ML19353A263
| ML19353A263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1980 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Lewis M AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101070621 | |
| Download: ML19353A263 (1) | |
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Mr. Marvin Lewis e
6504 Bradford Terrace A
m Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149
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Dear Mr. Lewis:
Your letter of October 29, 1980 to Mr. Denton, concerning the leakage of river water into the Indian Point 2 containment, has been referred to me for response.
I have enclosed a copy of an Iuaediate Action Letter, 80-41, dated October 22, 1980, as well as an IE Infonaation Notice No. 80-37, dated October 24,19d0 sent from Boyce H. Grier, Director of Region I in King of Prussia, to Consolidated Edison and Philadelphia Electric Company, respectively.
On November 21, 1980, IE Bulletin No. 80-24, " Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event)",
was sent to the utilities within Region I (including TMI-1) by the Director of Region I.
A copy of the letter with the enclosed bulletin which was sent to Philadelphia Electric dealing with the Limerick Generating Station docket is enclosed. This bulletin states that long term generic actions will be taken to preclude this type of event at other nuclear plants.
Before an operating license is issued for Limerick, the NRC staff will determine that it meets any design or procedural requirements that result froal NRC analysis of the Indian Point 2 incident.
)iincerely, h
v LienFut,ght W I' ih
'AL NrraTr uirector Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Letter dated October 22, 1980 2.
Letter dated October 24, 1980, with Information Notice 3.
Letter dated November 21, 1980, with Bulletin 8101070
ENCLOSURE 1 I.
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. Consolideied Edison Ccepany of
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All!*: Mr. Peter Israhas
.Vice President 4 Irving Place
- sew York, :lew York 10003 Ger.tleinen:
IMs refers to the telephone conversation be* ween Mr.
k'. Ibnti, !*.50aner. *iuclear Power Genr. ration Departoent and I*.r. E. Brunner, Chief, hactor Operations and
!!acica'r Su;;> ort Branch on October 21, 1980. regardi'ng the 6ccumulation of water on the prir.bry containnunt floor of Indian Point ::vcicar Gcuerating Station, Unit 7 on October 17, 1930.
With regbrd to the matters discussed, we understo.d that you will:
(1) Determine the cause of the turbine runbac' which followed the trip of.
nuclear instrument channel li42;
(?) Datertnine the cause of the erratic behavior of nuc1 car instrument ch6nnel li42 and repair as needed all affected nuclear instrur.entation to ensure their operability; (3)
Detennine the cause of the failure of the two containment sump puips and repair or ciodify as needed to provide the design reliability of.
the containa ent sump pump system; (4) Determine the status of the reactor incore instrument cavity sump pump (s) and provide needed repairs to establish operability; (5)
Detennine why the increasing water level in the containment went undetected and provide adzinistrative and hardware modifications to prevent a recurrence of the event; (5)
Determine why the containnent hu'nidity instrumentation failed to respond to the event and provide repairs as necessary; (7)
Determine what equipscot was or potentially was exposed to the collecting liquid, verify through analysis and inspection that no equipnent da :bge has occurred, and clean equip:.ent surfaces to reduce chloride conta.ninetion levels to less than or equal to 1 rive (5) n.icrograms per square inch; lWf
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. (3) Report ti.e results of your detcr. ir.etions both ore 11y ar 3 ir. writing j
, to RC, !tegion ]; and,
.(9) consult with and obtcin the conc 0erer.ce of !;RC, i'.cgion I..before plant' restart.
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i f our.' understar.dinfof your planned act'ons os described chove is not in cccorder.cc
'with the.nctual p16ns and 6ctions being ir.ple.cr.ted, please contact this office l
by telephor.a and.in writir.g within 24 i.ours.
Sir.;erely.
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W. D. &rt.lin; -As sistant,to 'ites1' ent 1*.ir.gineert_ng.
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i J. D. -iilo:%. Esquire. 'Escutive Vice President - Mrr.inistration -
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.d'go aarug#e ENCLOSURE 2 p,
UNITED STATES E Y' c c g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5
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%, D g' KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 194C6 October 24, 1980 Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353 Philadelphia Electric Company ATTN:
Mr. John S. Kemper Vice President Engineering and Research 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-37, " Containment Cooler Leaks and Reactor Cavity Flooding at Indian Point Unit 2," is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, g
a M
coyce H. Grier Director
Enclosures:
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1.
IE Infomation Notice No. 80-37 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Infomation Notices CONTACT:
E. G. Greenman (215-337-5257) l*
1 cc w/encis:
V. S. Boyer, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power l
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8008220249 UNITED STATES IN 80-37 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 October 24, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-37:
CONTAINMENT COOLER LEAKS AND REACTOR CAVITY FLOODING AT INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 Discription of Circumstances:
This Notice contains information regarding multiple service water leaks into containment with resulting damage to reactor instrumentation and potential damage to the reactor pressure vessel.
Upon containment entry on October 17, 1980 at Indian Point Unit 2, to repair a malfunctioning power range nuclear detector, it was discovered that a.significant amount of water was collected (approximately 100,000 gal) on the containment floor, in the containment sumps, and in the cavity under the reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
This collected water probably caused the detector malfunction, and the water in the cavity under the RPV is believed to have been deep enough to wet several feet of the pressure vessel icwer head, causing an unanalyzed thermal stress condition of potential safety significance.
This condition resulted from the following combination of conditions:
(1) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses from an unknown cause and the other due to binding of its controlling float; (2) The two containment sump level indicating lights which would indicate increasing water level over the water level range present in the containment were stuck (on) and may have been for several days, leaving the operator with no operable instrumentation to measure water level in the containment; (3) The moisture level indicators in the containment did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently because they are designed to detect pressurized hot water or steam leaks (i.e., a LOCA), and are not sensitive to the lower airborne moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (4) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also receive Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, etc.
These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows from the Unit 2 sump; (5) There were significant, multiple service water leaks frem the containment fan cooling units directly onto the containment floor.
These coolers have a history of such leakage, which cannot be detected by supply inventory losses since the supply system (service water system) is not a closed system; (6) The two submersible pumps in the cavity under the Reactor Pressure Vessel were ineffective since they pump onto the con-tainment floor for ultimate removal by the (inoperable) containment sump pumps.
There is no water level instrumentatica in the cavity under the RPV, nor was there any indication outside the containment when these pumps are running.
~The licensee has installed redundant sump level annunciated alarms in the control room and has installed an annunciated alarm in the control room to l
indicate if either submersible pump in the reactor cavity activates.
The licensee has also repaired the service water leaks, installed guide bushings t
on the sump pump control floats to prevent their binding, and has repaired the containment sump water level indicators.
i
s IN 80-37 October 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 The licensee plans in the longer term to replace the containment fan unit cooling coils.
It is anticipated that results of a continuing NRC investigation into this incident will result ia issuance of an IE Bulletin and/or an NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or require specific licensee and applicant actions.
In the interim, we recommend that all licensees ascertain that the poteltial does not exist for undetected water accumulation in the containment.
This Information Notice is provided to inform licensees of a possibly significant matter.
No written response to this Information Notice is required.
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a IE Information Notice No. 80-37 October 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued to Notice No.
Issued 80-36 Failure of Steam 10/10/80 All holders of a Generator Support power reactor Bolting OL or CP 80-35 Leaking and Dislodged 10/10/80 All holders of a Iodine-125 Implant Category G or G1 Seeds Medical License 80-34 Boron Dilution of 9/26/80 All holders of a Reactor Coolant During PWR Power Reactor OL Steam Generator Decontamination 80-33 Determination of 9/1S/80 All holders of Teletherapy Timer a teletherapy Accuracy license 80-32 Clarification of 9/12/80 All holders'of Certain Requirements an NRC or Agreement for Exclusive use State License Shipments of Radioactive Materials 80-31 Maloperation of Gould-8/27/80 All holders of Brown Boveri 480V-Type a power reactor K-6005 and K-Don 6005 OL or CP Circuit Breakers 80-30 Potential for Unaccept-8/27/80 All holders of able Interaction a BWR power reactor Between the Control OL or CP Rod Drive Scram Function and Non-essential Control Air at Certain l
BWR Facilities, 80-29 Broken Studs on 8/7/80 All holders of Terry Turbine a power reactor Steam Inlet Flange OL or CP Supplement Notification of 7/29/80 All holders of a
.to 80-06 Significant Events power reactor OL at Operating Power and near term OL Reactor Facilities applicants
,,,, g ENCLOSURE 3
'o UNITED STATES 8 },,,,
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t.g p
REGION I 0,
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KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 November 21, 1980 Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353 Philadelphia Electric Company ATTN:
Mr. John S. Kemper Vice President Engineering and Research 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-24, " Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (October 17, 1980 Indian Point 2 Event)" is forwarded for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Boy e H. Grier Director
Enclosures:
1.
2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins l
CONTACT:
D. L. Caphton (215-337-5266) 1
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4 Philadelphia Electric Company 2
cc w/encis:
V. S. Boyer, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power i
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'D SSINS No.:
6820 j,
2J Accession No.:
8008220270 IEB 80-24 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 November 21, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-24:
PREVENTION OF DAMAGE DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE INSIDE CONTAI (OCTOBER 17, 1980 INDIAN POINT 2 EVENT)
Description of Circumstances:
On October 24, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-37 described an event that occurred at the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP-2) facility.
On October 17, 1980, upon containment entry for repair to a nuclear instrument, it was discovered that several inches of water had accumulated on the containment floor without the operators' knowledge.
This accumulation was later determined to have amounted to over 100,000 gallons which flooded the reactor vessel pit and wetted the lower nine feet of the reactor vessel while the reactor was at operating temperature.
The flooded condition resulted from the following combination of conditions:
(1) There were significant multiple service water leaks from piping and fan coolers onto the containment floor.
This system had a history of leakage; (2) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses and the other due to binding of its float switch; (3) The significance of tso containment sump level indicating lights which indicated that the water level was continuously above the pump-down level was not recognized by the operators; (4) There was no high water level alarm and the range of sump level indicating lights failed to indicate the overflowing sump level; (5) The moisture level indicators for the containment atmosphere did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently due to an error in calibration and/or ranging which made them insensitive to the moisture levels resulting fram relatively small cold water leaks; (6) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the l
containment sump also received water from other sources (Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, etc).
These other water sources masked the effect of cessation of water flows from the Unit 2 sump; (7) The fan cooler condensate wier level measuring instruments were not properly calibrated; (8) There was no water level instrumentation in the reactor vessel pit and the pumps were ineffective l
since they discharge to the containment floor for ultimate removal by the containment sump pumps.
~
This Bulletin is issued to enable the NRC staff to formulate requirements for long term generic corrective actions which will be the subject (s) or future NRC actions.
The bulletin requires short term actions which will preclude IP-2 type events at other plants in the interim before the longer term generic actions l
are accomplished.
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IEB 80-24 November 21, 1980 Page 2 of 3 Actions to be Taken by Licensees:
1.
Provide a summary description of all open* cooling water systems present inside containment.
Your description of the cooling water systems must include:
(a) Mode of operation during routine reactor operation and in response to a LOCA; (b) Source of water and typical chemical content of water; (c) Materials used in piping and coolers; (d) Experience with system leakage; (e) History and type of repairs to coolers and piping systems (i.e., replacement, weld, braze, etc.); (f) Provisions for isolating portions of the system inside containment in the event of leakage including vulner-ability of those isolation provisions to single failure; (g) Provisions for testing isolation valves in accordance with Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 (h) Instrumentation (pressure, dew point, flow, radiation detection, etc.)
and procedures in place to detect leakage; and (i) Provisions to detect radioactive contamination in service water discharge from containment.
2.
For plants with open cooling water systems inside containment take the following actions:
Verify existence or provide redundant means of detecting and promptly a.
alerting control room operators of a significant accumulation of water in containment (including the reactor vessel pit if present).
b.
Verify existence or provide positive means for control room operators to determine flow from containment sump (s) used to collect and remove water from containment.
Verify or establish at least monthly surveillance procedures, with c.
appropriate operating limitations, to assure plant operators have at least two methods of determining water level in each location where water may accumulate.
The surveillance procedures shall assure that at least one method to remove water from each such location is available during power operation.
In the event either the detection or removal systems become inoperable it is recommended that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures be instituted.
- d. Review leakage detection systems and procedures and provide or verify ability to promptly detect water leakage in containment, and to isolate the leaking components or system.
Periodic containment entry to inspect
- An Open system utilizes an indefinite volume, such as a river, so that leakage from the system could not be detected by inventory decrease.
In addition, a direct radioactive pathway might exist to outside co_ntainment in the event of a LOCA simultaneous with a system leak inside containment.
A closed system utilizes a fixed, monitored volume such that leakage from the system could be detected from inventory decrease and a second boundary exists to prevent loss of containment integrity as a result of a system leak inside containment.
~
IEB 80-24 November 21, 1980 Page 3 of 3 for leakage should be considered.
Beginning within 10 days of the date of this bulletin, whenever the e.
reactor is operating and until the measures described in (a) through (d) above are implemented, conduct interim surveillance measures.
The measures shall include where practical (considering containment atmosphere and ALARA considerations) a periodic containment inspection or remote visual surveillance to check for water leakage.
If containment entry is impractical during operation, perform a containment inspection for water leakage at the first plant shutdown for any reason subsequent to receipt of this bulletin.
f.
Establish procedures to notify the NRC of any service water system leaks within containment via a specihl licensee event report (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with written report in 14 days) as a degradation of a containment boundary.
3.
For plants with closed cooling water systems inside containment provide a summary of experiences with cooling water system leakage into containment.
4.
Provide a written report, signed under oath or affirmation, under the provi-sions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, in response to the above items within 45 days of the date of this bulletin.
Include in your report where applicable, your schedule for completing the actions in response to items 2 (a) through (d).
Your response should be sent to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office with a copy forwarded to the Director, NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter please contact the appropriate IE Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
e
IE Bulletin No. 80-24 November 21, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
80-23 Failures of Solenoid 11/14/80 All holders of a Valves Manufactured by power reactor OL Valcor Engineering or CP Corporation 80-22 Automation Industries, 9/12/80 All holders of a Model 200-520-008 Sealed-radiography license Source Connectors 80-21 Valve Yokes Supplied by 11/6/80 All holders of a Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
power reactor OL or CP Revision 1 Boron Loss from 8/29/80 All holders to 79-26 BWR Control Blades of a BWR power reactor OL Revision 1 Failures of Mercury-8/15/80 All holders of a to 80-19 Wetted Matrix Relays in power reactor Reactor Protective OL or CP Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combustion l
Engineering 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse
31/80 All holders of a i
Type W-2 Spring Return to power reactor OL Neutral Control Switches or CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All holders of a Wetted Matrix Relays in power reactor OL Reactor Protective Systems or CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combustion l
Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All holders of a Minimum Flow 'NPu PWR power reactor Centrifugal 'n'egicg Pumps OL or CP Followinc,:.lcor1ary Side High Energy L os E1 sure Supplement 3 Failurt of Cor. trol Rods 8/22/80 All holders of a
,to 80-17 to Insert During a BWR power reactor Scram at a BWR OL or CP