and myself discussed the opening of both doors at the same time and he indicated they would have to l
have the problem corrected before PNPS went on.line.
Why has this condition of doors opening simultaneously been going on since at least 1987?
It is not clear why management from BECO, NRC, INPO, contractor supervisors, ALARA, H.P.,
etc. could possibly go through these doors for several years and not see the problems.
Would you please clarify this for me?
The following is a very brief and partial history of the inner and outer reactor (RX) building access doors.
8/1/87 Both door knobs fell off F.D. - Fixed 8/19/87 New Doors installed - Unacceptable 8/28/87 Door knob air lock side fell of f F.D. - Fixed 8/21/87 Interlock failure - Fixed 9/2/87 Performed safety / security walkdown with Dep.
chief (D.C.)
J. Morris and discussed door subject with R. Deacy (BECO Security).
l 9/19/87 Door knob air lock side fell off F.D. - Fixed 12/2/87 Performed safety / security walkdown with D.C.
l J. Morris.
Discussed door problems.
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Boston Edison Company September 25, 1989 3
Page 3 r
2/4/88 Maintenance request (M. R. ) initiated by Security --
door knob is extremely difficult to turn when either accessing or egressing, safety concerns.
Also memo sent to D.C. J. Morris about door
?
knob problems and split in the door (work completed 2/11/88).
2/11/88 Spoke to J. Gia W/E about the door problems.
4 He agrees action needed and he will pass on the information to John McMann in the morning.
2/29/88 M.R. initiated by security -- the light that indicates whether the opposite door is ajar does not function.
3/3/88 Performed safety / security walkdown with D.C.
J. Morris and discussed door problems with R. Deacy (BECO Security).
3/29/88 Safety memo to D.C. J. Morris - urgency for completion of repairs to F.D. for safety reasons - C.C. R. Deacy and L. Schrall.
4/18/88 M.R. initiated by security - door not latching.
4/26/88 Performed safety / security walkdown with D.C.
J. Morris - discussion of door problems -
referred to the fact this door had been a problem since I came to security in 1986.
5/9/88 Safety memo to Chief R. Rodriguez - failure of operation of F.D.
- c.c.
R.. Bird, R. Deacy, L. Schrall, K. Healy.
5/10/88 I discussed the doors with D. C. J. Morris and D. Long (BECO security) - interlock not working.
I On this date Mr. Tarantino (BECO P.R.), while conducting a tour of the RX building, held open the second air lock door - This action would be considered breaking secondary contain-ment.
Fortunately we were not on line.
A BECO representative should have set a better example.
My understanding is that the people on this tour were held up in your office for almost 45 minutes because'there was an interlock I
failure at the RX doors.
5/11/88 Interlock system failure.
5/30/88 Door not latching.
6/1/88 Latch sticking.
l 6/2/88 Latch problem.
L 6/5/88 Interlock hanging up.
6/8/88 Latch and interlock problems.
l 6/14/89 Scheduled safety / security walkdown with Chief R.
Rodriguez and D.C. J. Morris not performed as the Chief and Deputy never showed up.
I later reviewed the topics on the walkdown list with J. Morris.
7/13/89 Sent safety memo to Chief Rodriguez - extreme safety hazard - RX building - c.c.
R.
- Bird, D. Long, R.
- Deacy, L.
- Schrall, K.
- Healy, P.
Agnes and S. Collins.
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Boston Edison Company.
September 25, 1989 Page 4 s
7 /14/89 I received a telephone at home from Chief R.
R. Rodriguez about 1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br /> asking if I had mailed copies of the memo dated 7/13/88 to P. Agnes and S. Collins.
It seems Mr. R.
t Bird instructed D. Long of BECO security to have me come on site for a meeting.
Briefly in reference to the memo, a meeting was held in D. Long's office for about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and he said the following 1.
Engineering was to complete their task for an improved interlock system by 7/29/88.
2.
He agreed that the RX truck lock roll-up door would remain open except for a rict or earthquake or something of this magnitude.
3.
He told me BECO had all the parts and were going to replace the interlock system on f
7/15/88.
This was an interim action until engineering completed their work on 7/29/88.
On Friday, 7/15/88 I received a telephone call from the Chief Steward (Union), - who had attended the meeting with me, stating that BECO had decided to wait until 7/29/88.
That was lying at its best and an indication of how BECO works.
4.
We discussed a second way out of the RX build-ing and I said we should stop bartering the RX truck lock roll up door as an answer.
5.
D. Long discussed an alternate escape route that I said was unsatisfactory.
Many persons working in the RX building would have no knowledge of this route.
It is interesting to note that some heavy equipment had been placed on top of the egress escape hatch.
6.
It must be noted that BECO and security management both knew that I was going to be off site for surgery relating to an-on-the-job injury and my return to work was very indefinite.
Also, I told management copies for P. Agnes and S. Collins had not been mailed.
As you can see, Mr. Bird, there is a lack of certain qualities and honesty even with your management personnel.
Re-flections of the words and actions (or lack of) from yourself,
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Boston Edison Company September 25, 1989 Page 5 s
J. Lyash, J. Gia, D. Long, R.
- Deacy, L.
Schrall, D. Tarantino, etc. leaves a lot to be desired.
Since the M.R.'s initiated in 1985 nothing has changed, the problems still exist and you have a set of doors that are unacceptable.
The problems of interlock and latch failure, broken hinge, loose door knobs, door sticking, loss of containment and failure of interlock lights have persisted.
It is my understanding that one of your management team reported to you in April 1989 that these doors are being kept closed by physical force and it poses a safety concern to the security officers assigned.
What changes have been made in the last 5 months to correct this condition and eliminate the " safety concern" to security officers assigned?
Have any injuries occurred s
at this location?
According to C..Marschall, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, the " Breach of Containment" on September 7 was not insignificant and was a " violation of technical specifications" even though the safety significance was small.
The other 4 breaks of secondary containment must also have been violations of tech-nical specifications -- not.a very pleasant thought when one considers the length of time these door problems have existed without a final and complete maintenance resolution.
Will a replacement of these F.D.'s be made for certain during the scheduled outage in October 1989?
Will this action eliminate the need for assigning security officers at this location?
It appears that approxim-ately 25 months and $500,000 plus should be reason enough to complete this action.
The best door manufacturer in the world should be able to supply or manufacture a door to your specific-ations for that amount of money.
Mr. Bird, if this problem has not been a management de-ficiency then it appears that the quality of work and the in-spection department has been very poor.
Do you agree?
According to the NRC PNPS status report, it is indicated that "The licensee has taken corrective action to prevent reoccurrence and to repair the malfunctioning door interlock."
In view of the fact that there was another breach of contain-ment (violation) on 9/7/89 at the same location, can you tell me what corrective action was taken in both instances as referred to by the NRC?
Since the 9/7/89 breach of containment, is it true that the use of security officers has replaced the mechanical inter-lock system?
I refer to the use of human physical force to keep doors closed.
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