ML19351G036
| ML19351G036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/18/1980 |
| From: | Barnes I, Oller R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351G028 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900728 NUDOCS 8102200841 | |
| Download: ML19351G036 (10) | |
Text
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGICN IV Recor No. 99900729/80-01 Program No. 51300 Comcany:
Valcor Engineering Corporation No. 2 Lawrence Road Springfield, New Jersey 07081 Inspection Conducted:
Octocer 14-17, 1980 Inspector:
8w f, _a-f e k
R. E. Olier, Contractor Inscector Date Comconent Section II Vendor Inspection Brancn Approved by:
F-
,,_,e_a I. Sarnes, Cnief Gate ComconentsSection II Vendoe Inspection Branca Summary Inscection on Octocer 14-17, 1980 (99900728/S0-01)
Areas Insoected:
Implementation of 10 CFR Part 21 and other NRC recuirements incluaing assessment of the cause, corrective action and generic considerations relative to tnree (3) Part 21/50.55(e) construction deficiencies reported for McGuire 1 & 2 and other sites by Duke Power Company and Valcor Engineering Corporation.
The inspection involved 22 inspector-nours on site.
I Results:
In the tnree (3) areas inspected, no noncomoliance items or deviations were 1centified.
Valcon's Part 21 reports met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 recorting requirements.
The resolution is not comolete for the deficiency, i.e. latent coil material breakdown, identified in Valcon's 10 CFR Part 21 Recorts cated 9-26-80 and 10-17-80.
This item remains open pending a subsequent NRC inscec-tion of failed coil IE material qualification and completion of corrective action l
by Valcor involving new replacement coil design, manufacture, cualification testing, j
and a final recorting by Valcor to tne NRC.
s l o s 200P// i
2 DETAIL 5 3ECTION A.
Persons Contacted
- G. Borgo, Director - QA N. Borason, Assistant Chief Project Engineer
- M. Kreitenman, President
- A. La Mastra, Chief Project Engineer
- P. Schkeeper, Plant Manager "J. Shieh, QA Engineer
- Attended the Preinspection and Exit Meetings.
3.
Preinscection Conference A preinspection conference was held on October 14, 1980, with mar.agement personnel denoted in paragraph A.
The NRC inspector cefined the scope of tne inspection as being li=.'ted to:
Valcor Engineering's 10 CFR Part 21 Report dated 6-27-80 concerning control air solenoid valves wnien failed to coerate on diesel generators; the 50.55(e) construction deficiency reported by Duke Power on 8-7-80 for Valcor concerning coil failures in solenoid valves due to poor workmanship, and Valur's 10 CFR Part 21 Reports dated 9-26-30 and 10-17-80 concerning a latent material deficency in the solenoid coil wire insulation for valves at various locations.
C.
Recorted 10 CFR Part 21/50.55(e) Deficiency Concerning Malfunction of Diesel Generator Control Air solenoic valves on McGuire Units 1 and 2 1.
Introduction This problem was reported by telephone to the NRC on 5-27-80 by Duke Power Company (Duke) and by Valcor Engineering Corporation (Valcor) in a TWX Part 21 Report sent on 6-27-80 and a written Part 21 Report dated 7-3-80.
The problem was that solenoid valves No. V52600-554-1, installed in the diesel generator control air system, failed to reenergi:e curing an attempted immeaiate restart of the diesel generators after the solenoids nad been in a long sustained continuous period of operation in the energi:ed mode.
Valcor, indicated these valves ere not designed for this service condition.
There were eignt (8) valves involved on the diesel gen-erators.
In aadition, Valcor advised Duke that there were 30 other valves which were suspect because they were designed to the same gen-eral scecification.
In the Valcor report dated 7-3-30 to the NRC, Valcor identified the specific valves which were shipped to Duke for McGuire Units 1 and 2, to which the potential problem applied.
Valcor's research verified that only the McGuire valves were affected.
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2.
Obiectives The cojectives of this follow up inspection were to ascertain tnat the reporting organization had implemented tne requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and had:
a.
Met the requirements for reporting the deficiency.
c.
Performed an evaluation of the condition, including making an assessment of generic imolications.
c.
Assigned responsibility and imolemented a plan of corractive action.
3.
Method of Accomolisnment The preceding cojectives were accomplished cy:
a.
Discussions with cogni: ant oersonnel regarding tne Valcor 10 CFR Part 21 Reports cated 5-27-80 and 7-3-50.
b.
Review of the abcve Valcor Part 21 Reports to verify the following:
(1) The reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 were met.
(2) The deficiency was properly evaluated by Valcor or their customer, and an assessment of generic implications was made.
(;) Aporopriate corrective action was imolemented in a timely manner.
c.
Review of a copy of the Duke 10 CFR 50.55(e) telephone reoort, dated 5-27-80, to the NRC OIE Region 2 office concerning the sucject valve ialfunction.
d.
Observation of solenoid valve parts and assemoled valves.
e.
Observation of the plant valve manufacturing facilities.
f.
Review of Valcor's 10 CFR Part 21 reporting procedure, " Reporting of Defects and Nancomoliance...
" revised 9-17-50, and the referenced QA Manual Section II "Nonconformities."
g.
Review of Valcor Orawing V52500-554-1, Revision G for the suoject valves.
4 h.
Review of Duke's original purcnase Specification No. CNS-1205.08-00-001, dated 3-21-76, to identify tne design and operating requirements of the subject valves.
i.
Review of Addendum 7, dated 9-3-80, of Duke's specification CNS-1205.08-00-0001 to identify the revised design and operating requirements for the subject valves.
J.
Discussions with the Assistant Project Engineer concerning the design modifications required for the McGuire valves, and the method used to verify that the valve " pull-in" problem was limited to only those valves suoplied for the McGuire Units 1 and 2.
k.
Review of Valcor's Summam/ Sheet of Final Valve Test Reports Pull-in Voltage data used by Valcor in researching all of their power plant valve orders shipped up to 6-20-80, to determine generic considerations of the subject proolem.
1.
Review of a Final Test Report for one of the subject valves.
m.
Review of Valcor Modification Procedures for McGuire valves Model No. V52600-554-1, No. V52600-522-2 and No. V52500-5542-1.
n.
Review of the Valcor records of valve qualification tests to achieve IEEE Standard No. 323 requirements.
c.
Review of Valcor records of valve test acceptance voltage based on LOCA test conditions.
4 Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no noncompliance items or deviations were identified.
b.
Other Findings - Comments (1) Discussions and review of the above documents verified that Valcor's 10 CFR Part 21 Reports dated 6-27-80 and 7-3-80, met the requirements of 10 CFR Pa.-t 21.
(2) The valve malfunction deficiency was verified as being due to misaoplication of design and the problem was properly evaluated.
The assessment of generic considerations included all power plant service valves shipped by Valcor uo to 6-20-80, and estaolished that the susoect valves
- ere limited to those shipped to Duke for McGuire Units 1 and 2.
The generic review of valve test reports was based on the use of a rejection criteria of $8 volts at
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68 F maximum pull-in voltage, derived from LOCA data, and service requirements.
All valves with " pull-in" voltage of 68 volts or greater and continuously energi:ed mcce with immeciate cycling, were consicered suspect.
(3)
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED (4) The original Duke specification was revised on 9-3-80 to require that the suoject valves meet the requirements for being continuously energized and being immediately recycled.
D.
Recorted 10 CFR 50.55(e) Deficiency Concernino Valve Coil Failures Due to Poor norxmansnio in valves For a 5 tone & weoster site 1.
Introduction This problem was reported by telephone to the NRC on 7-7-80 and in writing on 8-7-80 by Duke Power Ccmpany (Duke) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) requirements.
This problem was reported to Duke by Valcor Engineering Company (Valcor), the valve manufacturer, in their QA report " Failure Analysis and Corrective Action, Valve Model V70900-21-3.
In the report Valcor advised Duke that Valcor did not have the infor-mation necessary to make a judgement if the problem would cause a substantial safety hazard to the public, and that Stone & Weoster and Duke should make this judgement and notify the NRC.
The problem was that two (2) valve coils, Model V70900-21-3, had failed at the Stone & Webster Prairie Island site, due to a splice in one coil and a lack of insulation on the coil pigtail in the other case.
A Valcor investigation showed that the deficiencies occurred at the Quality Coil Inc's coil manufacturing plant and was unknown by Valcor until the coils failed in the field and were reported by Stone & Webster to a Valcor field service engineer, along with the return of the two (2) coils to Valcor.
Valcor determined that four (4) of the suspect coils had been furnished for Prairie Island, and 70 coils to had been furnished for Duke's
[
McGuire Units 1 and 2.
Both lots of these valves coils were recalled by Valccr and replaced with new coils manufactured under an uograded manufacturing and inspection process at Quality Coil Inc.
Two (2) samples of the new coils were assembled into valves and cyclic tested at elevated temperatures in the Valcor Engineering Laboratory from 5-1-60 to 5-12-80.
During that period the new valves performed in accordance with specification.
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6 Although the acove valve coil problems, due to coor workmanship, were resolved, a new latent coil material incompatability proolem developed wnen the coils were in a continuously energi7.ed made at elevated tempera-ture.
This problem is discussed in the following parageach E, and affected the above Model V70900-21-3 valve coils replacements at Prairie Island and McGuire sites, in additior, to valve coils furnished to other customers.
This problem was reported to the NRC by Va!cor.
(See the following paragrapn E).
2.
Obiectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain whether or not Valcor, the equipment manufacturer, had performed an evaluation of the deficiency, provided appropriate corrective action, and made an assessment of generic considerations relative to other nuclear pcwer plant customers.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Discussions with cogni: ant cersonnel.
b.
Observation of the two (2) failed valve coils wnich had been returned to Valcor from Prairie Island.
c.
Review of a copy of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) telephone report, dated 7-7-80, and the final written report, dated S-7-80, from Duke for the subject valve coil problem.
d.
Review of Valcor's field service engineers report dated 3-27-80 to Valcor QA concerning the occurrence of the two valve coil failures in type V70900-21-3 valves at Prairie Island.
e.
Review of Valcor's QA Report " Failure Analysis and Corrective Action, Valve Model V70900-21-3" dated 5-12-30, which was sent to Stone & Webster and Duke.
f.
Review of Valcor's " Quality History" record on Quality Coils Inc.,
the manufacturer of the above coil Model V70900-21-3.
g.
Review of Valcor's final QA report, dated 5-22-80, supolement to above QA report dated 5-12-80, which was sent to Stone & Webster and Duke.
n.
Review of an internal Valcor letter, dated 4-2-30 describing the accountability of 163 suspect Model V70900-21-3 valve coils.
7 1.
Review of Valcor's " Receiving Inscection Summary" and " Stock Cards" used in determining the time period wnen the 163 suspect V70905-21-3 coils were received from Quality Coil Inc.
j.
Review of Valcor's List of Sales Orcers for valves shipped during the period of 1-22-80 to 3-27-80, used in determining that tne suspect coils were shipoed only to Stone & Webster and Duke.
k.
Review of Valcor's replacement coil certification dated 7-7-80 for Prairie Island and certification dated 5-26-80 for McGuire.
1.
Review of Valcor's letter dated 4-18-90 covering their visit to Quality Coil Inc. to discuss the coil proolem, and provide a corrective action plan and new controls for manufacture of new replacement coils.
m.
Review of Valcor's " Material Rejection Report" No. 242H dated 4-7-80, issued to Quality Coil Inc. concerning the subject coils.
3.
Findings a.
Within *his area of the inspection, no deviations were identified.
b.
Other Findings - Comments (1) Discussions and review of the bove documents verified that Valcor had performed an appropriate evaluation of the failed valve coils, initiated a new coil manufacturing corrective action plan, reolaced the suspect valve coils, and made a generic assessment to assure that only the Stone & Weoster Prairie Island and the Duke McGuire Sites had been furnisned with the suspect coils manufactured during the period of 1-22-80 to 3-27-80.
(2) Valcor's approval of Quality Coils Inc. as a vendor on a basis of historical performance will be further reviewed during a subsequent inspection, to determine conformance to Valcor QA program and customer purchase specification requirements.
E.
Recorted 10 CFR Part 21/50.55(e) Deficiency Concerning Valve Coil Failures Due to Latent Coil Material Incompataoility In Coils For McGuire Units 1 anc 2 ana Otner Nuclear Power Plant Customers 1.
Introduction This problem was reported by telephone to the NRC OIE Region 2 on 9-30-80 by Duke Power Company (Duke) and by Valcor Engineering Corporation (Valcor) in TWX Part 21 Reoorts dated 9-26-80 and 10-17-30 to tne NRC OIE Director.
The arablem was that solenoid valve coils furnished to Omaha Puolic Power Comoany, Duke Power Company, and Stone & Weoster/ Northern States Power Company failed by snorting after a period of service at plant operating conditions, i.e., the valves being coerated continuously at elevatea temoeratures.
8 The failures were determined to be due to a latent material imcompatability between the polyimide insulation coating on the coil wires and the polyvinyl butyal varnish used as a self binding agent in winding the coil.
Valcor verified that the condition is applicable to valve coil Model No.
V70900-21-1 and V70900-21-3, which are identical in design and material except for the lead wire, to these furnished to the above customers and others.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain that Valcor had:
a.
Performed an evaluation of the condition which caused the coils in the solenoid valves to fail.
b.
Made an assessment of generic considerations relative to other nuclear power plants to which the defective items may have been furnished, and notified all customers who may have been furnished defective units.
c.
Assigned responsibility and implemented a plan of corrective action.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Discussions with cognizant personnel.
b.
Review of a copy of the 10 CFR 50.55(e) telephone report, dated 9-30-80, by Duke to the NRC, and of the 10 CFR Part 21 Reports dated 9-26-80 and 10-17-80 (draft) by Valcor to the NRC.
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c.
Review of Valcor's " Failure Study of V70905-21-3 Coil", dated 1
10-10-80.
d.
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DELETED.
e.
Review of a copy of the notification form letter, sent by Valcor to all of their customers, who received the suspect coils.
This list included 11 purchase orders from seven (7) customers.
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9 f.
Review of Valcor's " Receiving Tickets" dated 8-12-80, 9-12-80, and 9-24-80, which identified the four (4) failed valve coils, Model V70905-21-3 returned by Stone & Webster / Northern States Power.
g.
Observation of a copy of Duke's " Test Procedure and Test Report",
TR-018, dated 6-19-80, covering evaluation test by Duke on the subject coil.
h.
Review of the Valcor QA Director's memorandum, dated 9-16-80, placing a hold on the subject coils, and on Quality Coil Inc., the manu-facturer of these coils.
i.
Review of Valcor's letter, dated 9-17-80, to Quality Coil Inc.
confirming the hold.
j.
Review of Valcor's " Summary of Tests and Evaluation for V709 series valves - Mill Power contracts for Duke," dated 9-23-80, and a copy of an evaluation report of the failed magnet wire, dated 9-9-80 from Kendall Infrared Laboratory.
k.
Review of Valcor's letter, dated 10-7-80, to Duke advising Duke that the NRC had been notified of the Duke and Omaha Puolic Power failed coils.
1.
Review of an internal Valcor memorandum dated 10-1-80, concerning discussions between OA and the Chief Engineer,- of methods to prevent problems similar to those involving the V70900-21-3 and the V52600-554-1 model solenoid valve coils.
4.
Findings a.
Within this area of the inspection, no items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Other Findings - Comments l
l (1) Discussions and review of tne above documents verified that Valcor's 10 CFR Part 21 Reports dated 9-25-80 and 10-17-80, covering the latent material deficiency, met the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
However, further review of the basis for the IEEE Standard No. 323 material qualification by Valcor of the failed coils is neeoed.
This area will be review-ed during a subsequent inspection at Valcor.
Also since th of the Valcor reports are of an interim type, Valcor's c
'a-tion of corrective action will require additional repor-
'a the NRC.
Consequently this item remains acen.
(2) All of Valcor's customers identified in the 10 CFR Part 21 Report dated 10-17-80 were notified by Valcor by form letter dated 10-14-80.
This letter also requested tne customers to I
10 supply mode of valve operation, duty cycle, and amoient temoerature so Valcor can determine if replacement of coils is necessary.
(3) Valcor is proceeding with a design and material aging tests for replacement coils.
These coils will utilize different materials.
A new manufacturer has been surveyed and accepted by Valcar for manufacture of these coils.
F.
Exit Interview 1.
The inscector met with management personnel denoted in paragraph A at the conclusion of the inspection on October 17, 1980.
2.
The status of Valcor's corrective and preventive actions, and generic considerations with regard to the three (3) separately reported prob-lems were discussed.
3.
Management's questions related to clarification of the above discussions.
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