ML19351D155
| ML19351D155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/11/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1747, NUDOCS 8010090103 | |
| Download: ML19351D155 (16) | |
Text
ACAS- / 7W
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MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUS:0M",ITTEE ON JUL 111990
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CLASS 9 ACCIDEt,TS CHICA30, IL MAY 9, 19S0 ith representatives of the NRC Tne ACRS Subcon-ittee on Class 9 Accidents niet w0 to discu Staff, Sandia Laboratory, and LASL on May 9,19S t t s of rulemaking on degraded e
Zion / Indian Point 2 & 3 Class 9 accident program, s a u A notice of the Research Program.
core cooling, and the Class 9 Accident SafetyApril 24, 1930 (Attachment A).
A A list meetino appeared in the Federal Register onis attached (Attachment B).
copy of the detailed presentation scheduleA list of documents provided to the of attendees is attached (Attachment C).
There were no written or oral Subcommittee is attached (Attachment D).The entire meeting was open to mem statements from members of the public.
i n to discuss the Class 9 of the public except for a very short closed sess o i
Accident Research Program buctaet.
MEETIN3 WITH THE fiRC STAFF (OPEri SE5510'Q Subcommittee Chairman's Openina Remarks _
bers of the Subcommittee and Dr. Kerr, Sebcommittee Chairman, introduced the menHe pointed o 1.0 noted the purpose of the meeting.
f the Federal Advisory Committee conducted in accordance with the provisions o that Mr. Gary Quittschreiber was Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act and He stated that no requests for ting.
the Designated Federal Employee for the mee s of the public had been received b
oral statements nor written statements from mem er with regard to the meeting.
Zion / Indian Point 2 & 3 Class 9 Accident Progd Utility program on Zio Mr. Jim Meyer, NRC/NRR, discussed the NRC an for core melt accidents (Attach-2.0 Point 2 & 3 (Z/IP) to develop mitigation featuresThe l risk of severe reactor Features being to averaae plants.
ments 1-6).
accidents at these plants to a level similar ts, core retention devices, considered for Z/IP are filtered-vented containmenMeyer felt h
he felt more emphasis and hydrogen control methods.
is well directed to the specific needs of NRR; however, should be given to the development of real systems.
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. May 9,.1980 Class 9 Accidents J. 01shinski, NRC/NRE, indicated that probabilistic assessnent is an important part of the 2/IP program but that the IREP has been delayed for Z/IP and that decisions will be made with or without IREP.
Highlights fro-May 7-B,1950 Technolocy Exchange Meetina on Zion / Indian
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3.0 Point Meetir.:s Mr. Jim Meyer discussed the general highlights of the May 7-S, 1930 NRC/ Utility 2/IP Technical Exchange Meetings noting the following:
Licensees are concerned that the NRC is not considerino the appropriate o
accident sequences and is not givine credit for specific Z/IP mitigating features.
o Information flon is mainly from the NRC to Licensees.
reactor Licensees feel large amoJnts of water will always be in the o
cavity at the time the core melts through the bottom of the vessel.
Licensees do nct feel NRC is givinc Z/IP credit for steam driven o
i eq.ipment during loss of AC power accident; or for other containment features such as core-sprays, for reducing containment pressure for i
certain accider.t sequences.
It was generally agreed that the WASH-1400 risk from steam explosions, o
It was which represents about 15'4 of the total risk, is too high.
agreed that the WASH-1400 probability of the reactor vessel head becoming a missile (10-1) appears to be an impossibility; therefore, the overall 10-2 probability is probably much too high.
If much less than 10-2, the steam explosion contribution to WASH-1400 risk becomes insignificant compared to total risk.
Steam explosions micht affect coolability of a molten core.
It appears o
that if no steam explosion occurs the debris particles would be large enough to be coolable.
It is the opinion of some that if a steam If explosion occurs, core debris particles may be too small to cool.
There are not coolable, the molten debris would attack the base mat.
differences of opinion as to whether gases generated by base mat decom-position would make the debris more or less coolable.
May 9, 19S0.
n ss 9 Accidents Status and Directicn of-Advanced Notice of Rulemakina for Decra
' 4.0 Cooling i
Mr. M. Medeiros, NRC/OSD, described the' Advance Notice of Rulemaking (AN This rule-considered by the NRC for degraded core cooline (Attachments 7-9).
making procedure was oricinated by the Office of Standards Development in M k
No dates for 1979 and is required by the March 1950 TMI Accident Action Plan the ANE or final rule were given.
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questions which consider core damage in design and review, and which ana yze broad range of accidents inside and outside traditional design basis envelopes.
The ANF will solicit public and industry recornendations on such thines as core catchers, filtered-vented containments, and hydrogen controls.
Need for Class 9 A: cider.t Research Pro;ran 5.0 Dr. Kelber, NR:/RES, discussed the Class 9 Accident Research Program being The program is intended to provide a technical foundation formulated by RES.
Kelber indi-rulemaking activities related to Class 9 accidents.
for the NR cated that this progra-forms the basis for assessing methods for preventing a mitigating Class 9 accidents; which are calculated by RES to represent the He indicated that greatest source of risk to the public (Attachments 10-14).
the potential for risk reduction by r evention and mitigation of Class 9 acci-dents by a factor of about 100, which may be achievable, would reduce Class 9 A Licensee study on Z/IP suggests risk to about that from normal operation.
that readily available features on these plants reduce risk by a factor of 10 Kelber suggested that the NRC role in acci-from that calculated in WASH-1400 dent prevention be restricted to risk reduction related activities and mitiga-tion while the industry should bear the burden of developing solutions for 1
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accident prevention.
I Status of Class 9 Technoloay with Regard to Zion / Indian Point 2 & 3 Study i
j 6.0 Dr. C. Kelber noted that best current estimates of Class 9 technology with regard to Z/IP (Attachments 15-16) are summarized in the following reports which have been distributed to the ACRS:
NUREG/CR-1409, " Summary of the Zion / Indian Point Study" (1)
NUREG/CR-1410. " Report of the Zion / Indian Point Study," Vol. 1 (2)
(Sandia); Vol, 2 (L SL).
Dr. Kelber said that there is not complete agreement on the conclusions re steam explosions but that the Sandia program will yield conclusive data wi
. May 9, 1950 Class 9 Accidents The evaluation of the filtered-vented containment (FVCS) indicates two years.
that it is feasible and Will be effective in reducing consequences by an order of magnitude; however, the FVCS interaction with the rest of the containment is complex and may carry with it some charce of added risk. Kelber mentioned a new progra" on accident management being formulated by RES.
It will go into effect once it is presumed the plant is headed to core melt. The strategy of whether to introduce water to the plant or reactor cavity, thereby possibly causing high pressure and containment rupture, requires further study by the Accident Management Prograr.
7.0 Overvie., of the Integrated Core Melt Pro:ra-M. Silberberg,tRC/RES, discussed the objectives, scope, logic, and planning of the Integrated Fuel Melt Research Program in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
(Attachments 17-19). This program is one of the major components of a broader research program on Class 9 accident research which is currently beina formulated in RES.
The overall objective of the Program is to develop a data 4
base and verified models for assessing the consequences of fuel melt accidents which threaten containment and to evaluate design features for accident conse-quence mitigation. The specific technical objectives of the program are to pro-vide information for answering the followinc questions related to assessino the threats to containnent:
(1) Can a melted core breach the reactor pressure vessel and overload the containment?
(2)
Can a steam explosion breach the containment?
(3) Can a hot core melt through the basemat?
(4) Can the centainment be overloaded by slow pressurization?
(5) Are there special features which can mitigate these threats?
The Program will provide technical bases for rulemakina, for NRC decision options, for regulatory criteria and standards, and for siting and siting reviews related to.
degraded and core melt accidents.
Mr. Silberberg briefly mentioned a task to develop quantitative goals, require-ments, and priorities for the research program subelements.
Preliminary results
C1' ass 9 Accidents May 9, 1980 from SCL for PAS are expected in FY SO with additional development of guidance plar.s to be performed in FY S1 and 82.
8.0 Class 9 Accidents Analyses Work (Code Work)
Dr. C. Kelber discussed the Class 9 accident analysis program. The objectives of the analytical progra are as follows:
o To provide the capability for rigorous analysis of the course and consequences of severe accidents.
o To evaluate the effectiveness of accident consequence mitigators, o To provide a means to integrate and extend the experimental data base in the development of new or revised reactor safety criteria.
The analytical progra: must be prepared to develop accident scenarios, to support the experimental program in experiment design and interpretation, to develop the tools to analyze core melt accidents, and to evaluate the importance of principal phenonenclogical uncertainties.
The IARCH code which evolved from BCL support for WASH-1400 is a systems code that treats the beginning of the primary system transient through the development of the radiologica,1 source term.
It was used in the recent 2/IP study. MARCH uses simple models to derive an approximate sequence of events during meltdown.
It is thought to provide an adequate measure of the consequences for risk assess-ment but the modeling needs for mitigation studies are beyond its capabilities.
Proper evaluation of mitigation systems will require better understanding and modeling of key phenomena as well as better integrated codes to provide a con-sistent treatment throughout the accident.-
Dr. Kelber feels that much o' the work done in the LMFBR research program can be used to provide considerable insight into severe accidents. The Los Alamos staff prepared an analysis of the applicability of LMFBR codes to LWR core disruption. They concluded that LAFM, SIMMER, SAS, and COMMIX all can be modified for LWR analysis without extensive development. They recormend such a course of action as a technically defensible approach.
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- Class 9 Accidents May 9, 1920 Tne BEACON code is designed to handle short term thermal-hydraulic transients in a dry multicompartment containment.
It does not treat the radioactive source or core-concrete interactions. The MARCH-CORRAL does handle fission pro' duct transport and core-concrete interactions but the models are simple and not suitable for detailed analysis of mitigation alternatives. The CONTAIN code is a modular code, originally developed in the LMFBR program,that appears to have desirable features for LWR containment analysis.
It treats core-concrefe interactions, aerosol oehavior and fission product distribution, inter-compartmental flows, and debr.s bed heat transfer.
Dr. Kelber believes that analysis development is an integral part of any viable program and he intends to press to see that this vie < is recognized.
10.0 Fuel Debris Coolin; Studies Drs. R. Coates and R. Lipinski, Sandia Laboratory, discussed fuel debris cooling studies and noted many uncertainties with regard to melt motion, crust forma-tion and interactions (Attachments 20 thru 21).
It appears that many of the questions will never be answered due to the infinite number of ways a fuel melt can progress from start to finish and the many configurations the debris bed can form.
It is the opinion of R. Lipinski that debris bed particles of22 mm diameter can probably be cooled, but if a steam explosion were to fragment the particles to 0.2 mm or smaller the debris bed probably is not coolable.
11.0 Steam Explosion Studies and Conclusions Drs. W. Bohl, Lt.5L, and M. Corradini, Sandia, discussed steam explosion phenomena (Attachment 25 - 34). The LASL analysis of steam explosions for Z/IP indicates that lower reactor vessel head failure is likely to occur prior to upper head failure, decreasing the likelihood of energetic missile generation in the upward direction. Sandia concludes that with regard to 2/IP steam explosions, it is unlikely that large missiles will be generated. Analyses of five different loading conditions on the vessel head suggest that local failure of the head will occur rather than a circumferential rip. With regard to small mass contcol rod missiles, the Z/IP containments are protected by a concrete missile shiela.
Class 9 Accidents May 9, 1953 Mr. Corradini provided the followinc conclusions with regard to the steam explosion state-of-technology:
1.
Thermal to mechanical energy conversior, for large scale steam explosions is probably about 2%, conservatively bounded by 15%.
2.
The fractior, of a mciten core which can participate in a steam explosion is protatly about 20-50%, conservatively bounded by 100%.
3.
Esti ates of the probability of large mass missile generation are corpletely non-rechanistic.
Although deemed unlikely, additional aralysis ar.d experimentation would be pruder.t.
4 Altho gn srall mass missiles Car, be generated, their damage potential see s to be snall.
Prudence, again, would require additional research.
5.
Containment failure d;e to stean explosion shock waves is unlikely.
6.
Stea overpressurization is more likely to result from efficient boilin; rather than from inefficient steam explosions.
12.0 Research Bud:et Related Ite~s Dr. C. Kelber discussed the logic that has led RES to the proposed Class 9 accident research progra.
He noted that they are proceeding with the assump-tion that after some degree of core damage the core can no longer be cooled, and melts. Kelber noted that budgetary pressures require the LMFBR and LWR safety research technology be transferred as much as possible. RES is awaiting Congres-sional guidance on LMFSR safety research progran funding.
13.0 Executive Session D**D D ~3'l f i %A d3 a
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Class.9 Accidents
-8 May 9, 1950
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The meeting was adjourned at 6:30 pm on May 9, 1950.
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For additional details, a complete transcript of the meeting is available in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20555, or from Alderson Reporting Company, Inc. 300 7th St.
S. W., Washington, D. C.
20024.
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Ct~td DeglaterTT5 UCL"EDFT Nwceur.wpenmar_----_-.-
e recommended in R,%50, the Safety nonemergency oper:tions wiU be l
recommrdation R-%44 will be bild in Boird n:tes BARTs efforts to provide directed through that channel.
notzfi(ation procedcres, With refeisnce is recommendation R-tha most acc2ptable qualities of Erme.
The Boa d believes that the retardation / toxicity in seat materials 79 j8, BART states that training in the i
open stata use of the 4-hour, closed circuit i
instructionc to the Power / Supply and improved critical underside floor breathing devices for BART Pohce has Controller tc, notify both San Francisco areas. and asked to be advised of the begun and win continue until all and Oakland Are Departments in the results of the tests and the anticipated response personnel are trained The i
event of a smoke / fire report address completion date of both programs.
retrainingin the use of the 30 minute recommendation R-7N5, and. pendmg With respect to recommendation R-masks for the Emergency Vehicle a test of the notification procedures. R-
%51, conceming vehicle floor fire Operators has been completed.
7M5 ta classified,'Open-Acceptable resistance' the Board believes that Concerning R-%50, BART states that Action." Recommendation R-7H6 is BARTa p!ans to lessen the probabihty the District will advise the Safety Board similarly classified, pending a review of of electrical fires and to upgrade the fire upon completion of liner testing now in the control effectiveness of the gg Progress; documentation on the prog-ess instructions to the BART Police Services
,8 '\\n aky red Ere of the seat replacement program to date
,t and the establishment of a Fire hazards. When BARTs review and was completed on March 10. He Board Department Incident Commander, the evaluation have been completed, the willbe advised upon completion (f the recommendation is directed to the d aS pp se results f the tests on floor componer.:s dreignation of a coordmator of rescue d
t e for n w in progress,in response to afforts.
the retrofitting program. Also, the Board recommendation R-%51. With With respect to recommendation R-is interested in learning of the results of reference to R-%52, the design redew
%47, which concemed fire the current review of BARTs uncoupims of the uncoupling modification is dipartments' radio usage. the Safety modification, recommended in R-%5..
complete and minor revisions to the Board believes that a fire department The Board asked to be advised of the analysis are in progress, BART reports.
should have an exclusive emergency particulars of the testmg programs and Analysis and final design information communication system, using portable the fmal design when the evaluations will be supplied to the Board when radios or fixed telephones. Preferably, are completed.
completed.
the system would utilize radios. since a BARTs response of March 13 states wawn f the SaW %eds wired telephone facility could become that while they have had the good
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inoperative due to a fire or other fortune to not have another opportunity results of the radio testing program as to test the procedures with a serious
"[,"r *[rg7All tecident damage.Pending receipt of the uests io cop e u tbe wel as BARTs final decision regarding train fire requiring evacuetion between in writms. identified by recommendation cmergency commu destions.
stations. BART has conducted numerous number. Address requests to: Public Inquiries recommendation L7H7 will be dnlls and has had fire department Section. National Transportation Safety Board. Wa shmgion. D C. 2o594.
clrssified "Oper-Acceptable Action."
responses to one serious tr in fire at In commenting on recommendation R-Oakland West (December r 1979) and (se U.S C.'too3(a)(21.1906)
%48 regardir.g the trainmg of numerous smoking brake incidents.
Margaret I. Haber, cmployees fe,r tunnel rescue operat,ons.
BART provided a list of the drills, and rederdRepsurLeso@er.
i the February 121etter from the Safety actualincidents show that the April 2L 1980.
,Boaro stated the emergency plans for procedures referenced R-79 c. R-79-43.
((b the Transbay Tube and the Berkeley R-79-44. R-79-45, and R-n *, are Hills Turnel *equire prompt action on proven, accepted. and rot.
.fy the part of BART Police Service operational practices.
in commenting n R-P 5 and R-%
NUCt. EAR MGULATORY Opera o Train i t e se f 4-hour, 49.BART states that the nond tram COMMISC ON closed-circuit breathing devices will radio frequency (R-79-49) matellation is Advisory ommittee on Reactor substantiauy increase the margin f to be accomplished in two parts.The Safeguart s, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on safety for these employees. Pendmg first part will provide for use of the Clasa 9 A cidents; Meeting assigned second frequency as an adm,inistrative channelin a limited The ACI S Ad Hoc Subcommittee on reco nd i n R-7 e
clas.ified as "Open-Acceptable Portion of the system by July 1980.The Class 9 Act dents will hold a meeting on Action. -
second part will accomphsh installation May 9.1980 it the Sheraton O' Hare Pending receipt of additional systemwide.The second phase is part of Motor Hotel,9810 N. Mannheim Road.
information, as noted below, the Safety a pending UhrrA Grant application, and Chicago II.ei. t18. Notice of this Board's February 12 letter indicated that installation will be completed 2 years meeting. Origin lly scheduled to be held the remaining recommendations. R after receipt of funding BART states May 6 in Washi gton. DC, was 49 through R-79-52, would also be that this project also includes the " white published March 'Q,1980 classified as "Open-Acceptable band" which will provide all Fire in accordance with the procedures Action." With reference to R-79-49, Departments with enderground radio outlined in the Federal Register on concerning a dedicated radio frequency communications [R-79-47).The second October 1,1979. (44 FR 56408), oral or for emergency communications, the (new) channel will be used as an written statements fnay be presented by Board asked to be advised of further administrative channel except during an members of the public, recordings will well as the completion date of modifying emergency. In an emergency situation, be permitted only during those portions details of the retrofitting program, ab the train radio equipment and whether the primary frequency will become the of the meeting when a transcript is being the second frequency will be dedicated dedicated emergency frequency.The kept, and questions may be ajked only to emerSency use. Concerning fire administrative radio will be declared thp by members of the Subcommittee. Its resistance of plastic componenta primary train control frequency and gli consultants, a,nd Staff. Pe neyesiring x
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M 4 M W M E @2rW @Ii M % M gg%3E %Tsijigg M M & g M E 6
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,m-27BM Fed;ral Register / V:1. 45. No. 81/ Thursday. April 24. 1980 / Notic:s
't3 make oral statements should notify a.m. and 510 p.m.. EST or EDT. as Ucencee states that it will test Unit lif the Designated Federal Employee as far applicable.
the results of the tests on Units Nos. 2 i
and 3 indicate that a test of Unit 11s a
in edvcnce as practicable so that Deted: April 21.19e0.
needed. De April 14 letter provided a i
cppropriate arrangements can be made John C. Hoyle.
listing of the nor -nuclear operatirg 13 cllow the necessary time during the gggg yg g mzeting for such ststements.
parameters needed by the plant P' D" "" * " " "!
operators in order to place the plant in a I
The egenda for subject meeting shall be as follows:
safe hot shutdown condition in I
" C" " "
accordance with the commitment in Frida) May 9.1980
[ Dockets Nos. 50-269, W270, and 50-287)
Action 1. The April 14 letter also 1
a30 a.m. Until the Conclusion of provided the specificlist of tests which 4
- Busines, Duke Power Co. (Oconee Nuclear constitute a the commitment in Action 2.
t Station, Unita Noa.1,2, and 3);
I have concluded that timely
. Coni cmatory Order implementation of these three short tertn i
Ex e t ve S n.
an ofi actions. at operating B&W system 1
consultante who may be p esen.t. to I
nuclear power plants is necessary to t
explore and exchange their prt iminary The Duke Power Company (the
[revide continued assurance of public (puuons regardmg matters which should ucensee)is the holder of Facility ealth and safety.
be considered dunng the meeting.
Operating Ucense Nos. DpR-38. DPR-47 At the conclusion of the Executive and DpR-55 which authorize the IU 3
Session, the Subcommittee will hear Ucansee to operate the Oconee Nuclear In view of the importance of this presentations by and hold discussions Station. Units Nos. t. 2 and 3 (the matter I have determined that these with representatives of the NRC Staff, facilities) at power levels r.ot in excess commitments be formalized by order their consultants. and other interested of 2.568 megswatts thermal for each and ths.t the public health, safety and I
persons regardmg the following topics:
unit.%e facilities are pressurtzed water interest require that this Order be made (1) Consideration of low probability, reactors located at the Ucensee's site in immediately effective. Accordingly.
high consequence accidents (including Oconee County, South Carolina.
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of g
care melt) as part of the licensing 1954. as amended, and the Commission's g
Process-regulations in to CFR Parts 2 and 50. It is (2) %e Integrated Fuel Melt Research Following the incident of February 28, hereby ordered, effective immediately.
Program.
1980 at the Crystal River Unit No. 3 that:
(3) Review of pertinent portions of the Nuclear Generating Plant, the NRC staff (1) ne Ucensee shallimplement at NRC budget and research program for held meetings with the Ucensee, other Oconee Nuclear Station. Units Nos.1. 2 tha ACRS annual reports to NRC and operating licensees with Babcock and and 3 all the three actions provided in Congress.
Wilcox (B&W) reactor systems, and Part II of this Order except the testing of The ACRS la required by Section 5 of B&W.The meetings were held in Unit No.1.
the 1978 NRC Authorization Act to Bethesda. Maryland on March 4.17 and (2) %e Ucensee shall perform a review the NRC research program and 18.1980.nese meeting resulted in the verification test en Unit No.1if the budget and to report the results of the development of three actions.
results of the tests on Units Nos. 2 and 3 review to Congress. In order to perform
- 1. Actions which will allow the do not confutn the effects of various this review, the ACRS must be able to operator to cope with various combinations of loss of instrumentation engrga in frank discussions with combinations of loss of instrumentation and control functions as determined by members of the NRC Staff and such and con *rol functions.%is includes the design review analysis on Units Nos.
discussions would not be possible if changes in (A) equipment and control 2 and 3.
b:Id in public sessions. In addition. It systems to give clear indications of (3) The Ucensee shall complete the m:y be necessary for the Subcommittee functions which are lost or unreliable; above requirements within 90 days after 13 hold one or more clond sessions for (B) procedures and training to assure the date of this Order or in the the purpose of exploring matters positive and safe manual response by alternative, place and maintain each involving proprietary information. I have the operator in the event that competent facility for which this Order is not determined. therefore, in accordance instruments are unavailable.
completed in a cold shutdown or with Subsection 10(d) of the Federal
- 2. Determination of the affects of refueling mode of operation.
Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L 92-various combinations ofloss of g
463), that should such sessions be instrumentation and control functions required. it is necessary to close by design review analysis and Any person who has an interest portions of this meeting to prevent verification by test.
affected by this Order may request a frustration of the above stated aspect of
- 3. Correction of electrical deficiencies hearing within twenty Sve days of the the ACRS's statutory responsiblities and which may allow the power operated date of the Order. Any request for a 13 protect proprietary information. See 5 relief valve and pressurizer spray valva hearing will not stay the effectiveness of U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B) and 552b(c)(4).
to open on non-nuclear instrumentation this Order. Any request for hearing shall Further information regarding topics power failures such as, the event which be submitted to the Director, Office of ta be discussed. whether the meeting occurred at Crystal River. Unit 3 on Nuclear Reactor Regulation. U.S.
has bien cancelled or rescheduled, the February 28,1980.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ch:irman's ruling on requests for the
%e Ucensee stated byletters dated Washington. D.C. 20555, with a copy to epportunity to present oral stater ents March 24 and 28. and April 14.1980, that the Executive Legal Director at the and the time allotted therefor en be it has already implemented some and above address. If a beanng is requested cbt ined by a prepaid telephone r.all to has confirmed that except for the testing by a person who has an interest affected the cognizant Designated Federal of Unit 1 as specified in Action 2 above by this Order the Commission willissue Employee.Mr. Cary Quittschreiber it would implement the remainder of the an Order designating the time and place (telephone 202/634-3267) between 8:15 three actions at the facilities.The of any such hearing.
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PRESENTATION SCHEDULE Class 9 Accidents Subcomittee Meeting SHERATON O' HARE MOTOR HOTEL 6810 N. Manheim Rd Chicago, Il May 9, 1990 PRESENT ATION APPROX TIME _
ORGANIZATION TIME MEETINS WITH THE NRC ST AFF SPEAKER 8:30 am AfD THEIR CON 5'JLTANTS Executive Session (0 pen Session) 8:55 am 1.0 SubcoritteeChairman'sdpening 2.0 Rerarks (0 pen Session)
Techrical Presentations 9:00 am 3.0 (Oper. Sessior-)
25 min NRC/NRR Zion / Indian Point 2 & 3 T. Spies, J Meyer 3.1 Class 9 Accident Prograc Overview of Progra-o Conclusiens/croblers o
Highlights f ror ay 7th o
anc Ett "eetings Controlling Accident Sequences o
Future Actions with Regard o
to Accident Mitigations 10 min 9:40 am HRC/050 Status and Direction of M. Madieros Advanced Notice of Rulemaking 3.2 for Degraded Core Cooling 20 min 10:15 am NRC/RSR Status of Class 9 Technology C. Kelber 3.3 with Regard to Zion / Indian Point 2 & 3 Study 10:40 am C0FFEE BREAK 20 min 10:50 am N'tC/RSR Future Class 9 Accident C. Kelber 3.4 Research Needed 40 min 11:20 am NRC/R$R Overview of Integrated Core R. Silberberg 3.5 Melt Program 12:20 - 1:20 pm LUNCH 20 min 1:20 pm NRC/RSR Class 9 Accident Analysis R. Curtis 3.6 (Code Work) 30 min 1:50 pm Sandia Fuel Debris Cooling Studies 3.7 h
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3.C-Steam. Explosion Studies and Sandia/LASL 30 min 2:35 pm Conclusions 3:20 pm
'C0FFEE BREAK 3.9 Items Related to Research NRC/RSR 40 min 3:30 pm Budget for Class 9 Accidents C. Kelber o Overall Strategy and Direction of Class 9 Accident Related Research Program o Handling of Research Budget Line Items f or Class,9 Accident Related Itemt o Re>ponse to ACRS Reconnendations in Annual Report Concerning Class 9 Accidents 4.0 Class 9 Accident Research Budget NRC/RSR 10 min 4:25 pm (Closed. Session)
C. Kelber 4:45 pm 5.0 Executive Session (0 pen Session)
Discussion o Information Needs for the Prepara-tion of Class 9 Accident Section of the ACRS Annual Report 4
o Need for Future Meetings and Items Discussion to be Discussed Discussion Assignments for Subgroups to Class 9 o
Accident Subcommittee (if any)
Discussion o Conclusions and Remarks 5:15 pm ADJ0URNMENT NOTES:
(1) Time will be allowed for receiving ora! statements from members of the public.
(2) The speakers should limit their presentations to the. time allowed.
An allowance, amounting to 50% - 100% of the presentation tine, has been made for questioning by the Subcommittee.
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April 23,1980 PROJECT STATUS REPORT ACRS SUBCCMMITTEE ON CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS MEETIN3 ON MAY 9,1980 PURPOSE A'O COM!iENTS The Class 9 Accidents Subcomm;ttee will mee. to begin work on the following specific tasks which have been assigned to ttis Suocommittee for performance:
' Determine if low probability accidents with consequences greater than the DBA should be taken into account in the licensing precess;
' Consider processes leading from hot fuel to melt-through to de-termine if core cooling can be accomplished inside the reactor PV or the containment; consider nature and characteristics of related events such as core coolant interactions (e.g., steam explosions);
core containment interactions (e.g., reaction with concrete, heating of structural elements, etc.); consider impact on containment design including need for and design chracteristics of a tore catcher; need for and characteristics of filtered vents and/or other provisions to handle large quantities of gasses which may be generated as the re-salt of a core melt;
' Provide guidance to the FNP, Zion and Indian Point project Subcom-mittees in considering and designing these features for these specific projects.
' Prepare appropriate section of ACRS Annual Report on the RSR Progrem.
The Class 9 Accident Subcommittee has a Subgroup, Molten Core Retention Device, which will report to the Subcommittee on characteristics and design of molten core retention devices including the proposed core ladle for the FNP, Zion, and Indian Point Nuclear plants.
The Subcommittee may set up addition Subgr?ups to perform specific tasks as the need arises.
ATTENDEES LIST NAME AFFILIATION NRC/NRR JIM MEYER NRC/RES Mel SILBERBERG NRC/RES CHARLES KELBER NRC/NRR JOHN OLSHINSKI NRC/RES RAYMOND DISALv0 R&D ASSOCIATES SAMUEL M. Zivi l
WALTER C. LIPINSKI ANL P. B. HAGA H (OPS)
JOHN E. HANSON EG&G IDAHO, INC.
NRC CONSULTANT D. G. SWANSON SUZANNE R. PHELPS EDISON ELECTRIs ANSTITUTE M. S. MEDEIROS, JR.
NRC/0SD COMMONWEALTH EDISON W. F. NAUGHTON LOREN IHOMPSON EPRI KEVIN W. HOLTZCLAW GE SAFETY & LICENSING R0hALD J. LIPINSKI SANDIA NATIONAL LABS SANDIA NAT'L LABS' FFED HARPER GARY J. BOYD SANDIA R. L. COATS SANDIA SANDIA JOE RIVARD DAVID G. RENFR0 TVA SANDIA MIKE CORRADINI SANDIA DANA A. POWERS SANDIA ALLAN S. BENJAMIN WESTINGHOUSE DON PADDLEFORD NRC/RES/FBRB RICK SHERRY NSAC/EPRI M.C. LEVERETT JOANNE DUNN MCGRAW-HILL NSAC/EPRI LEE ANDERSON GARRY R. THOMAS EPRI/NSAC ANL/ILL10NIS COM ON ATOMIC ENERGY JAN B. BAN ERP LUCIAN A. WOOTEN UNIV 0F MICHIGAN
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ATTENDEES LIST (CONT'D)
UNIV 0F MICHIGAN KENNETH W.-NORRIS ROGER W. HUSTON CONS'UMERS POWER CO W. R. B0HL LASL VAUGHN L. CONRAD PUBLIC SERVICE CO OF OKLAHOMA W. KERR, CHAIRMAN P. SHEWMON, ACRS MEMBER
-J. LEE, ACRS CONSULTANT I. CATTON, ACRS CONSULTANT R. SEALE, ACRS CONSULTAt1T G. QUITTSCHREIBER, ACRS STAFF
- DESIGNATED FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 1
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ATTACH"ET.TS 1 - 34
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DELET!8ii-6
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ATTACHMENT D