ML19352A750

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IE Insp Repts 50-498/81-09 & 50-499/81-09 on 810325-27.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Corrective Action in Response to Previous Insp Findings & 10CFR50.55e Items
ML19352A750
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 04/16/1981
From: Crossman W, Hubacek W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19352A747 List:
References
50-498-81-09, 50-498-81-9, 50-499-81-09, 50-499-81-9, NUDOCS 8106020011
Download: ML19352A750 (6)


See also: IR 05000498/1981009

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. 50-498/81-09; 50-499/81-09

Docket No. 50-498; 50-499

Category A2

Licensee: Houston Lighting and Power Company

Post Office Box 1700

Houston, Texas

77001

Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2

Inspection at: Houston, Texas

Inspection Conducted: March 25-27, 1981

Inspecto.r: [# . 9 9 V9 d r o d

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W. G. Hubacek, Reactor Inspector, Projects Section No. 3

Date

Approved:

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W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section No. 3

Date

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on March 25-27, 1981 (Recort tio. 50-498/81-09; 50-499/81-09)

Areas Inspected: Announceo inspection of licensee corrective action in response

to previous inspection findings and 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) items.

The inspection

involved twenty inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

  • J. H. Goldberg, Vice President, Engineering and Construction
  • W. N. Phillips, Projects QA Manager

-R. L. Ulroy, Houston QA Manager

. R. A. Romeo, Supervisor, Audits and Technical Services

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  • P. W. Ratter, Lead QA Specialist
  • L. R. Jacobi,-Supervising Engineer, Nuclear Licensing
  • R. M. McDaniel, Senior QA Specialist

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M. E. Powell, Licensing Team Leader

S. S. Rodgers, Engineer

The NRC. inspector also contacted other licensee employees including

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members of the OA and engineering staffs.

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview on March 27, 1981.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinos

(Closed) Deficiency (50-498/79-13-A.0; 50-499/79-13-A.D): Failure to

Maintain Completed Audit Checklist in Audit Files.

The NRC inspector

observed that QAP-58, which contains requirements relative to audit

checklists, has been revised and training in the procedure reovire-

ments has been accomplished on several occasions since this finding

was identified. The most recent training of QA personnel was accom-

plished on January 12 and 15,1981. The checklist for Audit HL-60

has been corrected. Review of checklists for eight other randomly

selected audits indicated that the checklists were complete and

adequately maintained in the audit files.

This matter is closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-498/79-13-3.d; 50-499/79-13-13.d):

Inadequate Response to Findings in Audit BR-26.

The NRC inspector

observed that an amended response regarding the control of the

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Brown & Root (B&R) training manual was considered acceptable by

Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P). The amended response

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was expanded to include review of other 0A controlled manuals.

HL&P

acceptance of the response and follow up to verify implementation of

B&R corrective action were documented in HL&P letter ST-HL-BR-4750,

dated February 28, 1980.

This matter is resolved.

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(Closed)~ Unresolved Item (50-498/79-13-3.k; 50-499/79-13-3.k): Auditor

Certifications. 'Following an unsuccessful effort to locate the missing

auditor certification records for the two terminated' employees, the

licensee reconstructed the records from information obtained from training

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files and audit records. As recurrence control, all auditor certification

records have been microfiched and are maintained in the HL&P Records

Management System vault.

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The NRC inspector was informed that HL&P Procedure OAP-5A was revised

to comply with ANSI N45.2.23-1978 and that auditor qualifications have

been reviewed and updated to ANSI N45.2.23 requirements. The NRC

inspector reviewed randomly selected certification records of twelve

personnel who participated in recent HL&P audits and found them to be

in compliance with Procedure QAP-SA.

This . matter is resolved.

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3.

Review of Reported Construction Deficiencies

The NRC inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions taken relative

to matters reported to the NRC in accordance with the requirenents of

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10 CFR Part 50.55(e). The following items were reviewed:

a.'

Reduced Secondary Cooling Following a Main Feedwater Line Rupture

With an Assumed Failure in the Secondary Blowdown System

Following receipt of a Westinghouse letter, dated February 20, 1980,

which informed HL&P of the potential for reduced secondary cooling

with an assumed failure in the steam generator blowdown system,

HL&P notified the NRC on February 26, 1980, that this matter was

considered to be a potential construction deficiency.

Brown & Root subsequently reviewed this matter and determined that

the postulated event could not prevent an adequate supply of

secondary cooling water from being introduced to the steam generators.

It was also determined that the design of the isolation valve cubicle

prevented interactions between the feedwater lines and secondary blow-

down lines which could cause reduction of secondary cooling to an

unacceptable level. The HL&P Incident Review Committee which met on

March 26,1980, concurred with the B&R evaluation and determined that

this matter was not reportable under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e). The NRC

was notified on March 27, 1980, that the evaluation revealed that

there was no associated safety concern.

Based on review of records and discussions with licensee represen-

tatives, the NRC inspector concurred with the licensee's evaluations

and had no further questions regarding this matter.

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b.

Unqualified Operator for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater

Pumps

Following a meeting of the Incident Review Comittee. HL&P notified

the NRC on April 10, 1980, that the moter operators on the trip and

throttle valves for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps for STP, Units 1

and 2 were not qualified to Class'IE reouirements. This condition

was identified by B&R following the delivery of the Turbine Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps to the STP site.

It was determined that

this condition could affect the proper operation and safety function

of the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Corrective action will be

accomplished by replacement of the unqualified motor operators with

Class IE motor operators prior to plant startup. The defective

valves have been returned to the turbine supplier and are presently

awaiting the availability of qualified replacements. The final

report on this matter was submitted to the NRC on May 7, 1980.

Based on review of records and discussions with licensee represen-

tatives, the NRC inspector concurred with the licensee's evaluation-

of this matter and the proposed replacement of the unqualified

motor operators.

c.

Breakdown in the Ouality Program - Procurement Cycle of Purchased

%terials

On June 13, 1980, HL&P notified the NRC of a breakdown in the quality

program for the procurement cycle of purchased material and equipment.

The breakdown was identified by a Vendor Control Program initiated by

B&R to study the effectiveness of prior vendor coordination and

surveillance activities following failure of the B&R OA Vendor

Surveillance Program to detect inadequate documentation of welder

certification at a Category I steel supplier's facility.

A controlled release procedure was initiated at the STP site on

June 16,1980, to provide quality control verification of required

records for efety-related materials and equipment prior to release

by Quality Engineering to Construction.

Technical Reference Document (TRD) 7A700GP007, " Vendor Control

Program for Safety-Ralated Equipment and Materials," has been issued

and establishes the basis and provides instructions for reviewing

and investigating the adequacy and control of the STP Vendor Program.

The TRD addresses the elements and activities intended to ensure

that procured engineered equipment and services meet quality

comitments contained in STP procurement, quality assurance, and

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licensing documents. One hundred sixty-six purchase orders for

safety-related engineered equipment will be reviewed in accordance

with the TRD. This review is expected to be completed by December 1,

1981.

This matter will be reviewed during future IE inspections.

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d.

Safety Injection System Emergency Sump Piping Design

On October 25, 1979, HL&P notified the NRC of a design deficiency-

in the Safety Injection System (SIS) containment emergency sump

piping design. .It was determined that the one quarter inch seal

weld between the sump liner and the process pipe was not sufficient

to carry the design loads.

If left uncorrected, failure of the weld

joint would create stresses in the associated recirculation isolation

valve that would exceed the design criteria and could adversely affect

the operation of the valve.

This deficiency will be corrected by anchoring the process pipe

to the guard pipe outside the Containment Building and adding an

expansion joint to the process pipe inside the emergency sump.

Recurrence control will involve reverification of designs issued

prior to January 1979, when a revised design. verification procedure

was implemented.

The licensee submitted a final report on June 30, 1980, and provided

additional information on August 22, 1980, in response to a request

by the NRC.

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This matter will remain open pending further review by IE durina a

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future inspection.

4.

Review of B&R Corrective Action in Response to HL&P Audit Findings

During review of records of HL&P Audit BR-26 of the B&R QA Department

conducted in June 1979, the NRC inspector observed that a Significant

Discrepancy (3s defined in HL&P procedures) identified during that

audit had not been corrected despite repeated efforts by HL&P OA to

resolve the problem. Correspondence in the-audit file indicated that,

although six separate corrective action responses had been received

from B&R, four of which were acceptable, none of the acceptable

responses were satisfactorily implemented by B&R, On February 23,

1981, this matter was referred by HL&P QA to upper HL&P management

for resolution.

This matter is considered unresolved pending review of the adequacy

of B&R corrective action during future IE inspections.

5.

Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required

in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations,

or deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inr#ection

is discussed in paragraph 4.

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6.

Exit Interview.

v.

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) on March 27, 1981. The NRC inspector sumarized t'.e

purpose and ccope of the inspection aild the findings.

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