ML19351D830
| ML19351D830 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/07/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351D827 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8011200089 | |
| Download: ML19351D830 (76) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR KEGULATCy.Y C0Y.r.ISSION
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SRIEFING ON WESTINGHOUSE TU23INI DISC CH ACKING S
6 CLOSED.".EETING 7
8 Nuclea: Requietory Commission Eco= 113C 9
1717 H Street, N.
W.
Washington, D. C.
10 Thursday, August 7, 1980 11 12 The Commissica met, pursuant to notice at gs 13 10.18 a.m.
4+.
14 3EFORE:
15 JOSEPH E. HENDRIE, Commissione:
16 VICTOR GILINSKY, Co=missione:
17 PETEE A BPADFORD, Commissione:
18 19 ALSO PRESENT:
20 L.
BICKWIT S. CHILK 21 E. SHC)2XAKE3 V.
NOONAN 22 E. CASE W.
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2 COMMISSIGhEE HE30?!E:
The next item of business
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(h 3 on this corning 's scenda is a discussion with the staff 4 about turbine disk cracking problens.
5 Apparently a good part of what we vill be 6 discussing vill be prop letary material and we theref ore -
7 find it appropriate to close th e meeting under Exec; ion u 8 of the Sunshine Act.
I need to ask you to join me in a vote 9 to close.
10 Those,in favor?
11 COMMISSIONIR GILINSKY:
Aye.
12 COMMISSIONEE 3RADFORD:
Aye.
wr_
13 COMMISSIONER HENDRII:
Aye.
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14 COMMISSIONI3 GILINSKY:
Who makes the 15 determination thtt the material is p cprietary.
16 COMMISSIONE3 HENDEII:
That fellow down at the end 17 certifies that it is legitimate to close the meeting.
He 18 doesn't require that we close, but he says there is a 19 legitimate basis and so on.
20 I heard your discussion with Ed about portions 21 open and portions closed.
'ihy don't you tell us.
But at 22 the soment the meeting has been voted closed.
23 MR. SICKWIT:
A good bit of the ma terial that vill
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iEs 24 be discussed involves information the pro;rietary nature of
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25 which is in dis;ute.
Fovever, there is material where there
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E59 ALDEASCN REPCRTING COMPANY, INC.
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. 77 1 is no dispute as to the proprietary nature.
That material 2 vill be so interspersed throughout any logical presentation
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- f; 3 of this subject matter that we would have to close it on 4 that basis.
COMMISSkONE3EENDRII:
! vas going to ask vi. ether 5
6 you proposed the table by yourself.
7 Vince.
8 52.' CASE:
Vince Noonan, Assistant Director of 9 sombthing for the Division of Engineering in NH3 ---
10 COMMIESIONER HENDEIE:
I can't keep track any more 11 ei th e r.
12 MR. CASE:
---vill letd the presentation.
We vill 13 also have discussion of the prorietary problems CE10.
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14 COMMISSIONER HENDEII:
All right.
15 ER. N00NANs Good mornin g, gentlemen.
16 Back on March inth of this year we made a 17 presentation to the Commission talking about the turbine 18 cracking problem that first came to our attention around the 19 middle of November.
20 Since that time we have been working very 21 diligently to deternine exactly the extent of the probles as 22 it involves all turbine s, both *4estinghouse and General 23 Electric.
We had been involved in so=e proprietary problems
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24 in discussions with both turbine nanufacturers.
25 The reason for having this meeting closed is
_t E53 ALCERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC,
4 1 because of those ;:oprietary proble=s which are in dispute 2 between the staff and the two tufbine nanufacturers and in hh}
3 order to show you all the data that we have and clearly talk 4 about the ; oblem.
We felt that at this point in time it 5 would be best to proceed with the meeting in a closed 6 session since ve are tied basically legally with the turbine 7 manufacturers on this thing.
8 I wish to make one point clear.
That is, as ft:
9 as petting the information to the staff both turbine 10 manufacturers have been most cooperative.
They have given 11 the staff all the information that we requested.
It is just 12 that th a t information is being held in a proprietary nature 13 and they have objected to us making any of this thing in a f..g 14 public disclosure.
"e vill get into this in some detail.
15 (Slide.)
16 I guess what I would like to do is start out with 17 the first slide which just talks about that this is a 18 briefing on turbine disc integrity.
19 I would like to make a point at this time.
Ve are 20 going to be talking about the turbine disc integrity and we 21 are not necessarily being addressed to any missile 22 problems.
Our position at this point in time is that we 23 have developed criteria that we feel that we inspect 5EA 24 turbines and catch any cracking veil before it becomes any 25 type of sissile potential even a t the nor:a1 overs;eed of
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So we are coing te limit our discussica to that 2 particular part of the ; obles. *: an not trying to dj) 3 emphasize tha t we are not lookin; at turbine nissiles, that 4 is being looked at by the staff, but it is a separate effort 5 and I don't vant to necessarily go into that discussion here 6 because we have quite a bit of data te shev you.
It is just 7 on the crackin; problem and wha t we are doing about that 8 part of the p chlen.
9 CCEMISSIONE3 GII NSKY:
3ut the ulti: ate concern 10 and the reason you vere concerned about these cracks is tne 11 turbine missile problem which I believe is controlled if you 12 control the cracks.
13 MR. NCONAN:
I will go into that a little bit gg Eg 14 later.
I do have a slide on that and I will explain explain 15 exactly why we don't want to go int: that in g: eat depth 16 because there are still numbers being genera ted by both 17 turbine manufacturers involving the energies.
They have not 18 yet been confirmed so ve don't have that thing in hand.
19 In the meantine ve are taking a position that we 20 are going to take every step to prevent a turbine =issile 21 from cracking c: even getting to the point where it is close 22 to becoming what they call a critical crack, and you vill i
U see that in our presentation.
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i 24 COMMIESIONER G:1INSKY:
Nov, is this of concern 25 where the turbine is pointed in the right d.i r e ct ion, in r.,
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l other vords away from the third pressure vessel?
2 MR. NCONAN I as going to answer that in the
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557 3 affir:ative.
It is my pe:sonal opinion that it is a concern an, time ve vould have a potential for a mi'ssile flying 4
5 loose, particularly for a high trajectory type missile.
6 While ve make the point that if the turbine is oriented in a 7 proper direction it reduces the safety impact on safety 8 equipment.
You knov, when you have a high trajectory 9 missile, even thou;h the turbine is directed ;:operly, ve 10 have a problem with that particular aspect of it.
That is 11 why ve have taken this, what we vould call, a rather 12 conservative approach to inspect turbines, to find th e ss; 13 cracking so we don't get to that point ever no matter which
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14 vay the turbine is c:lented.
15 M3. CASE:
Eu the orientation decreases the 16 probability.
17 MR. NOONAN:
Yes, very definitely.
18 COMMISSIONI2 EENDEII:
It is one of the elements, 19 and again a sort of defense in depth with regard to missiles.
20 MB. NCCNAN:
That is right.
21 COMMISSICNER HENDRII:
If you get an end-on 22 orientation, the reactor is here and the turbine shaft is 23 this vay, you have to throw one up in the air and have the n --
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24 trajectory lean forward, which indeed it can do becaase 25 those discs are expected to throv missiles in a, you knov,
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1 coming out with some angle of =pread and then up and then cf 2 course all around so you can get one to :coe forward.
But ggy 3 the ;;ohability certainly is ---
4 MR. NOGNAS:
---=uch, such, auch less.
5 COMMISSIONER HINDRIE:
--- reduced over having the 6 plane of totation.of the shaf ts, you knov 7
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Go back to the point where 8 you can disregard it.
9 ME. CASE:
I started to say that is debatable.
10 COMMISSIONE3 EENDEIE4 That is a subject of 11 argument because depending on what you think the probability 12 of cracking is you can do a rather nice piece of trajectory iM.
13 analysis, you know, to decide what th e probability of 14 dropping it on a saf ety-re lated item, and then th e 15 probability of penetration and serious damage.
You know, at 16 various times people have made cases that for the end-on 17 orientation that ;tobability now has dro;;ed to the point 18 where it is fair to say it is a no, never =ind.
19 MR. CASE:
As long as there is so=e inspection of 20 an' integrity of the disc itself.
21 COMMISSIONE3 HINDRIE:
Yes.
But o bviously if you 22 nov come along and say, gee, you know, the discs seem to be 23 cracking at a hundred times the rate that are assumed before,
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25 Furtheroo:e, there are arguments about th ese various phases
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ALDERSCN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 of the calculations.
2 ME. NOONAN:
5ct clea:1y that point is made by the 35E 3 utilities that have this ---
4 C05%!SSIONER GILINSKYr At what ;oint do ther 5 switch to the crientation away f rom the pressure vessel?
MR. NOONAN We have two plants that I an aware of 6
7 right now.
One plant is an old plant, San Cnofre.
San 8 Onofre I has she right crientation.
The only other plant 9 that I as aware of is Sequcyah.
10 CO3MISSIONE2 GILINSKY:
Sequeyah has that.
11 MR. FCONAN:
Sequoyah has the proper c:lentation, 12 cc::ect.
13 COMXISSIONE3 HENDRIE:
The cid one was just ygg mq=-
14 --vell, I don't want to say by accident -- you know, the 15 designe:s had some reason ther vanted to lay it out that 16 var, but ~ doubt very much that it had anything to do with 17 turbine missiles.
It was '73 or '7u before we settled down 18 on urging plants tha t could 19 C0!MISSIONEE GILINSKY:
So it was several years 20 before that nev generation of plants.
21 COMMISSICNER HENDEII:
Well, it was almost late 22 enough so ve hardly got any of what is now apparently the 23 probles projects that, you kncv, vill have a fair prospect
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24 of staying live problems.
i 25 XR. NCONAN:
One thing that I would like to get
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$D I into a little bit bette: is the fact that if the turbine is 2 oriented pro perly with the con tainm en t, say, for unit one,
--(g; 3 ve have found some cases whera :aybe another unit could be 4 sitting alongside of a turbine and while it is oriented 5 properly for unit one it night impact unit two.
That is why
)
6 ve are a little hit leery of the orientation question 7 slightly.
8 Can we go to the next slide, please.
9 (Next slide) 10 This is the last slide that we showed you on our 11 meeting in March.
At that time this particular slide was of 12 the plants that we had been looking at that we knew that we 13 had inspection require =ents to be placed on the utilities.
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14 We showed you this particular slide with the exception of 15 that last column which is now being covered up.
- ie did so 16 at the time because Westinghouse had claimed that that 17 pa:ticular number was a prop:1etary nu:ber and could not be 18 disclosed in open session.
19 ME. CASI:
And that was a Westinghouse nunber at 20 t h'a time.
21 MS. NCONAN:
that was a ~4estinghouse number at the 22 time.
23 COMMISSIONIE G 1 NSXY:
Which number is this now?
2-5 Tr 24 MR. NCONAN:
It is the A over A number.
Critical 25 In other words, as this ratio approaches one it indicates FM ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INO.
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.e are now approaching the ::itical cra ck where you
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2 would expect the turbine disc to come apart.
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@j) 3 COMMISSIONER HINDRIE:
A is at what, 120 Critical 4 percent?
5 MR. NOONAN:
Ev+. ything is at 120 pe: cent.
6 MR. CASE:
At the design overspeed.
7 COMMISSIONE3 HENDRIE:
At the design overspeed, 8 yes.
I 9
COMMISSIONEI 0:1:NSKY:
A that is the Critical 10 proprietary nucher?
l 11 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Yes, because that relates 12 back to the material properties and they way they fo:ced it 13 and in general the proprietary ; ocess of producing the ggg
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14 structural menber that the disc constitutes.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSK!:
That is a ;erformanca 16 number on the material.
17 MR. NGON AN :
It is a number that is based on a 18 number of things.
It is based en stress.
It is based on 19 material properties.
20 COMMISSIGNI2 CILINSKY:
How can that be 21 proprietary?
It is just saying how strong it is.
22
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CASE:
We vill be covering that.
NCONAN:
We vill be cuvering that.
23 c.
iD 24 00MMISSIONIE G:".INSKY:
The yield point cf 25 materials is proprietary?
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MR. CASE For the pa:ticular material they use.
2 COM ISSIONE2 HENDEIE:
It can be.
- [h-3 MR. NGONAN
The pa:ticula: material they use in 4 their design of their turbines is what they claim is 5 pr o p rie t a ry.
You can back engineering into that number.
6 COMMISSIONER HENDEIE:
These turbine discs are 'not 7 just convention ASTM fu6, or something like th a t, forging 8 type "A",
you know.
The material composition and treatment 9 is a proprietary thiap.
10 COMMIE 3IONE3 GILINSKY:
I am not talking about th e 11 mate:ial composition.
I as talking about the perf ormance of 12 the material.
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13 COMMISSIONER HENDEII:
The material properties are 14 part of that proprietary package.
15 MR. NOONAN:
We vill be discussing that in quite 16 some detail.
17 COEMISSIONEE GILINSKY:
I must say I ac ama ed.
I 18 mean, it is one thing to say it is 30 percent this and 12 19 percent this and this is the way you make it.
That I can 20 understand being ;:o prie ta ry.
But to say that the result is 21 then a material which is so strong it can do the following 22 things, I as amazed.that that last list is ;:oprietary.
23 COMMISSIONER HENORII:
Not if what you are making 50:
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24 and sellinc, Vic, is a machine for which this particular set 25 of properties in the material is an important design aspect
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!! you were selling the material you would be hard put to sell it without allowing people to know that the 4
5 fractu:e toughness is so much and, you know, yield is so 6 such.
If you are not selling the saterial properties in a 7 direct way but are using the caterial in a machine which is 8 now you: patented proprietary design 1 chine, why then they 9 reg a rd that saterial property as well ss the composition and 10 method of manuffeture is within the proprietary information s
11 envelope.
I think that is probably under current case law 12 in these kinds of matters.
I think that is a f air s@h 13 proposition, isn't it?
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14 MR. SHOMAKIR.
I will be discussing the 15 proprietary clai=s a little more deeply later in the 16 discussion, but those fall into the category of what we call 17 hard propriatary which the industry and the engineering and i
18 technical staff automatically regards as ; oprietary.
- 4 e 19 vill be discussing the hard ;:oprietary, the derivatives 20 from that and then remote proprietary claims, but no one on 21 the technical staf f and in the prop:letary area is villing 22 to say that your material properties are not proprietary.
23 MR. N00 NAN:
Now, since that time, if we can
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24 proceed a little bit, but since that time when we showed you 25 this last slide ---
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1 COMMISSIGNER G!1INSXY let se just pursue this S
2 for a little hit.
The maxi:c: peftulated crack size, that ijh) 3 is wha t, the cracks that we think are ;:esent there now?
4 XE. NOONAN:
The maximum postulated crack size are 5 crack s that we ---
6 COMMISSIONER GIIINSXY:
Well, a :onservative 7 estimate.
8 XR. NCONAN:
It is our conservative calculation of 9 what we think is there nov.
10 COMMISS!0NER GILINSXY:
Therefore ve are saying 11 th a t the degree to which those a:e a;;: caching the dange:
12 point is something that can't be disclosed to the public.
I
. ~a 13 find tha*. to be a f antastic conclusion.
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14 MR. NCONAN:
We are going to discuss that in quite.
15 a bit of detail hare and tell you what the staff's opinion 16 is of that particular thing.
17
- 53. CASE:
I have got a clai: here becaure they 18 are the one who made the calculation as we vill go into 19 later on.
We have made our own calculations of c:itical 20 crack siza, and sit there while I tell you that Westinghouse 21 claims that that, too, is ;:oprietary even though we 22 calculated it.
23
%R. NCONAN:
I
'll show you that also.
That is 24 wh y ycu are seeing this thing in closed session, but I will 25 get into that discussion.
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1 ME. SECXAEE2:
You might qui =kly add that we are 2 not accepting that last clai=.
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CC5%ISSICNER HENDi!E:
Furthermore, ! bet you they 4 would have a lot of trouble.
5 ER. CASE:
Well, that is a;ain a derivative 6 argument.
7 coggIssIONIR gggnaII:
I was going to say they 8 vould have a lot of trouble getting me under the proprietary 9 infor:ation statutes.
10 ME. CASI:
But their argument is you can back 11 calculate.
12 COEMISSIGNER EINDEIE:
Well, if I didn't use ME5 13 numbers but simply said that my inspection of the results of
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14 staff calculations and of Westinghouse proprietary mat'erial 15 leads me to believe that there may be a safety problem in i
16 terms of cracking of the number so and so disc in the Ccoper i
17 turbine.
18 CCM ISSICNES GIIINSKY:
You are in trouble on 19 that, but I would say that even you said it is within "X"
20 percent 21 COM5ISSIONEE HENDEII:
But in terms of public 22 information my statement is likely to be scre meaningful 23 than saying that, ycu know, the critical crack size is 1.25
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24 inches.
25 EE. CASE:
Just to complete the story so you vill
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3 COMMISSIONER HINDEII:
That is proprietary.
4
- 53. CASE:
That is proprietary.
3; ring ' S1 is 5 okay but March '81 is not.
6 COMMISSICNER HINDEII:
Is it all right if we send 7 out people in plain clothes and they leave their ID's at 8 home and use false names?
How about th at ?
9
- 53. NOONAN:
I don't knov.
10 (laughter.)
11 COMMISSIONER HENDEII:
How about if Vince claims 12 to be a sale'sman for, I don't know, a used car salesman.
@Mh 13 How about that?
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14 MR. SHCMAKEE:
A used turbine salesman.
15 (Laughter.)
16 CO5MISSIONER GIIINSKY:
You want to know about 17 compgny "A"
and company "S."
18 (laughter.)
19 MR. NOONAN Commissioner Gilinsky, at the last 20 meeting you directed the staff to go back and do their own 21 calculations so that we could =ake th es e numbers in an open 22 public session.
We did that.
We vent back and we started Z3 to d o our own calcula tions exclusive of the Westinghouse
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24 calculations.
25 However, in that pericd of time the ap; cach taken
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- c 1 by Westingh0use started to cc:e close to the a;; roach taken 2 by the staff.
The staff numbers'were being generated and QHi 3 Westinghouse felt their approach was too conservative and 4 they started to cc:e close to our numbers.' So at a poin t in 5 time as of today th e Westinghouse ;enerated nurbers and the 6 staff generated ausbers, even though we generated them 7 independently, are very close to each other, so close that 8 Westinghouse is claiming that the staff generated numbers 9 are also proprietary.
10 So what would ha;;en if I had to come to an c;en 11 session today based on this dispute, my original vievgraph 12 there now vocid block out all those columns with the
- gg 13 exception of the name, the :odel number and the total hours 14 to next shutdown.
15 (Next column on slide shown.)
16 The date of the next inspection Westingh ouse has 17 claimed to.be proprietary.
18 C0hM:SSIONER GILINSKY:
Let's see, when you are 19 talking about total hours to the next shutdown, that is 20 bringi".g th e turbine down I assume.
21 X F.. NCONAN:
That is bringing the turbine down, Z1 when the turbine co=es down.
Tha t is the total hours to 23 when the turbine co=es off line.
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Do turbines go f or ten 25 years?
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1 ME. NCONAN:
Ch, : ore than that.
The Yankee Rove 2 turhine vas like 15 years easy.
'I guess one vent 20 years.
ij) 3 MR. CASI:
Well, they expect them to operate the 4 life of the plant with mino: repairs as th e'y to along.
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5 MR. NOONAN:
So that is.the position that we are 6 in right nov.
Now, the staff has taken the position that we 7 do not agree with the proprietary clais on the A over 8 A number.
We have also taken the position that we Cri tical 9 do not 10 COMMISSIGNIR GILINSKI:
Now, these are your 11 numbers or their numbers?
12 MR. yCCNAN:
The vievgraph you see here is one
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14 Westinghouse generated numbers as f ar as the A Critical 15 but there are numbers as to when ve f ; alt the next inspection 16 should occur.
17 We have taken the view that the scheduled dates.
18 are not proprietary.
Whether it is March or so forth, we 19 have a vay of working around tha t to keep the spirit of 20 cooperation between the turbine people and ourselves there 21 so we can keep getting this data.
We have a var of 22 presenting this data in open session and we are prepared to 23 discuss that with you.
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24 COMMISSICNIR HINDEII:
Why is the Zion -- what 25 does the "2"
mean in the model number there?
Is it some
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2 YR. NCONAN:
That is a different model number.
[hk 3 Right.
That is another variation.in the turbine model 4 number.
Model 31 and 281 are somewhat different.
5 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
If I ran just divert you 6 again for a moment.
Is th e fo rm ula for the critical crack 7 sire something that you have to concoct yourself or does 8 this come out of a standard book basically.
9 3R. NCONAN:
It comes out of a standard book 10 basically.
Warren vill talk to that.
11 MR. HAZElTON:
Well, it is No.
5.
It is not 12 Westinghouse proprietary.
That is standard f raction 59..
13 mathematics.
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14 COMMISSIONI3 GILINSKY:
So it is a matter of' 15 putting in the sigmas and ---
16 MR. N0ONAN:
That is right.
17 MR. EAZIlTON:
That is correct.
We get the sigmas 18 from Westin;h ouse.
19 COMMISSIONER GIIISSKY:
No wonder you agree.
20 (Laughter.)
21 (Next slide.)
22 ME. N00 FAN:
In the meetin; that was held by i
23 Westinghouse with their utilities, and this is a recap, ve l
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24 presented it earlier, Westinghouse infor:ed their utilities l
25 on October 3Cth that they had these three new topics to talk i
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1 about.
I really von't dwell en this subject because it has 2 been presented bef:re, but they talk about probability of a
[jh 3 missile, =issile energies and th e probability of disc 4 gallure, 5
Can I have th e next slide, please.
6 (Next slide.)
7 We talked about the consequences of disc failure.
8 We had talked about this previously.
We are talking abcut 9 the steam release from the turbine casing and the turbine 10 sissiles as being the two majcr consequences of turbine 11 failures.
12 Go to the next slide, please.
Ex.
13 (Next slide.)
- l!E 14 Now, at this point, before we ;et into this slide 15 since this vill be presented by br. Harelton, I vculd like 16 to point out that on July of this year we took and we 17 presented to the Commissioners an information repcrt on the 18 turbine disc problem.
We have talked about things that have 19 occurred since the first briefing and we talked about cur 20 impasse with Westin; house in reaching a proprietary 21 agraecent on various types of numbers.
Z1 How, ~4arren vill go through these numbers and talk Z3 to you in detail ;iving you current ins;ection statuses and
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2 24 our interia criteria on how ve plan to handle the turbine
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25 disc integrity probles.
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1 C05%!Se'ONER G*lINSKY:
Let's see, is this a 04 2 problem that a_ _ _i::s "estinghcuse ?
shh 3
MR. NCONANs No, sir.
Well, the majc problen 4 that affects Westinghouse, Warren vill get 'into what we have 5 found on the General Electric turbines.
6 So I think at this point in time ve vill let 7 Warren go ahead and proceed.
8 (Next slide.)
9
- 52. EAZIlTON:
This table lists the plants with 10 cracked turbines and the ones with no cracks.
If you will 11 no ti ce, there are about twice as many with cracks as were 12 found with no cracks.
In.other words, about two-thirds of EE.
13 the operating Westinghouse turbines were found to have one.
=.-
14 or nore cracked discs in then.
15 We did sone preservice inspections on some'nev 16 turbines, that is after hot functional, they are listed 17 here, and no cracks were found, with the possible exception 18 of one very snall indication that is probably not 19 significant.
It is just noted there.
20 Cn there is says "Not Yet Reported" - Tu rk e y Point 21 u.
We just got a verbal report not confinned yet that 22 significant cracks vere found about one inch deep which we Z3 vould have expected.
Or. 17 24 Just taking a look at the operating plants, in 25 each case every Westinghouse nodel nunber has had instances
.. ;iii-
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2 ALOERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 of cracking and cases where there were no crachs.
'Je have 2 cracks and no cracks on Westinghouse PWRs, CE PW3s and 3CW
==.
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3 ?WRs.
We have got just one case of a %estinghouse turbine on a SWE, that is Cooper, and we did find v'ery significant 4
5 cracks.in that one.
6 COM%ISSIONER GILINSKY:
How do you find the cracks?
7 MR. HAZELTON:.The cracks are found by ultrasonic 8 inspection with a very special technique that has been 9 developed over the past eight years.
10 COMMIS50NER HENDRIE:
A big, complicated 11 operation.
You know, you have got to tak e the turbine apart 12 and you lift all those big secions off the top.
jgg 13 XR. HAIELTON:
If you are interested, I have a 14 slide that shows the general procedure.
15 COEMISSIONER GILIN SKY:
Why don't we do that at 16 the end.
17
- 33. HAZEL;0N:
Very good.
18 Just to reiterate, what we are trying to do is to 19 prevent disc failures, and obviously the only thing we can 20 do is to try to see to it that the turbines are inspected 21 before any cracks grow to critical sire.
That neans first 22 you have to effective inspections.
We ha ve been involved in 23 th e details of the inscection nethods used by both j
E25 24 Westinghouse and GI.
We have had our consultants on the job 25 and we are convinced tha t they are doin; a good job and they 25F ALDERSON RE80RTING COMPANY, INC.
23.
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1 a:a findin; all st tifican: cricks.
Next, of course, you 2 have to determine hov fast the scrst crack could grow.
3 COMMISSIONER GILI:! SKY:
Nev, critical size I 55?
4 assume means a size at which cracks begin t'o grov rapidly?
5 MR. HAZILTON:
That is the fracture mechanics 6 terminology for what size of crack would cause it to fail, 7 and that is called the critical crack size.
. a _4_1 e a n _4.. o.
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8 9
ME. NCONAN:
To come apart.
10 Ma. g;;ELTON:
To burst.
When we talk about crack 11 growth ra te we are taking about a little bitty crack starts 12 and then how fast does _t g:cv in te.as of, for example, hov 13 many inches per month or inches per year does it crow.
How 5.pg
=
14 fast does it q:cv.
15 COMMISSIONER OILINSKY:
Well, it was only when you 16 reached the critical size that it failed rapidly?
17 MR. NOON AN :
That is right.
That is right.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It propagates rapidly at 20 that point?
21
!R. NOONAN:
At that point.
22 M3. HAZELTON:
Well, yes.
Z3 MR. CASI:
We just say it fails.
The turbine just
- =.
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24 fails.
i 25 MR. HAIELTCN:
When we are talking about the crack j
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ALDEASCN RE?CRTING OCMPANY. INO.
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1 growth rate ve are talking about the growth rate of the 2 little stress cc:: sion crack that is growing slowly.
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3 MR. CASE:
3efore it reaches the critical crack 4 size.
5
- 33. uAIILTON:
Then, of course, we have to have 6 some kind of handle on how much margin do ve want.
How s'a,fe 7 do ve vant to be.
8 (Next slide.)
9 The next slide t+11s essentially what our current 10 criteria are.
Ob vio usly we calculate the critical crack 11 si:3 for each disc, and each disc has a different number 12 because it has a different set of material properties and eg; 13 stresses.
=l2 14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKI:
Does this depend on the 15 orientation or anything like tha t?
16 MR. HAIILTON:
No.
17 MR. NOONAN:
No, it does not de pend on orienta tion.
18 COMMISSIONER HENDRII:
That is, they haven't built 19 back into the turbine disc cont:cl attempts any variation 20 which would depend on external f actors like the containment 21 is a long way away or the turbine is oriented ZZ COMMISSIGNER GILINSKY:
I cean the crientation of 23 the rack on the generating disc, does that affect the
.=:
24 critical sine?
-~
25 MR. MAZELTON:
Yes, it does, but these cracks are ALDERSON REPCRTING COMPANY, INC.
25
.=.
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1 all oriented the worst way so there is no problem there.
2 (lauchter.)
__(i) 3 MR. HAZELTON:
What they use f or crack crowth 4 rates is just simply we take a look at the" worst c:acks we 5 have seen, that is th e c ra ck s th a t have grown the fastest 6 and deepest per operating time and we take the vorst case'.
7 %e vill g e t in to th a t a little bit :o re.
8 Our'sain objective is to try to have some margin 8
9 so ve try to see af it that the turbines are inspected 10 before the postulated worst case crack could reach to be 11 half of the critical crack sire.
That is sort of 12 arbitrary.
To pick a number out of a hat seems to be a
. 25:.
13 reasonable number.
_
14 C05hISSIONER GILINSKY:
Does the rate of growth 15 grow with the sire of the crack?
I assume that it would.
16
- 33. HAZELTON:
No.
17 COEXISSIONER GILINSKY:
It doesn't.
18
- 13. HAZELTON:
I can cover that in more detail.
19 There has been a great deal of work done on this.
This type 20 of stress corrosion cracking in turbine disc bores and 21 keyvays a ppears to -- once it starts to crack there is an ZZ incubation time and that can be very, very quick if there is 23 contamination in it.
==.
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24 Ihen it a;;arently very quickly reaches a steady 25 rate-of growth and that is apparently independent of how
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l ALOERSON REPORT'.NG COMPANY, INC.
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This steady rate of growth continues until 2 sometime later where it can go into a kind of uncontrolled (j!
3 situation.
Either it can grow very quickly or it branches 4 significantly and doesn't really increase it depth such.
We 5 talk about that c5 a third stage situation.
6 What we are trying to do, and we think that've 'are 7 doing it, is~to keep the uninspected discs a t least in this 8 steady state growth sit'uation so we have some idea of how' 9 fast the cracks can* grow.
10 We do Aave a little ; oblem in this regard with 11 th e turbine discs that have been inspected and cracks found 12 and the utility has decided they want to operate that 13 cracked dis for some period of ti:e yet until they are gjg
==
14 ready to do a repair.
Because ve have some doubts about our-15 crack growth rate, we asked for an extra margic of a factor 16 of two on time.
17 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
What is the time to go 18 from half critical to critical?
19 MR. HAZELTON:
It depends very greatly on the 20 particular disc and the temperature that it operates at.
I 21 vill have some examples later on.
Il COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You vill talk about time?
23 MR. HAZILION:
Yes, tha t is right.
.M..
24 (Next slide.)
25 XI. HAZELTON:
All righ t, the next vievgraph just
==
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At,OE9SCN REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
i 27' l
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~~
1 shows where we stand with regard to Westinghcuse turbines.
2 Operating turbines have not yet been inspected.
Here what h::g=p 3 ve have done is put down what the inspection date was that 4 the utility has planned and our calculation
- of the ratio of 5 the postulated crack to the critical crack size that we 6 would calculate at that time.
7 There is no particular p chlen.
We may want to 8 take a closer look at Farley I, bu*. we think we are in 9 pretty good shape here compared to, for example, where ve 10 were the last tL:e we talked to you on the turbines when ve 11 had cany of them to be inspected.
Westinghouse was 12 calculating a very high A cver A ratio.
C
- T*
13 ME. NOON AN :
I might point out again th a t these "m=
14 numbers are based on a 100 to 120 percent normal overspeed 15 conditions, che A ove: A number.
Critical 16 (Next slide.)
17 MR. HAZEITON:
This next one shovs'which plants 18 are operating with cracks in one or more turbine discs.
I 19 d 4 *t have to go through the details.
It just shows you 20 basically how we performed the calculations and wha t the 21 important things are.
For exa=ple, in Point Beach we have 22 to calculate for that particular disc.
The critical size is 23 inches.
Then ve determined hov such the crack "W:
24 COEXISSIGNIE GILINSKY:
'4 h a t is limiting crack 25 sire?
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l Al.OER$CN REPORTING COMP ANY. INC.
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28
- 9'.
1 NE. HAZELTCN:
Oh, there are several cracks in a 2 disc or several discs with cracks in the machins, and we are
..::=
q saying this is the one that is the vorst one.
4 MR. NOONAN:
Limiting would be inches.
5 MR. HA!ELTON:
We just showed on the disc table 6 the calcula tions f or the worst crack in Point Beach I and 7 Point Beach I! and Palisades, et cetera.
Each of these may 8 have three or f our discs with one or :::e cracks in the:.
9 We just showed hara f:: illustra tion purposes the vorst 10 case.
That is all.
11 COMMISSIONEE GILINSKY:
I guess I don't understand 12 something.
Does that cc respond to the =axinum postulated ggg 13 crack size on your earlier list ?
.:[.:
14
%R. HAZELTCN:
The A is the thing you Critical 15 calculate on the basis'of the particular material properties 16 of that specific disc.
What size crack would cause it to 17 fail or cause it to come apart.
Okay?
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Right.
19 MR. HAZELTON:
Then whst we are sa ying is we ---
20 COMMISSIONER GILISSKY:
You are saying the biggest 21 crack that you observed right now, say, at Point Seach I is 22.25 inches?
23
- 52. HAIELTCN:
That is cc :ect.
==
=EE 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, how does that 25 cc: respond to the number -- vell, let's take Foint Eeach II, i==
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ALDERSCN AE80RTING CCMPANY, INC.
n 1 which is.12 inches -- what is this nu:ber en your earlier 2 priority list which lists
?
h[j-3 MR. HAZELTON:
Remember that earlier pricrity list 4 was done a long ti e ago and nest of these humbers came f rom 5 Westinghouse.
I don't know exactly what you =ean.
Do you C
6 mean what would be postulated at that time versus what vis 7 actually found?
8
- 53. NGONAN The first slide.
I would like to 9 emphasize en the first slide the numbers have changed since 10 the time we havs been because of the fact of the methods of 11 calculation being used.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So we thought that the En 13 maximum size of a rrack might be and we nov
- g 14 believe it to be.12 inches.
15
- 33. HAzs; TON:
No, it was measured.
16 MR. NOONAN:
It was measured at
.12.
~
17
- 33. HAZILTON:
It has been inspected and this is 18 the biggest one that has been found.
19 C0bMISSIONER GILINSKY :
So where did the come 20 from?
21 MR. HAZELTON:
That was the criginal estimate on ZZ the worst possible case.
23 MR. CASE:
We thought it could be that had.
z :.
1.K'::.
24 CO%MISSIONE3 GILINSKY:
On the basis of what?
25
'5.
CASE:
On the basis of experience with other
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l ALOE 95CN RE80RTING COM8ANY. INC.
1
30 m.
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1 cracks.
2 ME. MAztLTON:
Well, en the crack growth rate that ah.
ggg 3 ve vill get to late: I can show you the curves.
So those vere not measured 5 numbers?
6 Y. E. N005AN:
They were not. -They were calculated 7 and postulated.
8
- 33. EAZELTON:
They were postulated :: assumed or 9 vhatever word you want to use.
10
!?, dGCNAN:
I think I made reference to the fact 11 that Westinghouse was using a very conservative technique.
12 They have since shifted thei: position somewhat and those EEE 13 nuchers nov vould come down.
If we had redone tha t chart
5
14 for you those numbers voeld have been much less than what 15 you see there.
16 COMMISSIONEE GILINSKY:
The reduction comes from 17 measuring crack sizes?
18 ME. NOON AN :
On this chart here the reduction 19 comes from seasured crack sizes.
20
- 33. CASE:
There is a change in calculations, too.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But that doesn 't seem to 22 be very great.
i
!3. CASE:
There is a change in calcultions for U
I 5_.5.. E 24 critical crack size.
25 COMMISSIC.NER GILI6 SKY:
The critical crack size on
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ALOERSON REPORT.NG COMP ANY. INC.
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1 the earlier bases vould be divided by which isn't 2 all that different.
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COEEISSIONER HEND3II:
You get the critical crack 4 site from the basir properties of the mater'ial together with 5 standard fracture rechanics formulas.
So that gives you 6 critical crack sire.
If you haven't been able to measure a 7 disc yet, and you say, gee, I vonder how bad the cracking 8 could be at this point?
You look at the material properties 9 and the stresses and then you go to some e=pirical data on 10 crack crowth rate fo r this kind of =a te rial and 11 circumstance.
If you are trying to be conservative you take 12 sort of the upper bounds.
So it is a different system than 13 the calculations.
s.=h.
14 COEMISSICNER GILINSKY:
No, I understand tha't, but 15 the big difference seems to have come in the crack site 16 rather than in the critical ---
17 ER. HAZELTON:
Well, in this particular case, yes.
18 COEMISSIONER HENDEIE:
Presumably you do the 19 fracture mechanics formulas before and you de the saterial 20 properties reasonably well.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, they have changed 22 the formulas apparently a little bit.
23 MR. HAZElTON:
It is a little more complex than
- -=
N5.5
~
24 that because in some cases ---
25 COMMISSIONER.HENDEIE:
You are strended at the h?+
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ALOERSCN REPORTING CD:.1PANY, INC.
32 2.,5_%.
I moment.
Don ' t explain.
2 (Lacchter.)
kh 3
E. HAZIlTON:
I just want to point out that in 4 some of these cases they found ti;;er crach's in the disc.but 5 they repaired them.
They are not nov operatin; with those 6 big cracks in them.
7 C035ISSIONE3 GIIINSKY I see.
Ec the earlier 8 estimates veren't all that far off.
9
. 3.
v..i. v. e_ _ e. v h
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w 10 C0!ISSIONER GIIINSKY:
I as glad you hung in there.
11 (laughter.)
12 ga. HAZELTON.
Okay, where are ve.
13 C0%3ISSIONER HENDFII:
There is always a question
- =-
14 of whether the next piece of information vill inprove 'the 15 your underttanding or begin to degrade it.
16
- 53. HAZELTON:
Eight.
I just vant to ;o through 17 this again very quickly.
18 First. we take Point Beach I.
The biggest crack 19 it has in there now th a t is concern is a quarter of an 20 inch.
For that particular disc the critical crack size is 21 inches.
We let it go to half the critical crack size 22 and we add.06 because cf possible error in neasuring the 23 crack.
So ve say the allovable ;:ovth is in ch es.
.
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24 Then to find out how long that is going to tak e we 25 need to know the hub temperature, which is Westinghouse 55I-
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i ALOERSCN REPORTING COMPANY. INC, l
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=-
U 1 3:oprietary.
%? need to knov the s::ength level of the 2 disc, which is Westinghouse ;:o p rie ta ry.
Then we can
=.
?5F 3 determine our rate in inches per conth.
That is inches 4 instead of "11".
That comes fro: ou: crack' growth rate 5 curves which is similar to but not necessarily the same as 6 Westinghouse.
So ve calculate hov long it vould take for it 7 to get to grow this inches in that 64 conths, and we 8 say, okay, you can go half of that, 32 months, before you 9 inspect.
10 Th e rest of these are similar.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So there are really two
~12 factors of two ?
13 vR. HAZELTCN:
That is right.
Yes.
In this
. =.. _. = _ _.
..=
14 particular case because ve have ne direct data on hov' fast 15 an existing crack vill grow.
We have to reason to think 16 that it is going to grow at about the fastest rate that we have,seen in our inspections, but we are not sure of that so 17 18 ve vant an extra factor of two.
+
19 COMMISSIONIE GIIINSKY:
What ha;; ens to some of 20 ~ th e high flyers on the earlier chart?
21
- 33. HAZIL;CN:
Well, we vill get to that a little 22 later.
We vill.
23 CCMMISSIONEP HINDEII:
Speedie along th en.
ss 24 (Next slide.)
25 XR HAZE 1:0N:
I don't vant to dwell on the 9_3E ALDERSON AE?cRTING COMP ANY, INC.
34 n2=:-
~~
l fracture mechanics except just to show that to calculate th e 2 critical crack size we need certain infor:ation.
The
.==
ige 3 critical crack size says A We need the K and we C:
10 4 need the stress which is sic a.
Those numb'ers are 5 essentially Westinghouse proprietary.
Westinghouse 6 considers thes proprieta ry.
7 We do the K determination for Westinghouse 1C 8 turbines using a cc relation Eolfe-Novak fros U.
S. Steel 9 came up with.
In that case ve need to knov Sigma that Y
10 is the yield strength, the actual yield strength of those 11 specific discs.
We have to know CVN which is the Charpy 12 fracture energy in foot-pounds.
Both of those nu:bers
$5; 13 Westinghouse claims are proprietary to them.
So ae do have
.==
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14 a bit of a ; ohlec.
Although the f racture mechanics 15 formulation and approach is standard and well-known that we 16 plug in Westinghouse says it is proprietary to them.
17 (Next slide.)
18 F. R. HAZI1 TON:
The next one, we might show just a 19 little what happened to some of these vorst ones.
You can 20 look at it.
Here I want to point out that the calculation 21 f or the critical cra ck depth depends somewhat on what shape 22 of crack you are assuming.
23 Westinghouse originally asumed that if they had a l
.+2k 24 crack one inch deep 1: vould extend for ten inches actually 25 along the bore of the disc.
That was very conservative.
==.
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/MMOPf@N Pi?@RTIN@ (@MPANY, IN@.
35
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ggie 1 When ve found out what the shapes of the actual cracks were, 2 ve started to use a four to one ratio because, as a catter E+;
mg.-
3 of fact, most of the cracks had about a two to one ratio.
4 So we thought a f our to one ratio would giv'e us a better 5 feeling for what a reasonable critical crack size vould.be.
6
- COMMISSION ER GIIIS SKY :
I a: sorry.
I missed your 7 definition of that ratio.
8 MR. EAZELTON:
The ratio has to do with the ratio 9 of how long the crack is.
10 COMMISSIONEE HIND 3II:
The length to depth ratio 11 of the crack.
12 MR. HAZELTCN:
The length to depth ratio.
We vill
+r 13 put it this wa y.'
We found that most of the cracks really
+
14 are less than twice as long as they are deep.
So a two to 15 one ratio is kind of reasonable for the cracks that have 16 actually been seen.
We used four to one for our 17 calcq1ations for some conservatis=, although I just want to 18 point out that some of the early calculations that you have 19 seen vere done by Westinghouse using a ten to one.
20 For example, in the case of Cooper it actually had 21 a crack about three inches deep which was essentially what 22 ve had postulated on the vorst case basis.
Westinghouse 23 originally calculated that the critical crack sire, the
_. =
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=55 1
24 critical crack depth for overspeed would be We 25 calculated that it would be about sh r_-
ALDERSCN RE?CRTING CCMP ANY. INC.
36
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1 four to one ratio.
2
- t turns out that it vks three inches deep and the
==
' f; 3 actual shape of the crack was about t wo to one.
So you can f
4 see, if you do the fracture sechanics caleclation for the 5 size cracks that they actually found, it is in the 6 right-hand colusn there if you want to coopare, that the 7 crack they found was about three inches deep and they found 8 about six of them, but several vera about three inches deep.
9 The critical crack size that we calculate for a 10 normal cperation vould be inches, just slightly more.
11 MR. CASI:
That is where the two to one ratio is.
12
- 53. HAZILTON:
That is the two to one ratio for gh; 13 the actual cracks that we are seeing, but at overspeed there
.
14 was only about inches.
15 COMh SSIONER GIl!NSKY:
When do you get into 16 overspeed?
17 MR. HAZELTON:
- .s don?
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
When do you get into 19 overs;eed?
20 MR. NOONAN:
If you have a generator trip you go 21 into overspeed.
22 5R. HAZIlTCN:
So if they had had a case of a 23 generator trip and vent to overspeed, it is very likely that
==
24 one of those two discs could have come apart.
25 COMMISSIGNER G!LINSKY:
It is not running thou;h?
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ALCERSON REPORTING CCMPANY. INC.
37
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1 Mn. NOONAN:
It has just been cc rected, in fact.
2
- 37. gAII; TON:
That is'right.
It has been
.=.
t{g 3 repaired.
4 COMMIISIONI2 GILINSXY:
Let me take ycu to one.cf 5 these c:hers.
You have got on Zion I a 1.3 inch crack.
6 MR. HAZELT0N:
They found one.
It is no longer 7 there.
8 COM5ISSIONER GILINSXY:
It has been corrected?
9
- v. u....2. n. 2.. r. y
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10 COMMISSIONEE GILINSKY:
That is why the other 11 chart has ---
12 E. HAZELTON:
The other chart shows you all
- s:.
13 th e ---
.p; 14 COMMISSIONIE GILINSXY:
Where ve are now.
15 ER. HAZILTON:
Where ve are now after repair, 16 et cetera.
17 ER. NOCNAN:
A lot of of these cracks you see, 18 particularly the big ones, have now been taken out.
There 19 is no plant operating vi h large cracks.
20 MR. HAZELTCN:
15at other table is a complete 21 listing.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSXY:
It might help if you label 23 th es e.
...=Z.*
24 MR. SCONAN:
%*e can correct that for you.
25 MR. EAZELTON:
"e just wanted to show hov it cane
. :.~:..
ALDEFSON REPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
38-r=a 1 out.
Of course, as you remember, Yankee Rove f ailed about 2 the day af ter the original meetin; that the staff had with fjj 3 you.
It had & bit of a problem.
We don't have a completc 4 re;crt on the evaluation of the f a-11ure, but it looks like 5 the most significant crack that they had, probably the c
6 deepest crack that they had, was about 1.8 inches.
7 We hadn't make any f racture mechanics 8 calculations, nor had Westingh'ouse, because that was a very 9 'early model turbine and it was cade during th e time period 10 that they didn't run =aterial property tests to permit 11 fracture toughness numbers to be generated so they had no 12 basis to do some calculations, although ve were very 13 concerned about it and we had several discussions with the ga
=
14 utility.
15 They had a problem in that to do a proper 16 inspection they would have to destructively remove one of I
l'7 their discs to get to inspect the others and they preferred 18 not to do it at that point in time.
19 I just want to mention th a t the discs that 20 actually failed rould have been inspected directly.
It was 21 a No. 1 disc.
It is just too bad that they didn't at least ZI do that.
Do you(W xhet to show the photographs?
Z3 MR. NOCNAN.
535-i 24 MP. EAZI1 TON:
We vill show you some pictures.
'+
25 C0!MISSIO322 HINDEII:
3efore you get off this
.T :.
= =:
ALDERSON RE?CRTING COMPANY, INO.
I
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2;:
1 slide, what pulls the I? III critical cracks so f ar down?
2 33, gArg; TON:
The Indian ?cints II and III had a EE
-23r 3 kind of unique model.
It was a model e1, but it was 4 designed for 132 percent overspeed.
That 1s a very high 5 overspeed designed f or that !
tess because of limitations e
6 at that time on the instrunentation of the valving to shut 7 it down quickly in case of a trip.
3 So it was a designed for a high overspeed which 9 sean: that it had to be designed for high stresses in the 10 discs.
Therefora the disc ma te rial was very high stress, 11 high strength and in this particular case also fairly lov in 12 toughness.
Sut the fact that the stresses and overspeed 9
M ab.
13 vere very high combined with f airly fracture toughness A
E9 r
14 meant the critical crack size was fairly small.
15 Indian Poin II and III are kind of unique cases.
16 We have no other cases just like that.
17 We have some photographs that we would like to 13 show you of the Yankee Rove failure and some of the actual 19 cracks that you can see on the f racture f aces.
We also have 20 some of the Cooper failure.
21 (Next slide.)
22 This is just an overview cf the Yankee Reve 23 low-pressure turbine after the casing is off and you can one
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24 fairly mangled disc segment there in the center that they
~
25 are trying to jack out of th ere.
That gives you a fairly
.?E:.
E5 ALDERSON MEPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
40
~
1 cood overall view.
2 MR. 500 NAN I understand both discs failed on
$5;l 3 this one, both No. 1 discs, No. 1 on each side, they both 4 failed.
5 (Next slide.)
6 ME. HAIELTON:
That is just a little closer vie'v 7 of the =ituation there.
8 (Next slide.)
9 That shows one of the segments of a failed 10 first-stage diso in the process of being jacked out.
'I t is 11 a little closer view of it.
Both No. 1 discs case apart 12 like segments of a ;ie.
- ie vill show you more of that later.
7l?
13 MR. NOONAN:
You will see at -5e to; of that disc
=
14 there are the blades that have been all viped off.
15 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Is it the higher operating 16 temperature that typically makes the s'o. 1 disc the 17 sensitive one?
18 MR. HAIIlTON:
I sus going to go into that if you 19 vanted to, but the higher operating tenperature, yes, =akes 20 it' sensitive if it is vet.
It also has to be vet.
21 COMISSIONE3 HENDFII:
I was just looking for some 22 basis why t ie No. 1 disc tends to be th'e sensitive one or 23 the No. 2 rather than the last stage.
It has got those
==
~~
24 grea t big vindmill blades en it.
25 ME. HAIELTON:
From the experience that we have dis
- c.-
ALDERSCN RE?CRTING COMPANY. INC.
41 as I had it appears that the hottest disc that c;erstes vet is 2 goin; to be the most serious one.
Q@i 3
COMM!SSIONE3 HENDEII:
So it is No.
1, low 4 pressure stages.
5 P. R. HAZELTON:
In many of the plants the No. 1 6 disc is too dry to crack even th ough it is hotter.
7 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
They are just coming out of 8 rehe a te rs ?
9 7.3. NCONAN:
That is right.
10
- v. :...
2..1 ' ?.? ". 0 N.-
- 5 a *. _* s 11 MR. NOONAN:
And the =oisture separation t xes c
12 place on tha second ggg 13 COMMISSIONIE HENORII:
So No. 2 or No. 3 disc.
- 5:.=
14 P.R. 500 NAN:
On the No. 2 or 3 disc, that is right.,
15 COEMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Onvard.
16 COMMISSIONER 3R ADFORD:
Had there been cracking?
17 Mad you seen signs of crackin; at Rove?
18 HR. HAZELTCN I guess you weren't here when I 19 sentioned that it couldn't be inspected in the no::al way.
20 They would have had to destructively reseve actually the No.
21 2 discs so they could inspect both sides of the No. 1 and 22 No.
3.
These three stages were the ones that we were 23 concerned about.
.=
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24 P.R. CASE:
The answer to your qtestien is it had l
1 25 never been inspectad.
If5
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AL::FASON AE?ORTING COMP ANY..NC.
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1 ME. HAZELTCN:
No, it could not be inspected.
2 M3 CASE:
Had not been.
-;p 3
ME. EAZELTON:
That is right, had not been.
4 COEEISSIONER BRADF0ED:
Are there many other 5 turbines that are like that?
6 MR. NCONAN:
No.
7 MR. HAZELTON:
No.
8
%R. CASE:
There are no others like it.
9 F. E. NOONAN:
That is right.
This one is unique in 10 that aspect.
11 M.R. HAZELTON:
And it is no longer like that.
It 12.has now been very carefully inspected.
sa 13 (Next slide.)
- q 14
.._ : just shows the fracture of ot.
af the discs.
15 We vill see so=e later.
16 (Next slide.)
That just shows some of the 17 associated damage that-occurs when these discs come apart.
18 (Next slide.)
19 This is a selection of slides that were taken by 20 some of our consultants and some of our own people up there 21 at Yankee Rove when they were trying to put the discs back ZZ in the same general shape that they were befere they cracked 23 so they could start to figure out what was going on.
- Es 24 (Next slide.)
25 This shows some shaft damage.
You can see those
= =.
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ALDERSON RE=oRTING CCMPANY. INC.
1
43 4+h 1 little drops of water.
That is just =oisture en the portion 2 of the shaft that once had a disc on it.
+.
EW 3
(Next slide.)
4 One of the discs failed that had bany stress 5 corrcsica cracks in it.
The other one ap;arently had no
+
6 stress cc:::sion cracks and just failed by impact from the 7 firs t one.
We vill that a little bit later.
In that 8 particula: case half of the disc sort of stayed in place and 9 rutted against the shaft and caused a good bit of damage 10 th e r e.
11 (Next slide.)
12 This shows the workmen putting the broken pieces ig_
13 back together again.
I think it gives you a pretty good
==
14 feel fer the size of the ;ieces we are talking abcut.
It 15 shows the several f ractured surf aces.
16 (Next slide.)
17 That is the No. 1 disc that caused the failure put 18 back with the piecas back in thei: original ;ositions.
Each 19 of those pie seg=ents, of course, has the fracture surfaces 20 on where ve vere going to look to see if we can find the 21 reason for the failure.
22 (Next slide.)
In that one you can just start to see something.
3 EM 24 COMMISSIOSI? HENORII:
If you have get seme 25 picture Of the fracture surface le t 's ;e t on with it.
a a 6 ALOERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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44 J t*r E
1 (Next slide.)
2 xy,. HAZILTON.
That shows s keyvay, a typical
.. =.
jjp 3 keyway there.
It did =ct fail in the keyway.
4 (Next slide.)
5 That shovs the bcre of the disc and shows a good 6 bit of cracking.
There were lite: ally thousands of little 7 cracks all along the bore.
8 9
10
'J e w ill 11 talk about that a little later perhaps.
12 (Next slide.)
.sc.
13 There is a good shot of one of the fracture 52 14 faces.
Those little black thunbprints along the right'-hand 15 edge there are the stress cc::csion cracks that vere in a
1 16 there.
That is kind of typical.
Some of them are more 17 requia:.
18 (Next slide.)
19 This is a little darker, but you can also see the 20 ty pical eliptical or se:1-circula r det black cracks that 2h vers there before the dis: came apart.
Z2 (Next slide.)
23 There is another viev.
=
24 (Next slide.)
25 That is another case.
th
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AL:ERSON REPCRTING COMPANY, LNO.
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1 (Next slide.)
2 That is ;:obably the vo::t case.
Here is a p: int
. :=.
@p 3 that you can probably tell better.
4 (A photograph was handed by 1:. Foonan to 5 Commissiona: Rendrie.)
6 MR. HAZELTCN:
See, when I said the cracks are two 7 to one is sort of typical, you can see in this case there 1
8 was one that was actually nuch deepe: than it was long along 9 th e bore.
10 C3MEISSIONER HEN 0?II:
That is one to two or one 11 to two and a half instead of two to one.
12
- 33. HAZIL CN:
Instead of two to one; that is "g
13 correct.
But in this case you realize that the two adjacent 14 cracks there vill probably cause the overall thing to 'act in 15 the fracture mechanics manner something like a two to one.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
'Jhere does all this lead?
17 ER. CASI4 That turbines can crack.
18
- 53. HAZELTON:
Turbines can crack.
19 CCMEISSIONIE 3 RAD?O33:
Is there a requirement for
- 3) inspection?
21 MR. HA2ELTON:
There is now.
22 COMMISSIONER SEADFORD:
There wasn 't befere.this?
23 MR. 500 NAN The only require:ents that was placed
=,.
- EE 24 on the licensees was by tha turbine sanufacture:s.
They 25 recommended fro five to six years that the turbines be ALOERSON REPCRTING COMPANY, INC.
46
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1 inspected.
There was no requirement by the NEC, though, to 2 inspect turbines.
5=
MEF 3
COMMISSIONIZ 3BADF0ED:
" hen did we impose the 4 :equirement?
- 'e imposed the :equirement shortly 5
53 NOONAN:
6 af ter we became aware of the cracking that took place in 7 October when we first found out about the cracking that was 8 taking place.
9 COM5:SSIONER 3RAOFCED:
Las: October.
10 ME. NOONAN:
Then we cent out the 50.5a7 letters 11 telling the utilities to give us inspection results or give 12 us their schedule for inspection.
13 COMMISSIONER SR ADF0ED:
How did Rove respond to gg 14 that?
15
- 53. NGONAN:
By that time Rove had cracked.
16 COMISSIONER ERADFORD:
I see.
That is a response.
17 (Laughter.)
18 COMMISSIONEE ENDEII:
Let's charge along.
19 EE. HAZELTO.v; Let's go back to the vievgraphs 20 now.
Maybe ve can skip some here and just go into it if we 21 vant to.
'4 h y do n ' t you skip directly to No. 11.
22 (Next slide.)
23 All along this time period we have been also
..==
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24 talking with General Electric and the other turbine 25 manufaturers.
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1 ALDERSON REJORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 MR. NOONAN:
Warren, let =e cc::ect something.
I 2 misspoke.
The :0.5c? letters vent cut on February 25th.
!@f 3 Yankee Rove f ailed ! arch 15th.
So they did fail after the
~
4 letters vent out.
5 C055ISSIONER 3RADFORD:
But before they had 6 responded.
7 ME. HAZIlTON:
We had several discussions with 8 them on the phone about whether c: not they should really 3 inspect.
We tried to talk that into it.
They were l
10 convinced because they had just had a inspection at main 11 Yankee and found no cracking that their water chemistry up 12 there was so good they didn't expect to have any cracking.
dpg 13 At that time we didn't have enough inic::ation to
=.:
14 argue with the: too strongly.
15 General Electric turbines have been inspected 16 also, and this just lists what they found.
Now, the only 17 thing that they have found that is questionable is a 18 situation that they call water cutting in the keyvay.
It is 13 just a little bit of water erosion from their somewhat 20 larger keyway that General Electric feels vill be 21 self -lici tin g and vill cause no problec.
We are keeping our 22 minds open on that, but we are pretty much in apreement with their description of what they have seen to date.
23
..n..,...
24 MR. CASE:
Warren, are there other operating GE 25 turbines that have not been inspected?
1
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CE3 ALOERSON RE?CRTING COMPANY. INC.
48 ii2 1
M?.. FAZELTONs Yes.
2 MR. CASE:
How many of these?
- (hI 3
MR. HAZE 100N:
I don't have the ---
4 MR. CASE:
About.
5 MR. HAZEITCN At least 20, somathing lik e th a t.
6 We can have a list if we needed it.
7 So you can properly understand the ;roprietary 8 problem I would just like to cover a few points.
9 (Next slide.)
10 The n+xt slide shows essentially what people are 11 currently thinking in terms of what is the cause for the 12 turbine disc cracking.
We have to remember that we have a 13 two-phase thing.
First, it takes a little while for the 14 crack to start cracking.
That is called initiation or 15 incubation.
Then it g:cus.
You need moisture for both.
16 Now, the initiation time or the incubation is 17 shortened by things like contaminants, caustic acids, some 18 lubricants, 19 high stress and high stress 20 co'ncent:ations, high material strength level and certain I
21 metallurgical treatments that cause a condition that is ZZ called temper embrittlement also shortens the time for a Z3 crack to start crackic.g.
Then of courre the stagnant
, ur:
==
24 conditions.
If you have flowing conditions, say, throu;h a 25 keyvay, apparently it is less problem.
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ALDEASCN RE?ORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 Now, when you cosa to tha rate at which that crack 2 vill grow once it starts to g:cv, it a;;arently is not a.
Qs!
3 affected too uch by some of those things.
It is affected 4 more by the temperature, but the strength a'nd stress levels 5 also appear to be important to us.
c 6
(Next slide.)
7 These are important to keep in sind when we go to 8 the next slide where ve are going to compare so=e aspects of 9 th e 'Jestingbouse and GI designs.
I ju:
vant to say that I 10 didn't want to stite out anything.
This is a very sensitive 11 area, as you can imagine.
It is one of the reasons that we 12 have such a proprietary problem.
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13 COMMISSIONE3 HENDRIE g
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14 15 16 MR. EAZIiTON:
17 18 19 20 21
- 2 23
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14 15 16 CD55!SSIONER GILINSK!s The size of the turbine 17 can't be proprietary.
18 MR. HAIELTON:
No.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Or the parts of it, can 20 they?
21 C0!!!SSIONER HENDRII:
The shape of the parts in 22 it, it is hard to cor.ceal the everall size of the beast.
23 XR. HAIELTON:
That is right.
..T7.7.
- .-'F 24 CCM%ISSIONEZ HENOFII:
You have to ; ovi:le so much 25 turhine haul length to get the rachine in.
Do they put out 8.5?
ALDERSON REPORTING CCMPANY. INC.
O" ~9 m...m..
1 cross-section drawings?
2 M3. HAzg;TCN:
We have some that are not 3 considered proprietary, yes.
Details they try to.r.ee;
==
ggy 4 proprietary.
I think you have to recognize that both 5 Westinghouse and General Electric knov pretty =uch what the 6 other one is doing, but they don't want it to come out in' 7 th e o;en.
8 COMMISSIONER HENDRII:
But they don't officially 9 know what the other one is doing.
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11 General Ile=tric not to be able to know in the open and talk 12 about the Westinghouse design.
So it is kind of a crazy sh 13 little problem there.
a-14 COMMISSIONI2 GILINSKY:
The turbine people seem to.
15 be a very special : owd.
16 53. RAZELTON: 'They are.
17 COMMISSIONE3 MINDRIE:
If you think of them a lot 18 like foreign governnents and state depart =ents then you 19 begin to get the sense of, you know, talking papers and 20 things that are not known and not papers and not discussions.
21 (Next slide.)
22 E3. FAZELTON:
The last one that I have just 23 discusses a little bit about some of the possible fixes for
-5 24 the Westinghouse turbines and it is rather obvious.
Keep 25 th e moisture away and perhaps you should ;1 ate th ese E i.
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ALOERSON RE.*C ATING COMPANY. INC.
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Short-term fixes you can remove and they actually 2 this, remove some of the most vulnerable discs.
They might mm.
JEy 3 modify the keyway design.,
4 Long term, it is going to take a long time for 5 them to redesign the discs and get the=, and so forth and so 6 on, but these are things that they can.do.
That is it.
7 M3. NCONAN:
I think a t snis point in time ve vant 8 to g e t into the proprietary part here to be given by Mr.
9 Shomaker.
Before ve get to it, I voulf like to reiterate a 10 couple of pointe.
11 In my opening remarks ! said the turbine 12 manufacturers have been cooperative to the staff in giving Th.
13 the information we require.
They have a problem with us
==-
14 making any of this public.
However, the staff has made a 15 determination of what we feel it is necessary to disclose in 16 a public manner.
Obviously we disclosed the name of the 17 plant.
We can disclose when we feel the plant should be 18 inspected.
We can do that in a number of ways.
We can do 19 it by actual date or ve could do it by refueling, refueling 20 outages.
We could go by refueling outages if the actual 21 date became that much of a problem.
22 We definitely feel that the ratio is critical, the 23 numer that the staff generated.
It might be close to the nE:
24 Westinghouse number, but clearly it is a staff generated 25 number and it is necessary.
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ALOERSCN REPORTING CCMPANY, INC.
64 MEh
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1 COMMISSIGNIE GILINSKY Isn't there an inspection 2 repo:t that goes into the public' document roo:?
'.gf 3
MR. NOCNAN:
On inspection results, yes, there is.
4 C05%ISSIONER HIN0?II:
Less ;ro; ietary :sterial.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
"J e ll, but the fact of the 6 inspection and the date of the inspection is a :atter of 7 public record.
8 ER. NCONAN:
It is somewhat a tenuous claim, but, 9 as we said, we can work vich the date.
Very cles:17 ve 10 think date is not proprietary.
However, we could work 11 around that if ve had to.
12 CO HISSIONER GILINSKY:
It is elenentary 4
13 a rit hm e tic.
14
- 53. NCONAN:
I would like to introduce Id Shocaker 15 here who is the reptasentative from Il0 who had been 15 involved with all the legal discussions on proprietary.
17 ER. SHOMAKIR:
'Je seem to be running slightly late 18 on our planned presentation so I will abbreviate what I had 19 planned to say and see if tha t vill apply.
Otherwise, I 20 vill pull it back and I will do whatever you want.
21 CCMEISSIONER HINDRII:
Good.
Try the short ZZ version.
23
- 53. SHOMAKIR:
Try th e short, okay.
.=.
E-n 24 The technical people have explained now in some 25 detail vhat we rean by "A"
the po stulated cra ck d e;,th, and 35...b.
ALOERSON REPCRTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 What what we saan by A and hov ve have at:ived at Critical 2 those figuras.
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Through different submittels from Westinghouse, 4 beginning with the submittal on Dece:ber 27th, 1979, and the 5 submittals in response to our 50.Sc? letters of February 6 25th, 1980, the staff has amassed a lot of data fro 7 Westinghousa, their own postulated calculations plus data 8 from actual inspections of plants.
9 The staff has taken certain values offered by 10 Westinghouse as what we term h&tc. hard proprietary.
That 11 would be the stress, the tempera tures, the materal 12 properties and the critical crack size, as was discussed by J # _-
13 Warren.
14 For those items briefly ve are villing te ac' cept
^
15 the proprietary claim of Westinghouse and they shall be 16 informed of that.
17 The variable that causes us the greatest 18 C0!EISSIGNEP GILINSKY:
let =e go back over that 19 one.
When you say stress temperatures, those are the stress 20 temperatures when it is operatin, right?
21 MP.. CASES Yes.
ZZ hE. SEC%AKEE:
Those are the values plugped into 23 the formulas that you saw earlie: in the presentatica.
In
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24 some of the formulas there woulf he seven variables to the i
1 25 final conclusion, two c three of the= provided by i,=_
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ALDERSON REPORDNG COMPANY. INC.
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- ~ nt 1 Westinghouse and the other a re NEC staff a ssu=;tions 2 provided.
That is why when you do off of the hard L][$
3 prop:letary, off of a stress figu:e and put it into a let's say, you end up with a 4 fo rnula f or a A Critical 5 conposite, part hard ;:oprietary and part staff assu:;tions, 6 and end up with a figure "A"
or a fi;ure A Critical 7
The staff is willing to accept the Westinghouse 8 proprietary clain for that fornula result, the "A"
and the 9 A Where the staff is now drawing the line is Critical 10 ex tr apola tin g f urther in the ;reprietary claim to the value 11 of the :atio A over A That is a staff generated
- itical 12 ratio because ou is different than Westinghouse's v,alue E:.
13 "A".
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14 CCMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
" ell, wait a ninute.
"A" 15 is a neasured quantity.
16 Ms. CASE:
No.
17 XR. NCONAN:
It is a postulated quantity.
18 ER. SHOMAKER:
" A " is th e po s tula t ed ---
19 MR. NCON AN s It can be in those plants when 20 inspected.
You know "A" then that that is what it is at the 21 tine of inspection.
22 COMMISSIONEZ GIIINSKY:
When it is a neasured 23 quantity it can't be ; oprietary.
==
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- F 24 MR. NOONAN:
No.
That is cc::ect.
25 MR. SHOMAKIEt
" hen it is the calculated I
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ALDERSCN RE*CRTING COMP ANY. INC.
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57
. -z52 1 quantity 2
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NCCNAN:
It is whe5e you posulate to the next
[7 3 ins;ection interval.
We postulate "A"
at the next 4 inspection -interval.
5 COH!ISSIONER GILINSKY:
Where does "A" come from?
s 6
"A" cc=es f rom these curves?
7 MR. HAZELTON:
Crack grewth rate.
The number of 8 hou:s that it q ovs at hov fast a rate.
We didn't get to 9 that.
It is this one.
10 ME. SHOMAKEE:
Do ycc vant tc back up to th a t 1
11 slide first, Warren?
12 COM!ISSONIE GILINSXY:
What is pro; ietary abcut 13 this now?
c __.
.
14 MR. HAZELTON:
The ;:chlen with the crack g 'ovth 15 ra te is that we plot it as a function cf temperature.
16 CCMMISSIONERE GIL!NSX?.
So this is a ;:operty of 17 this material?
18 MR. HAZILTCN:
No, it isn 't.
Well, let's see.
19 The way ve get it I guess is ---
- 20 COM ISSIONER HENDRIE:
It is a property of the 21 several materials and of the designs.
22 COM!!SSIONER GILI.NSKY:
Where do these lines come Z3 from?
_.= =
E3" 24 MR. HAZILTCN:
Let me tell ycu where the ;cints 25 come f:es first.
Lik e the ;cint for Cooper, ve have pot a
=.r.'..
=-
ACERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC,
58 m
"F 1 three-inch deep crack in, what was it, 41,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
2 Therefore it had an average cracp. growth rate of.05 inches 1])
3 per month.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
31;ht.
5 MR. HAZELTON:
Each point there is a m.e a su red 6 crack at a specific tine so you put on a rate.
7 COMM!SSIONER GILINSKY:
Is it the operating B temperature?
9 MR. HAZELTON:
It is the hub temperature.
Ihat is P
10 the teoperature that is ' lotted.
11 COMMISSIONER:
I know, but is that what is 12 proprie ary?
13 MR. HAZELTON:
Yes.
sa
===-
14 COMMISSIONE3 GILINSKY:
That is the proprietary 15 gg. HAZEL CN That is cc: rect.
So Westinghouse 16 is concerned that if we give out a crack growth rate for 17 Cooper and give this crack ;rowth rate curve anybody can 18 find out at what temperature the hub of the Cooper disc runs 19 at a nd 'a'estinghouse considers that their own ; op letary 20 design infornation.
That is the p:chlem.
21 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Sut suppose this kind cf 22 thinking was a; plied to, say, reactc: cores.
There is 23 nothing like that in any other part of a rea ctor, is there,
_==
=
24 where ve go to these lengths?
25 COMMISSIONER HINDEII:
Well, there ce:tainly used
==
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ALCERSCN RE?oRTING CCMPANY, INC,
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I to be with regard to fuel properties, the problems we got 2 into in fuel densification.
There was a time when they q@p 3 didn't want to tell us even in confidence abou those fuel 4 properties and we broke that down, but I th' ink we still 5 accorded proprietary status, didn't ve.
Anybody know?
6 MR. N00NA3s I think we dc.
7 MR. CASE:
I think we do.
Details of fuel design 8 are generally proprietary.
9 COMMISSIONER G!LINSKY:
Well, wait a minute.
I 10 would like to distinguish between the manner in which you 11 prepare the fuel and arrive at the product and th e actual 12 operating temperature of the fuel.
I mean, that-isn,'t 13 proprietary, is it?
gp
. =;p 14 MR. CASE:
Mo, I don't think so.
15 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKYs
- hat is what I would like 16 to do here.
I mean, it is one thing to say ve are going to 17 tell peo ple just how we come u; with this thing and how ve 18 mix all these metals together and how we heat them up and 19 cool them down.
20 COMMISSIONER HENDEII:
You have got a little bit 21 different situa tion between turbines and rea ctors.
You knov 22 a lot about reactors and how calculate, you know, fuel 23 temperatures and all that stuff and how they can operate and
==
24 so on, because there was an enormour a=ount of governsent 25 supported work which is public domain work.
. #5
=
At.csason ns?canno coupANY, me.
60 drE' 1
You go ove in the turbine business and ycu don't 2 find any publicly su;;orted work.
You find people who vill 3 sell you a nachine, in effect a black tox, and they say ou:
5.hk 4 machine, our black box, you know, you spin the shaft at this 5 end or you pu the steam in here and it spins the shaft and 6 then you can run a generato: and so on.
You sav you van't to 7 know everything about the design of that turbine, and they 8 say, nc, no, you kncv, if you don't want to buy cur black 9
- box, don ' t buy our black box. Eut, you kncv, i; is a seed 10 one, look, we have got then runnin; all over.
If you. :y 11 it, why you just buy the outline.
What vent into the design 12 in the black box is sonething which, se far as I know, is in 13 fact, you kncv, privately dcne to p:cduce a salable black
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14 box.
So th a t part of the back;round is different.
15
- 33. uAggt;ogs 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 C055ISSIGNER GIIISSKY:
!s the custoner bcund by 23 these restrictions on ;:oprietary infornation?
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24 E. MAZILTCN:
- Yes, t
25
?. R. NCCNAN:
Yes.
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CohM!SSIONIE GIII'3 SKY:
He agrees to that when he
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3 buys the turbine?
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COMMISSIONIE HENDRIIs Cypically'they don't tell 5 him all this.
6 ME. N00NANs They don't tell him this 7 in f o rma tion.
8 COMMISSIONIE HENDRII:
You are a utility and you 9 bought that guy's black box.
You listen ;c it one day and 10 it appears to be rattling and you say, wait a minute, I have 11 got to understand wha t is goin; on with this machine.
In 12 they march and they will be glad to look at their black box 13 for you but they don 't invite you in and explain everything.
,jg 14 MR. NOONAN:
Clearly in our early discussions with-15 the licensee they didn't know any of the details about their 16 turbines.
It took the 50.5aF letters bef ore the licensees 17 became aware of their parc=eters and th en they had to sign 18 prop rietary agree.eents with the 'Jestinphouse or General 19 Electric people.
- ' ell, is this a good idea 20 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
a 21 for this infor:ation not to be a vailable?
22 ME. CASE:
I think that is very philosphical 23 because there are reasons fc: proprietary data.
ih WF 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am not talking abou:
25 eliminating it all.
As I say, I was looking for a iis ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
6~9 51 r=
1 distinction between how you make the thin; in the first 2 place and what temperature it runs at or what its ; operties
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are.
4
- 5. CASI:
No. 1 you can say the utilities have 5 this inf orma tion.
So there is no bar there.
The concern 6 would be the general public.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Ec the general public 8 doesn't make t : bines.
9 MR. CASE:
Then I don't understand you
- oint.
10 COMMISSIONE3 GIIINSKY:
- 4 e l l, this is 11 proprietary.
"J1 are no t talking about, you know, security 12 information or something like th a t, we are talking about 13 protecting one sake: of turbines against another maker of 3
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14 turbines so that if he comes up with sone-hing that gives 15 him an advantage i. isn't immediately taken up by his i
16 competitor.
17
%R. CASES Eight.
18 COMEISSIONER GILINSKY:
Nov, you have got to 19 balance that against the value in havinc safety infor=ation 20 re'a dily available.
21 ME. CASE:
That is what I was taling about, the 22 value of having this information readily available.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSK!:
I as sorry.
You may have
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24 been making just the point I wanted to make.
I took it to 25 be the op;csite point.
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I i..m.s AL::ERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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M2 CASI:
Ihe utilities have it anyvsy :2 ve t
2 wouldn't gain f:c: that standpoint.
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The gain vecid be to the general public 5 and how they could use this infornation in assuring 6 themselves of the safety, or lack thereci, cf thei: plants.
i 7 You have to balance that ; sitive agains the negative of 8 hev it af fects the :c:bine manuf acturers in the future and 9 their cooperation with the staff in providing inic::a tion w e 10 need from the safety standpoint.
I think we think we have 11 drawn the ;:oper line.
12 CONEISSIONIE GILINSXY:
Well, I think you have 13 certainly gone in the right direc:1ca.
I haven 't thought
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14 dee;1y abcut the subject, but my inclination is ge further.-
15 MR. SHOMAKER:
If I could continue.
Could I see 16 slide No. u of the ;:evious presentation.
17 (Slide.)
18 ha. NCONAN:
The introduction slide.
19 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
20 21 22 B
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W.
'S At.OEASON REPORT.NG OOM8 ANY. INO.
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2 ME. CASE:
a
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(Laughter.)
4 COMMIES CNER HENDR!I:
Well, guyr go back and 5 forth, you know, turbine engineers that have worked f or 6 Westinghouse go to work for GE s some later point.
E ve n' 7 with the best intention to observe the p:oprieties, why 1
8 there is bound to be a certain amoun: of sort of infor:al 9 and unofficial cross-fertilization of ideas.
10 33, sgogAxz3:
The clai: that is made by the M
11 proprietary owners vould he it would be a useful teol for b
12 verification of their designs.
They probably already kncv.
13 They spend a great deal of soney learning, but it would be a
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That is part of l
15 the proprietary claim that we get.
It is not jus hthe piece 4
16 itself is technically proprietary, but that information 17 coupled with the technical knowledge vould allow a marketing 18 took or a marketing advantage which is competitive.
M 19 There are many parameters in this =#wt we could b
20 sp' nd forever doing JPe.
Suffice it to say that the claims e
21 for a proprietary nature are basically legitimate and we 22 have deter =ined that they are for technically hard 23 proprietary claims.
That is what ve. started with on first
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- F 24 the sub:ittals and then the calculated values "A" and 3 A Critical 1.. _
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1 C05%IESICSE3 0:1:NSKY:
Well, you describe the: as
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! quess ! an unpe:staded that the
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3 properties of a material ought. to be ; c;:letary infor:ation.
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4 X3. SHOMAKEE:
Well, let se put l't this way.
5 COE%ISSIONE3 HENORIE:
If it is patentable under O
6 the laws of the United States.
7 C05 ISSIGNER GIIINSKY:
What you are patenting is 8 a way of makin; something which has a certain ;:operty.
9 M2. SHOMAKEE:
This is different than the patent 10 process.
11 CCEMISSIONIE GILINEXY:
Well, in that case there 12 is no point in bringing that in.
13 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I as just sayin; that the cra
+E 14 laws of the United States permit a pe: son to develop for his 15 own use and with his own resources certain inf orsation.
The 16 law allows him to keep that information to himself as a 17 matter of being o'f value in the commercial ;:ocess.
18 MS. CASE:
That is the test o matter whether it 19 is the ; operty of the material c: how you make the 20 material.
The test, as I understand it, is whether 21 discicsure would have a financial disadvar.tage.
Isn't that 22 cc ect?
The test if the financial ~ aspects of th e thing, of Z3 disclosure.
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24 XE. SH0XAKI3:
- is also written into our 25 regulations that substantial c cpetitive har: is the test
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1 that we use.
Whoever vants us to withhold information f om 2 public disclosure has to prove to our satisfaction that the
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3 public release of this information vill cause substantial T:fp 4 harm to their competitive position.
E In the various items to consider it is not only 6 how they treat the information as pro;:ietary, but has it 7 been held in confidence within the company, do they transfer 8 it to others with the same kind of confidential treatment, 9 what do they ex;end monetarily to produce it and are ther 10 going to receive a tenefit f rom th a t e xpe ndi tu re, literally 11 a return on their RED.
That coupled with whether this axwl 12 disclosure vould be of direct beanfit to a competitor that Jackr g
"[yeht4 Mi Oa4' 13A m the harm is another valid consideration.
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14 CCMMISSIO.9ER C LINSXY.
Well, it seems to me've 15 have got to balance all this in releasing th e inf ormation in 16 ene honefit, say, to public health and safety.
17 MR. SHOMAKER.
That is what we are asked to do 18 under our regulations.
We m ak e th a t balance.
The staff at 19 this meeting is saying that we have considerded the 20 submittal and the affidavits of Westinghouse and are villing i
21 to balance in favor of withholding from public disclosure
&uG 22 the items that go into the material ; operties)t
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23 th e temperatures.
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24 What we aren't villing to extend at this time is 25 to the staff calculated :ntic A over A tecause Critical m.
1
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ALDERSCN RE*CRT:NG COMP ANY, INC.
47 3
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1 th at gets in to cu: inspection schedule and we think that is 2 too remote fro: the material proderties and you can't
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reversa engineer to discover the ite=s that specifically 4 given to us by Westinghouse.
5 Could you go to :y pro;rie*.ary slide, please.
6 (Slide.)
7 ME. SHOMAKER:
It is the last slide.
In capsule 8 form t.kisdemonstrates the ite:s that the staff is willing 1
9 to maintain as Westinghouse ;:c;rietary and I just =entioned 9ectafe/
10 those.
We vill consider the staff c:n.-21 A over A to A
C:
11 be nonproprietsy.
As Vince said earlier, the staff vill 12 maintain the right to use our =a terial in anyway that is 13 sw necessary for us.
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14 Fo r instance, we coul'h give out an inspection date 15 on a plant saying, hey, shut down on May Sth,
'S1.
But've 16 could also say in an SEE shut down at the next refuelin:
17 which is scheduled for May of
'51.
We would accomplish the 18 same thing.
What I as saying is that we have made a 19 statement that the A over A is nonp:cprietsry, how Critical 20 divulge that to the rglic/ n
?.
21 MS. CASE:
That being the case, then doesn't it 22 automatically follow that May 1,
1952, is :ot proprietary?
23 MR. SHOMAKEE.
That is true.
It is just a =atter im "r
24 of discretion as to how do ve want to =ake tha t information 25 public.
Ve can do it with exact dates and there is no b
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ALDERSCN RE?CRTING COMPANY, !NO.
68 2h
~~
1 proble:.
We can do it with parameters within the SIR or wi th letters to the licensees.
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00MMI25!ONER GIIINSKY:
I as sure ve can po on for 4 a long time, but I am not persuaded that anf of this 5 material ought to be ; oprietary.
! mean, there =ay be good 6 reasons for it, but I haven't heard thec.
7 TR. SHOMAKIR:
By our : equations if the Commission 8 vants to deter:ine this informa tion not to be ;:oprietary
]
9 they would have to balance that public interest and other 10 bases outveighs the ;:oprietary concern of the owner.
You 11 have the legal right to do that.
I am sure the general 12 counsel vould be coordinating with you on making that 13 stand.
Then the opposite vould be that Westinghouse has a
- H 14 right legally to protect its claim.
They could go into 15 court and seek an injunction so th a t you would not publicly 16 release the information they claim to be proprietary, and 17 that is their option.
18 COMMISSIONER BEADFORD:
What flows from treating 19 the top three bullets as ; op:letary in terms of difficulty 20 that that causes to the staff?
How such more cumbersome is 21 it to treat that material as ; oprietary for you: purposes 22 than if all of it were in the public do=ain?
23 MR. NOONAN:
The top three bullets we have
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24 basically a; eed we could handle on a ;roprietary basis.
25 That does not cause the staff any ; oblems in doing our u.
ALCERSCN RE?oR7tNG COMPANY. INC.
6Q.:
4EF 1 calculations.
The licensees are aware ef this infernation.
2 We can do our calcula ticas with she infer:ation.
The
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555 3 turbine manufacturers have ;iven us this information.
So 1:
4 l
does not cause us any problem keeping that"p:c; ietary.
5 COMMISSIr*
GILINSKY Do the licensees have this 6 information?
i i
7 MS. NCt "as, sir, th e y d o.
They have it 8 under the same ha
.s we have it in the p:c;;ietary clain.
9 MR. HAZELTON:
They have the infornation for their 10 own machines.
I 11 MR. SCONANs For their own machines.
They don't 12 have it for anybody else's machines.
They have it fo: thei:
13 own machines only.
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!ve 14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, one vould have to 15 look in detail to verify this, but it scens to me that i
16 whenever something is proprietary it restricts the 17 interchange of information, of views and of thinking about 18 the subject.
If we really think it is an important area in 19 terms of safety, then you are paying a penalty in terms of 20 how many people pet to look at this p chlec, how much 21 information they exchange and se on.
So there is a 22 penalty.
It is hard to pin down.
It is an intangible one 23 and it is hard to put a number on it, but there certainly is d%
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24 a penalty.
25 M3. NOONAN:
There is probably somewhat of a d.s
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AL:ERSON MPoRTING COMPANY, INC.
i 70 k=m:.
1 penalty, but to be very hensst about it, the staf f has all 2 the information in its possession.
We can make the gy=
3 determination as to when a plant should shut down and 4 inspect.
- Je can noti:y that plant.
5 COMMISSONZR GIIINSKYa We can't do everything.
6 M3. CASE:
(Inaudible)
We are not cmnipotent a'nd 7 somebody else might (Inadible).
8 COMMISSIONER GIIINSKY:
Ripht.
I mean, you are 9 saying for example that one licensee can't discuss things 10 f reely with another licensee.
I don't know what they do 11 when e.her get together in I?BI and so ca.
We are counting 12 now a great deal on the industry taking initiatives 13 post-Three Mile Island and doing a lot of things that 'they gg.
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14 haven't been doing before.
15 Now, I don't know how that is affected in this 16 area by the proprietary restrictions, but it has got to be 17 affected in some way and in the v eng direction.
All of 18 these things need to be taken into account when we make this 19 kind of a determination.
I recognize that there is 20 something of a commercial disadvantage.
At least on the 21 basis of this brief discussion I am not persuaded that the 22 properties as opposed as to how the material was created and verked and so on are sensitive enough commercially that it 23
==
Er 24 is important to keep that ma terial proprieta ry as opposed to 25 releasing it.
You know, this i= not a judq ent one can
, a':S
+2 ALCERSCN REPORTING COMPANY, lHC.
71 5%:
"E" I essily zake on the basis of a b:lef discussion lik e this, 2 but my inclinations are on the side of making it ijyp 3 nonproprietary.
4 MR. CASE:
" ell, now, vait.
I un'derstand you:
5 view, but I don't know quite how that should affect what we 6 do on this side of the table.
7 C312ISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am sharing with you ny 8 reactions.
9 MR. CASE.
! as taking it into account, although !
10 don't think tha-is binding on ne in any wa y.
11 COMMISSIONER GIII3 SKY:
No, I an just have a 1 *- conversation.
It is a closed meeting and I just want to be 12 frank with you.
ji:13
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14 MR. CASI:
Fine.
We appreciate that.
15 COMMISSIONER RRADFORD:
You are asking : hough for 16 our reaction to the proposed resolution?
17 MR. CASE 4 We are just reporting it.
18
!R. NCONAN I think basically we are reporting to 19 you the probless we have.
We have expended a lot of 20 manpower on this problem and we are reporting our results 21 and primarily ve wanted to tell you about the overall 22 inspection problem, inspection results on the turbines.
23 That was our primary purpose and then to point out to you ME 24 the proprietary problems that we had been having in this 25 particular area.
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=;:5 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC,
72 ma
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YR. CASES We think we are proceedin; in 2 accordance with the regula tions.
.L ijj 3
COEX SS!ONER 3RADFORO:
As to those three items 4 again, is the:e such difference be:veen the' third and the 5 other two as far as what one could derive?
It seems to me 6 if you knew the critical crack size that really wo uldn ' t 7 tell you very nuch.
8 3R. NOONAN.
We have discussed that in detail with 9 Westinghouse.
- 4estinghouse claims that if you know the 10 critical crack size that you can reverse engineer the 11 equations since ther are standard equations.
You can 12 reverse engineer and obtain the other parameters.
That is fii 13 why they ara ms.<ing the prop:letary clai: on the A R#
Critical 14 number.
15 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
let's see, if you knew th e 16 critical crack size, do you think you could reverse engineer 17 and determine the other numbers?
18 3R. NOONAN:
~4 e l l, ve have been working with it 19 for such a lonc time I guess ~ve could.
'Je could co=e up 20 with some pretty c1cse approximations.
21 MR. HAZILTON:
I think what they are concerned 22 about, of course, is there a rc two inputs, the stress and 23 the f racture tought.ess.
- =
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_ ALDERSCN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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CASE:
If you sign s p cgrieta ry agreement.
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ALOER$QN REPCATING COMPANY. INC.
1 74 55 1
COMMISSIONEE HINDEIEs If you sign the proprietary 2 agreement.
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COMMISSIONER BRADFCED:
Yes.
q 4
COMMISSIONER HINDRIE:
Yoc kncv, it wasn't very 5 lonc ago when they just wouldn't tell utilities this kind of 6 infornation.
7 COMMISSIONIE BRADFCEDs I bet they tell the Yankee 8 utilities.
9 MR. NOONAN:
" hen we sent out the 50.50F letters 10 GE was very reluctant to supply that infornation to their 11 utilities even on a proprietary basis.
Finally we talked 12 them into doing that.
13 COMMISSIONE3 HEND2II:
I nust say I think there is gg3
=..=.
14 a certain anount of cunbersoneness in dealing with it this 15 vay but the turbine field has always been one of the black 16 arts, heavy on com=ercial secrets sort of enterprises.
I 17 think in fact staff has verked out a reasonable operating 18 procedure and they have access to whatever there is to have 19 access to.
I think the sort of propositions that have been 20 worked with the holders of proprietary information that have 21 resulted in tha t f ull access are no t un re a so n a bl e, in 2 particular in a stage nov where ve are able to set some 23 inspection schedules which have rather good likelihcod of
.=.=r-24 intercepting any serious cracking so that you have a good 25 crip on possible failures of turbines.
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7O m-1 I would hate to perturb that ; ogress by some My 2 sterner stand and more self-righteous stand as what we vill ggg accept as proprietary or not.
You know, these are 3
=-
a :angements that staff has made in good faith with these 4
5 people and I would be rather reluctant to upset them.
6 COEMISSIONER 33ADF0ED:
Lo we have in fact 7 requests of some sort pending f cm anyone for this material?
8 MR. CASI:
No.
Just frot Westinghouse 9
C035:SSIONER 3EADFORD:
To treat it as proprietary.
10 MR. C A,S E :
Is that correct?
11 XR. SHOEAKER:
That is cc::act.
And from General 12 Electric to treat their submittals as proprietary.
13 COMMISSIONER HENDEII:
Anything further?
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~
14 COMEISSIONE3 BRADFCED:
We haven't asked, I take 15 it, OGC to review that particular question separately, but !
16 as certainly prepared to proceed on this basis for the 17 moment.
18 CO !!SSICNER HENDRIE:
Very good.
I thank you, 19 9verything.
20 (Whereupon, at 12 Noon, the meeting adjourned.)
21 22 23
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24
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25
.=.. = _ _
ALDFA$.% EPORTING CCMP ANY. INC.
69MGlT3D /_TMWA@HINGTON, D.C. 20024_t2021554-2345
e.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.T4ISSION i
This is to cercify chat the attached preceedings before the
..:@j Com-ission Meeting
- m; ir. the matte. cf: CLOSED SESSION - Briefing on Westinghouse Turbine DISC Cracking
- Date of Proceecing:
August 7, 1980 Decket flumber:
.' _ a c a. c.'
P ca.a.d'ng:
Washington, D.
C.
were held as herein appesrs, and that this is the original transcrip:
therecf for the file of the Cet:ission.
Mary C.
Fimens Official Reporter (Typed)
. =:.
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mem 9
Of ficial ?.e perte.- (5ignature) 1 i
e 5.4. 5 s
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